Peder Østbye
No abstract is available for this record.
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Peder Østbye
No abstract is available for this record.
Kristiina Valtanen, Jere Backman, Seppo Yrjölä
Before the implementation of a solution, it is cost-efficient and practical to be able to evaluate and analyze the expected value of use cases. Especially, this is emphasized in blockchain (BC) use cases, which typically have a wide business ecosystem and possibly disruptive business models. This paper presents two BC use case value evaluations and results. The IoT use cases were selected from two different industry segments: telecommunications-oriented 5G network slice brokering and the energy industry-related internal electricity allocation in a housing society. The use case value was assessed by applying a resource configuration framework and 4C - commerce, context, content, and connection - business model typology against BC and smart contracts characteristics and capabilities. The results derived from the data collected from the expert workshops proved the expected value of the use cases, and in general, the feasibility of BC technology for facilitating various value-creating resource configuration processes was shown. Furthermore, the resource configuration framework proved to be a valuable theoretical approach for analyzing and developing also the BC-enabled novel use cases and business models. According to the findings, further development of the framework is proposed with an introduced novel decentralized resource configuration prototype that can replace predominant platform-based business models.
Shelina Lusandro
Blockchain has been a trending topic in the technology industry for the past few years because of its infrastructure to support a decentralized system as opposed to the conventional centralized server. Smart Contracts as enablers of transactions integrated within blockchain have been used to drive different functionalities on blockchain. Different use cases have been tried to exploit these functionalities with the goal of finding the most effective usage for this revolutionary technology. One possible use case is also trending in the business sector as it fuelled some of the fastest growing businesses of the past years, the sharing economy. This project explores the feasibility of integrating sharing application with blockchain. This decentralized application (DApp) introduces the design and implementation of a Web-based peer-to-peer (P2P) rental application which leverages Ethereum blockchain and Smart contract. It allows users to participate in the transactions as lenders and borrowers to share their unused everyday object in the platform without involvement of a Trusted Third Party (TTP). Trust to this system is enabled by using deposits to increase compliance and loyalty between parties in a contract. As an addition to the basic trade contract, the application also supports disputes resolution with voting and rating system. \nThe end goal of this application is to create a fully functional DApp that promotes self-sovereignty, savings, and security. Users control how their data is being shared and used. Additionally, it requires low transaction fee with no commission, platform, and exchange rate fee. Finally, blockchain is secure because all the transactions are validated by other users and appended into the immutable blockchain.
Jack Clark Francis
No abstract is available for this record.
Ville Savolainen, Jorge Soria
No abstract is available for this record.
Pieter Hartel, Ivan Homoliak, Daniël Reijsbergen
Since it takes time and effort to put a new product or service on the market, one would like to predict whether it will be a success. In general this is not possible, but it is possible to follow best practices in order to maximize the chance of success. A smart contract is intended to encode business logic and is therefore at the heart of every new business on the Ethereum blockchain. We have investigated how to measure the success of smart contracts, and whether successful smart contracts have characteristics that less successful smart contracts lack. The appearance of a smart contract on a listing website such as Etherscan or StateoftheDapps is such a characteristic. In this paper, we present a three-pronged analysis of the relative success of listed smart contracts. First, we have used statistical analysis on the publicly visible transaction history of the Ethereum blockchain to determine that listed contracts are significantly more successful than their unlisted counterparts. Next, we have conducted a survey among more than 200 developers via an anonymous online survey about their experience with the listing process. A significant majority of respondents do not believe that listing a contract itself contributes to its success, but they believe that the extra attention that is typically paid in tandem with the listing process does contribute. Finally, based on the respondents' answers, we have drafted 10 recommendations for developers and validated them by submitting them to an international panel of experts.
Daniel Ferreira, Jin Li, Radoslawa Nikolowa
Abstract We develop a theory of blockchain governance. In our model, the proof-of-work system, the most common set of rules for validating transactions in blockchains, creates an industrial ecosystem with specialized suppliers of goods and services. We analyze the interactions between blockchain governance and the market structure of the industries in the blockchain ecosystem. We show that the proof-of-work system may lead to a situation in which some large firms in the blockchain industrial ecosystem—blockchain conglomerates—capture the governance of the blockchain. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
Akaki Mamageishvili, Jan Christoph Schlegel
We study optimal smart contract design for monitoring an exchange of an item performed offline. There are two parties, a seller and a buyer. Exchange happens off-chain, but the status update takes place on-chain. The exchange can be verified but with a cost. To guarantee self-enforcement of the smart contract, both parties make a deposit, and the deposits must cover payments made in all possible final states. Both parties have an (opportunity) cost of making deposits. We discuss two classes of contract: In the first, the mechanism only interacts with the seller, while in the second, the mechanism can also interact with the buyer. In both cases, we derive optimal contracts specifying optimal deposits and verification policies. The gains from trade of the first contract are dominated by the second contract, on the whole domain of parameters. However, the first type of contract has the advantage of less communication and, therefore, more flexibility.
Vipul Aggarwal, Yong Tan
No abstract is available for this record.
Madeleine Maslin, Millicent Watt, Christopher Yong
This paper dissects the research methodologies implemented by the Research Team for the Smart Contracts Working Group (TC-307/IT-041 Blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technologies) in developing standards to inform best practice in the design and use of blockchain and distributed ledger technologies. In doing so, it explores the origins of blockchain standardisation and outlines the high-level methodology for conducting and delivering research in this rapidly evolving space.
Gamze Öz Yalaman, Hakan Yıldırım
No abstract is available for this record.
Hossein Nabilou
The ultimate objective of cryptocurrencies is to become a payment system substituting, complementing, or competing with the conventional payment systems. Irrespective of whether such an objective could be accomplished, the functional similarities between certain cryptocurrencies and fiat money has persuaded competent authorities of certain EU Member States to grant payment institution licenses to cryptocurrency exchanges. At first blush, granting such an authorization would seem to be a step forward as it would bring otherwise unregulated cryptocurrency exchanges within the scope of the existing payment regulatory framework. However, this authorization effectively applies payment laws to new payment infrastructures that rely on volatile settlement assets with probabilistic finality. Since the volatility and finality risks cannot be fully addressed under the existing payment laws, an alternative policy option would be granting a special license to cryptocurrency businesses or introducing ring-fencing mechanisms to protect the conventional payment systems from the risks of cryptocurrency payments.
John Taskinsoy
No abstract is available for this record.
Wei-Meng Lee
Now that you have seen how Smart Contract works and how to interact with them through the use of the web3.js APIs, it is now a good time to explore an application from end to end – from the Smart Contract to the front end, and perhaps give you some ideas for building your own decentralized applications.
Henry Kim, Marek Laskowski, Michael Zargham, Hjalmar Turesson · 6 authors
The study of setting up cryptocurrency incentive mechanisms and operationalizing governance is called token economics. Given the US$250 billion market cap for cryptocurrencies, there is compelling need to investigate it. In this article, we present facets of the token engineering process for a Swiss blockchain startup.
Pouyan Esmaeilzadeh, Hemang Subramanian, Karlene Cousins
Although adoption of cryptocurrencies has received much attention in recent literature, little is known about what factors affecting adoption of Bitcoin. Since the context of cryptocurrencies is different from traditional technologies, several factors derived from the Blockchain technology may play important roles in adoption. We conducted email interviews with 165 students to identify the positive utilities (benefits) and negative utilities (risks) attached to Bitcoin. Then, based on a literature review and the results of our explorative research, we propose a qualitative theoretical model which extends the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) and utility theory. Our theoretical model consists of correlations amongst the following constructs: positive and negative utilities, structural provisions, perceived value, attitude, personality traits, and intention to adopt Bitcoin. The proposed model can serve as a foundation for future studies addressing factors shaping individuals’ Bitcoin adoption decisions. Further research is required to empirically test the model to articulate Bitcoin adoption at the individual level.
Sean Stein Smith, Rossen Petkov, Richard Lahijani
The rise and continued implementation of cryptocurrencies and other cryptoassets is having, and will continue to have, a disruptive impact on the accounting, federal income taxation, and broader financial services industries. Much has been written, researched, and discussed about both cryptocurrencies and the underlying blockchain technology, but uncertainty remains as it pertains to how these items should be reported for accounting and tax purposes. What this research attempts to accomplish, through both a review of the literature and publicly available guidance issued by tax and accounting authorities, is to document and analyze what current guidance represents for financial reporting. Additionally, this research proposes how future iterations of cryptoassets and cryptocurrencies might be reported, with recommendations applicable for both practitioners and academics seeking to expand on this work.
John Taskinsoy
No abstract is available for this record.
Karlene Cousins, Hemang Subramanian, Pouyan Esmaeilzadeh
Cryptocurrencies and their underlying blockchain technology have begun to transform numerous industries. Although we have seen an uptrend in the types of created cryptocurrencies, it has not yet translated into mainstream adoption., In this paper, we use value-sensitive design principles to identify values among current and potential cryptocurrency adopters. Using Bitcoin as the context for this qualitative research study, we use grounded theory analytical techniques to discover manifested values among users and non-users. We develop a cryptocurrency value-sensitive design framework to summarize our results. As our main contribution, we offer a research agenda based on the cryptocurrency stakeholders’ underlying value system. This agenda can help information systems scholars apply this value-sensitive design perspective to their own cryptocurrency research.
Kee-Youn Kang
We develop a general equilibrium model of cryptocurrency to study a double spending prevention mechanism without payment confirmations. Agents trade cryptocurrency using a digital wallet, and the cryptocurrency system provides a means to verify a wallet's double spending history. A digital wallet may obtain a good reputation for no double spending attempts based on its transaction history. If a buyer makes a payment with a digital wallet that does not have a good reputation, sellers provide goods after payment confirmations in the blockchain to prevent a double spending attack. On the other hand, sellers deliver goods immediately without payment confirmations if the payment is made through a digital wallet with a good reputation as long as the cost of losing a good reputation outweighs the short-run gain from double spending. As the time required for each confirmation increases, the utility loss from delayed delivery of goods increases so double spending incentives decrease.
William J. Luther
No abstract is available for this record.
Simon Mayer
No abstract is available for this record.
Weilun Huang
This article has developed a structural equation model, aimed at evaluating the impact factors on people’s holding intention of Bitcoin, a cryptocurrency created by the Blockchain technology. Specifically, this study directs its attention on the Bitcoin holder's perceived value and risk, the moderating effects of gender, income, age, and the experience of digital token provided by the respondents. The conclusions are: (1) The majority of individuals do not have any understanding of the values or risks of Bitcoin; (2) The more transaction and speculative risks of Bitcoin people perceive, the less government intervention they are expected to have. Nevertheless, even if government intervention is necessary, it would not impact their holding intention; (3) The higher value of Bitcoin people perceive, the more government intervention people would prefer. Despite this preference, people's holding intention remains intact. However, its degree of influence is definitely less conspicuous than the above effect of the second conclusion; and (4) The government advocacy about the values and risks of Bitcoin should be differentiated by the more nuanced factors such as gender, income, the experience of digital token usage, and age of users, in order to obtain an effective regulation of Bitcoin.
Alain Yee‐Loong Chong, Eric T.K. Lim, Xiuping Hua, Shuning Zheng · 5 authors
Blockchain technology, despite its origins as the underlying infrastructure for value transfer in the era of cryptocurrency, has been touted as the main disruptive force in modern businesses. Blockchain has the capacity to chronologically capture and store transactional data in a standardized and tamper-proof format that is transparent to all stakeholders involved in the transaction. This, in turn, has prompted companies to rethink preexisting business practices, thereby yielding a myriad of fascinating business models anchored in blockchain technology. In this study, we advance contemporary knowledge of business applications of blockchain by drawing on the theoretical lens of the digital business model and value configuration to decipher how pioneers in this space are leveraging blockchain to create and capture value. Through a comparative, multiple case study approach, we analyzed five companies in mainland China that have rolled out blockchain initiatives. From our case analyses, we derived a typology of five blockchain-inspired business models, each of which embodies a distinctive logic for market differentiation. For each business model, we offer insights into its value creation logic, its value capturing mechanism, and the challenges that could threaten its longer-term viability. Grounded in our findings, we discuss key implications for theory and practice.