Blockchain Papers

Herminio Bodon, Pedro Bustamante, Marcela Gomez, Prashabnt Krishnamurthy · 9 authors

No abstract is available for this record.

Usman W. Chohan

This chapter seeks to contextualize the nature of cryptocurrencies as an alternate form of capital that, while being inspired by cryptoanarchist thought, has come to embody extreme forms of inequality among its owners. The concentration of wealth produces a “whale effect” that, as the chapter argues, in fact reflects the forms of inequalities that are found in the ownership of traditional forms of capital. The chapter thus alludes to the mismatch between the professed cryptoanarchist philosophical bent of cryptocurrency owners and the reality of capital ownership in the cryptocurrency domain; while cryptoanarchism postulates autonomy, decentralization, and the spread of ownership, the whale effect suggests that cryptocurrencies are insufficiently different from traditional forms of capital in this regard. This challenges the degree to which the praxis of cryptocurrencies coheres with the philosophy of cryptoanarchism.

Brendan Markey‐Towler

Blockchain technology makes it more feasible for individuals to exit political-socioeconomic systems at the level of the system itself and elect to accede freely to institutional systems which formulate, promulgate, keep and verify institutions and public records without a centralised authority. This essay investigates the dynamic of such a society in which political-socioeconomic systems may be organised using blockchain technology. We propose a theory of society as an evolutionary system in which the unit of selection is the institutional system associated with a particular blockchain or the state and selection pressures are applied by individuals deciding to interact within them and have their interactions entered into the public record. We establish the conditions under which institutions will thus be selected by considering the limits to substitutability and discover that any institutional system must meet requirements and provide sufficient complementarities in order to be selected and retained by the evolutionary process.

Vitalik Buterin, Zoë Hitzig, E. Glen Weyl

We propose a design for philanthropic or publicly-funded seeding to allow (near) optimal provision of a decentralized, self-organizing ecosystem of public goods. The concept extends ideas from Quadratic Voting to a funding mechanism for endogenous community formation. Individuals make public goods contributions to projects of value to them. The amount received by the project is (proportional to) the square of the sum of the square roots of contributions received. Under the standard model this yields first best public goods provision. Variations can limit the cost, help protect against collusion and aid coordination. We discuss applications to campaign finance, open source software ecosystems, news media finance and urban public projects. More broadly, we offer a resolution to the classic liberal-communitarian debate in political philosophy by providing neutral and non-authoritarian rules that nonetheless support collective organization.

Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson, Jason Potts

No abstract is available for this record.

Bill Maurer

The agencies of money gain new currency as new privately owned systems for creating and transferring value occupy the imagination of industry players and regulators, as well as us everyday folk. Experts have predicted the end of cash and coin almost as soon as modern governments standardized their issue. But before there was coin, there were records of transactions warranting other transactions and literally inscribing (in clay, stone, papyrus) the distributed agencies of human interaction. Asking after the infrastructures facilitating that transfer leads to the role of accounting not as a record of monetary interaction, but as that interaction itself. It is precisely a question of the distribution of agency: who shall make entries into the great ledger of human transaction and exchange? As the ledger pluralizes, who controls the cross-referencing, the gateways between newly dispersed accounts?

Meixing Dai, Moïse Sidiropoulos

Le bitcoin attire de plus en plus l'attention des spéculateurs, des consommateurs et des sites marchands, et augmente rapidement en capitalisation. Les autorités de régulation sont plus que jamais préoccupées par la façon dont il doit être traité du point de vue économique. Est-il une monnaie, une chaîne de Ponzi ou un actif financier très spéculatif ? Selon les réponses données à cette question, les réactions des autorités seront très différentes.

Ayushi Bajaj, Tai-Wei Hu, Guillaume Rocheteau, Mario Rafael Silva

No abstract is available for this record.

Denis Dupré, Jean-François Ponsot, Jean‐Michel Servet

International audience

Ricardo Alonso, Wouter Dessein, Niko Matouschek

We examine the relationship between the organization of a multi-divisional firm and its ability to adapt production decisions to changes in the environment. We show that even if lower-level manag-ers have superior information about local conditions, and incentive conflicts are negligible, a centralized organization can be better at adapting to local information than a decentralized one. As a result, and in contrast to what is commonly argued, an increase in product market competition that makes adaptation more important can favor centralization rather than decentralization. (JEL D21, D23, F23, L22) The organization theorist Chester Barnard and the economist Friedrich Hayek shared the view that the “economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time and place ” (Hayek 1945, 524). But whereas Hayek viewed adaptation as an autonomous process, undertaken by individual economic actors, Barnard (1938) stressed the ability of organizations to engage in what Oliver Williamson (1996, 2002) calls “coordinated adaptation.” Williamson (1996, 103), referring to Barnard and challenging Hayek, argues that:

Yutaka Suzuki

This paper uses a contract theory framework to analyze the mechanisms of eurozone financial governance, with a focus on centralization vs. decentralization and incentive problems. By constructing a Stackelberg game model with n Ministries of Finance as the first movers and the European Central Bank as the second mover, we show that each government can create growth in its own country (self-benefit) by increasing government spending, but that this will increase inflation, resulting in a decrease in the value of the euro. As these effects are shared equally by eurozone countries (cost sharing), an incentive to free-ride at the expense of other countries is present. We then analyze a penalty-based solution to the free-rider problem and derive a second-best solution where a commitment not to renegotiate penalties ex-post is impossible. The optimal solution shows that ¡°limited sovereignty, ¡± that is, substantially constrained fiscal sovereignty, should be imposed as a high marginal cost for the issuance of public debt. Finally, we close the paper by discussing the possibility of Fiscal Integration (Fiscal Union).

Jacob Hamburger

No abstract is available for this record.

Martín Shubik

The practical and theoretical meaning of the rise and fall of new local and virtual currencies suggest that two basic theories of money both have their validity and reasons for coexistence. The drive for increasing efficiency in the payment mechanisms is in full swing and still presents many opportunities for improvement.

Torbjørn Bull Jenssen

The aim of this thesis is to provide a holistic analysis and an economic understanding of Bitcoin, answering two key questions: (i) Why do bitcoins have value? (ii) Why and how will governments seek to regulate the use of bitcoin? To answer these questions, the thesis begins with a discussion of money itself, developing a framework of different types of monies in terms of their uses and properties that will form the basis of the analysis. Based on the technical properties of Bitcoin the framework developed above is then applied to identify bitcoin as a digital commodity money. Following this identification, potential uses of bitcoin supporting its value will be discussed, drawing particular attention to Bitcoin s resilience to regulation. In addition, real world examples of other commodity monies will be used to support the claim that bitcoin may circulate without use value and state backing. Governments tend to seek economic control through controlling money, and it will be argued that there are good reasons to expect governments to be hostile towards widespread use of bitcoin. This is to be expected, as use of bitcoin undermines governments capacity to control money.

Fred E Foldvary

Abstract. This paper examines the process of mass democracy as the fundamental cause of transfer seeking and the centralization of governance, using Austrian-school theory and methodology such as decentralized knowledge, disaggregated phenomena, and the structure of capital goods. The alternative of decentralized, small-group gov-ernance reduces the demand for campaign financing and makes more effective use of decentralized knowledge. In addition, when public revenues originate in the local districts and are passed on to higher levels of governance, it provides incentives for revenue sources which do not have an excess burden on production. The governance struc-ture of cellular, bottom-up, multi-level voting, with public revenue flowing up from the lower to the upper levels, provides a contrast for a comparative systems analysis that can yield insight into the transfer seeking endemic in mass democracy.

Aleksander Berentsen, Guillaume Rocheteau

No abstract is available for this record.