As the blockchain and decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystems continue to expand and mature, rug pull scams involving meme coins are occurring with increasing frequency, posing a threat to the security of investors' assets and the healthy development of the industry. Rug Pull scams are characterized by extremely low deployment costs, covert execution, rapid fund transfers, and high detection difficulty. Traditional manual reviews or fixed rules struggle to meet real-time early warning requirements, and existing detection methods generally suffer from issues such as a single feature dimension, inadequate handling of class imbalance, and weak model generalization and interpretability. To address these shortcomings, this paper focuses on the detection of Ethereum-based rug pull scams. First, we clarify their definitions, types, and harm mechanisms, and construct a multi-dimensional feature system based on dimensions such as malicious smart contract design, on-chain transaction anomalies, liquidity manipulation, and social media disclosures. Next, using the "Second Uncle Coin"(token symbol: BOBU) case as an example, we reconstruct the attack process and derive quantitative detection metrics. Subsequently, a risk detection model based on a Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) is designed. We employ a combined strategy of SMOTE oversampling and Focal Loss to address the issue of sample imbalance, dynamically search for optimal thresholds to balance precision and recall, and incorporate gradient pruning and early stopping to enhance training stability. Experiments show that the model achieves an accuracy of 0.927, an F1 score of 0.787, and an AUC-ROC of 0.952 on the test set, outperforming traditional methods. Finally, a visualizable web-based detection system is developed using the Flask framework, enabling batch risk assessment, high-risk ranking display, and result export functions.
Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are a fundamental building block in cryptography, enabling powerful privacy-preserving and verifiable computations. In the post-quantum era, hash-based ZKPs have emerged as a promising direction due to their conjectured resistance to quantum attacks, along with their simplicity and efficiency. In this work, we introduce SmallWood, a hash-based polynomial commitment scheme (PCS) and zero-knowledge argument system optimized for relatively small instances. Building on the recent degree-enforcing commitment scheme (DECS) from the Threshold-Computation-in-the-Head (TCitH) framework, we refine its formalization and combine it with techniques from Brakedown. This results in a new hash-based PCS that is particularly efficient for polynomials of relatively small degree âtypically up to <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mrow> <mml:msup> <mml:mn>2</mml:mn> <mml:mrow> <mml:mn>16</mml:mn> </mml:mrow> </mml:msup> </mml:mrow> </mml:math> â outperforming existing approaches in this range. Leveraging this new PCS, we design a hash-based zero-knowledge argument system that outperforms the state-of-the-art in terms of proof sizes for witness sizes ranging from <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mrow> <mml:msup> <mml:mn>2</mml:mn> <mml:mn>6</mml:mn> </mml:msup> </mml:mrow> </mml:math> to <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mrow> <mml:msup> <mml:mn>2</mml:mn> <mml:mrow> <mml:mn>16</mml:mn> </mml:mrow> </mml:msup> </mml:mrow> </mml:math> . Additionally, we present exact zero-knowledge arguments for lattice-based problems using SmallWood, demonstrating highly competitive performance: our scheme yields proof sizes under 25 KB across a wide range of lattice parameters, including Kyber and Dilithium instances.
Ryan Anthony, Jechenthia Maria Taso, Stephen Yohanes Christopher, Ridhwan Ardiyansyah
This study aims to analyze and compare the performance of three algorithms, namely Support Vector Regression (SVR) with a linear kernel, XGBoost, and LightGBM, in predicting the Price of Ethereum cryptocurrency based on daily historical data. The study uses Ethereum Price data in USD for the last five years obtained from the investing.com website. The variables used are Close, Open, High, and Low Prices. The study uses two data splitting scenarios: 80% training data and 20% testing data, and 70% training data and 30% testing data. This study also uses time step variations to test the effect of time dependency on algorithm performance. The results indicate that the LightGBM algorithm has the best performance compared to the other two algorithms with an average MAE value for High Price of 75.486, SVR has a value of 115.590, and XGBoost has a value of 77.314 in the 80% training data and 20% testing data split. In the 70% training data and 30% testing data split, the LightGBM algorithm still excels with an average MAE value for High Price of 78.228, SVR of 104.356, and XGBoost of 83.573. Other evaluations such as RMSE and R2 also show the superiority of the LightGBM algorithm. For the required computation time, the SVR algorithm outperforms the other two algorithms.
Active asset managers increasingly include cryptocurrencies in their alternative asset allocations, highlighting their speculative and volatile nature. The aim of this research is to examine trends in the returns and volatility of cryptocurrencies, whilst accounting for the depegging of stablecoins, driven by speculative trading during macroeconomic shocks and technological shifts. We build a sample of market capitalisation, using data from the daily closing prices of Bitcoin (BTC), Ethereum (ETH), Binance (BNB), and Ripple (XRP), two fiat-backed stablecoins (USDT and USDC), and a cryptocurrency-collateralised stablecoin (DAI). As a first step, a Granger-causality framework is applied to examine the influence of stablecoin depegging events on crypto returns during financial market stress. The results are strongly asymmetric: there is little evidence that depegs predict returns; whereas cryptocurrency returns robustly Granger-cause USDC depegging events, an effect that intensifies during periods of market stress. Stablecoin depegs appear to be a downstream symptom of cryptocurrency stress rather than a leading indicator of it. The analysis was extended by modelling volatility, using an EGARCH-X model to study whether depegs also affect crypto during periods of market stress and if larger deviations from the dollar peg are associated with higher cryptocurrency volatility, concentrated in the most liquid stablecoins (USDT and USDC), while the evidence for any change in this association during stress is limited. The findings carry implications for risk monitoring in digital-asset markets, where stablecoin behaviour reflects, rather than anticipates, cryptocurrency market conditions.
A decentralized system faces a fundamental governance tension: its governancerules are themselves amendable, which means that the metaârules stipulating howrules are modified are also at risk of being revised. Starting from the paradox ofselfâamendment uncovered by legal philosopher Peter Suber, this paper argues thatthis logical dilemma is not a purely philosophical speculation but a structural difficulty that repeatedly arises in the practice of blockchain constitutionalism. Underthe tenet thatâcode is law,âcodeâbased rules bear the metaâgovernance functionsthat in a constitutional structure ought to be carried by constitutional provisions,yet code logically cannot set an insurmountable boundary for its own amendmentauthority. In response, this paper proposes a layered metaâconstraint security architecture: metaâconstraints are divided into an unmodifiable layer of logical constants, a layer of cognitive virtues formulated through community constitutionalprocedures, and a layer of value homeostasis adjusted through public deliberationand evolution; the trustworthiness of metaâconstraints is anchored in the logicalphysical isolation provided by trusted hardware roots. Through the institutionalization of procedures for identifying and attributing metaâconstraints, this paperdemonstrates how forkâexitâbased social verification, cognitionâtesting through independent auditing, and physical anchoring through multiâkey witness mechanismstogether constitute a mutually independent multiâlayered defense system. By examining the 21âmillionâcoin supply cap of Bitcoin, the Ethereum EIP governanceprocess, and the constitutional crisis of The DAO incident as case studies, thispaper reveals the partial instantiation patterns of the threeâtier metaâconstraintarchitecture in existing systems and their failure boundaries. The paper concludesthat the longâterm security of a decentralized system ultimately depends not on theByzantineâfaultâtolerance strength of its consensus algorithm, but on the completeness of its metaâconstraint architectureâthat is, the existence of a set of boundariesthat are hierarchically protected in procedure, isolated and verified in hardware,and socially anchored in consensus, such that the combined cost of breaching themis raised to a level that no actor can afford within the expected life cycle of thesystem.
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) consensus is a foundational achievement indistributed systems theory, providing dual guarantees of safety and liveness forasynchronous networks with malicious nodes. However, this theoretical frameworkimplicitly relies on a presupposition that has not been sufficiently examined: allhonest nodes are homogeneous in their cognition of the protocolâsobjectives. Whena decentralized system evolves from a closed task-oriented network into an opengovernance ecosystem, the functional differentiation of nodes in storage strategies,verification preferences, and governance commitments deprives this presuppositionof descriptive validity. This paper does not deny the security contributions of BFT,but argues that security alone is insufficient to constitute a complete consensus.The full logic of consensus requires a complementary dimension: the capacity toaccommodate functional differentiation. Integrating recent empirical classificationstudies of blockchain nodes, protocol architecture design experiences that acknowledge functional differentiation, and Ostromâs polycentric governance theory, thispaper proposesâCognitive Niche Equilibriumâ(CNE) as an extension of the consensus concept. System stability does not require all nodes to be isomorphic inevery function; rather, it requires the simultaneous satisfaction of three stabilityconditions: feedback anchoring, cross-validation, and evolutionary stability. Using Bitcoin and Ethereum as comparative cases, this paper translates these threeconditions into a layered implementation architecture symbiotic with existing BFTprotocol stacks, and discusses the security engineering principles and trade-offsunder this framework.
Version control systems (VCS), including central VCS (CVCS) and distributed VCS (DVCS), are widely adopted to manage changes to software code and various types of documents. Unlike CVCS, where entities obtain data from a central server, each entity in DVCS stores the entire repository and shares it independently. In VCS, existing access control schemes require the participation of a central server and cannot be deployed in a completely distributed scenario. Additionally, these schemes often fail to enforce fine-grained access control for write permissions, which is crucial for collaborative work in a distributed environment. In this paper, we propose a distributed version control system access control scheme (named DVAC), which enforces cryptographic access control on distributed user nodes based on attribute-based encryption (ABE) and attribute-based signature (ABS). DVAC is designed to enforce a cryptographic access control protocol for DVCS, which enables file granularity read and write separation access control without the support of a central server. To ensure the integrity of the core version control functions in DVCS while protecting data security, DVAC incorporates a version control adaptation protocol. Additionally, DVAC leverages Ethereum smart contracts to maintain access control policies, ensuring distributed storage and trusted management of access policies. The architecture of DVAC is designed to seamlessly integrate with existing mature DVCS, such as Git, with minimal modifications. We have implemented a prototype of DVAC and integrated it with Git. A comprehensive performance evaluation was conducted to assess the overhead introduced by DVAC, and it was demonstrated that the overhead is modest.
This study examines the short-run effects of U.S. monetary policy shocks on cryptocurrency returns and asks whether digital assets respond to conventional macroeconomic transmission mechanisms. Focusing on the post-2020 period, it evaluates the magnitude, direction, and persistence of Federal Reserve rate shocks across Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, Ripple, and TRON. The analysis applies an SVAR-X framework to daily data for January 2020-December 2025. Cryptocurrency log returns are treated as endogenous variables, while the U.S. Dollar Index and VIX are included as exogenous controls; federal funds rate changes are modelled as strictly exogenous policy shocks. Impulse-response results show positive and significant contemporaneous responses for Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, and TRON, but no significant reaction for XRP. These effects dissipate within days, indicating modest, short-lived, and heterogeneous monetary-policy transmission rather than persistent effects on cryptocurrency return dynamics over time.
The inherent challenge of balancing scalability, security, and decentralization â commonly termed the blockchain trilemma â continues to hinder the adoption of distributed systems. This paper presents InternxtChain, a decentralized storage framework designed to address this trilemma through a novel integration of erasure-coded sharding, zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (zk-SNARKs), and a sharded Proof-of-Storage consensus mechanism. By leveraging aggregated BLS-381 signatures and distributed redundancy protocols, the framework achieves a throughput of 2,800 transactions per second with a latency of 420 milliseconds across 1,024 nodes, surpassing Filecoin by a factor of 3.5 and Ethereumâs capacity by 165 times. The system maintains 99.9% data integrity even under adversarial conditions involving 30% Byzantine nodes. Additionally, InternxtChain reduces storage costs to $0.002 per gigabyte, representing an 85% reduction compared to centralized alternatives like AWS S3. Empirical evaluations demonstrate linear scalability to 4,200 transactions per second with 2,048 nodes, alongside hardware affordability at $180 per node. These advancements not only outperform decentralized platforms in throughput by 2.8 times but also ensure GDPR-compliant data sovereignty, positioning InternxtChain as a pioneering solution for Web3 ecosystems seeking to harmonize enterprise-grade performance with decentralized trustlessness.
Cryptocurrency users have increasingly become targets of phishing and scam attacks. To mitigate these threats, leading crypto wallets (e.g., MetaMask) have introduced transaction simulation, which previews a transaction's balance changes before on-chain execution. While effective against traditional fund-draining attacks, we show that this defense can itself be exploited by a new phishing technique, which we term transaction simulation phishing. This attack uses carefully crafted smart contracts whose execution depends on dynamic blockchain state, causing simulations to display benign or profitable outcomes while the actual on-chain execution redirects users' funds to attacker-controlled addresses. We present the first comprehensive study of transaction simulation phishing. We first develop a taxonomy of phishing contracts that can be utilized to facilitate this attack. Then, we propose SIMGUARD, a bytecode-level detection system that combines static and dynamic program analysis to identify phishing contracts. Applying SIMGUARD to Ethereum, Binance Smart Chain, Avalanche, and Polygon, we detect over 4,000 phishing contracts deployed between August 2024 and June 2025. Our analysis identifies more than 5,700 victims and approximately $3.48 million USD in losses, 91.5% of which occurred on Ethereum. Moreover, our clustering result reveals that the largest phishing contract cluster alone accounts for about 83% of the total losses. These results expose a critical weakness in current wallet defenses and highlight the urgent need for more robust transaction simulation mechanisms.
To managing identities in a secure and decentralized manner, new opportunities have emerged because of recent breakthroughs in blockchain technology and biometric authentication. Blockchain is different from traditional biometric systems in that it is an unchangeable, distributed ledger that runs safe, decentralized code. Traditional biometric systems store data in one location and canât be updated. Traditional biometric systems have some flaws, including template tampering, channel interception, and comparator overrides. So, the proposed work presents a Distributed Multimodal Biometric Security System with Blockchain to handle such issues. This system uses 3D face and 3D ear biometrics with blockchain technology, which comprises IPFS, smart contracts, and decentralized applications. Features from 3D face and 3D ear are embedded into a single multimodal template, which then undergoes encryption and storage on IPFS via content-addressed storage. The Content Identifier (CID) and data are then archived by smart contracts on the blockchain to maintain data integrity, security, verifiability, and immutability. In this way, a person can prove his identity without using any central services, further improving privacy. Blockchain consensus and the smart-contract-based access control mechanism further provide security, audibility, and simplicity to P2P transactions in biometric enrolment testing results show that feature extraction takes from 120 ms to 300 ms, uploading to IPFS takes between 200 and 600 ms, and completing blockchain transactions on local private network takes from 0.5 to 1 s, using 117,519 gas per enrolment. Additional analysis on the Ethereum Sepolia test network reveals that transaction fees change depending on network conditions, but gas consumption stays deterministic. The suggested solution is resistant to typical attacks like replay, interception, and template alteration; it is also irreversible, revocable, and unlinkable, according to security analysis conducted under a formal adversarial model.
Blockchain is becoming an approachable data platform with several stakeholders having a shared history of transactions without being owned by an individual. The fundamental concepts of cryptographic hashing, peer-to-peer communication, and agreement protocols are sufficiently documented, and a lot of current research focuses on performance, security, privacy, and governance individually rather than as interacting dimensions. Recent blockchain research publications and deployments were structured based on a four-axis perspective that follows the dynamics of a system in terms of security, scalability, privacy, and governance. This lens was applied to consent mechanisms including proof-of-work, proof-of-stake, and practical Byzantine fault tolerance, and to techniques such as sharding and layer-2 that are designed to enhance throughput. Basic throughput calculations using reported block sizes, transaction sizes, and block intervals indicate that configuration limits are usually much larger than the transaction rates achieved in practice, implying that protocol overheads and network behaviour require a major share of the budget. A survey of attacks and defences indicates that increases in speed and programmability often expand the attack surface at the consensus and smart contract layers, which motivates the development of better analysis and monitoring tools. The results are applied to draw design insights for domains of finance, supply chains, healthcare, identity, and smart city platforms, and to highlight remaining problems in benchmarking and cross-chain coordination. A practical mapping of major blockchain platforms, namely Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Hyperledger Fabric, onto the four-axis framework was also provided to demonstrate its utility for platform comparison and selection.
Counterfeit medicines, fragmented record management, limited end-to-end visibility, and dependence on centralized databases create security and traceability challenges in pharmaceutical supply chains. This article presents Pharma-Chain, a blockchain-enabled pharmaceutical supply chain management system developed to record medicine registration, stakeholder interactions, ownership transfer, and authenticity verification on an Ethereum blockchain. The system integrates a React.js frontend with Web3.js, MetaMask wallet authentication, Solidity smart contracts, Truffle deployment tools, and Ganache for local blockchain development and validation. Manufacturers register medicine batches with product and lifecycle information; distributors and retailers verify blockchain records before accepting and transferring ownership; and customers retrieve medicine details and transaction history before purchase. The implementation was tested module by module and as an integrated application in a local Ethereum environment. Testing confirmed successful authentication and role-based access, medicine registration, ownership transfer, transaction validation, blockchain record retrieval, and medicine verification. Each successful supply-chain operation generated a blockchain transaction record, providing an immutable ownership history and improving transparency and auditability. The project demonstrates a practical decentralized approach for secure pharmaceutical tracking while identifying QR-code verification, IoT monitoring, AI-assisted analytics, mobile access, and deployment on public or enterprise blockchain networks as future extensions.
Open access
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Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Pharmaceutical Quality and Counterfeiting
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
Sybil bots are Ethereum actors that imitate legitimate users to extract airdrop rewards or influence governance. Recent Sybil detection methods increasingly use deep learning and treat blockchain activity as a quasi-linguistic sequence. However, complex sequence models are computationally expensive for real-time monitoring, and their reported performance may be inflated by label leakage from high-signal smart contracts. We ask whether and how organic users, Sybil bots, and MEV bots differ in the structural complexity of their transaction histories; whether sequential models outperform tree-based tabular models once leakage is reduced; whether transaction order or timing provides the stronger behavioral signal; and whether the resulting models are practical for low-latency deployment. Our approach to leakage-aware Sybil bot detection consists of a Blind-Spot protocol and a Transaction Grammar representation of wallet behavior. The former eliminates shortcuts associated with high-signal contracts, whereas the latter models wallets using rhythm, EVM execution structure, and intent. We evaluate this approach on Ethereum actor classification by comparing Transformer and BiLSTM sequence models against XGBoost and SVM baselines. We contribute a framework for leakage-aware Ethereum actor classification and a Transaction Grammar representation of wallet behavior. Our results demonstrate that, under leakage-aware evaluation, XGBoost outperforms Transformer-based sequence models while providing lower latency and estimated energy use.
Empirical work on algorithmic collusion asks one question of the data: are prices supracompetitive? We show this can be answered "no" by a conspiracy that is nonetheless profitable. Consider bidding agents that couple only through the joint distribution of their unexplained bid components, leaving every agent's own bid law exactly at the competitive law. Any test whose input is a single agent's price or bid history then has power exactly equal to its false-positive rate, for every coupling strength up to comonotonicity. The published detection methodology is therefore blind to this conduct by construction rather than underpowered, and no sample size repairs it. Three empirical results follow. First, the mechanism appears in real language-model agents: twenty models from nineteen independent developers, three deployment prompts each, show residual correlation of $+0.053$ between two deployments of one model against $+0.0001$ across models, with a 95% interval clustered by developer of $[0.030, 0.078]$, under an auditor that sees every order feature and is fitted out of sample. Second, the coupling falls monotonically as sampling temperature rises ($p=0.002$), turning a deployment parameter into a candidate mitigation. Third, on 24 days of Ethereum block-building auction data covering 77,684 bids from 39 bidders, the honest population of bidder pairs is itself so dependent that a screen held at a 5% false-positive rate must sit above a floor of $+0.50$ to $+0.81$, which is 20 to 32 times the family-wise sampling threshold and does not fall as the audit window grows. Since lawful multi-identity operation and conspiracy are behaviourally indistinguishable here, the tractable regulatory target is not detection but counting: resolving 40 bidding identities into 23 operators raises the Herfindahl index by 247.5%, and adding behavioural clusters from public bid streams reaches 324.5%.
Smart contract vulnerability detection requires evaluation protocols that separate real representation signal from dataset-specific artifacts. DIVE provides lifecycle-based tabular features for Ethereum smart contracts, but benchmark performance alone cannot show whether a dominant feature group is useful or only benefits from having many columns. This study examines Opcode Distribution features using 22,330 contracts, 397 processed features, and eight DASP-aligned vulnerability labels. Five multi-label learning configurations were evaluated under 3 x 5 repeated cross-validation, followed by global feature-group ablation, size-controlled random opcode ablation, per-label degradation analysis, cumulative stability analysis, and opcode-profile group-aware robustness checking. MultiOutput LightGBM achieved the best baseline performance, with Micro-F1 of 0.91396, Macro-F1 of 0.82464, and Macro-PR-AUC of 0.90146. Removing the full Opcode Distribution group reduced Macro-F1 to 0.78745, while removing a same-sized random opcode subset produced Macro-F1 of 0.82404. The findings indicate that Opcode Distribution acts as a collective predictive representation rather than a feature-count artifact, without implying causal vulnerability mechanisms.
This study investigates two questions relating to cryptocurrency market dynamics. First, whether a composite skew measure derived from MicroStrategy (MSTR) trading activity can predict future Bitcoin (BTC) and Ethereum (ETH) volatility. Second, whether Ethereum volatility exhibits reproducible structural properties consistent with established theories of volatility persistence and cascading shock dynamics. Using rolling out-of-sample testing, autocorrelation-adjusted significance testing, regime classification, shock-decay modelling, return-interval analysis, and earthquake-inspired cascade frameworks, the study finds no evidence that MSTR composite skew provides a useful forecasting signal. More broadly, no forecasting model tested outperforms naive benchmark models beyond horizons of approximately three to five days. However, several descriptive properties of Ethereum volatility appear robust, including volatility persistence, regime structure, extreme-event clustering, non-simple shock decay, and partially transferable aftershock dynamics. In particular, while Omori-style decay and the productivity law are supported, Bath's Law fails consistently, suggesting cryptocurrency volatility cascades may differ fundamentally from those observed in traditional financial markets. The findings contribute to the understanding of volatility organisation in digital asset markets while highlighting the difficulty of extracting persistent predictive signals from historical OHLCV
Sybil attackers are Blockchain actors that adopt the characteristics of regular users to exploit airdrops or influence governance. Current methods of Sybil actor detection include constructing graphs, which requires token transfers between examined wallets. Machine learning algorithms have been employed as well, but they treat the task as a closed-set classification problem, making them vulnerable to frequent changes in attack strategies or evasion tactics. We address the following questions: can compression-based similarity differentiate Sybil bots, organic users, and arbitrage bot wallets without direct financial links? What is the effect of high-signal contracts on the discovery of Sybils, and how robust are behavioral graphs under temporal drift and adversarial perturbations? Our approach synthesizes a symbolic Transaction Grammar from EVM (Ethereum Virtual Machine) traces, capturing separately transaction rhythm, execution structure, and functional intent. The high-signal contracts are filtered with our own protocol, called the Blind-Spot Protocol. Gzip-based NCD is used to construct a behavioral graph for Sybil discovery. We validate this framework against supervised machine learning baselines, a temporal split, and synthetic camouflage stress tests. Ultimately, we contribute a leakage-aware behavioral framework for Sybil candidate discovery. Its core NCD primitive requires no supervised training and can expand suspicious seed wallets without explicit funding links. We position the method as a training-free local discovery primitive for open-world blockchain audits, rather than as a formal open-set recognition system.
Relating low-level executable code to a high-level account of its behavior has been a central concern of programming-language research for decades. From formally verified compilers to translation validators, certifying compilers, and proof-carrying code, each approach chooses between laborious but foundational mechanized proofs and automation that costs completeness, generality, and an increased trusted base. Recently, large language models (LLMs) have begun to change the economics of formal verification. Agentic proof development is now capable of producing machine-checked proofs at a scale and speed that were previously out of reach. In this paper, we evaluate the capabilities of LLMs to produce foundational, machine-checked proofs of refinement between executable code and its high-level specification, as post hoc, per-artifact certificates. We study this in the context of the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), a low-level virtual machine that executes smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain. We build EquiVM, a foundational framework in Lean comprising an executable EVM semantics and a specification language that characterizes the intended behavior of smart contracts, but commits to no source language or compilation toolchain. In EquiVM, refinement is stated for deployed bytecode of arbitrary provenance, interaction with unknown code is part of the semantics, and each proof is a replayable, machine-checked certificate. No previous technique achieves this combination. Using frontier commercial LLMs, twenty-three real-world contracts are proved end to end with minimal human guidance, among them most of the MakerDAO stablecoin system, at up to a hundred million tokens and a hundred hours of proof time per contract. We conclude that foundational mechanized proofs can now be bought at the price of tokens, and that this shift can reshape how verification frameworks are architected.
Every widely followed Bitcoin cycle indicator (Pi Cycle, MVRV, Mayer, Puell) called turns precisely for a decade, then degraded in one sequence: precise, then early, then silent. This is one structural phenomenon. Across the four halving epochs (2011-2026), the per-cycle maxima of five top-calling oscillators decline monotonically while minima end higher, so any threshold calibrated on past cycles must stop firing; short-horizon indicators decay toward zero and several invert sign; yet Bitcoin's time structure stays fixed, with mature-cycle tops 525/546/534 days after their halvings and bottoms 406/364/366 days after their tops. Turns are identified retrospectively by a fixed mechanical rule, not a real-time record. Timing-free nulls put the joint clustering at 5e-6 to 1e-3 across every variant. A harder empirical null (block-bootstrapped paths under the identical rule) never reproduces the top cluster under its deterministic construction (0 of 10,000); the bottom cluster is largely intrinsic to the drawdown process (31-43% of paths), so the evidence concentrates in top phase-alignment. In block height (the exact 210,000-block unit) the top null stays 0 of 10,000 and partial bottom structure emerges; shape and volatility overlays do not improve. A causal power law in time-since-genesis (exponent near 5.6) is the only signal whose sign is stable across mature epochs, replicates on a second source and Ethereum, and whose timing edge over buy-and-hold turns positive in the current cycle (one holdout, suggestive not decisive). We rest nothing on per-epoch significance: a rotation null shows HAC inference over-rejects here (size 0.33 at nominal 0.05; p=0.21). Macro drivers (M2, yield curve) show the same instability and lose a joint horse race. We pre-register falsifiable windows: a 2026 bottom (Oct 5-Nov 16) and a next top 525-546 days after the following halving.