The future architecture of financial systems is a subject of contention, with centralized and decentralized governance proponents. Here, we ask the following question. Would the architecture affect the quality of decision making? We propose a game where financial network participants demarcate the ownership of claims to income. This governance task can be decentralized (shared authority), centralized (single authority), or hybrid (alternating authority). Without communication, all architectures supported poor outcomes. With communication, decentralization ensured good governance and maximum profits, whereas centralization did not—lowering communication’s potency in promoting socially optimal decisions. This indicates that there is scope for decentralization in innovating financial institutions. This paper has been accepted by Camelia Kuhnen for the Virtual Special Issue on Digital Finance. Funding: N. Chemaya acknowledges partial financial support from the NET Institute. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2025.02314 .
This paper presents, to the best of our knowledge, the first formal mechanism design treatment of Quran 2:282 as a low-cost verification mechanism. It proves that the Quranic debt documentation mechanism drives the creditor's expected verification cost to zero in the costly state verification framework. It achieves this by creating ex ante evidence through writing and witnessing, and by introducing a dual deterrence system: a fixed internal moral cost and a detection-contingent legal penalty. The paper also offers two interpretative contributions. First, it shows that the Quranic witness rule is an early redundancy mechanism for error correction, anticipating the logic later formalized by Hamming (1950). Second, it proposes an economic reading of the terms safih, da'if, and the inability to dictate, arguing that the guardian who dictates with justice may be a qualified third-party verifier, not merely a relative.