Recent research has shown how federalism affects health care finance, health care reform, and health policy innovation. The purpose of this article is to extend this research program to study the linkages between federalism and technological change. It does so using comparative case studies spanning five countries to examine innovation and diffusion of two blood technologies-enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISA blood tests) and heat treatment-in response to the threat to the blood supply posed by HIV during the 1980s. Prior research has produced three contradictory models of the federalism-innovation relationship. This article attempts to resolve these contradictions, posits new hypotheses, and highlights sources of omitted variable bias that have important implications for understanding technological change. The case studies show that overall decentralization, rather than federalism alone, aids technological progress by allowing its supporters to "venue shop" around political resistance. Decentralization also makes the state less vulnerable to capture by status-quo interest groups. Moreover, political decentralization may have a positive effect on technological diffusion, but a far weaker effect on innovation. Thus, prior research that conflates these two effects should be revisited.
The regional organization of the Spanish national health system offers a âunique fieldâ for exploring the sources of health inequalities as well as for testing the effects of political decentralization on health and healthcare inequalities. Drawing from the results of an empirical analysis where inequalities in three dimensions of health (outcome), healthcare (access) and healthcare payments (financing) are estimated, this article first explores the association between three such inequality dimensions alongside other system and socio-economic controls. Second, we examine whether the first wave of asymmetric healthcare devolution which took place in Spain between (1980â2001) â whereby health policy responsibilities were transferred to a few region states (autonomous communities [ACs]) â correlates with higher inequalities in health, healthcare and health financing. Our findings suggest that inequalities in health and healthcare appear to be driven by income inequalities and inequalities in use but not by inequalities in financing and health expenditure. Region states politically responsible for the organization of healthcare did not exhibit significant differences in health and healthcare inequalities and tend to exhibit a better equity performance.
The global financial crisis poses a threat to global health, and may exacerbate diseases of poverty, e.g. HIV, malaria and tuberculosis. Exploring the implications of the global financial crisis for the health sector response to tuberculosis is useful to illustrate the practical problems and propose possible solutions. The response to tuberculosis is considered in the context of health sector development. Problems and solutions are considered in five key areas: financing, prioritization, government regulation, integration and decentralization. Securing health gains in global tuberculosis control depends on protecting expenditure by governments of countries badly affected by tuberculosis and by donors, taking measures to increase efficiencies, prioritizing health expenditures and strengthening government regulation. Lessons learned will be valuable for stakeholders involved in the health sector response to tuberculosis and other diseases of poverty.
The objective of the study was to analyze the status and explore the challenges to decentralization policy implementation in Nepal. Thirty seven key informants rich in experience and knowledge, seven focus group discussions, observation of six health facilities and analysis of about 25 key policy documents provided the data for this study. The study identified the challenges to the implementation of decentralization reforms in the public health sector as: (i) centralised and weak management and programming practices of the government; (ii) weak legal and institutional framework; (iii) conflicting policy objectives; (iv) lack of implementation strategy; (v) poor financial and human resource management system; (vi) lack of adequate preparation for managing the reform; (vii) weak capacity at all levels; (viii) political instability. It was revealed that the implementation of the policy in Nepal was extremely poor as many of the important policy measures were either never initiated or they were only partially implemented. The challenges lie both at - policy design and implementation phase. Clear policy objectives, appropriate structure, sound planning, financing and human resources policy, adequate capacity, responsive information system, defined service packages, active participation of stakeholders and a conducive socio-political environment are considered imperative for successful implementation of the policy. Preparation for managing reform implementation at national and district levels is prerequisite for decentralization to work. Pushing for decentralization in a politically fragile environment may rather lead to further fragmentation, instead of strengthening government legitimacy.
In this essay a conceptual and theoretical scheme for decentralized integrated health care systems of the northern European kind is developed. With small changes it is also applicable to other countries, e.g. Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Three ideas tie together the scheme: modified fiscal federalism, principalagent thinking and the analysis of discrete structural alternatives from new institutional economics. As a special case it encompasses the ideas of planned markets and public competition developed by von Otter and Saltman. The scheme can be used to analyse driving forces behind reforms and prediction of effects. To illustrate the thinking the recent Norwegian reform is put into context, not only geographically but also theoretically. The geographical context is that of Scandinavia and there is a summary of reforms in the Scandinavian countries over the past 20-30 years. The essay thus serves the double purpose of presenting and evaluating the Norwegian reform in a Scandinavian context and to take part in the neglected discipline of developing a theory of health care reform. The Norwegian January 2002 reform is described in some detail. It is a reversal of the Scandinavian model of decentralization and a move towards more centralism. The hospital system was transferred to the state that established five regions with independent (non-political) boards and each region has a number of daughters (hospitals) that have great autonomy with their own boards and are outside the legal restrictions of the public sector. Basically the idea is to mimic the corporate structure of large private companies. The reform is evaluated based on principal-agent thinking and the analysis of discrete structural alternatives. Overall there is no a priori reason to expect large improvements in efficiency â but on the other hand neither should one expect things to get worse. Many effects depend, however, crucially, on (a) the financing system that will be put in place late 2002 or early 2003, and (b) whether or not the political and management culture change as a result of the reform. In the concluding sections possible implications for Denmark and Sweden are discussed.
Options for health financing reform are often portrayed as a choice between general taxation (known as the Beveridge model) and social health insurance (known as the Bismarck model). Ten years of health financing reform in Kyrgyzstan, since the introduction of its compulsory health insurance fund in 1997, provide an excellent example of why it is wrong to reduce health financing policy to a choice between the Beveridge and Bismarck models. Rather than fragment the system according to the insurance status of the population, as many other low- and middle-income countries have done, the Kyrgyz reforms were guided by the objective of having a single system for the entire population. Key features include the role and gradual development of the compulsory health insurance fund as the single purchaser of health-care services for the entire population using output-based payment methods, the complete restructuring of pooling arrangements from the former decentralized budgetary structure to a single national pool, and the establishment of an explicit benefit package. Central to the process was the transformation of the role of general budget revenues - the main source of public funding for health - from directly subsidizing the supply of services to subsidizing the purchase of services on behalf of the entire population by redirecting them into the health insurance fund. Through their approach to health financing policy, and pooling in particular, the Kyrgyz health reformers demonstrated that different sources of funds can be used in an explicitly complementary manner to enable the creation of a unified, universal system.
The health financing schemes is the foundation for the nationâs health care system, and the health insurance is a main one of some options for financing health care. This article compares two health care financing schemes in urban areas before and after the health reform, and targets at the impacts facing coverage groups, the financing methods, decision-making power or financial management (i.e. the distribution of responsibility and rights between the central government and local governments), payment arrangement and cost containment of health care financing mechanisms. Prior to reform, the equal access and universal coverage of health care services were implemented through the employment-based health insurance in a state-controlled economy with guaranteed full employment and central control in general. The decentralization reforms of fiscal system and tax sharing reforms disrupts the past economic foundation, the rebuilding health insurance system which still benefits the employed bring the limited coverage. The next trend is to make transition from health insurance covering only part of the employed population to what are in effect national health services covering the whole population in urban areas.
Health and education expenditures constitute some of the most important public services that governments provide. Their features are also particularly relevant for nations with multiple levels of government. The provision of health care and education services, and sometimes health insurance coverage for individuals, is typically entrusted to subnational governments. At the same time, as we have mentioned in earlier chapters, these services fulfill important national objectives. They contribute to redistributive objectives such as equality of opportunity and social insurance, and they also promote efficiency and growth in the national economy. The result is that, although the provision of health and education services are decentralized, the federal government maintains an interest in how they are delivered and engages in policies to influence that delivery. We devote this chapter to investigating in more detail some the issues that arise because of this shared responsibility. RESPONSIBILITY BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT In discussing the assignment of responsibilities for health care and education and the role of each level of government, it is important to distinguish between the provision of services and their financing. Provision of Health and Education Services Both health care and education represent services provided by hospitals, doctors, schools, teachers, and others directly to individuals. By necessity, the provision of these services is decentralized to local agencies or institutions.
BACKGROUND: During the Suharto era public funding of health in Indonesia was low and the health services were tightly controlled by the central government; district health staff had practically no discretion over expenditure. Following the downfall of President Suharto there was a radical political, administrative and fiscal decentralization with delivery of services becoming the responsibility of district governments. In addition, public funding for health services more than doubled between 2001 and 2006. It was widely expected that services would improve as district governments now had both more adequate funds and the responsibility for services. To date there has been little improvement in services. Understanding why services have not improved requires careful study of what is happening at the district level. METHODS: We collected information on public expenditure on health services for the fiscal year 2006 in 15 districts in Java, Indonesia from the district health offices and district hospitals. Data obtained in the districts were collected by three teams, one for each province. Information on district government revenues were obtained from district public expenditure databases maintained by the World Bank using data from the Ministry of Finance. RESULTS: The public expenditure information collected in 15 districts as part of this study indicates district governments are reliant on the central government for as much as 90% of their revenue; that approximately half public expenditure on health is at the district level; that at least 40% of district level public expenditure on health is for personnel, almost all of them permanent civil servants; and that districts may have discretion over less than one-third of district public expenditure on health; the extent of discretion over spending is much higher in district hospitals than in the district health office and health centers. There is considerable variation between districts. CONCLUSION: In contrast to the promise of decentralization there has been little increase in the potential for discretion at the district level in managing public funds for health - this is likely to be an important reason for the lack of improvement in publicly funded health services. Key decisions about money are still made by the central government, and no one is held accountable for the performance of the sector - the district blames the center and the central ministries (and their ministers) are not accountable to district populations.
In this article, the determinants of health care expenditure per capita in Spanish regions are analysed. The coexistence of several models concerning the degree of spending power decentralization and financing systems makes Spain a singular case and allows us to draw conclusions relevant for other countries decentralizing their health care systems. Analysing the Spanish case also serves to show a number of pitfalls affecting econometric estimation of the effects of income and demographic structure on health expenditure. Because the reliability of parameter estimates is a key issue in the literature on the determinants of health expenditure, these potential problems should be taken into account when estimating and interpreting results.
Two papers in this volume focus on public finance and decentralization as central to resolving India's systemic public health crisis. However, some states and districts have achieved success despite serious financial and administrative deficits; this suggests that factors such as political commitment, community participation, human resource management, women's empowerment, and governance may be as or more important. The success of the National Rural Health Mission will depend on state and local institutional capacity, including strong partnerships with civil society organizations and private-sector actors. Increased resources and decentralization will not be sufficient by themselves.
In this paper the problems of health services in China and India are related to some structural features of the two economies. Some similarities and differences exist across these two countries in terms of political economy, with differential results. Both countries have experienced remarkable economic growth during the past quarter-century, but this has not always translated into improvements in health for the poor. Although China used to have an egalitarian basic public health service, the system has become quite inegalitarian during the past quarter-century, with the disintegration of the communes and adoption of fee-based services under a system of decentralized public finance. India's health system has remained inegalitarian throughout.
El Sistema Nacional de Salud (SNS) presenta una compleja situaciĂłn de equilibrio, que aunque puede ser satisfactorio a corto plazo, plantea grandes problemas de sostenibilidad y gobernabilidad; el incierto balance del proceso de descentralizaciĂłn sanitaria en España señala claramente la senda de buscar nuevas alternativas organizativas para hacer efectivas las ventajas de la descentralizaciĂłn, a la vez que ser capaces de aprovechar las economĂas del sistema y conseguir la equidad pretendida. Se proponen cuatro lĂneas de actuaciĂłn: redefiniciĂłn del SNS en torno al aseguramiento pĂșblico y derecho cĂvico igual para todos; replanteamiento del sistema de financiaciĂłn y del papel del fondo de cohesiĂłn; redefinir el papel del gobierno central y el Ministerio de Sanidad, y crear un nuevo organismo, la Agencia del SNS con un Comisionado que de soporte organizativo e identidad al SNS como ĂĄmbito de acciĂłn cooperativa. The Spanish National Health System (SNHS) is currently in a complex equilibrium which, even if acceptable in the short term, faces major sustainability and governance challenges; the so far inconclusive outcome of the SNHS decentralization process clearly underlines the importance of seeking new alternatives to effectively bring about the real benefits of decentralization, while taking advantage of the system's economies of scale and achieving its equity objectives. To this end, four lines of action are proposed in this paper: first, redefine the SNHS based on universal public coverage, as a civic right and equal for all; second, reframe the financing system and the role of the Cohesion Fund; third, review the role of central government and its Ministry of Health, and fourth, create of a SNHS Agency headed by a Commissioner, for providing an organizational framework and identity for the SNHS, and serving as the cooperative body of the seventeen Autonomous Communitiesâ Health Services.
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Global Health Care Issues
Health Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life
The case of Spain reflects to a marked extent the more general European tendency toward the proliferation of new institutions called on to meet social and demographic challenges. Health care in Spain has traditionally been dispersed among a host of largely autonomous agencies associated with various levels of political authority (national. provincial, or municipal.) The creation of the National Health System (SNS) as a single, albeit decentralized system, has brought important organizational changes and led to a generalized reconsideration of institutional equilibria by establishing the Governments of the Autonomous Communities as the primary interlocutors of the Ministry of Health. Also present are professional associations, labor unions, and other organizations such as NGOâs or patientâs associations. These have, with more or less success, attempted to influence the decision-making process. The present article analyzes the evolution of actor networks involved in the «governance of health» in Spain, an evolution characterized at once by strong decentralizing tendencies and by new forces of public management often bringing a reinforcement of the regulatory role of the state.
A major shift appears to be underway in Europe in the relationship between national, regional, and local control over health sector decision-making. Since World War II, a central thrust of health policy has been to decentralize key dimensions of decision-making authority to increasingly lower levels of government, as well as (in Social Health Insurance systems and recently in some tax-based systems) to private sector organizations.1 This strategy, to adapt Kondratiev's business-cycle framework,2 has been one of two overlapping âlong wavesâ that helped frame structural decisions in most Western European health systems. The second waveâmarket-influenced-entrepreneurialismâhas run simultaneously with decentralization since the late 1980s. However, while this second, market-oriented wave has generated considerable controversy in some health policy circles, the concept of decentralization was readily accepted in many national policy contexts. As a result, over the second half of the 20th century, expanded decentralization of authority to regional, municipal and non-governmental control has become part of the âreceived wisdomâ about what good health policy should include. In the tax-funded health systems in Nordic countries, for example, most administrative and managerial responsibility as well as substantial political (policy) and fiscal decision-making control has been decentralized inside the public sector: from national to regional level (somatic hospitals in Norway in 1970; mental hospitals in Sweden in 1967), from regional to municipal level (elderly residential care in Sweden in 1992), and from national to municipal level (effective decision-making control over central hospitals in Finland in 1993). In the tax-funded health systems in Southern Europe, most administrative and managerial as well as many political (but not key fiscal) responsibilities were devolved from national to regional governments in Spain (to the 17 autonomous communities from 1981 to 2003), and in Italy (to 22 regional governments starting in the late 1980s). In social health insurance funded countries in continental Europe such as Germany and the Netherlands, most administrative and managerial as well as many fiscal (but not key political) decisions have long been delegated to private not-for-profit bodies (sickness funds and hospitals), under a form of âenforced self-regulationâ grounded in explicit national statutory responsibilities.3 In many cases, this particular form of decentralization has been in place since those systemsâ inception. In the more state-based social insurance systems that have emerged since 1990 in many Central European countries, various forms of decentralization have been utilized. Reacting strongly to the prior highly centralized Semashko model, countries decentralized ownership of hospitals from national to regional (Hungary) and local (Estonia, Poland) governments. The Czech Republic even termed its decentralization of hospital ownership to municipal governments as âprivatizationâ. In similar fashion, centralized funding structures of the Communist period were decentralized into regional social health insurance funds in countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The strategic role of decentralization was further strengthened by changes in overall governmental structures in Europe. During the 1980s and 1990s, national governments increasingly ceded areas of sovereign power upward to European Union bodies, while at the same time that they were losing responsibilities downward to increasingly assertive regionsâa process captured by the popular 1990s discussion about a âEurope of Regionsâ. This overall reduction in the role of national governments served to reinforce the health sector experience that the era of centralized power at the national level in Europe was fast receding. In the first years of the 21st century, however, this conventional wisdom has started to come undone. Far from continuing to recede, the role of the state in the health sector has begun to strengthen measurably. Instead of reinforcing the continued decentralization of authority away from national governments, state institutions have reversed course and are seizing responsibility for substantive political and fiscal decision-making in European health care systems. It now appears that in the near-term future only administrative and managerial authorityâe.g. day-to-day operating decisionsâwill remain decentralized to lower level and/or non-governmental organizations. These counter-indications can be observed in many of the health systems noted earlier. In the tax-funded system in Norway, the national government took over political and administrative/managerial responsibility for all hospitals in the entire country in January 2002, removing control from the 19 regional governments (counties) that had previously owned and operated the public hospitals and transferring the administrative role to five newly created regional bodies appointed from Oslo. The national government also set out new rules for how these regions were to manage their hospitalsâas âpublic enterprisesâ. Fiscal responsibility for health care remained, as before, a national responsibility. In Denmark, the national government initiated a major re-structuring of the health sector in January 2006. In the new configuration, the number of regional governments was reduced from 14 to 5, and their powers were greatly reduced. Fiscal and most political responsibilities were centralized back to the national government, with certain prevention and chronic care issues being re-allocated to the municipalities (also consolidated, from 271 to 98). At the end of these changes, the new regions retained little more than administrative and managerial responsibility for hospitals. A similar pattern of regional consolidation and a strengthening of the state role appears to be underway in Sweden and Finland. In Sweden, a royal commission is expected to recommend that the number of regional level governments (which have responsibilities for hospital and also primary care) be reduced from the current 21 to between 6 and 8. Similarly, in Finland, the national government is expected to propose that the number of central hospital districts, currently 22, be reduced to 18, and also that the number of municipalities (responsible for primary, nursing home and home care services) be reduced from 450 to about 250. In the United Kingdom, similar recentralization can be seen in the transformation of England's Regional Health Authorities from line to support functions, as well as in current plans to reduce the number of Primary Care Trusts from 300 to 150. In Ireland, key operating responsibilities were recently shifted from regional health care boards to a health executive at central level and the regional boards were abolished. A parallel, if less aggressive, thrust toward more state control over both political and fiscal decisions can also be observed in several social health insurance funded countries. In the Netherlands, the national government in 2006 changed the health system's funding structure from a sliding 50% employee/50% employee paid model to a 100% individually paid fixed premium, supplemented by social assistance funds (e.g. taxes) for low income citizens. The Dutch government also, since the late 1990s, has been ratcheting up the percentage of total expenditures for which the private not-for-profit sickness funds are at risk, forcing funds to manage their money more efficiently. In Germany, the federal government in 2009 is scheduled to take on responsibility for pooling all social health insurance contributions and then allocating them to the sickness funds on a prospective, risk adjusted, capitation basis. While this funding model has been in place in the neighboring Netherlands for many years, in Germany it would represent a major move toward centralizing fiscal responsibilities away from the private not-for-profit sickness funds and into the hands of a national government body. In Central Europe, Poland, in 2003, pulled operating control over its social health insurance system away from 17 regional funds and back into the Ministry of Health. From the perspective of national health policymakers, this process of re-centralization appears to reflect a complex set of concerns. Structurally, there is substantial worry about the aging of their populations (e.g. more elderly), the rapid growth of expensive new clinical technologies, and the economic constraints on health sector funding generated by European regionalization as well as the globalization of markets. Administratively, there is evidence in countries like Finland and Norway (also concerns in Denmark) that local control over health sector decision-making has led to increased disparities in services provided and in outcomes to vulnerable populationsâin short, that decentralization has heightened equity problems. Economically, there are worries that local finance bases are insufficient to fund expensive future care needs, and that local administrative arrangements are inefficient and duplicative. Politicallyâan important factor in Northern European tax-funded countriesâthere is a sense among national politicians that they are being blamed when the health system fails to meet the expectations of the citizenry, and that national policymakers need to have the necessary organizational levers to correct these problems. Technically, the introduction of electronic medical records and other computerized reporting systems has reduced the transaction costs of information and made it feasible to more closely monitor health system performance from a central level. While many of these dilemmas with decentralization were predicted earlier in theoretical assessments,4 one can see strong elements of their concrete manifestation in the current movement toward re-centralization. Moreover, since these causal factors are long-term in nature, their recent importance lends strength to the argument that re-centralization may indeed represent a long-term structural shift in national health strategies. Several important questions arise from these examples of re-centralizaton in both tax funded as well as social health insurance funded health systems. One is whether the observed changes represent more than just the normal ebb-and-flow of policy development in European health systems, and instead signal a fundamental shift in the overall pattern of these decisions. A related question is whether political and fiscal authority will continue to migrate from regional and municipal to national government, leaving mostly administrative and managerial forms of control at the lower levels. The underlying issue here concerns the mix of national and local authority that typically exists within most European health care systems, and whether the main bias in structuring that mix might be changing from one favouring decentralizing to local governments into one that favors centralizing authority back to national governments. Posed more provocatively, one might ask whether a new âlong waveâ of re-centralization has now begun, pointing toward a health policy future of stronger national governments and weaker regional, local, and delegated private (SHI) institutions. There areâas Kuhn's theory about the complexities of paradigm shift would predict5âseveral confounding factors in arriving at satisfactory answers to these questions. One issue concerns whether a new âlong waveâ of re-centralization can co-exist comfortablyâas decentralization didâwith the parallel long-wave pattern of market-influenced entrepreneurial measures, particularly in tax-funded health systems. Will re-centralization and entrepreneurialism reinforce each other, as happened previously with decentralized local units? Second, there are several exceptions to this broad pattern of increasing re-centralization across European health systems. One clear exception is in countries with serious ethnic conflicts, for example Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia in the Balkans, and also in Belgium. Recent history suggests that decentralization may be essential in these highly charged political environments, in that various forms of local control are typically linked to the survival of the state itself. Another conceptually messy question concerns the pattern of continued regional decentralization of health sector decisions in Southern European countries like Italy and Spain. Regional governments in these two countries have fiercely defended their recently gained authority in the health sector, and have forced their less convinced central governments (Spain in 2003, for example) to tread carefully in designing new national programs to monitor performance or set standards for quality and outcomes. Of course, Spain and Italy both have histories of earlier regional sovereignty. Moreover, both are geographically larger and have bigger populations than Nordic countriesâalthough they are roughly equal in size to the United Kingdom and also Poland. There is, further, within both Italian and Spanish regions a tendency toward greater internal centralization inside the regions themselves. Despite these caveats, however, it appears that Italy and Spain are pursuing greater decentralization at the same point in time that Northern European countries are shifting away from decentralization in their health systems. This brief review of recent health sector patterns raises a series of questions that do not allow for easy answers. A further complicating factor is the apparent lack of fit between continued local control over services to the elderly (home care, social assistance, also nursing home care) and increasing central control over fiscal and policy decisions in the overall health sector, which implies that re-centralization may soon confront key structural limitations. The current distribution of health sector evidence does suggest, however, that many European health systems will continue to see a tightening of state controls, especially over fiscal and quality-related matters. In this clash between national and local governments, it would appear that, on balance, democratic control at the national level will strengthen, taking increased authority over political and fiscal decisions, while democratic control at the regional and municipal level will weaken, and be increasingly focused only on administrative and managerial decisions. Moreover, given the rapid melting of publicâprivate boundaries within many European health systems, this greater state role will likely be combined with growing public as well as private sector entrepreneurialism, despite the appearance that greater reliance on market-oriented decisions contradicts tighter state control over health system behaviour. While the particular balance between increased state controls and increased entrepreneurial initiatives will vary from country to country, this new blend of two âlong wavesâ, with increasing levels of state authority over key health sector decisions, will likely define the future policymaking framework for many European health systems in the near-term future. Earlier versions of this argument were presented at the Third International Health Policy Conference in Jerusalem (December 2006) and the Annual Meeting of the European Public Health Association in Helsinki (October 2007). This version has benefited from comments made by a number of colleagues at both meetings, and especially from Josep Figueras, David Chinitz and Charles Phelps. An earlier version of this article is included in the conference proceedings of the Jerusalem meeting.
Open access
Health Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life
BACKGROUND: The Ministry of Defense budget constitutes 16% of the state budget. The budget for the Ministry of Health and for civilian health care is derived from the state budget. The health care funds receive their budgets from several sources. The capitation formula, which is determined by law, is the main factor that affects the size of the budget each fund receives. OBJECTIVE: The objective of this study is to describe the manner of planning, managing, monitoring, and controlling the budget allocated to medical services, which is a public budget for soldiers. METHODS: Several parameters are suggested for comparison, including the interface with the civilian health system, the method for budgeting a health care system, possible results of managing a medically centered budget, and the possibilities for monitoring the provided services. We also examine the potential for decentralization of authority. CONCLUSIONS: Managing the budget and locating appropriate alternatives, as well as the availability and accessibility of medical services, are important for procurement and for forming contracts with both military and civilian systems. Turnover based on updated information might serve to improve future health services.
Albert J. Jovell, Robert J. Blendon, MarĂa Dolors Navarro, Channtal Fleischfresser · 7 authors
BACKGROUND: Fifteen years ago, public opinion surveys in Spain showed substantial dissatisfaction with the health-care system. Since that time, health-care in Spain has undergone significant changes, including a decentralization of the system, an increase in spending and a change in the way the system is financed. OBJECTIVE: This study examines how Spanish citizens rate the performance of their health system today, both as compared with other sectors of society and as compared with earlier time periods. METHODS: Data are drawn from nationally representative telephone surveys of the non-institutionalized adult Spanish population (age 18 years and over). The study was carried out in two phases: October-November 2005 (n = 3,010) and January 2006 (n = 2,101). RESULTS: The majority of the Spanish population thinks the health system needs to be changed. The problems cited relate mostly to long wait times to get health-care. Nevertheless, over the last 15 years, the proportion of people who have very negative views about the health system has decreased by half. The majority believes that not enough money is spent on health-care, but few people would support an increase in taxes to provide additional funding. The survey finds the National Health System's institutions and health professionals to be more highly trusted than other institutions and professional groups in the country. CONCLUSIONS: Government policy-makers in Spain face a dilemma: the public wants more health spending to decrease wait times, but there is substantial resistance to increasing taxes as a means to finance improvements in the system's capacity.
In many countries health services and/or health insurance are delivered but also partly financed by subnational entities that vary in their fiscal or financial capacity, e.g. local governments and social health insurance schemes. The central government typically mandates a specific (or at least minimum) level of benefit or expenditure per intended beneficiary, and sets rules about enrollment and coverage. It also typically contributes to the cost of the program, partly because the resources of subnational entities may be insufficient, on average, to meet the expenditure requirements, but partly for equity reasons. These two problems are typically addressed through tax-transfer schemes. In practice, there is considerable institutional heterogeneity across countries in the mix of vertical and horizontal schemes, and the way each works. In this Note, we show how the progressivity of health outlays by subnational entities can be decomposed into contributions from vertical and horizontal schemes, and how each of these can be further decomposed into contributions from taxes and transfers. We suggest that, in addition to providing a foundation for future empirical work, the decomposition provides some insights into the reasons for different institutional choices, and into the way vertical and horizontal tax-transfer schemes operate in practice.
Global Health Care Issues
Healthcare Policy and Management
Health Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life
In this paper the main determinants of health care expenditure per capita in Spanish autonomous communities are analyzed. The coexistence of several models concerning the degree of spending power decentralization and financing systems converts Spain in a singular case, allowing to extract interesting conclusions for other countries in ways of decentralizing their health care system. Besides, our results allow to evaluate the incidence of some factors of over-cost underlined by the autonomous communities with a view to future changes in the autonomous communities financing model.
Pakistan currently principally uses three modes of financing health--taxation, out of pocket payments and donor contributions of which the latter is the least significant in terms of size. Less than 3.6% of the employees are covered under the social security scheme and there is a limited social protection mechanism, which collectively serves the health needs of 3.4% of the population. The main issues in health financing include low spending, lack of attention to alternate sources of financing and issues with fund mobilization and utilization. With respect to the first, health reforms proposed as part of the Gateway Paper make a strong case for promoting the reallocation of tax-based revenues and developing sustainable alternatives to low levels of public spending on health. With respect to alternative sources of health financing, the Gateway Paper lays stress on exploring policy options for private health insurance, broadening the base of Employees Social Security, creating a Federal Employees Social Security Programme, developing social health insurance within the framework of a broad-based social protection strategy, which scopes beyond the formally employed sector, establishing a widely inclusive safety net for the poor; mainstreaming philanthropic grants as a major source of health financing; developing a conducive tax configuration; generating greater corporate support for social sector causes within the framework of the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility and developing cost-sharing programmes, albeit with safeguards. The Gateway Paper regards efficient fund utilization a priority and lays stress on striking a balance between minimizing costs, controlling costs and using resources more efficiently and equitably--in other words, getting the best value for the money, on the one hand, and increasing the pool of available resources, on the other. Specific interventions such as the promotion of transparent financial administration, budgeting and cost controls and enhancing the capacity to overcome onerous financial management procedures and decentralizing decision-making are underscored as a priority as is the need for ensuring greater financial procedural clarity at the federal-provincial-district interface.