The recent hype about blockchain technology and its abilities has led to a reconsideration of existing structures in the field of finance. With a bigger focus on efficient transaction processing, interaction and automation, the underlying concept of a distributed ledger has also showed feasibility for a much broader field. For this reason, the objective of this article lies in a first evaluation of this technology for blockchain-driven supply chains by taking a closer look at potential use cases and existing applications, particularly supply chain operations and trade finance. By aligning all relevant data streams on a digital scale, it is possible not only to make trading processes significantly more functional, but also to improve regulatory control through elimination of redundant practices. A digital, autonomous, decentralized, and distributed network would be applicable to a countless number of services. The initial concept for trade finance provides here a foundation to close the gap between vague assumptions and practical contributions in supply chain management.
This The virtual currency is a paramount in a strong economical situation of any country in the future, especially the countries that try to lead the world with its economy, this currency has been created to replace the traditional currency of the countries that can be issued by any central bank and put a value for it, but the virtual currency is a currency that no one can control and manipulate its value and no one can use it to control any country economical situation (c.f. Selgin, 1988).The virtual currency helps poor countries to develop its economy because it will have the same currency that any developed country has with the same value. But the virtual currency will face a lot of problems before entering to market(Gandal, N., &Halaburda, H. (2014) and will face a lot of barriers that will stop the development of the state economy, some of those problems are: the culture of the country and the government laws and policies, plus there is an important problem that it will face and it represent by the economic agreements and the Unified Banks Network (e.g. Jerin, 2014).To solve those problems the research will use the qualitative method with an interpretive research philosophy, that helps the research to use specific case study that have similar situation to collect the second data and use the interview to collect the primary data.The interview that is made with experts will show some solution that answer the research question and it can be applied and the step to apply it to receive to needed solution to let the virtual currency be accepted in the market (Gandal, N., &Halaburda, H. (2014). Therefore, the government started to encourage the citizen and the companies to use this new currency, and they created an environment that helps those users to trust and accept it.This currency will face a lot of obstacles and problems at the beginning, the government will try to put plans and long term strategies to solve these problems before they occur, starting from creating and issuing new laws and policies arriving to create a large and strong educational advertising to let the citizen know this new currency and its benefits.Also, the private sectorsare responsible too, especially the bank sectors because they have the principle relation with this field and they have to motivate their customers to use it (Gans, J., &Halaburda, 2013).From this research, we will try to find some solutions that the concerned sector need to apply to let the virtual currency enter the market and let the citizen trust it and start trading with it (Gandal, N., &Halaburda, H. (2014).
Blockchain technology on the platform business becomes a new paradigm which gets security, irreversibility, and trustfulness closer to both of clients and service providers (SPs) for providing a better quality of service. To provide an economic analysis of such blockchain-based platform business, a game theoretic approach is used to model a competitive market against the incumbent platform operated by a centralizer as a trusted third party. In this market, the platforms behave as a mediator to deliver the services provided by SPs to clients. The crucial factors for the success of blockchain-based platform business are (i) how SPs' participation is reflected on its quality of service (QoS) and (ii) how to incentivize SPs to contribute their resources such as computing/storage infrastructure. In our game formulation, a non-cooperative two-stage dynamic game is used, where the first stage models how to incentivize SPs in a blockchain-based platform and the second stage models the competition between platforms to attract clients. As a result, we provide an equilibrium analysis, which gives a useful insight into how much the service quality of blockchain-based platform affects the competition between platforms and the equilibrium incentive strategy for SPs. Moreover, our numerical analysis shows that the equilibrium incentive increases with proportional to the QoS of a blockchain-based platform whereas the incentive becomes negative if it provides a non-increasing QoS with the number of participated SPs.
As the Internet of Things and distributed ledger technology (DLT) continue to evolve, so do questions regarding the future of ‘autonomous’ machine-to-machine (M2M) payments. For example, whether machines can carry out autonomous payments, how they could carry out such payments, and indeed whether they should are all points worth consideration. While autonomous machines are often depicted as frightening images of a dystopian future, it is worth noting that M2M payments are already being implemented in closed-loop systems where payments such as road tolls are made ‘on behalf’ of the consumer. DLT-based approaches, however, remain proprietary and without any proven realworld use case, while genuinely autonomous M2M payments still belong to the world of science fiction. This opinion piece discusses M2M payments from three perspectives: the legal point of view, the functional implementation of payment systems, and the social context. Specifically, it considers the declaration of will, DLT-based proprietary M2M payments, and whether people will be willing to let robots make autonomous decisions, including payments.
Developments in internet-based payment platforms employing the blockchain technology known as “cryptocurrencies” contributed their integration in the official payment systems. Because of the growing interest in cryptocurrencies, it is necessary to review existing cryptocurrency research literature and determine areas for future studies. This study gives an up to date summary of accessible literature on cryptocurrencies according to their subject of issues, theories, methods, and findings and provides direction for future research. A systematic literature review was carried out to examine accessible academic and reliable publications between 2010 and 2018. Based on results research limitations for individual, organizational, ecosystemic and discourse approaches are identified and the study concluded that there are still insufficient and uncovered issues related to the cryptocurrencies notably from a legal and regulatory point of view.
This research studies cryptocurrency trading with an emphasis on technical analysis. In particular, the classic Turtle Trading System is modified to suit cryptocurrency trading. Based on backtest results on main cryptocurrencies, the extended Turtle Trading System yielded 114.41 % average net profit margin and 52.75% average profitability, which were higher than those of the original system. The trading strategy was next implemented in a mobile application. The application prototype is also presented in the paper.
Blockchain is a decentralized transaction and data management solution, the technological weapon-of-choice behind the success of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. As the number and variety of existing blockchain implementations continues to increase, adopters should focus on selecting the best one to support their decentralized applications (dApps), rather than developing new ones from scratch. In this paper we present a framework to aid software architects, developers, tool selectors and decision makers to adopt the right blockchain technology for their problem at hand. The framework exposes the correlation between technological decisions and architectural features, capturing the knowledge from existing industrial products, technical forums/blogs, experts' feedback and academic literature; plus our own experience using and developing blockchain-based applications. We validate our framework by applying it to dissect the most outstanding blockchain platforms, i.e., the ones behind the top 10 cryptocurrencies apart from Bitcoin. Then, we show how we applied it to a real-world case study in the insurtech domain.
Liudmila Zavolokina, Florian Spychiger, Claudio J. Tessone, Gerhard Schwabe
Recent research reports the need for consistent incentives in blockchain-based systems. In this study, we investigate how incentives for a blockchain-based inter-organizational network should be designed to ensure a high quality of data, exchanged and stored within the network. For this, we use two complementary methodological approaches: an Action Design Research approach in combination with agent-based modelling, and demonstrate, through the example of a real-world blockchain project, how such an incentive system may be modelled. The proposed incentive system features a rating mechanism influenced by measures of data correction. We evaluate the incentive system in a simulation to show how effective the system is in terms of sustaining a high quality of data. Thus, the paper contributes to our understanding of incentives in inter- organizational settings and, more broadly, to our understanding of incentive mechanisms in blockchain economy.
Luís Picciochi Oliveira, Liudmila Zavolokina, Ingrid Bauer, Gerhard Schwabe
The growing usage of tokens in real-world blockchain projects – mostly visible in ICOs – has unveiled the need to understand what blockchain tokens in fact represent and how they relate to their underlying business model. Previous research has contributed to this gap but often lacks a comprehensive understanding of tokens and their design as well as of the growing and rapidly-changing complexity in token landscape. This has crucial implications for assessing tokens' value and utility. Applying a structured, scientific approach towards blockchain tokens, we provide a comprehensive token classification and a decision-aid on token design. This is based on a literature review and an empirical study to cover this research gap. Our work offers a novel contribution in an emerging field within the Blockchain research domain and proposes structured analytical tools which can be used by both practitioners and researchers.
The blockchain technology has potential applications in various areas such as smart-contracts, Internet of Things (IoT), land registry, supply chain management, storing medical data, and identity management. Although the Github currently hosts more than six thousand active Blockchain software (BCS) projects, few software engineering research has investigated these projects and its' contributors. Although the number of BCS projects is growing rapidly, the motivations, challenges, and needs of BCS developers remain a puzzle. Therefore, the primary objective of this study is to understand the motivations, challenges, and needs of BCS developers and analyze the differences between BCS and non-BCS development. On this goal, we sent an online survey to 1,604 active BCS developers identified via mining the Github repositories of 145 popular BCS projects. The survey received 156 responses that met our criteria for analysis. The results suggest that the majority of the BCS developers are experienced in non-BCS development and are primarily motivated by the ideology of creating a decentralized financial system. Although most of the BCS projects are Open Source Software (OSS) projects by nature, more than 93% of our respondents found BCS development somewhat different from a non-BCS development as BCS projects have higher emphasis on security and reliability than most of the non-BCS projects. Other differences include: higher costs of defects, decentralized and hostile environment, technological complexity, and difficulty in upgrading the software after release. Software development tools that are tuned for non-BCS development are inadequate for BCS and the ecosystem needs an array of new or improved tools, such as: customized IDE for BCS development tasks, debuggers for smart-contracts, testing support, easily deployable simulators, and BCS domain specific design notations.
Innovation in smart contract systems helps to create decentralized payment systems. These developing concepts will be a new perspective to solve transparency issues. Smart contracts can prove all transactions and flow of funds and money between parties. Business deals and financial payment methods are expected to be a hybrid approach in both traditional and smart contracts in the future. Empirical analysis of smart agreements among their emerged platforms, different applications, and design views will enlighten future needs of trade payment methods. This chapter investigates the concept of smart contracts and critical issues for developing on financial payments environment. This research also aims to examine possible advantages of the application of smart contracts as innovation, legal, and technical aspects of the emerging business environment. The analysis will compare new mechanisms securing a block-chain applied to financial payments. This chapter also reviews the mechanisms of smart contracts and block-chain and focus on predicted future areas on the financial system.
In the Bitcoin system, miners are incentivized to join the system and validate transactions through fees paid by the users. A simple "pay your bid" auction has been employed to determine the transaction fees. Recently, Lavi, Sattath and Zohar [Lavi et al., 2019] proposed an alternative fee design, called the monopolistic price (MP) mechanism, aimed at improving the revenue for the miners. Although MP is not strictly incentive compatible (IC), they studied how close to IC the mechanism is for iid distributions, and conjectured that it is nearly IC asymptotically based on extensive simulations and some analysis. In this paper, we prove that the MP mechanism is nearly incentive compatible for any iid distribution as the number of users grows large. This holds true with respect to other attacks such as splitting bids. We also prove a conjecture in [Lavi et al., 2019] that MP dominates the RSOP auction in revenue (originally defined in [Goldberg et al., 2006] for digital goods). These results lend support to MP as a Bitcoin fee design candidate. Additionally, we explore some possible intrinsic correlations between incentive compatibility and revenue in general.
Since its introduction in 2008, the value and popularity of Bitcoin have risen exponentially. Despite being 10 years old, the concept of crypto currency is fairly new in South Africa. The increase in the value of Bitcoin, together with extensive media coverage, has led to the creation of a Bitcoin economic system with many South Africans jumping on the Bitcoin bandwagon. This study aims to identify the determinants affecting end-user adoption of Bitcoin in South Africa and to determine the main use of the crypto currency by South Africans. A research model was developed utilising constructs from the technology acceptance model and theory of planned behaviour. The model was then tested empirically by utilising two survey-based questionnaires, one for current users of Bitcoin and one for non-users. For users, perceived usefulness and access to facilitating conditions were the primary determinants influencing their decision to adopt the crypto currency while lack of trust and social influences were the primary reasons non-users chose not to adopt Bitcoin.
Anders Henten, Iwona Maria Windekilde, Anders Henten, Iwona Maria Windekilde
This paper examines current business applications of blockchain technology and discusses blockchain implications for transaction costs. Blockchains are a relatively new set of technologies that can be used for various business purposes, primarily activities related to contracting. Transaction costs comprise the operational costs of contacting (searching and communicating) as well as the costs of contracting (writing and enforcing contracts), and blockchains can be used to lower, first and foremost, the costs of writing and enforcing contracts. Other technology applications that have been investigated to a larger extent, such as multi-sided platforms, primarily help in lowering the costs of searching and communicating, while blockchains can contribute to lowering the costs of contracting.
Muhammad Mehar, Charles Louis Shier, Alana Giambattista, Elgar Gong · 8 authors
In spring 2016, the Distributed Autonomous Organization (The DAO) was created on Ethereum. As with Bitcoin, Ethereum uses a P2P network, where distributed ledgers are implemented as daisy-chained blocks of data. Ethereum's native cryptocurrency, Ethers are spent to execute pieces of code called smart contracts. Investors paid their Ethers for the DAO to operate and received the opportunity to vote on and become investors in venture projects proposed by Ethereum-based startups. Transactions and settlements between investors and startups are executed autonomously. The DAO experiment failed shortly after inception as an anonymous hacker stole over $50M USD worth of Ethers out of the $168M invested. The Ethereum community voted to return (or fork) the state of the network to one prior to the hack, returning Ethers back to investors and shuttering the DAO. However, this action arguably represented as a bailout—ironically, Bitcoin was conceived as a reaction against the 2008 bailout of US banks—and violated the ledger immutability and “code is law” ethos of the blockchain community.
The cryptocurrency market is unique on many levels: Very volatile, frequently changing market structure, emerging and vanishing of cryptocurrencies on a daily level. Following its development became a difficult task with the success of cryptocurrencies (CCs) other than Bitcoin. For fiat currency markets , the IMF offers the index SDR and, prior to the EUR, the ECU existed, which was an index representing the development of European currencies. Index providers decide on a fixed number of index constituents which will represent the market segment. It is a challenge to fix a number and develop rules for the constituents in view of the market changes. In the frequently changing CC market, this challenge is even more severe. A method relying on the AIC is proposed to quickly react to market changes and therefore enable us to create an index, referred to as CRIX, for the cryptocurrency market. CRIX is chosen by model selection such that it represents the market well to enable each interested party studying economic questions in this market and to invest into the market. The diversified nature of the CC market makes the inclusion of altcoins in the index product critical to improve tracking performance. We have shown that assigning optimal weights to altcoins helps to reduce the tracking errors of a CC portfolio, despite the fact that their market cap is much smaller relative to Bitcoin. The codes used here are available via www.quantlet.de .
Code and law have been entangled in a silent tension ever since the advent of cyberspace. The centralised architecture of cyberspace paved the way for law to prevail. The latest manifestation of this tension, however, appears to be opening up a Pandora’s box. Blockchain and law are on a silent collision course that must be addressed. This paper argues that in bridging the divide between code and law in blockchain, a radical rethink of regulation is imperative.
Modern centralized online marketplaces such as eBay offer an alternative option for consumers to both sell and purchase goods with relative ease. However, drawbacks to these marketplaces include the platform's ability to block merchants at their own whim, the fees paid to the platform when listing a product and when selling a product, and the lack of privacy of users' data. In this paper, we propose an application that remedies all three of these drawbacks through use of the Ethereum blockchain platform. The application was developed using the Truffle development framework. The application's functions were contained within an Ethereum smart contract, which was then migrated to the Ethereum network. The user's input was read through a web interface and sent to the Ethereum network via the web3.js API. Statistics about the application were gathered on the Rinkeby test network. The application was shown to have an average transaction runtime of 3.8 seconds, and an average gas consumption of 4.6 wei. Contract creation times for the application were shown to be less than a second. A cost analysis of the application was then conducted. The gas consumption of the transactions needed to both buy and sell a product was converted into US dollars, and the gas cost of the application was then compared to the cost to use an online auction marketplace such as eBay as well as an in-person auction house such as Sotheby's. The results showed that selling on the application is cheaper than existing online options as well as existing in-person options. These tests showed that our application was successful in addressing the drawbacks of current auction marketplaces.
The world of cryptocurrency is not transparent enough though it was established for innate transparent tracking of capital flows. The most contributing factor is the violation of securities laws and scam in Initial Coin Offering (ICO) which is used to raise capital through crowdfunding. There is a lack of proper regularization and appreciation from governments around the world which is a serious problem for the integrity of cryptocurrency market. We present a hypothetical case study of a new cryptocurrency to establish the transparency and equal right for every citizen to be part of a global system through the collaboration between people and government. The possible outcome is a model of a regulated and trusted cryptocurrency infrastructure that can be further tailored to different sectors with a different scheme.