Blockchain Papers

Eiichiro Fujisaki, Keita Xagawa

No abstract is available for this record.

Antonio Faonio, Daniele Venturi

We revisit the question of constructing public-key encryption and signature schemes with security in the presence of bounded leakage and tampering memory attacks. For signatures we obtain the first construction in the standard model; for public-key encryption we obtain the first construction free of pairing (avoiding non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs). Our constructions are based on generic building blocks, and, as we show, also admit efficient instantiations under fairly standard number-theoretic assumptions.

Carsten Baum, Ivan Damgård, Kasper Green Larsen, Michael B. Nielsen

No abstract is available for this record.

M. Albrecht, Lorenzo Grassi, Christian Rechberger, Arnab Roy · 5 authors

No abstract is available for this record.

Broadbent Anne, Zhengfeng Ji, Song Fang, Watrous John

Prior work has established that all problems in NP admit classical zero-knowledge proof systems, and under reasonable hardness assumptions for quantum computations, these proof systems can be made secure against quantum attacks. We prove a result representing a further quantum generalization of this fact, which is that every problem in the complexity class QMA has a quantum zero-knowledge proof system. More specifically, assuming the existence of an unconditionally binding and quantum computationally concealing commitment scheme, we prove that every problem in the complexity class QMA has a quantum interactive proof system that is zero-knowledge with respect to efficient quantum computations. Our QMA proof system is sound against arbitrary quantum provers, but only requires an honest prover to perform polynomial-time quantum computations, provided that it holds a quantum witness for a given instance of the QMA problem under consideration. The proof system relies on a new variant of the QMA-complete local Hamiltonian problem in which the local terms are described by Clifford operations and standard basis measurements. We believe that the QMA-completeness of this problem may have other uses in quantum complexity.

M. Albrecht, Pooya Farshim, Shuai Han, Dennis Hofheinz · 6 authors

Abstract We provide constructions of multilinear groups equipped with natural hard problems from indistinguishability obfuscation, homomorphic encryption, and NIZKs. This complements known results on the constructions of indistinguishability obfuscators from multilinear maps in the reverse direction. We provide two distinct, but closely related constructions and show that multilinear analogues of the $${\text {DDH}} $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mtext>DDH</mml:mtext></mml:math> assumption hold for them. Our first construction is symmetric and comes with a $$\kappa $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mi>κ</mml:mi></mml:math> -linear map $$\mathbf{e }: {{\mathbb {G}}}^\kappa \longrightarrow {\mathbb {G}}_T$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mrow><mml:mi>e</mml:mi><mml:mo>:</mml:mo><mml:msup><mml:mrow><mml:mi>G</mml:mi></mml:mrow><mml:mi>κ</mml:mi></mml:msup><mml:mo>⟶</mml:mo><mml:msub><mml:mi>G</mml:mi><mml:mi>T</mml:mi></mml:msub></mml:mrow></mml:math> for prime-order groups $${\mathbb {G}}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mi>G</mml:mi></mml:math> and $${\mathbb {G}}_T$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:msub><mml:mi>G</mml:mi><mml:mi>T</mml:mi></mml:msub></mml:math> . To establish the hardness of the $$\kappa $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mi>κ</mml:mi></mml:math> -linear $${\text {DDH}} $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mtext>DDH</mml:mtext></mml:math> problem, we rely on the existence of a base group for which the $$\kappa $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mi>κ</mml:mi></mml:math> -strong $${\text {DDH}} $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mtext>DDH</mml:mtext></mml:math> assumption holds. Our second construction is for the asymmetric setting, where $$\mathbf{e }: {\mathbb {G}}_1 \times \cdots \times {\mathbb {G}}_{\kappa } \longrightarrow {\mathbb {G}}_T$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mrow><mml:mi>e</mml:mi><mml:mo>:</mml:mo><mml:msub><mml:mi>G</mml:mi><mml:mn>1</mml:mn></mml:msub><mml:mo>×</mml:mo><mml:mo>⋯</mml:mo><mml:mo>×</mml:mo><mml:msub><mml:mi>G</mml:mi><mml:mi>κ</mml:mi></mml:msub><mml:mo>⟶</mml:mo><mml:msub><mml:mi>G</mml:mi><mml:mi>T</mml:mi></mml:msub></mml:mrow></mml:math> for a collection of $$\kappa +1$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mrow><mml:mi>κ</mml:mi><mml:mo>+</mml:mo><mml:mn>1</mml:mn></mml:mrow></mml:math> prime-order groups $${\mathbb {G}}_i$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:msub><mml:mi>G</mml:mi><mml:mi>i</mml:mi></mml:msub></mml:math> and $${\mathbb {G}}_T$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:msub><mml:mi>G</mml:mi><mml:mi>T</mml:mi></mml:msub></mml:math> , and relies only on the 1-strong $${\text {DDH}} $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mtext>DDH</mml:mtext></mml:math> assumption in its base group. In both constructions, the linearity $$\kappa $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mi>κ</mml:mi></mml:math> can be set to any arbitrary but a priori fixed polynomial value in the security parameter. We rely on a number of powerful tools in our constructions: probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscation, dual-mode NIZK proof systems (with perfect soundness, witness-indistinguishability, and zero knowledge), and additively homomorphic encryption for the group $$\mathbb {Z}_N^{+}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:msubsup><mml:mi>Z</mml:mi><mml:mi>N</mml:mi><mml:mo>+</mml:mo></mml:msubsup></mml:math> . At a high level, we enable “bootstrapping” multilinear assumptions from their simpler counterparts in standard cryptographic groups and show the equivalence of PIO and multilinear maps under the existence of the aforementioned primitives.

Xun Yi, Xuechao Yang, Andrei Kelarev, Kwok‐Yan Lam · 5 authors

Kriptovalute su digitalni novac utemeljen na kriptografiji i decentraliziranom sustavu. Postoje samo u elektroničkom obliku kao jedinstveni digitalni novčići ("tokeni"). Iza njih ne stoji autoritet države niti ih je moguće svojevoljno proizvesti. Rad se fokusira na značajkama, postavkama, razvoju i svim međuodnosima važnih ekonomskih faktora koji utječu na kriptovalute. U prvom poglavlju navedena su obilježja kriptovaluta. Drugo poglavlje daje primjere i govori o primjeni kriptovaluta u svakodnevnom životu. U trećem poglavlju je raspravljano o trenutnim i budućim regulacijama najmoćnijih zemalja svijeta (G20) , kao i njihovoj zajedničkoj suradnji u želji za jedinstvenim i standardiziranim pravilima, a sve u svrhu što kvalitetnijeg nadzora nad kriptovalutama kako bi se spriječile malverzacije i zaštitili potrošači. Četvrto poglavlje govori o inicijalnoj ponudi kovanica, a peto poglavlje je namijenjeno sigurnosti kriptovaluta. Cilj istraživanja je utvrditi koliko je studentska populacija upoznata i usmjerena prema novim oblicima digitalnog novca, koje značajke kriptovaluta smatraju pozitivnima, a koje negativnima i u kojoj su mjeri investirali ili su spremni investirati dio svojih ulaganja u kriptovalute i sl. Metode istraživanja korištene u radu su kompilacija na temelju proučavanja postojeće literature o temi rada, prikupljanje i analiza podataka vezanih uz kriptovalute, ponajprije podataka vezanih uz cijene i tržišnu kapitalizaciju, anketiranje studenata Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci i metoda dedukcije putem koje su pokazane sve važne karakteristike i obilježja kriptovaluta. Na temelju provedene ankete u kojoj je sudjelovalo 90 studenata Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci zaključak toga dijela istraživanja je da je mlada populacija dobro upoznata s kriptovalutama i njenim glavnim značajkama, ali i određenim nedostatkom informiranosti o tehnologiji (trećina studenata nije čula za pojam "blockchain") i nedovoljnoj odlučnosti oko investiranja i trgovanja u kriptovalute. Povrh toga, dokazan je i negativan utjecaj hakerskih napada i određenih kriminalnih radnji, kao i nestabilnost tržišne cijene na povjerenje studenata, ali i ukupne populacije vezane uz globalni financijski sustav u kriptovalute. Ishod istraživanja omogućio je da zaključimo kako su kriptovalute trenutno u ranoj fazi razvoja i nisu se dovoljno implementirale za široku primjenu u trgovini roba i usluga ili općenito kao sredstvo razmjene. Faktor koji je uključen u istraživanje kako bi opisao veličinu, odnosno obujam neke kriptovalute je tržišna kapitalizacija u dolarima. Temeljna ideja ovog rada je informirati čitatelja o pozitivnim i negativnim značajkama koje se se vežu uz kriptovalute. Na taj način čitatelji će biti bolje informirani i educirani o potencijalnom riziku ulaganja u kriptovalute, kao i većoj razini zaštite prilikom posjedovanja neke digitalne valute.

Anchal Doegar, M. Sivasankar

In this paper we propose a digital signature scheme using a two-layer multivariate polynomial system. This scheme works like a zero-knowledge proof scheme. The algorithm can be implemented in two modes, parallel mode and series mode. As Multivariate Polynomial Cryptography (MPC) is a viable choice in the post quantum era, various algorithms based on MPC are gaining importance. The proposed scheme points to a potential direction for digital signature schemes in the presence of quantum computers.

Maciej Skórski

For any pair $(X,Z)$ of correlated random variables we can think of $Z$ as a randomized function of $X$. Provided that $Z$ is short, one can make this function computationally efficient by allowing it to be only approximately correct. In folklore this problem is known as \emph{simulating auxiliary inputs}. This idea of simulating auxiliary information turns out to be a powerful tool in computer science, finding applications in complexity theory, cryptography, pseudorandomness and zero-knowledge. In this paper we revisit this problem, achieving the following results: \begin{enumerate}[(a)] We discuss and compare efficiency of known results, finding the flaw in the best known bound claimed in the TCC'14 paper "How to Fake Auxiliary Inputs". We present a novel boosting algorithm for constructing the simulator. Our technique essentially fixes the flaw. This boosting proof is of independent interest, as it shows how to handle "negative mass" issues when constructing probability measures in descent algorithms. Our bounds are much better than bounds known so far. To make the simulator $(s,ε)$-indistinguishable we need the complexity $O\left(s\cdot 2^{5\ell}ε^{-2}\right)$ in time/circuit size, which is better by a factor $ε^{-2}$ compared to previous bounds. In particular, with our technique we (finally) get meaningful provable security for the EUROCRYPT'09 leakage-resilient stream cipher instantiated with a standard 256-bit block cipher, like $\mathsf{AES256}$.

Rong Hu

Cryptography relies on Mathematics in all its aspects, beginning from the constructions relying on various mathematical theories, continuing with security evaluation of cryptographic systems, and proving their security, and finally ending in implementation.Recently, new security threats are posed by the emerging quantum computing technology.Specifically, quantum algorithms can break some public-key encryption schemes such as RSA and Elgamal, which are widely used for protection of computer systems and networks.This issue demands us to develop a new generation of cryptographic systems, which will serve as secure alternatives to the currently used ones.Such the new systems are referred to as the post-quantum cryptography.One promising direction in post-quantum cryptography is the systems whose security is based on hardness of mathematical problems arising in the context of coding theory.In particular, the problem of decoding random linear codes has been studied for over 30 years, and still no polynomial-time solution has been proposed, even when using quantum algorithms.In this thesis, we focus on this area, which is called the code-based cryptography.The first code-based public-key encryption (PKE) scheme was introduced by R.J. McEliece in 1978.Since then, various code-based public-key encryption, digital signature and identification schemes were introduced, but currently, one of the main challenges is to introduce more advanced cryptographic functionalities based on coding.In this thesis, first, we give a brief introduction about post-quantum cryptography and codebased cryptography, and then we provide the background information about the cryptographic primitives, which we will study, as well as the relevant notions and results from coding theory and cryptography.Next, we introduce our contributions as follows.Firstly, we study zero-knowledge (ZK) identification schemes based q-ary linear codes.We show that when q < 5, a straightforward generalization of Stern's ZK identification scheme (1993) is more efficient in terms of both communication and computation, as compared to the ZK identification scheme by Cayrel, Vron and El Yousfi Alaoui (2010), which is specifically designed for q-ary codes.Secondly, we introduce the first proof of plaintext knowledge (PPK) for the McEliece PKE and the Niederreiter PKE.These protocols allow the encryptor to prove the knowledge of the plaintext contained in a given ciphertext to any party, who does not hold the secret key for decryption.We also provide a performance evaluation for the proposed schemes.

Raza Ali Kazmi

In this thesis we present our contribution in the field of post-quantum cryptography. We introduce a new notion of weakly Random-Self-Reducible public-key cryptosystem and show how it can be used to implement secure Oblivious Transfer. We also show that two recent (Post-quantum) cryptosystems can be considered as weakly Random-Self-Reducible. We introduce a new problem called Isometric Lattice Problem and reduce graph isomorphism and linear code equivalence to this problem. We also show that this problem has a perfect zero-knowledge interactive proof with respect to a malicious verifier; this is the only hard problem in lattices that is known to have this property.

Ning Ding

No abstract is available for this record.

Sanjam Garg, Yuval Ishai, Eyal Kushilevitz, Rafail Ostrovsky · 5 authors

No abstract is available for this record.

Rong Hu, Kirill Morozov, Tsuyoshi Takagi

Code-based public-key encryption schemes (PKE) are the candidates for post-quantum cryptography, since they are believed to resist the attacks using quantum algorithms. The most famous such schemes are the McEliece encryption and the Niederreiter encryption. In this paper, we present the zero-knowledge (ZK) proof systems for proving statements about data encrypted using these schemes. Specifically, we present a proof of plaintext knowledge for both PKE's, and also a verifiable McEliece PKE. The main ingredients of our constructions are the ZK identification schemes by Stern from Crypto'93 and by Jain, Krenn, Pietrzak, and Tentes from Asiacrypt'12.

Itai Dinur, Yunwen Liu, Willi Meier, Qingju Wang

Abstract. LowMC is a collection of block cipher families introduced at Eurocrypt 2015 by Albrecht et al. Its design is optimized for instanti-ations of multi-party computation, fully homomorphic encryption, and zero-knowledge proofs. A unique feature of LowMC is that its internal affine layers are chosen at random, and thus each block cipher family contains a huge number of instances. The Eurocrypt paper proposed two specific block cipher families of LowMC, having 80-bit and 128-bit keys. In this paper, we mount interpolation attacks (algebraic attacks intro-duced by Jakobsen and Knudsen) on LowMC, and show that a practically significant fraction of 2−38 of its 80-bit key instances could be broken 223 times faster than exhaustive search. Moreover, essentially all instances that are claimed to provide 128-bit security could be broken about 1000 times faster. In order to obtain these results, we had to develop novel techniques and optimize the original interpolation attack in new ways. While some of our new techniques exploit specific internal properties of LowMC, others are more generic and could be applied, in principle, to any block cipher.

M. Albrecht, Christian Rechberger, Thomas Schneider, Tyge Tiessen · 5 authors

No abstract is available for this record.

Reinhold Burger, Albert Heinle

In this paper we present a new primitive for a key exchange protocol based on multivariate non-commutative polynomial rings, analogous to the classic Diffie-Hellman method. Our technique extends the proposed scheme of Boucher et al. from 2010. Their method was broken by Dubois and Kammerer in 2011, who exploited the Euclidean domain structure of the chosen ring. However, our proposal is immune against such attacks, without losing the advantages of non-commutative polynomial rings as outlined by Boucher et al. Moreover, our extension is not restricted to any particular ring, but is designed to allow users to readily choose from a large class of rings when applying the protocol. Our primitive can also be applied to other cryptographic paradigms. In particular, we develop a three-pass protocol, a public key cryptosystem, a digital signature scheme and a zero-knowledge proof protocol.

Sebastian Faust, Pratyay Mukherjee, Jesper Buus Nielsen, Daniele Venturi

Non-malleable codes are a natural relaxation of error correcting/detecting codes that have useful applications in the context of tamper resilient cryptography. Informally, a code is non-malleable if an adversary trying to tamper with an encoding of a given message can only leave it unchanged or modify it to the encoding of a completely unrelated value. This paper introduces an extension of the standard non-malleability security notion ‐ so-called continuous non-malleability ‐ where we allow the adversary to tamper continuously with an encoding. This is in contrast to the standard notion of non-malleable codes where the adversary only is allowed to tamper a single time with an encoding. We show how to construct continuous non-malleable codes in the common split-state model where an encoding consist of two parts and the tampering can be arbitrary but has to be independent with both parts. Our main contributions are outlined below: 1. We propose a new uniqueness requirement of split-state codes which states that it is computationally hard to find two codewords C = (X0;X1) and C 0 = (X0;X 0 1 ) such that both codwords are valid, butX0 is the same in bothC andC 0 . A simple attack shows that uniqueness is necessary to achieve continuous non-malleability in the split-state model. Moreover, we illustrate that non of the existing constructions satisfies our uniqueness property and hence is not secure in the continuous setting. 2. We construct a split-state code satisfying continuous non-malleability. Our scheme is based on the inner product function, collision-resistant hashing and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge and requires an untamperable common reference string. 3. We apply continuous non-malleable codes to protect arbitrary cryptographic primitives against tampering attacks. Previous applications of non-malleable codes in this setting required to perfectly erase the entire memory after each execution and and required the adversary to be restricted in memory. We show that continuous non-malleable codes avoid these restrictions.

Wang Ming-we

A new signature scheme based solely on the MQ-problem is presented,which satisfies the following properties:(1)Forward security,which means that a compromise of a key now does not necessarily expose old traffic.(2)Backward security,which means that a compromise of a key now does not necessarily expose future traffic.We do not have to revoke our public key and re-issue a new key system everytime we detect a key leak.We use two fundamental tools,such as zero knowledge proof and mulitivariate public crypto.Our basic model is Koichi Sakumoto's identifcation scheme which is transformed by parallel processing and Fiat-Shamir transforming.What is novel about our approach is the key updating algortithm,which makes our scheme preserve backward security besides the forward property.Finally,we prove that our scheme satisfies the security under the random oracle model.

Michel Abdalla⋆, Fabrice Benhamouda, David Pointcheval

Abstract. Smooth Projective Hash Functions (SPHFs), also known as Hash Proof Systems, were first introduced by Cramer and Shoup (Eurocrypt’02) as a tool to construct efficient IND-CCA secure encryption schemes. Since then, SPHFs have been used in various applications, including password authenticated key exchange, oblivious transfer, and zero-knowledge arguments. What makes SPHFs so interesting and powerful is that they can be seen as implicit proofs of membership for certain languages. As a result, by extending the family of languages that they can handle, one often obtains new applications or new ways to understand existent schemes. In this paper, we show how to construct SPHFs for the disjunction of languages defined generically over cyclic, bilinear, and multilinear groups. Among other applications, this enables us to construct the most efficient one-time simulation-sound (quasi-adaptive) non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments for linear languages over cyclic groups, and the first one-round group password-authenticated key exchange without random oracles.

Алексей Витальевич Онацкий

One of important issues of information security in the interaction of users is the use of methods and tools, allowing one party to make sure of the authenticity of another party. The proof of knowledge protocols which have the additional property of zero-knowledge are applied to solve this problem. The protocols based on asymmetric encryption have received wide acceptance, such as the Fiat-Shamir, Schnorr, Okamoto, Guillou-Quisquater, Brickell-McCurley, Feige-Fiat-Shamir protocols. Cryptographic strength of these protocols is defined by discrete logarithms in a finite prime field, as well as an increase in the number of accreditation cycles. As a result of the development of methods and tools of cryptanalysis and rapid development of technologies and power of computing systems, there is a need to increase the sizes of system-wide parameters of the protocol, leading to increased resource intensity and performance complexity of basic operations in the fields.Cryptographic zero-knowledge protocols on elliptic curves are proposed in the paper. The strength of cryptosystems on elliptic curves is based on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem in the group of elliptic curve points, and is more difficult than the discrete logarithm problem in the finite field. The completeness and soundness of protocols were determined, computation examples were given. The tools of the Strength Protocol Animator package were applied to verify the protocols for resistance to enemy attacks. Consequently, the use of cryptographic protocols on elliptic curves will significantly reduce the sizes of protocol parameters and increase the cryptographic strength

Guomin Yang, Chik How Tan, Yi Mu, Willy Susilo · 5 authors

No abstract is available for this record.

Rong Hu, Kirill Morozov, Tsuyoshi Takagi

Cayrel.et.al at SAC 2010 proposed a zero-knowledge identification scheme based on syndrome decoding of q-ary codes. It is a 5-pass scheme with soundness error q/2(q-1). We propose an alternative to this scheme by generalizing (binary) Stern zero-knowledge identification from CRYPTO 1993 directly to q-ary setting. Our proposal is a 3-pass scheme with soundness error 2/3. We show that it is superior to Cayrel et al scheme in terms of communication cost for the case q = {3, 4}. A possible application for q-ary code-based identification schemes with small q is a proof of plaintext knowledge for code-based public key encryption.

Neil Savage

Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali laid the foundations for modern cryptography, with contributions including interactive and zero-knowledge proofs.