O conceito de Organizacoes Autonomas Descentralizadas (Decentralized Autonomous Organization
- DAO) surgiu como um organizacao que pode operar sem uma hierarquia gerencial, ou seja,
autonoma. Esse conceito foi desenvolvido na tecnologia blockchain, e por este motivo, foi restrito
a ela. Embora os estudos na area da blockchain estejam em constante avanco, alguns conceitos
atrelados a ela ainda causam duvidas. Ao desvincular DAO de blockchain, ela deixa de ser o
estudo de uma area e passa a ser uma area de estudo, para tanto, e necessario um levantamento
de suas caracteristicas e sua associacao com conceitos ja estabelecidos. A identificacao e compreensao
dessas caracteristicas de DAO, de forma clara e objetiva, gerando a sua caracterizacao, foi
o principal objetivo deste trabalho. Essa caracterizacao se mostra relevante tanto para sua analise,
quanto para o seu desenvolvimento. Ao relacionarmos o conceito de DAO com conceitos estabelecidos,
podemos diversificar e abranger um maior numero de estudos em DAO. Para atingir
esses objetivos, este trabalho propoe caracterizar DAO atraves da analise de dominio, defini-la
de forma a nao limitar a uma tecnologia especifica, passivel de obsolescencia, correlacionando
as caracteristicas aos conceitos de Sistemas Multiagentes e Organizacoes Descentralizadas. Para
desenvolvimento deste trabalho, utilizamos um metodo de analise de dominio que fosse livre de
aspectos de implementacao, mais precisamente, o Metodo de Analise de Dominio Orientado
a Caracteristicas (Feature-Oriented Domain Analysis Method - FODA), em que obtivemos as
principais caracteristicas. De porte dessas caracteristicas, analisamos elas de forma a integra-las
e, por fim, geramos um definicao livre de aspectos tecnologicos.
Several years after the inception of the most dominant cryptocurrency, bitcoin, the European Central Bank in 2015 indicated the need for establishing legal clarity by relevant authorities through explaining how the current legal framework applies to cryptocurrencies. Three years later, no meaningful step has been taken by any of the European Union (EU) institutions including the parliament. By examining the EUâs legal framework governing payments services, including the Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA) Regulation, the Electronic Money Directive, the Payment Services Directive and the proposed AML/CTF Directive, this article concludes that (a) because the existing payment services laws apply to payments effected in currencies (legal tenders) and cryptocurrencies are not defined as currencies under the EU law or the laws of member states, they do not cover cryptocurrencies. It also argues that it is impossible to design sui generis payments services law for cryptocurrencies without curbing their essential features, especially decentralization. Lastly, the article proposes centralization and the creation of state cryptocurrency as possible solutions moving forward and examines their strengths and challenges.
Identifying and quantifying the drivers for adopting blockchain technologies are important for developing effective launch plan. Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and its derivatives have been used for this purpose. However, some of these models only use a few standardized, predetermined independent variables to collectively represent the drivers. Low predictive power of TAM leads to questions on whether this restriction may detrimentally constrain the exploration of other driving factors. Some other extended models with higher R2 are considered impractical and lack of theoretical foundations. This paper demonstrates that reasonable predictive power can be achieved even with simple, practically implementable model when research targets are sampled and segmented properly. By employing a more fundamental theory, this study has also included additional variable that would normally not be considered in TAM.
Shehu M. Sarkintudu, Huda Ibrahim, Alawiyah Abd Wahab
Blockchain platform has given information system scholars research opportunities in understanding dynamics of convergence of technology and social context. The information system research issues are complex and require taxonomies to understand the similarities and uniqueness among objects. Developing taxonomies is a complex process that needs systematic approach. This paper is a research-in-progress. We proposed taxonomy for Blockchain platform using existing method of developing taxonomies in information systems. With the unprecedented growth led to several companies to develop the varieties of Blockchain platforms. The complexity in the implementation and understanding the technical protocols leading to difficulty face by researchers and practitioners to access their full potentials. To bridge the gap, we proposed a taxonomy of Blockchains distributed ledger platforms in order to provide a mechanism for researchers and practitioners to understand the phenomenon. Final of taxonomy contains five (5) dimensions with fifteen (15) characteristics. Our analysis discovered Blockchain platforms are designed with specific goals, which prescribe its features, i.e FinTech Blockchain platforms for financial domain.
Tobias Riasanow, Rob Jago Flötgen, David Soto Setzke, Markus Böhm · 5 authors
The emergence of financial technology companies (Fintechs) through the easy access of digital technologies is transforming the entire financial industry, heralding a new era of business models. With digital technologies like mobile payments, robo advisors, and distributed ledgers or blockchain, Fintechs are challenging the prevailing position of traditional financial institutions. However, literature does not provide a structured overview of the digital transformation in the financial industry, including inter- organizational innovation patterns. By analyzing 792 Fintechs, this paper visualizes the 22 generic roles and value streams within the financial ecosystem using the e3- value method. Moreover, we identify and discuss seven inter-organizational innovation patterns of the digital transformation in the financial industry. We contribute to literature by examining digital transformation in the financial industry from an inter- organizational perspective. Practitioners may apply the model to position themselves and to identify disruptive actors or potential business opportunities. We also analyze the influence of blockchain technology.
Over the last decade, blockchain technology has facilitated a method by which a network of equipotent and equally privileged peers can jointly maintain and edit databases in an entirely decentralized manner, without any kind of an intermediary exhibiting unilateral control. As a consequence it has enabled the creation of a new type of multi-sided platform architecture with distributed governance. As the different platform provision functions are opened to free market competition rather than monopolized by a single entity, the monopoly-like pricing structure typical of platforms is overhauled. Instead, blockchain-enabled distributed platforms appear to share value more evenly between the all the different market sides connected to the platform. Our analysis reveals that blockchain technology adds new considerations to how multi-sided platform architectures should be perceived and analyzed.
Jan 1, 2018·Proceedings of the ... Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences/Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
Simon Albrecht, Stefan Reichert, J. Schmid, Jens StrĂŒker · 6 authors
This case study analyzes the impact of theory-based factors on the implementation of different blockchain technologies in use cases from the energy sector. We construct an integrated research model based on the Diffusion of Innovations theory, institutional economics and the Technology-Organization-Environment framework. Using qualitative data from in-depth interviews, we link constructs to theory and assess their impact on each use case. Doing so we can depict the dynamic relations between different blockchain technologies and the energy sector. The study provides insights for decision makers in electric utilities, and government administrations.
Blockchain Technology and CryptocurrenciesImplications for the Digital Economy, Cybersecurity, and Government Christian Catalini (bio) The recent rise in interest in block-chain technology and cryptocurrencies has been associated with a fundamental misunderstanding of the opportunities and challenges this new wave of technological change entails. As with other major technological transitions, there is high uncertainty about what successful implementations of the underlying concepts may look like once the initial phase of scientific and entrepreneurial experimentation is complete. Furthermore, such uncertainty is fundamentally unmeasurable, leaving early adopters, entrepreneurs, and investors with diverging and often irreconcilable hypotheses about the future relative to the rest of society.1 By questioning key assumptions behind how domain experts and incumbents interpret and react to the environment, and by challenging established business models and institutions, the technology attracts a fair degree of criticism, fear, andâwhere it reaches a sufficient scaleâopposition. Conflicting incentives reinforce the separation between enthusiasts and skeptics, with enthusiasts overestimating the short-run impact of the technology, and skeptics underestimating its long-run effects. Whereas skeptics generally ignore the extent toward which the technology will improve because of recent investments in research and development by startups and academic labs, enthusiasts fail to account for how much market demand, pre-existing frictions, and the response by incumbent institutions will shape its evolution. The objective of this paper is to abstract away from the idiosyncratic features of different, competing implementations of blockchain technology and to focus on its underlying economics in order to understand its implications for competition in the digital economy, cybersecurity, and government. Implications for the Digital Economy Confusion around the very definition of what blockchain technology is stems from the fact that there are different ways to implement the technology, each one posing unique trade-offs in terms of efficiency, reliance on existing intermediaries, and governance. At a high level, blockchain technology allows a network of economic agents (e.g., individuals, firms, devices) to reach consensus, at regular intervals, about the true state of some jointly maintained and shared data. Such shared data can represent exchanges of cryptocurrency (as in Bitcoin) [End Page 36] and other types of digital assets, making the technology applicable to multiple industry and public-sector verticals. From an economics perspective, blockchain technology is associated with a reduction in two key costs: the cost of verification of transaction attributes and the cost of launching and operating a digital platform.2 This reduction in costs is achieved through a clever mix of cryptography and game theory, and heavily relies on economic incentives to ensure that a decentralized network of economic agents can coordinate and process transactions without assigning excessive control and market power to the entities operating and overseeing the marketplace. At its core, because of its ability to support the formation of consensus about the true state of transactions and data without relying on traditional intermediaries, block-chain technology provides a novel way to coordinate economic activity on a global scale and reach "Internet-level consensus." This constitutes both its key opportunity and challenge, as depending on what the economic incentives embedded in a block-chain protocol are designed to encourage, it can have an extremely beneficial or detrimental impact on society and markets. For example, the same privacy-enhancing features of the technology that can offer consumers greater control over their digital lives and reduce the impact of data breaches can be exploited to facilitate illegal activities such as money laundering, terrorism, and tax evasion.3 Similarly, while the technology can facilitate global trade and increase transparency and competition within financial markets, it can also allow for regulatory arbitrage and make it more difficult to impose economic sanctions on individuals and countries. By replacing trust in an intermediary with trust in the incentives, code, and governance of a software protocol, blockchain technology unbundles part of the activities performed by traditional intermediaries, lowers barriers to entry for new types of intermediaries, and allows for the creation of new types of digital marketplaces. This change in the nature of intermediation has consequences for market structure, as it allows a marketplace to operate without assigning a disproportionate share of market power to a single entity (or a small group...
Now that you have learned how to write and deploy smart contracts, in this chapter youâll integrate a smart contract with a web front end. You can interact with a smart contract from your web front end through the Web3.js JavaScript libraries.
Low transaction cost, low level of entry, worldwide quickness, and anonymity of the transactions is the main advantage of cryptocurrency use, making it an attractive transaction media for African countries. At the same time, there are certain drawbacks of it in terms of strong volatility, lack of user-friendliness and its usage in crime. The conceptual paper explores the use of cryptocurrencies, and its potential in the African context. The research paper utilizes UTAUT 2 Model and adds key constructs for analyzing the adoption of new technology by Africans. These additional constructs include hedonistic motivation, habit and price cost. Key factors were considered in the case of African countries in order to analyze whether cryptocurrency is essential for economic growth in some economic countries. The application of UTAUT model in the case of Arica shows that performance, effort expectations, social influence are favorable for African countries while the influence of hedonic motivations and price is unfavorable for acceptance of cryptocurrencies in African countries.
By allowing networks to split, decentralized blockchain platforms protect members against hold up, but hinder coordination, given that adaptation decisions are ultimately decentralized. The current solutions to improve coordination, based on âpreminingâ cryptocoins, taxing members and incentivizing developers, are insufficient. For blockchain to fulfill its promise and out-compete centralized firms, it needs to develop new forms of âsoftâ decentralized governance (anarchic, aristocratic, democratic, and autocratic) that allow networks to avoid bad equilibria.
Kristian Lauslahti, Juri Mattila, Taneli Hukkinen, Timo SeppÀlÀ
Platform businesses are born global, with instant access to global markets. Thanks to the algorithmic, self-executing and self-enforcing computer programmes known as smart contracts, platform businesses now also have instant access to global capital markets from birth. However, the legal status of these smart-contract-enabled funding mechanisms and smart contracts in general is not well defined. In this article, we analyse how well the formation mechanisms of the general principles of Finnish contract law can be applied to the technological framework of smart contracts. We find that depending on the case, smart contracts can create legally binding rights and obligations to their parties. We also observe that contracts have not been formerly perceived as technical boundary resources in the sense that platform ecosystems could foster broader network effects by opening their application contracting interfaces to third parties.
Daniel Haberly, Duncan MacDonald-Korth, Michael Urban, Dariusz WĂłjcik
While contemporary technological disruption is increasingly conceptualized in terms of the logic and paradoxes of the digital platform economy, discussions of âFinTechâ have only engaged to a limited extent with these debatesâparticularly from an economic geographic standpoint. Here we fill this gap by proposing an adapted Global Financial Network (GFN) framework for conceptualizing the organizational and geographic logic of the digital platform economy in finance, and applying it to examine the impact of the digital platform model on asset management. As we will show, asset management is being profoundly disrupted by what we dub digital asset management platformsâor DAMPsâwhich encompass services including index fund and ETF provision, robo-advising, and analytics and trading support. Like other digital platforms, DAMPs do not so much leverage technology to enhance their competitiveness within markets, as to radically restructure the market itself. Also, like other platforms, their rise has produced a winner-take-all paradox of centralization through democratization that defies predictions of technology-enabled industry decentralization. However, the logic and implications of the rise of DAMPs diverges, in other respects, from non-financial digital platforms, as finance has long possessed an informational intensity and regulatory and organizational fluidity characteristic of the digital platform economy. Consequently, the digital platform model has mostly developed endogenously in asset management through incremental innovation by major financial firmsâin a process that has reinforced the position of leading incumbent asset management centers, and above all New Yorkârather than being introduced from the outside by upstart technology firms and clusters.
This paper is an attempt to analyze the role of transaction fees in a proof-of-stake cryptocurrency currently in development. The authors have employed a microeconomic, static equilibrium approach to model a market in which the cryptocurrency is exchanged for a physical good. Furthermore, the relationship between transaction capacity and the size of the network has been investigated. It has been shown that the total amount of validator capital and the number of validators can be controlled by setting a fixed fee on transactions as well as a minimum capital requirement on individual validators. The total surplus in the economy has then been optimized by setting a fee and the authors have discussed how a minimal capital requirement could be used to also optimize transaction capacity.
Sina Rafati Niya, Florian SchĂŒpfer, Thomas Bocek, Burkhard Stiller
Abstract This work introduces the design and implementation of an Android-based Peer-to-peer Purchase and Rental Application termed PuRSCA, which leverages Smart Contracts (SC) and the Ethereum public blockchain (BC). As a Device-to-device (D2D) communication protocol, WiFi-Direct is chosen to enable the P2P data transmission between two parties. This work results in a cost-efficient, secure, SC-based, P2P, and Decentralized application (Dapp). Evaluations on performance of this Dapp is specified in terms of its D2D deployment, transaction costs, scalability, security, and privacy.
Decentralised issued crypto "currencies", like bitcoin, have the potential to drastically change the existing retail payment system and even the monetary system. Insights into the factors that influence their adoption are therefore crucial. Using a large representative sample of retailers that sell their products online, we find that acceptance of crypto payments is currently modest (2%), but there is substantial interest among retailers to adopt crypto payments in the near future. Consumer demand, net transactional benefits and perceived adoption effort influence adoption intention and actual acceptance by retailers. Regarding non-financial factors, our findings suggest that service providers who act as intermediaries between retailers, their customers, and providers of payment instruments play a crucial role as facilitators of competition and innovation in the online retail payments market by lowering such barriers. The most serious barrier for crypto acceptance seems to be a lack of consumer demand. Information from consumers indicate that those who possess cryptos, don't use it for online payments. It seems therefore unlikely that the adoption of cryptos by retailers will increase substantially, making it highly unlikely that cryptos like bitcoin will drastically change the existing retail payment system.
The rise of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin is driving a paradigm shift in organization design. Their underlying blockchain technology enables a novel form of organizing, which I call the âdecentralized autonomous organizationâ (DAO). This study explores how tasks are coordinated within DAOs that provide decentralized and open payment systems that do not rely on centralized intermediaries (e.g., banks).\nGuided by a Bitcoin pilot case study followed by a three-stage research design that uses both qualitative and quantitative data, this inductive study examines twenty DAOs in the cryptocurrency industry to address the following question: How are DAOs coordinated to enable growth? Results from the pilot study suggest that task coordination within DAOs is enabled by distributed consensus mechanisms at various levels. Further, findings from interview data reveal that DAOs coordinate tasks through âmachine consensusâ and âsocial consensusâ mechanisms that operate at varying degrees of decentralization. Subsequent fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analyses (fsQCA), explaining when DAOs grow or decline, show that social consensus mechanisms can partially substitute machine consensus mechanisms in less decentralized DAOs.\nTaken together, the results unpack how DAO growth relies on the interplay between machine consensus, social consensus, and decentralization mechanisms. To conclude, I formulate three propositions to outline a theory of DAO coordination and discuss how this novel form of organizing calls for a revision of our conventional understanding of task coordination and organizational growth.
This paper explores how entrepreneurs can use fungible tokensâwhereby they issue digital assets and commit to only accept those tokens as payment for future products or servicesâto fund venture development. We show that tokens can acquire value through a mechanism where entrepreneurs generate buyer competition by setting divide-the-money prices, despite lacking traditional equity-like cash flow rights. However, we uncover a fundamental tension: when ventures face ongoing operational costs, they must retain tokens to credibly commit to fair pricing, yet this conflicts with their need to sell tokens to raise development capital. We prove this leads to an impossibility result for simple token structures and demonstrate how observed practices such as vesting schedules, multi-stage offerings, and pre-committed buybacks resolve this tension. Our analysis reveals that while venture returns are independent of token supply growth, initial fundraising is maximized by setting that growth to zero. Beyond traditional ICOs, our model applies to various token-based financing mechanisms including layer-1 protocols, DeFi platforms, and Web3 applications, providing insight into how these mechanisms facilitate coordination among stakeholders in digital ecosystems.
Aim/Purpose: This paper explored the factors (enablers and barriers) that affect Bitcoin adoption in South Africa, a Sub-Saharan country with the high potential for Bitcoin adoption. Background: In recent years, Bitcoin has seen a rapid growth as a virtual cryptocurrency throughout the world. Bitcoin is a protocol which allows value to be exchanged over the internet without a central bank or intermediary. Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin are technological tools that arguably can contribute to reducing transactions costs. This paper explored the factors that affect Bitcoin adoption in South Africa, a Sub-Saharan country with the high potential for Bitcoin adoption, as little is known about the factors that affect Bitcoin adoption and the barriers to adoption. Methodology: A quantitative questionnaire was distributed to South African virtual communities where Bitcoin is a topic of interest, and 237 quantitative responses were received, along with 212 open-ended comments. Contribution: This research contributes to the body of knowledge in information systems by providing insights into factors that affect Bitcoin adoption in South Africa. It raises awareness of incentives and barriers to Bitcoin adoption at a time when financial literacy is a crucial issue both in South Africa and worldwide. Findings: The results indicate that perceived benefit, attitude towards Bitcoin, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control directly affected the participantsâ intentions to use Bitcoin. Perceived benefit, usefulness, ease of use, and trust-related risk were found to indirectly affect intention to use Bitcoin. Further, it emerges that the barriers to Bitcoin adoption in South Africa consist of the complex nature of Bitcoin and its high degree of volatility. Recommendations for Practitioners: Bitcoin can contribute to reducing transactions costs, but factors that affect adoption and the barriers to adoption should be taken into consideration. These findings can inform systems and software developers to develop applications that make managing Bitcoin keys and transacting using Bitcoin less complex and more intuitive for end users. Recommendation for Researchers: Bitcoin adoption in South Africa is a topic that has not been previously researched. Researchers could research similarities or differences in the various constructs that were used in this research model. Impact on Society: South African Bitcoin users consider it as a universal currency that makes cross-border payments cheaper. A large number of refugees and workers in South Africa make regular payments across borders. Bitcoin could reduce the costs of these transfers. Future Research: Future research could explore Bitcoin (and other cryptocurrencies) adoption in other developing countries. Researchers could look at factors that influence cryptocurrency adoption in general. The factors affecting adoption of other cryptocurrencies can be compared to the results of this study, and similarities and differences can thus be identified.