Urban decarbonization requires scaling rooftop solar across millions of fragmented producers, yet cities face a fundamental tension: energy data is easily manipulated, and economic incentives often reward speculation rather than actual infrastructure deployment. We present SolarChain, a platform that resolves both problems by anchoring digital accountability to the thermodynamic limits of solar energy conversion. Using real-time meteorological data, geospatial coordinates, and first-principles calculations of solar yield, the system establishes a hard physical boundary for every panel's maximum possible output; any reported generation exceeding this limit is automatically rejected before entering the shared ledger. This trustless verification enables a peer-to-peer marketplace with programmatic reward structures that continuously reinvest value into equipment maintenance and market liquidity, preventing the speculative hoarding that typically destabilizes blockchain-based marketplaces. When electricity is consumed, the corresponding digital credits are permanently retired in direct proportion to physical energy dissipation, creating an auditable one-to-one mapping between urban consumption and carbon accounting. Deployed across heterogeneous city nodes, the prototype demonstrates resilience against data injection attacks while lowering capital barriers for community-level solar expansion. Beyond energy, the framework offers a general model for coordinating economic activity with physical law in any domain where distributed infrastructure demands both data integrity and sustainable investment. We release the data and code as open-access on GitHub.
Pim Keer, Ioannis Alexopoulos, Matteo Maffei, Marco Argentieri · 6 authors
Bitcoin is the cryptocurrency with the largest market capitalisation, but its widespread adoption is fundamentally limited by the scalability constraints of its consensus algorithm, which requires every transaction to be confirmed onchain. To address this, several Layer-2 scalability solutions have been proposed to move payments offchain -- most notably, the Lightning Network. However, their deployment remains hindered by cumbersome setup requirements: users must lock funds onchain to participate and engage in complex auxiliary protocols (e.g., for channel rebalancing, top-ups, and routing). Other solutions, like payment pools, sidechains and rollups, cannot be implemented in a non-custodial way on Bitcoin due to its limited scripting capabilities, or require all protocol participants to update the offchain state. In this work, we present Ark, the first Bitcoin-compatible commit-chain. Ark enables offchain transactions of virtual UTXOs (VTXOs), through an untrusted operator who aggregates them into succinct onchain commitments. A distinctive feature of Ark is its ease of deployment: users can receive offchain payments without locking any funds beforehand and Ark state updates can be performed only requiring the users involved in that update. We formally define the Ark protocol and prove its security. During this process, we identified two attacks affecting the testnet implementation, which we responsibly disclosed and proposed fixes for, which have been now integrated into the mainnet implementation. Our experimental evaluation demonstrates that Ark can commit onchain to batches of arbitrarily many VTXOs with a constant-sized footprint of approximately 200 vB. Cooperative exits add one output per user, while unilateral exits require $\mathcal{O}(\log n)$ transactions of roughly 150 vB per VTXO for a batch of $n$ VTXOs.
Bitcoin recently introduced a new protocol for the encryption of peer-to-peer (P2P) communication. The protocol, known as V2 P2P transport, represents a big step towards securing the overlay network against various previously-known attack vectors. Based on an analysis of V2 P2P transport, this work examines the current viability of said attacks and concludes that while they are now remediated, alternative attacks and paths to similar objectives exist. The identified shortcomings are conceptual (and not implementation bugs) and even applicable to other P2P networks. We show how a network-level attacker can identify application messages using the length of TCP payloads, can eclipse a target node by taking advantage of how encrypted communication channels work and can downgrade all of a node's connections to the unencrypted protocol by using the mechanisms designed for compatibility. We validate our contributions using a combination of network measurements, emulations and simulations. Finally, we propose a series of short-term and long-term countermeasures towards securing Bitcoin's P2P network. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study Bitcoin's security under V2 P2P transport.
AI agents such as OpenClaw are increasingly deployed in local workflows with access to external tools. This creates indirect prompt-injection (IPI) risk: an agent may execute harmful instructions embedded in untrusted inputs such as email, downloaded files, webpages, repositories, or group-chat messages. Existing evaluations are often small, purely simulated, or focused on a narrow set of channels. We introduce LivePI (Live Prompt Injection), a structured benchmark for IPI risk in a production-like but test-controlled environment. LivePI covers seven input surfaces, twelve attack/rendering families, and five malicious goals, including protected-information exfiltration, unauthorized security-control changes, unsafe code retrieval or execution, inbox-summary exfiltration, and cryptocurrency transfer. We run LivePI on a real virtual machine with live but test-controlled email, chat, web, local-file, repository, and wallet interfaces. Across GPT-5.3-Codex, Claude Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, Kimi K2.5, and GLM-5, total attack success rates range from 10.7% to 29.6%. Group-chat injection is uniformly successful across the evaluated backbones in our deployment, and repository-link attacks produce high-severity failures despite a small denominator. We also evaluate a two-layer defense consisting of prompt-level filtering and pre-execution tool-call authorization. In the GPT-5.3-Codex setting, the defense intercepts all tested malicious-goal completions in LivePI before execution while preserving benign utility on PinchBench-derived workloads.
Since 2016, Apple has claimed that device analytics collected to improve user experience are protected by differential privacy (DP). Apple's DifferentialPrivacy framework is deployed across its operating systems and handles sensitive signals such as Safari domains, keyboard events, photo attributes, and health-related reports. Because Apple has not open-sourced its privatization algorithms, these privacy claims have been difficult to verify independently. We present a client-side audit of Apple's DP framework on macOS Sonoma 14.2 and Sequoia 15.6. We reverse engineer the shipped binaries, recover Objective-C interfaces, build runtime harnesses that execute Apple's deployed mechanisms, and test whether their outputs match the advertised privacy guarantees. Our audit covers nearly all active deployed mechanisms, including Count Median Sketch, Hadamard-CMS, randomized-response mechanisms, and Prio-style secure aggregation. We find multiple implementation bugs and misconfigurations. Every audited mechanism that relies on floating-point noise fails to meet its advertised DP or zero-knowledge proof guarantee, due to insecure samplers with known floating-point vulnerabilities. We also find secure-aggregation configurations with local DP disabled, exposing pre-aggregation records to any party with access to those logs. Overall, we find DP violations in 5 of 9 audited mechanisms, affecting 87% of data collection in macOS Sonoma and 68% in Sequoia. We also identify public leaked iPhone logs that can be decoded to recover private information, including Safari domains and keyboard emoji signals.
Austin Bennett, Preston Vander Vos, Duc V. Le, Mira Belenkiy
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) run protocol governance by letting token holders vote on proposals. The dominant rule, voting power proportional to wallet balance, concentrates control among a small number of large holders, fueling the token-control governance attacks that have already compromised real protocols. To counter this concentration, the community has turned to anti-plutocratic voting mechanisms such as Quadratic Voting (QV), which assign sublinear voting power per token with the goal of dampening the influence of large holders. We prove that no voting rule that derives power solely from wallet balance can succeed on a permissionless blockchain. Through a costed model of on-chain voting that captures realistic blockchain frictions -- including per-wallet splitting and voting costs, fixed setup costs, and minimum-balance requirements -- we show that whenever a wallet of any size yields nonzero voting power, a Sybil attacker who splits tokens across many wallets achieves total voting power that grows at least linearly in their token holdings. For concave rules actually proposed to dampen governance power -- those that are positive, increasing, and finite -- we show that the optimal strategy yields power that is asymptotically linear in token holdings, regardless of the cost scheme. Instantiating the model on real DAOs reveals attack costs orders of magnitude below the value at stake. Replaying the ten most recent finalized proposals of five major DAOs (ENS, Compound, Uniswap, Arbitrum, and ZKsync) under linear, quadratic, logarithmic, and power-($β= 0.25$) voting, we measure Sybil amplification factors between $1,172\times$ and $4,039\times$ under Quadratic Voting, and exceeding $229,000\times$ under steeper power rules.
On-chain crowdsourcing leverages blockchain's decentralization, transparency, and tamper-resistance to build trustworthy and verifiable Web3 crowdsourced services. However, existing decentralized reputation frameworks do not reconcile anonymity, reputation binding, and scalability. This paper demonstrates how on-chain crowdsourcing can simultaneously achieve these requirements under a trust-minimized model. We introduce DARTIC, a decentralized, anonymous, and scalable reputation-driven framework for crowdsourcing. DARTIC presents a dual-ledger system that enables requesters and workers to use distinct pseudonyms across interactions, ensuring unlinkability while maintaining accountability. To mitigate Sybil and reputation-reset attacks, we employ zkSNARK-based set membership proofs, cryptographically binding all user pseudonyms to a single access token without revealing the linkage. For scalability, we investigate two aggregation techniques that compress multiple proofs into a single succinct proof to minimize verification overhead. In addition, we design an automated, privacy-preserving reputation model that dynamically evaluates contributions across diverse crowdsourcing contexts. To demonstrate practicality, we instantiate and assess DARTIC in both crowdsensing and federated learning scenarios. Experimental results show that (i) individual proof generation for token spending completes in less than 3s, (ii) aggregation reduces the verification time of 1024 proofs from 8.7s to 0.96s, and (iii) zk-batching lowers gas costs by more than 100x compared to a pure Layer-1 deployment. These results demonstrate that anonymity, robust reputation binding, and scalability can be jointly achieved in fully decentralized crowdsourcing systems.
The rapid adoption of Web3 infrastructures has led to a growing number of security incidents affecting cryptocurrency exchanges, custody services and blockchain-based platforms. While existing research predominantly focuses on vulnerabilities in smart contracts and blockchain protocols, a substantial portion of real-world losses originates from off-chain systems, organizational processes and human-centered operational workflows. This paper presents a qualitative, incident-based analysis of publicly documented, high-impact security breaches in the Web3 ecosystem, including the Bybit exchange incident (2025), the Ronin Network bridge compromise (2022), and the DMM Bitcoin exchange breach (2024). The selected cases are systematically analysed and mapped to established Web2 security reference frameworks, including OWASP-based vulnerability categories and organizational security control domains. The results indicate that dominant failure patterns in Web3 environments are insufficiently addressed by generic security control catalogues, particularly with respect to cryptographic key management, transaction approval governance, signer and validator infrastructure, third-party tooling dependencies, and human-in-the-loop processes. Based on these findings, this paper argues for the adoption of established information security management systems (ISMS) in Web3 organizations and derives a structured set of blockchain-specific cybersecurity control categories to operationalize existing ISMS frameworks for blockchain-based systems. The proposed categories aim to bridge the gap between generic security governance frameworks and domain-specific risks inherent to Web3 infrastructures.
Advances in quantum computing challenge the hardness assumptions underlying widely deployed public-key cryptography in blockchain systems. Although post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards are emerging, understanding quantum risk remains fragmented across research, engineering, governance, and investment communities. This demo presents Quantum Futures Interactive, a live interdisciplinary demonstration combining educational visualization, participatory interaction, and demonstrative post-quantum artifact generation using a toy LWE-based construction. Participants engage in a structured seven-stage interaction flow covering quantum threat education, sentiment capture, technology prioritization, infrastructure tradeoff exploration across simulators and QPUs, and artifact generation. The system integrates distributed trust concepts and sustainability-aware infrastructure considerations within an interactive decision framework.
In this paper, we make a case that endogenous tokens such as cryptoassets are not money. First, we define and classify tokens found on public, permissionless ledgers, contrasting them with privately issued stablecoins and proposed CBDC designs. We then discuss the work of Kahn et al in Money is Privacy on cash versus simplified credit, and we extend their analysis to the situation found on most public, permissionless ledgers. Many public, permissionless ledgers utilize an account-based abstraction for balances, resulting in a default state that maps onto the most harmful models of agent interaction enumerated in Money is Privacy. The conclusion is threefold: that most blockchain economies lack a cash-like primitive; that stablecoins do not intrinsically fulfil this role; and that the reliance of a network on an endogenous token for security exposes holders even of a privacy-preserving asset to the same risk, if that asset relies on the same global ledger state as the endogenous token.
Privacy-preserving cryptocurrency exchanges alter what the pricing mechanism observes about order flow. We derive the unique linear Kyle equilibrium when a committed Bayesian market maker observes order flow perturbed by independent Gaussian privacy noise. The price-impact coefficient and informed-trader strategy rescale by reciprocal factors of the privacy parameter (one down, one up), so their product is invariant. A welfare decomposition then identifies a closed-form per-period transfer from the protocol's LP pool to traders -- the "privacy subsidy", the break-even fee any privacy-aggregated exchange must charge. The result is the single-period closed-form privacy-noise analog of Loss-Versus-Rebalancing (Milionis et al. 2022). The primary application is shielded AMMs with explicit additive-noise injection (e.g., differential privacy); related designs (batched swaps, sealed-bid auctions, oracle-pegged crossings) require separate frameworks that we leave to future work.
Every BFT consensus protocol uses collision-resistant hashes to compare validator state. Collision resistance destroys distance: two validators agreeing on 19 of 20 transactions produce unrelated hashes, indistinguishable from validators sharing nothing. This forces three design constraints across the BFT literature: validators must synchronize state before voting, agreement quality cannot be measured until votes are counted, and hierarchical committees must be large enough for independent BFT, limiting tree depth. This paper introduces distance-preserving transaction digests, a primitive that replaces collision-resistant hashes with commutative vector sums in 8-dimensional space. The primitive has three properties hashes lack: distance is proportional to disagreement, weighted means are exact, and set differences are identifiable via bloom filter diff. We demonstrate three applications: a two-phase BFT protocol (Proxima) that achieves single-round finality when validators agree; tree-structured consensus with groups of 10 validators (vs 128 in Ethereum), enabled because distance filtering replaces per-group BFT; and cross-shard consistency verification at 128 bytes per shard pair, replacing the per-transaction coordination of two-phase commit. Safety is proved: fewer than N/3 Byzantine validators cannot cause conflicting finalization, independent of Phase 1 clustering or tree topology. At N =100,000, Proxima Tree uses 2.2x fewer messages than HotStuff (a structural property unaffected by parallelism). Single-core finality is 0.9s vs 18s for HotStuff; multi-core BLS narrows but does not eliminate this gap.
Eunchan Park, Kyonghwa Song, Won Hoi Kim, Wonho Song · 5 authors
Traditional blockchain untraceability schemes, such as mixers and privacy coins, obscure the sender-receiver relationship by placing transfers within an anonymity set. This paper studies a stronger goal: whether the transfer event itself can be made unobservable by blending into common decentralized-finance (DeFi) activity. We introduce Deniable Covert Asset Transfer (DCAT), a class of transfers that stage common loss-producing events, such as sandwich and arbitrage operations, so that a sender appears to suffer an ordinary loss while the receiver appears to profit from it. We design and validate two DCAT instantiations: a sandwich-based transfer on Ethereum and an arbitrage-based transfer on Arbitrum. Our experiments show that, under the evaluated settings, DCAT transfers are empirically unobservable on both chains. They are syntactically identical to corresponding maximal extractable value (MEV) activities, classified as ordinary extractions by standard MEV detection tools, and leave the sender and receiver unlinked under representative forensic tools. Since syntactic inspection cannot distinguish DCAT from ordinary MEV activity, we examine whether economic semantics provide useful forensic signals. Through a large-scale study of MEV losses on Ethereum and Arbitrum, we show that key semantic features follow power laws. Extreme losses and repeatedly exploited addresses occur in the wild, and thus are not by themselves definitive evidence of collusion. This gives staged transfers plausible deniability and makes fixed-threshold detection prone to false positives. We therefore develop a multivariate statistical method for forensic triage that ranks incidents by the joint rarity of their economic footprint. Applied to real-world DeFi activity, our method narrows a large search space to suspicious cases for manual investigation; we present three such cases to illustrate this prioritization.
Data is critical for the operation of any organization and needs to be protected, especially against attacks that compromise the state of the database. In this paper, we explore an approach based on Byzantine-fault tolerant replicated state machines, built on top of a deterministic extension of PostgreSQL. Each replica deterministically executes transactions recorded in a shared log/blockchain. Our focus is on creating a practical system that is designed for efficient and quick detection of corruption, as well as quick repair concurrent with execution of transactions. We also present a performance study showing the efficiency and practicality of our approach. We believe our work lays the foundations for the practical use of the BFT replicated state machine approach in the context of databases.
The x402 protocol revives the HTTP 402 Payment Required status code to enable web-native micropayments across APIs, content, and agents. It combines synchronous HTTP authorization with asynchronous blockchain settlement and introduces a cross-layer attack surface absent from conventional web and on-chain payments. In this paper, we formally analyze x402 and empirically show that it is vulnerable in both design and implementation. We present five concrete attacks that reveal weaknesses in authorization, binding, replay protection, and web-layer handling, showing that x402 is vulnerable across multiple stages of the payment workflow. We validate these attacks through a reproducible testbed on local chains, Base Sepolia, and live endpoints and further audit three open-source SDKs and endpoints. Our results show that all five attacks are practical and can cause either unpaid service or paid-but-denied outcomes. We also propose practical mitigations.
Ring signatures offer highly desirable privacy features like anonymity and ad-hoc group formation with high autonomy, but partially lack linkability and accountability features required for strict use-cases like consent management in healthcare. Existing signature schemes fail to natively integrate scoped linkability with decentralized accountability defined here on-demand unconditional deanonymization of signers without reliance on a trusted party (opener) or a separate cryptographic commitment. We introduce Deanonymizable Scoped Linkable Ring Signatures (DSLRS) to address this gap. DSLRS builds on previous linkable and accountable signature schemes and their cryptographic primitives to construct a new signature scheme that natively implement both privacy and trust features. Scoped linkability in DSLRS is achieved using "scopes" (context identifiers) and dynamic key images, effectively providing ring-independent scoped linkability and unlinkability across different scopes. DSLRS relies on k-of-N decentralized deanonymization network nodes to extract the signer's public key (identity) from ElGamal components built in the signature, achieving ring-independent decentralized accountability. The full DSLRS algorithms, formal property definitions and proofs, signature evaluation and experimental results from an implementation, and a blockchain-based instantiation and application of our scheme in consent management for clinical trials are provided. DSLRS is proved under the ECDLP and DDH hardness assumptions in the Random Oracle Model (ROM).
The Ethereum blockchain utilizes the EIP-1559 algorithm to manage transaction inclusion and block assembly. However, EIP-1559 and much of the existing literature study this problem from a static perspective, focusing on price evolution without modelling transaction dynamics within the mempool. Motivated by this limitation, we study a dynamic transaction scheduling problem in which transactions with heterogeneous sizes and per-unit values arrive over time and remain in the mempool until scheduled. To capture the stochastic mempool evolution, we formulate the problem as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) whose state represents the mempool configuration and whose actions correspond to block prices. We first provide a primal-dual interpretation of the static EIP-1559 mechanism, showing that block prices arise naturally as dual variables of a social-welfare maximization problem. Building on this perspective, we extend the framework to the dynamic setting and formulate an objective that maximizes long-run discounted reward while incorporating holding costs and overshoot penalties. We then employ a Natural Policy Gradient (NPG) algorithm to compute the optimal policy. Our results show that dynamic pricing stabilizes the mempool while maximizing long-run discounted reward. In particular, as the overshoot penalty increases, the average scheduled transaction volume converges to the target block capacity, and the resulting NPG updates closely resemble the EIP-1559 price update rule. Finally, we study two special cases of the MDP formulation: homogeneous transactions and uniform arrivals. In the homogeneous setting, where the protocol directly controls scheduled volume, we show that the optimal policy has a threshold structure. We then propose a bang-bang pricing mechanism for uniform arrivals and derive a lower bound on the block capacity needed to ensure system stability.
We present \textbf{ORCHID} (\textit{Orchestrated Reduction Consensus for Hash-based Integrity in Distributed Ledgers}), a novel bio-inspired consensus protocol that maps the neuroscientific \emph{binding problem} -- how the brain integrates distributed neural oscillations into a unified conscious percept -- onto the distributed systems \emph{consensus problem}, how blockchain nodes agree on a single ledger state under Byzantine faults. Grounded in the Penrose--Hameroff Orchestrated Objective Reduction (Orch~OR) hypothesis and the Kuramoto synchronisation model, ORCHID equips each node with a quantum-noisy phase oscillator; consensus is triggered when the network's order parameter $r(t)$ crosses a \emph{binding threshold} $θ_b$, mirroring the gamma-band binding event in conscious perception. ORCHID is further strengthened by a coherence-weighted Quantum Secret Sharing (QSS) layer, extending the survey framework of Weinberg to a concrete consensus application. Simulation results on Watts--Strogatz small-world networks ($n=10$--$150$) demonstrate: (i)~the Kuramoto order parameter reaches $r_{\max}=0.988$ under coupling $K=3.0$, well above the theoretical critical coupling $K_c \approx 1.41$; (ii)~a sharp QSS fidelity phase transition at coherence $c^*\approx 0.82$, confirming Theorem~2; (iii)100\% consensus rate at all tested Byzantine fractions (0\%--40\%), with median convergence under 4~s for $n=30$; and (iv)~ORCHID achieves $O(n{\cdot}k)$ message complexity, outperforming PBFT's $O(n^2)$ at $n\geq150$. These results establish ORCHID as a scalable, biologically plausible, and quantum-augmented consensus mechanism for post-quantum distributed ledgers.
Stefan-Claudiu Susan, Andrei Arusoaie, Dorel Lucanu
The irreversible nature of blockchain transactions makes the identification of smart contract vulnerabilities an essential requirement for secure system development. While Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into developer workflows, their reliability as autonomous security auditors remains unproven. We assess whether current generative models are a viable replacement for, or only a complement to, traditional static-analysis tools. Our findings indicate that LLM efficacy is undermined by both inherent lexical bias and a lack of rigorous validation of external data inputs. This reliance on non-semantic heuristics, such as identifier naming, leads to a high frequency of false positives. Furthermore, prompting techniques reveal a trade-off between precision and recall. These results were derived using our custom automated framework, which achieves 92% accuracy in classifying model outputs.
Ali Irzam Kathia, Yimika Erinle, Abylay Satybaldy, Paolo Tasca · 6 authors
The integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) with Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) has become a growing research area, yet contributions tend to cluster around specific application domains or examine only one direction of the integration, leaving the broader architectural interplay between the two technologies poorly understood. This work addresses that gap through a structured, bidirectional review of peer-reviewed studies published between 2020 and 2025. We classify contributions along two directions: AI-enhanced DLT, and DLT-enhanced AI. In the first case, we examine how AI techniques improve DLT systems across five layers: data, network, consensus, execution, and application layers. In the second case, we analyse how DLT supports AI systems across five layers: infrastructure, data, model, inference, and application layers, with particular attention to federated learning, model evaluation, and multi-agent coordination. The analysis reveals that most works concentrate on a small subset of layers: execution and consensus for AI-enhanced DLT, data and model for DLT-enhanced AI. Other layers remain comparatively neglected. Despite reported improvements in controlled settings, no study demonstrates deployment at production scale, and the field has not yet offered satisfying answers to fundamental questions around scalability, interoperability, and verifiable execution. We argue that progress will require cross-layer co-design and empirical validation in real-world settings.
Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAO) can fragment when partisan communities emerge within their governance structures, leading to organisational splits known as "forks". We present a method to detect these emerging communities by analysing on-chain voting behaviour before fragmentation occurs. Our approach extracts voting events from governance smart contracts, constructs voter matrices encoding participation patterns, and applies pairwise dissimilarity analysis to quantify ideological divergence between addresses. We visualise these relationships using multidimensional scaling and identify partisan communities through k-means clustering with silhouette score optimisation. Using Nouns DAO as a case study, a protocol that has experienced multiple documented forks, we demonstrate that addresses destined to fork cluster together months before actual fragmentation events. Our analysis of 330 proposals spanning from contract deployment to the first major fork shows that 90% of fork addresses cluster together in the final 44 proposals, compared to only 47% in randomised data. These results indicate that partisan communities can be detected and visualised through on-chain governance analysis, offering early warnings of emerging divisions before they cause organisational fragmentation.
Autonomous AI agents are increasingly deployed on blockchain platforms, yet the design space that governs their interaction remains poorly understood. This convergence, where autonomous agents operate on and within decentralized systems, is a defining feature of the emerging Web~4.0 paradigm. This paper presents a Systematization of Knowledge organized around a bidirectional trust framework. In the B $\boldsymbol{\rightarrow}$ A direction, we examine how blockchain provides trust infrastructure for agents, spanning identity and account abstraction, permission and delegation, intent-centric execution, and tokenized agent economies. In the A $\boldsymbol{\rightarrow}$ B direction, we examine the reverse: how AI agents participate in core blockchain mechanisms including security auditing, consensus, and governance. A Trust Foundation of verifiable computation underpins both directions, with each primitive offering different trade-offs between trust minimality, computational overhead, and deployment readiness. We formalize the interaction as an Agent-Blockchain Interaction Model (ABIM), catalog 70 Ethereum EIPs/ERCs, examine 20 representative industry projects, and review 118 academic papers, applying a five-dimensional framework assessing Verifiability, Minimality of Trust, Expressiveness, Composability, and Maturity. Our analysis uncovers significant gaps: the agent-specific standards ecosystem is overwhelmingly immature, intent architectures lack formal analysis, and while isolated works have begun to explore AI participation in consensus and governance, a unified security framing that treats AI as a first-class actor at the protocol layer remains absent. We propose a three-dimensional taxonomy, identify nine concrete open problems, and highlight the sharpest research opportunities at this intersection.
Smart contract security has progressed from vulnerability detection toward a broader research agenda that includes semantic reasoning, automated repair, adversarial robustness, and real-time exploit detection. This paper develops a capstone-oriented research narrative around four directions: foundation-model-based smart contract semantics and vulnerability reasoning [1], automated smart contract repair with formal guarantees [2], adversarial learning for robust malicious contract and transaction detection [3], and real-time transaction-level exploit detection at blockchain scale [4]. We connect these directions to two recent studies that characterize the current frontier: a diagnostic analysis of where smart contract security analyzers fall short [5] and a scalable real-time system for malicious Ethereum transaction detection [6]. The resulting framework is intended to help students formulate capstone projects that are technically grounded, empirically measurable, and aligned with contemporary smart contract security research.
Swati Sachan, Dale Fickett, Richard Buchinger, Theo Miller
Recent advances in error-corrected qubits have accelerated the timeline for practical quantum computing. It poses a threat to cryptographic primitives used to secure financial systems, government infrastructure, communication networks, and DeFi (Decentralized Finance) ecosystems. This paper introduces a post-quantum secure federated DeFi framework that enables inter-bank collaboration to improve the inclusivity of individuals underserved by local lenders due to limited financial histories. Multiple banks contribute encrypted information batches to a virtual server, where lattice-based Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) enables end-to-end homomorphic computation. The server fuses local data-driven probabilistic assessments, expert beliefs, and verifiable evidence generated by the NASA-IBM Prithvi Geospatial Foundation Model (GFM), in encrypted format. Decentralized technologies are employed to ensure tamper-proof evidence and auditable accountability for all encrypted data exchanges between institutions and the server. The framework is tested on agricultural lending decisions for rural borrowers in Virginia.