Giacomo Vella, Daniel Trabucchi, Valeria Portale, Luca Gastaldi
Digital platforms follow a predictable trajectory: as they mature and accumulate network effects, they progressively centralize control, extract value from ecosystem participants, and constrain complementor autonomy, a pattern this study terms the "platform trap." Yet Ethereum, a blockchain-based platform now in its second decade of operation, has deliberately resisted this trajectory while fostering thousands of decentralized applications and a global developer community. This study investigates how a platform ecosystem can sustain innovation and architectural evolution in the absence of a central orchestrator. Drawing on a longitudinal qualitative case study of Ethereum (2013 to 2025), based on 67 archival sources and 227 first-order codes organized through the Gioia methodology, three governance mechanisms are identified that collectively constitute non-degenerative platform governance: (1) deliberate value capture restraint, through which the platform's steward organization forgoes extractive revenue models; (2) protocol-level rule codification, whereby governance rules are embedded in verifiable code and consensus mechanisms rather than managerial discretion; and (3) continuous stakeholder realignment, achieved through institutionalized multi-venue deliberation and adaptive crisis response. The study challenges the assumption that centralized orchestration is a prerequisite for ecosystem coherence and introduces decentralized platform stewardship as an alternative governance archetype.
Abstract Around three-quarters of Bitcoin transactions occur off-chain. While most empirical studies focus exclusively on on-chain transactions, only few papers analyse off-chain transactions. The empirical evidence of Bitcoin market considering both types of trading strategies remains limited. This paper is one of the first to present an empirical analysis of both on- and off-chain demand and supply-side factors and their short- and long-run relationship with the Bitcoin price. Employing the ARDL approach with daily data from 2019 to 2024, we demonstrate a differentiated contribution of on-chain and off-chain drivers to the Bitcoin price. In the long-run, off-chain demand pressures have a significant relationship with the Bitcoin price. In the short-run, both off-chain demand and supply factors are statistically significantly related to the Bitcoin price. The relationship between blockchain transactions and the Bitcoin price is also present, albeit likely operating through a different channel than off-chain trades. These findings confirm the dual nature of the Bitcoin market, in which price movements are related to both market fundamentals and speculative considerations captured by on- and off-chain trades, respectively.
The tokenization of real-world assets (RWAs) has emerged as a transformative application of blockchain technology, with market projections estimating trillions of dollars in tokenized assets within the coming decade. However, a fundamental challenge remains unaddressed: physical assets such as precious metals, stored commodities, and warehoused goods incur structural negative carry -- custody, insurance, and audit costs that accumulate over time. While existing tokenization models have successfully established the market for digital gold and treasuries, they typically manage operational costs at the issuer level. The FRS introduces a framework to bring these economics directly on-chain, avoiding mechanisms such as token rebasing that compromise fungibility and composability with decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols. This paper proposes the Fungible Reserve Standard (FRS), a deterministic token design framework that encodes carrying costs transparently into on-chain logic. The FRS introduces an asset-per-token variable q(t) that decreases according to a predefined annualized carrying cost rate, coupled with a supply reconciliation mechanism that preserves holder balances and ERC-20 composability. While mathematically inspired by the daily expense ratio accrual in traditional asset management -- which often embed centralized profit margins -- the FRS design specifically encodes actual operational carrying costs to provide pure institutional-grade accounting clarity without compromising DeFi compatibility. The framework is asset-agnostic and applicable to any real-world asset with positive, predictable holding costs.
The dissertation studies how privacy and trust are shaped by digital technologies: how individuals value privacy over personal data, how AI alters trust and disclosure, and how decentralised blockchains can sustainably replace trusted intermediaries. Chapter 1 argues that the 'privacy paradox' --- that individuals claim to value privacy, yet readily disclose personal data --- arises because privacy is treated as monolithic, when it is multidimensional. I develop a framework that distinguishes voluntary disclosure from involuntary data diffusion, reconciling the paradox by showing that disclosures reflect contextual trade-offs. Using a discrete choice experiment, I provide estimates of privacy valuations across both institutional and social contexts. I find that privacy has substantial value when exposure results in harmful consequences, such as socially revealing data reaching close contacts. I also document an AI privacy puzzle: individuals are less concerned about privacy from AI assistants than from the firms that develop them. Chapter 2 examines this AI privacy puzzle. Using a survey experiment, I replicate the finding from Chapter 1 specifically for firms in the AI industry, highlighting the privacy gap that arises despite the clear product--firm relationship. An information treatment that explicitly links AI assistants to their firms increases concern about both, but does not significantly reduce this gap. Instead, the gap also reflects the anthropomorphic features of AI assistants, aversion to the commercial nature of firms, and the trust and perceived control consumers attach to each. However, when respondents evaluate real-world AI assistant--firm pairs, brand familiarity is the strongest predictor of where privacy concern is attributed. Chapter 3 considers decentralised trust in blockchain systems, in which consensus mechanisms replace trusted intermediaries. I propose a 'proof of quiet quitting' consensus mechanism that reduces the excessive energy consumption of proof of work while retaining the decentralisation that proof of stake can compromise. By introducing a participation lottery with unrestricted entry and an endogenous cutoff, the mechanism separates maximum effort capacity from the probability of winning, inducing participants to exert no more than the minimum effort required in equilibrium.
Patrick Woitschig, Ruting Wang, Wolfgang Karl Härdle
Blockchain networks have raised growing public concerns due to their substantial electricity consumption. The transition from Proof-of-Work (PoW) to Proof-of-Stake (PoS) on the Ethereum network is widely regarded as a landmark event in reducing blockchain energy use, with prior studies commonly reporting energy savings exceeding 99%. However, existing estimates vary substantially because of the strong assumptions embedded in the dominant top-down and bottom-up approaches. The top-down approach assumes that miners' electricity costs are closely tied to mining revenue under market equilibrium, whereas the bottom-up approach relies on the assumed average efficiency of the mining fleet, which is unobservable and highly sensitive to assumptions regarding hardware composition and utilization. "The Merge'' provides an observable profitability-based sorting mechanism that helps identify the efficiency distribution of mining hardware. By observing which miners could profitably migrate to Ethereum Classic after "The Merge'', we infer the efficiency threshold of economically viable machines and reconstruct the pre-Merge mining fleet more realistically. Using this framework, we estimate Ethereum's pre-Merge PoW electricity demand at 2.98 GW. The Ethereum Classic midpoint residual post-Merge PoW demand of 0.099 GW implies net electricity savings of 96.67%; including the broader Ethash-family residual yields savings of approximately 93.7-96.3%. To further investigate the determinants of estimation divergence, we estimate a VAR model and find that fluctuations in Ethereum prices significantly affect mining equilibrium and implied energy consumption. Overall, the paper provides a transparent, behaviorally grounded framework for estimating blockchain electricity use and offers refined evidence on the energy implications of consensus-mechanism design.
Abstract This chapter reviews and contributes to the debate concerning the fiduciary duties of network participants of blockchain systems, with a focus on software developers and decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) members. After briefly introducing the concept of fiduciary duties in the UK and the US, the chapter surveys the early academic debates on the fiduciary status of core developers. It then turns to an analysis of the main case law in England and California relating to fiduciary duties in this space, before arguing that the imposition of implicit fiduciary duties could lead to unjust outcomes, deter participation in blockchain systems, and stifle innovation. Instead, the remainder of the chapter contends that pursuing co-regulatory efforts which are grounded in the principle of regulatory equivalence, such as the adoption of the COALA DAO Model Law, will secure the public policy objectives of imposing fiduciary duties, without sacrificing the distinctive features of blockchain networks.
<b>Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)</b> has evolved from a theoretical artifact of transparent transaction ordering into a dominant economic force shaping Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchain ecosystems. While early research framed MEV as an unavoidable but competitive phenomenon, recent infrastructure developments—particularly MEV relays, aggregators, and proposer-builder separation (PBS)—have enabled the consolidation of extractive power into coordinated intermediary groups. This paper introduces <b><i>MEV Aggregator Drift</i></b>, a structural phenomenon in which MEV extraction progressively centralizes into opaque, off-chain coordination clusters <b><i>(“collusion packs”)</i></b> that undermine validator neutrality, distort protocol incentives, and introduce cartel-like dynamics without explicit on-chain collusion. We analyze the economic drivers, execution mechanisms, and systemic risks of MEV collusion across PoS and DeFi systems, and argue that existing mitigations focus on efficiency while neglecting enforceable neutrality. Finally, we outline mitigation requirements centered on validator accountability, behavioral monitoring, and transaction ordering attestation.
Jan 1, 2026·Proceedings of the ... Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences/Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
Blockchain, originally developed to solve the double-spending problem in digital currencies like Bitcoin, has evolved into a foundational technology with broad applications across public and private sectors.Its key features-immutability, decentralized trust, and cryptographic security-enable authenticated data sharing without the need for a central authority.This is particularly valuable in systems like supply chains, where participants may not know or trust each other.Smart contracts further enhance blockchain's utility by automating agreements through code, reducing uncertainty and fostering trust among stakeholders.The rise of the decentralized web, combined with emerging technologies like IoT, AI, and AR/VR, signals a wave of disruptive innovation whose full impact is yet to be seen.Given the rapid pace of development, academic research is essential to understand and guide blockchain's evolution.Conferences are especially important for timely knowledge dissemination, as they can keep up with the fast-moving nature of the field better than traditional journals.This mini-track builds on a series of successful sessions from HICSS conferences (HICSS-51 through HICSS-58), which have focused on blockchain's impact in areas such as fintech, transformation, and innovation.Over the years, it has served as a valuable forum for exploring blockchain technology and its implications for process improvement and innovation.For the current edition, six accepted papers contribute to expanding the academic understanding and supporting broader adoption of blockchain solutions.The first paper, "Playing Strategic Games in The Open Network (TON): Analyzing the Robustness of Proof-of-Stake Slashing Incentives", by Sascha Hgele, analyzes how rational validators in the TON blockchain respond to slashing penalties in a proof-of-stake system.Using a game-theoretic model, it reveals that when penalty enforcement is uncertain, validators strategically weigh risks and rewards, which impacts
Vladimir Pavićević, Suzana Balaban, Bojan Stoiljković, Aleksandar Rašović
The Ethereum network, a leading blockchain platform for decentralized applications and smart contracts, has undergone significant transformations, particularly with the transition from Proof of Work (PoW) to Proof of Stake (PoS). This paper examines the sustainability challenges of Ethereum with a focus on its historical and current power consumption, associated carbon emissions, and broader economic implications. By critically analyzing Ethereum’s environmental footprint pre- and post-Merge, we assess whether the network’s shift to Proof of Stake constitutes a sustainable solution. Furthermore, we explore the trade-offs inherent in the decentrali- 498 ”Challenges of Digitalization in the Green Economy” Belgrade, October 30th, 2025 zation-efficiency paradigm and consider Ethereum’s position within the global movement toward greener technologies.
The convergence of fundamental blockchain technology with the Ethereum network has ushered in a new era of decentralized innovation, moving beyond simple cryptocurrency transactions to a programmable, trustless ecosystem. By introducing smart contracts—self-executing, automated agreements—and the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), Ethereum acts as a decentralized \\\"world computer\\\" that allows for the creation of decentralized applications (dApps) across numerous sectors, including finance, healthcare, and supply chain management. In recent years, blockchain technology has gained significant attention for its potential in various domains. However, the lack of interoperability between different blockchain platforms poses a significant challenge in meeting the demands of the modern world. To address this issue, our research focuses on unlocking blockchain interconnectivity through smart contract-driven cross-chain communication. We aim to contribute to the development of a model that enhances the functionality and usability of blockchain technology. To achieve interoperability, we explore various options and leverage the power of smart contracts.
On January 10, 2024 (July 23rd, 2024), the Commission approved the listing of eleven (eight) bitcoin-based (Ethereum-based) exchange-traded products (ETPs) in NYSE Arca, Nasdaq and Cboe BZX. Using these approvals as a natural experiment, we employ a program evaluation framework to study the impact of the introduction of crypto-based ETPs on the liquidity of spot bitcoin/Ethereum markets in crypto trading platforms. We use the most recently available blockchain data supplied by Kaiko. The estimation strategy identifies that while the level of liquidity has not changed, that the time series trading pattern has, and that successive returns are more (less) related. However, though returns are on average more correlated we find that the returns in the bitcoin and Ethereum spot market overall show improvements after the introduction of these ETPs globally as compared to before. The findings further shed light on the workings of different aspects of crypto asset markets.
We study the role of liquid staking and how it affects the interaction between issuance policy, economic productivity, and security in proof-of-stake blockchains, with a focus on the role of liquid staking. In a dynamic macro-finance framework, we show that issuance redistributes resources from productive on-chain activity to validators, which effectively acts as a tax on productive capital. This mechanism generates a Laffer-curve-type tradeoff: beyond an interior optimum, higher issuance weakens the productive base that finances security and reduces staking rewards. We then introduce liquid staking, which allows users to earn staking rewards while retaining liquidity for productive use. Liquid staking collapses the traditional tradeoff between staking and DeFi. When liquid staking tokens (LSTs) closely substitute for the native asset and benefit from strategic complementarities, issuance reallocates productive activity toward LSTs, compresses the feasible policy space, and can render issuance and slashing ineffective as policy instruments.
Este estudo analisa a arquitetura da interoperabilidade no ecossistema <b>Ethereum</b>, investigando como a padronização de interfaces e os mecanismos de comunicação entre contratos sustentam a natureza compostável da <b>Web3</b>. A pesquisa detalha a evolução dos padrões de tokens, partindo do <b>ERC-20</b> para ativos fungíveis, passando pelo <b>ERC-721</b> para ativos não-fungíveis (NFTs), até o advento do <b>ERC-1155</b>, que permite a gestão multi-token em um único contrato, otimizando custos de transação (<i>gas</i>).Além dos padrões, o texto explora os mecanismos de comunicação <i>cross-contract</i>, como o delegatecall, essenciais para a criação de sistemas modulares e contratos atualizáveis. No entanto, a obra ressalta que a interoperabilidade amplia a superfície de ataque, destacando a vulnerabilidade de <b>reentrância</b> e a importância do padrão <i>Checks-Effects-Interactions</i> para mitigar riscos financeiros. Por fim, o trabalho discute fronteiras emergentes, como o padrão <b>ERC-6551</b> (tokens vinculados a contas) e a necessidade de soluções seguras para a interoperabilidade entre diferentes blockchains (<i>cross-chain</i>).<br>
This paper introduces the Blockchain First-Principles Analysis (BFPA) framework, a novel methodology for the epistemic evaluation of distributed ledger systems. Unlike conventional blockchain assessment approaches that rely on performance metrics, tokenomics, or decentralization indices, BFPA constructs a rigorous derivation chain from physical laws and cryptographic assumptions through an action axiom to concrete protocol design decisions. The framework systematically identifies structural failure points by testing whether each design choice is derivable from foundational axioms or represents an ad hoc decision vulnerable to obsolescence. The framework introduces several analytical innovations: (i) a four-level axiom hierarchy anchoring evaluation in physics, cryptography, praxeology, and social consensus; (ii) a Nash equilibrium gate mechanism for social layer stability; (iii) a four-stage stability profile progressing from Nash equilibrium through evolutionarily stable strategies and lock-in to self-referential feedback; (iv) a lock-in typology distinguishing design-emergent, ecosystem-emergent, corporate-imposed, and regulatory-granted lock-in; and (v) a network effect genesis model identifying five necessary conditions for spontaneous adoption without marketing. We apply the framework systematically to eight major blockchain systems: Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, Monero, XRP, Polkadot, Tezos, and BNB Chain. The analysis reveals that epistemic design quality alone correlates weakly with market price and adoption. Lock-in type and network effect genesis conditions are substantially stronger predictors. This finding provides a principled explanation for two empirical puzzles: the Tezos Paradox (superior governance design, declining price) and the Monero Paradox (strong epistemic foundations, stagnant adoption). The framework provides a falsifiable, non-speculative methodology for institutional evaluation of blockchain systems as coordination mechanisms.
In late 2025 the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) discontinued the Hyperledger Besu pilot platform of its DREX permissioned-CBDC programme and signalled a redesign of the next phase, while the broader DREX initiative remained under development. Throughout the documented pilot, consensus authority stayed within six BCB-operated nodes running QBFT, while the sixteen institutional participants operated non-validating nodes. We therefore approach the DREX experience not as a failed governance experiment by institutional validators but as a motivating case for a broader question: under what conditions could institutional participants of heterogeneous type be safely promoted to validators in a future distributed phase of a permissioned CBDC? We develop an action-incentive-compatibility condition for the permissioned-CBDC setting under parametric type heterogeneity (BAIC): an incentive condition stated on validators' actions rather than on reported types, designed against the regulator's distributional knowledge of validator types. (We retain the Bayesian label for the design-against-distribution object; under the present calibration the expectation over other validators' types is degenerate, a point we make explicit in Section 5.3.) A four-archetype typology of candidate validators systemic banks, mid-tier banks and cooperatives, authorised ntechs, and registry institutions characterises the heterogeneity any future distributed phase would need to discipline. Privacy law enters as a lower bound on the false-positive rate of any admissible monitoring signal, generating a privacysustainability frontier we characterise analytically. A Quadruple Alignment result gives sucient conditions for systemic integrity on four levels consensus protocol, individual BAIC, validator-list composition, and regulatory feasibility of the required monitoring with explicit hypotheses for necessity. The composition condition is stated in a synchronised form consistent with the timing of the coalitional game: a coalition of eective per-member gain at most G max is deterred for archetype k when G max ≤ D k , where D k is the discounted per-member deterrence threshold that accounts for both detection and the honest path's own false-positive exposure. Under a parametrisation disciplined by institutional facts, only systemic banks satisfy the synchronised composition certicate; mid-tier banks fail it by a non-trivial margin under pilot monitoring, and are not jointly admissible with systemic banks at the legal privacy oor; ntechs and registry institutions exhibit a decit that persists under any isolated reduction in the false-positive rate within the maintained parameterisation it is not closed by better monitoring alone. The reported centralised reorientation of DREX, which the model represents as a counterfactual low-false-positive benchmark for a distributed network, leaves the ntech and registry decit untouched, because it lies in the archetypes' utility fundamentals rather than in monitoring precision; closing it would require changing those fundamentals (mandate, reputational stake, accessible gains, or voting rights), not merely the signal.
This paper examines the Virtuals Protocol as a case study in economic innovation enabled by autonomous AI agents. It analyzes how the protocol establishes a comprehensive infrastructure that combines tokenized ownership, decentralized governance, and standardized coordination to support agent-based economic organization. Drawing on transaction cost economics and network economics, the study shows how the protocol reduces coordination costs and amplifies network effects through agent specialization and composability. The concept of Autonomous Agent Organizations (AAOs) is introduced as a functional subclass of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), distinguished by their greater economic autonomy and composable inter-agent collaboration. AAOs represent a novel form of economic organization that transcends traditional boundaries between firms, markets, and platforms. The findings offer theoretical contributions to economic organization theory and practical implications for platform design, governance, and regulatory development. As AI agents become an increasingly prevalent aspect of economic activity, the Virtuals Protocol provides a model for scalable, adaptive, and inclusive economic coordination.
This paper introduces DNET (Dual Network Exchange Technology), an interface architecture that unifies Settlement, Exchange, and Record generation into a single transaction structure for digital payments. Modern payment systems often treat exchange and settlement as separate backend processes, leading to fragmented identifiers, inconsistent idempotency behavior, and operational divergence across implementations. DNET resolves these issues by binding Payment Intent, Exchange Decision, and Settlement Outcome under a single TxID, enabling atomic SER‑coupling across Web2 and Web3 environments. The architecture provides a protocol‑level foundation for multi‑asset payments, ensuring traceability, auditability, and interoperability while reducing operational complexity. This work positions DNET as an OS‑layer interface for value transfer, offering a structural standard for future financial infrastructure.