Bitcoins have emerged as a possible competitor to usual currencies, but other\ncrypto-currencies have likewise appeared as competitors to the Bitcoin\ncurrency. The expanding market of crypto-currencies now involves capital\nequivalent to $10^{10}$ US Dollars, providing academia with an unusual\nopportunity to study the emergence of value. Here we show that the Bitcoin\ncurrency in itself is not special, but may rather be understood as the\ncontemporary dominating crypto-currency that may well be replaced by other\ncurrencies. We suggest that perception of value in a social system is generated\nby a voter-like dynamics, where fashions form and disperse even in the case\nwhere information is only exchanged on a pairwise basis between agents.\n
Bitcoins are digital gold. They are a purely electronic commodity traded for speculative purposes as well as in exchange for goods and services. Just like physical gold, the relative price of bitcoins denominated in different currencies implies a nominal exchange rate. This is a departure from previous literature which treats bitcoin prices themselves as nominal exchange rates. I argue that treating prices as exchange rates is inappropriate as one would not consider the price of physical gold to be an exchange rate. Therefore, this paper characterizes the behavior of nominal exchange rates implied by relative bitcoin prices. I show that the implied nominal exchange rate is highly cointegrated with the nominal exchange rate determined in conventional foreign currency exchange markets. I also show that the direction of causality flows from the conventional markets to the bitcoin market and not vice-versa which can explain much of the volatility in bitcoin prices.
Bitcoin has enabled competition between digital cryptocurrencies and traditional legal tender fiat currencies. Despite rapidly increasing acceptance, so far the affirmation of cryptocurrency as better money has been thwarted by dramatic deflationary price instability. Successful at disposing of any central monetary authority, bitcoin has elected to have a fixed deterministic inelastic monetary policy, establishing itself more as digital gold than as a currency. Price stability could be achieved by dynamically rebasing the outstanding amount of money: the number of cryptocurrency units in every digital wallet is adjusted instead of each single unit changing its value. The apparent awkwardness of this unfamiliar paradigm is discussed at length, proving that its only real novelty is about fairness and effectiveness. Furthermore, suggestions are provided about how to ease the effect of contractionary monetary policy. The proposed monetary base adjustment has neutral impact on the overall wallet wealth, as it does not introduce any arbitrary distortion into the intrinsic value dynamics of the wallet. The adjustment is based on a commodity price index determined with a resilient consensus process that does not rely on central third party authorities. It is posited in this paper that a digital cryptocurrency adopting elastic monetary standard is Hayek Money, so named from the Nobel Prize-winning economist: a good money standard providing stable prices for a new economic era.
Though Bitcoin currently enjoys a healthy niche, the aspirations of many in the project are grander: to supplant the existing regime of fiat currencies with cryptocurrencies, and to do so outside of normal political channels. Its primary practical obstacle is its purchasing power volatility, arising from a rigid money stock in the face of wide swings in demand. Nevertheless, the historical example of gold, another (much more successful) money commodity with a more or less rigid supply, illuminates the institutional prerequisites for purchasing power stability, economic efficiency, and sustained growth – namely a market of financial intermediaries whose liabilities denominated in the base money themselves circulate as media of exchange. This paper discusses potential benefits and hurdles to establishing financial intermediation in cryptocurrency, as well as the possibility of managing the money supply to create a stable purchasing power cryptocurrency without the need for intermediation at all. Such schemes ultimately require an existing market of intermediaries in order to provide any benefits, the emergence of which governments are for the moment well-positioned to prevent.
At present, bitcoin is held mostly as a speculative vehicle, little used to pay for goods and services. Its value has been unstable, which impedes bitcoin’s wider use as a payment medium. We explain why the value of bitcoin has been so unstable. Then, we discuss entrepreneurial efforts that might enable bitcoin to become a more commonly accepted payment medium.
Meilė Jasienė, Arvydas Paškevičius, Ieva Astrauskaitė
Searching for alternative source of bank financing, the view on capital market is taken. Recent research on capital market issues are arranged into four dimensions: theory and assumptions of efficient capital market, government’s role in it, other distortions and global interrelatedness. Main investigations are decentralized and visualized in “theoretical eight” model. Conclusions made on the diversity of interpretation of market efficiency, strongly expressed demand of information symmetry, soft actions of governments and the value of foreign performance in domestic markets. Furthermore, new approach to the classification of countries by their maturity in capital market is argued. The state of art of 2009-2012 of bond market and government debt is briefly described.
In this paper, I consider two heterogeneous economies that engage in a currency union. The small economy adopts the currency of the large and is highly dependent on its wealthier partner for trade. The effects of a currency union, deficit financing and institutional restraints on inflation are analyzed in a dual economy with different wage-setting mechanisms. In the model, Northern Cyprus is the small economy and Turkey, being the only country that acknowledges it as an independent state is its larger partner. Features of the labour markets determine the wages. We make a conjecture that wage determination in Northern Cyprus (NC) is conducted with reference to centralized-bargaining and that decentralized bargaining sets the wages in Turkey (TR). Hence, the differences in wage-setting procedures cause a dual labour market. In order to incorporate monetary dependence into the analysis, we let the Turkish central bank to decide on the economic policy measures, in this case the inflation rate and unemployment. The institutional restraints such as economic sanctions increase the inflexibility in the NC and cause shocks to affect the economy more. In order to compensate for the losses that might be endured by the government in NC, TR finances the budget deficit of NC. Therefore, TR government needs to consider the burden of this financing issue.
In this paper we study the optimal monetary and fiscal policies of a general equilibrium model of unemployment and money with search frictions both in labor and goods markets\nas in Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2010). We abstract from revenue-raising motives to focus on the welfare-enhancing properties of optimal policies. We show that some of the\ninefficiencies in the Berentsen, Menzio and Wright (2010) framework can be restored with appropriate fiscal policies. In particular, when lump sum monetary transfers are possible,\na production subsidy financed by money printing can increase output in the decentralized market and a vacancy subsidy financed by a dividend tax even when the Hosios’ rule does\nnot hold.
:This paper aims to show how state intervention within the European Monetary Union can have positive effects not only on growth but also on public balances and debt. The relation between centralized monetary policy and decentralized fiscal policy partly solves the lack of coordination between the two. Each time a fiscal expansion in an EU country is not accompanied by a Central Bank interest rate increase, the expansionary effect of public spending, initially financed through the emission of public bonds, will be reinforced by endogenous money creation due to the increase in growth. The final result, if growth exceeds the rate of interest, is not only an increase in equilibrium income, but also a reduction in debt.
This paper studies the effects of stock market valuation on research investment, the rate of innovation, and welfare. In the presence of financing constraints for R&D investment, episodes of high market valuation can ease these constraints and raise the economy-wide investment in R&D and the rate of innovation. If the decentralized equilibrium rate of innovation is inefficiently low, then such episodes may lead to an increase in aggregate welfare even if the higher valuation is not entirely justified by fundamentals. We present a Schumpeterian-style growth model with a costly financial intermediation process to characterize the relationship between market value, entry of new firms, and the aggregate rate of innovation. We use the model to measure the welfare consequences of a stock market run-up that may only partly be justified by fundamentals. In particular, we apply the model to the US economy in the 1990s and calibrate the impact of the NASDAQ boom on the rate of innovation, growth and welfare. The welfare effect depends on the underlying change in fundamentals. We find that with an acceleration in US trend productivity growth from a pre-1995 rate of 1.4% to a rate of 2.0% per annum, the NASDAQ boom will have resulted in a net welfare gain of 0.55%. If the new growth rate is as high as 3%, the net gain was 1.35% of the present discounted value of consumption.
This article studies the effects of political institutions on inflation. In our view, hyperinflation is the manifestation of a tragedy of commons in a divided society with a weak central monetary authority. Economies with fiat money are inherently inflation-prone: the collection of seigniorage through the inflation tax is less conspicuous than other taxes, and the printing of money is essentially costless. In many countries, the control of the money supply is de facto or de jure decentralized. Sets of agents (in various regions or interest groups) can effectively pressure the central government to finance their expenditures. As these interest groups pursue their self-interest, they neglect the welfare effects of the inflation tax on individuals in other groups. These elements combine to imply that countries which rely on the inflation tax to meet the resource demands of competing interest groups will typically experience inefficiently (due to negative spillovers) high inflation.
The World Economic Outlook (WEO) exercise at the IMF evolved during the 1980s, partly in response to demands by policymakers in national finance ministries for objective and internationally comparable projections and policy scenarios. The exercise had begun as a staff initiative, encouraged by the Managing Director (Johannes Witteveen). Gradually, the Executive Board, the Interim Committee, the Group of Seven, and others came to view the discussion of the WEO documents as an important element in their efforts to keep abreast of world economic developments and prospects. Direct and indirect feedback from those discussions informed the staff as to how the exercise should be improved. Driven by this policy relevance, the WEO evolved from a decentralized project that was only haphazardly model-based into a more rigorous and coordinated exercise.
A recent development in economic science is the attempt to integrate monetary theory with the theory of general economic equilibrium. This work takes as its starting point the idea that money cannot have value in standard, general equilibrium models. In these, too much trade can be accomplished in centralized markets (see Robert Clower, 1969, 1971; Frank Hahn, 1973; or Neil Wallace, 1980). Thus, to decentralize or break up the structure, either exchange must be made costly or there must be restrictions on who can trade with whom, and thus such choicetheoretic models offer the intriguing possibility that real and monetary phenomena can be understood as intimately related. This paper continues in the relatively brief, choice-theoretic tradition, motivated by real and monetary phenomena associated economic development and growth: 1) To be noted first is Simon Kuznets' seminal work on national income (1971). In a cross-section study of fifty-seven countries in 1958, Kuznets shows that the share of the agricultural sector, including forestry, fishing, and hunting, in Gross Domestic Product is inversely correlated with Gross Domestic Product per capita. The share of the industrial sector, including transportation and communication, is closely and positively associated with per capita product. The share of the service sector tends to be positively but weakly associated with per capita product, but the share of banking, insurance, and real estate shows a striking rise as one shifts from lowto higher-income countries. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the ratio of industrial prices to agricultural prices is perhaps lower the higher is per capita income, though the evidence on relative prices for the service sector is inconsistent. Turning to long time-series for thirteen developed and four less developed countries, Kuznets finds dramatic evidence for a decline of the agricultural sector and a rise in the industrial sector with per capita income, at least in developed countries. Again, results for the service sector are mixed, but Canada, France, and the United States are positive exceptions. The share of a transport-communication subsector rises quite consistently. Turning next to shares of sectors in the labor force, Kuznets finds, both on a cross-sectional and secular basis, that all the above movements are at least mirrored and in many cases amplified. In particular, both components of the share of the service sector, services and commerce, rise substantially with Gross Domestic Product per capita. 2) To be noted second is the extensive work of Raymond Goldsmith on financial structure and financial intermediation. For the United States, Goldsmith (1958) finds that the activity of intermediaries, as measured by their share in national assets, in tangible assets, and in all claims, has shown a substantial rise from 1860 to 1952. Similarly, Goldsmith (1969) finds that the ratio of financial institutions' assets to Gross National Product rises substantially from 1860 to 1963 in both developed and less developed countries, including Switzerland, Great Britain, the United States, Japan, Argentina, and India. Related, the number of households with savings accounts, the number with life insurance policies, and the number with stock ownership expressed as percents of the population are all low for less developed countries relative to developed countries, and *Professor of Economics, Carnegie-Mellon University, Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Schenley Park, Pittsburgh, PA 15213. This paper was motivated by a conversation with Thomas Sargent and has been aided by helpful comments from Robert Barro, Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Dan Peled, Kenneth Singleton, and Neil Wallace. Financial support from the National Science Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and the Peterkin Symposium on Foundations of Monetary Policy and Government Finance at Rice University, and research assistance from Pramerudee Townsend are all gratefully acknowledged. I alone assume full responsibility for any errors and for the views expressed here.