Permissionless distributed ledgers provide a promising approach to deal with the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm. Since IoT devices mostly generate data transactions and micropayments, distributed ledgers that use fees to regulate the network access are not an optimal choice. In this paper, we study a feeless architecture developed by IOTA and designed specifically for the IoT. Due to the lack of fees, malicious nodes can exploit this feature to generate an unbounded number of transactions and perform a denial of service attacks. We propose to mitigate these attacks through verifiable delay functions. These functions, which are non-parallelizable, hard to compute, and easy to verify, have been formulated only recently. In our work, we design a denial of service prevention mechanism which addresses network heterogeneity, limited node computational capabilities, and hardware-specific implementation optimizations. Verifiable delay functions have mostly been studied from a theoretical point of view, but little has been done in tangible applications. Hence, this paper can be considered as a pioneer work in the field, since it builds a bridge between this theoretical mathematical framework and a real-world problem.
Cryptocurrencies and distributed registers (blockchains) have recently attracted increased interest among specialists from the widest variety of fields. In turn, the public has generated a pool of regularly asked questions, which have not yet been answered thoroughly. This article provides lines of reasoning with regard to several popular questions linked to this subject. It also addresses issues such as the creation of national cryptocurrencies and use of blockchain technology by businesses and governments. In addition, it analyzes the opinion that cryptocurrencies are a financial pyramid. Finally, it briefly examines the configuration of Bitcoin’s distributed register and looks at how this register could be affected by the hypothetical creation of a quantum computer.
Daniël Reijsbergen, Paweł Szałachowski, Junming Ke, Zengpeng Li · 5 authors
We present ProPoS, a Proof-of-Stake protocol dedicated, but not limited, to cryptocurrencies. ProPoS is a chain-based protocol that minimizes interactions between nodes through lightweight committee voting, resulting in a more simple, robust, and scalable proposal than competing systems. It also mitigates other drawbacks of previous systems, such as high reward variance and long confirmation times. ProPoS can support large node numbers by design, and provides probabilistic safety guarantees whereby a client makes commit decisions by calculating the probability that a transaction is reverted based on its blockchain view. We present a thorough analysis of ProPoS and report on its implementation and evaluation. Furthermore, our new technique of proving safety can be applied more broadly to other Proof-of-Stake protocols.
Daniël Reijsbergen, Paweł Szałachowski, Junming Ke, Zengpeng Li · 5 authors
We present Large-scale Known-committee Stake-based Agreement (LaKSA), a chain-based Proof-of-Stake protocol that is dedicated, but not limited, to cryptocurrencies. LaKSA minimizes interactions between nodes through lightweight committee voting, resulting in a simpler, more robust, and more scalable proposal than competing systems. It also mitigates other drawbacks of previous systems, such as high reward variance and long confirmation times. LaKSA can support large numbers of nodes by design, and provides probabilistic safety guarantees in which a client makes commit decisions by calculating the probability that a transaction is reverted based on its blockchain view. We present a thorough analysis of LaKSA and report on its implementation and evaluation. Furthermore, our new technique of proving safety can be applied more broadly to other Proof-of-Stake protocols.
As the basis of the most existing blockchain networks, Proof of Work (PoW) consensus protocol highly relies on the computational resources, and thus causing a huge waste of energy. Proof of Stake (PoS) is the alternative to relieve the PoW dilemma. However, it is also under threat, i.e., discouragement attack, which is a way to bring down the blockchain networks without any effective defense against it. To prevent the discouragement attack, the founders of Ethereum argue that the system should set a withdraw delay instead of allowing the validators entry/exit quickly. But how to determine the delay is still an open question. In this paper, we adopt the cyber insurance idea and propose the insurance contract to help determine the withdraw delay, as well as the insurance claim to relieve the loss of victims. Specifically, instead of requiring the insurance premium from the validators, the cyber insurer first signs the contract with the blockchain representative (e.g., beacon chain). Then the blockchain representative would sign a series of contracts with the validators. By such design, the validators can obtain the insurance claim without paying the premium, while the blockchain networks can keep the validators staying online to resist the discouragement attack. Finally, through the simulations, we demonstrate that the proposed model is capable of providing adaptive insurance contracts for the different validators and keeping the profits of the blockchain network and the cyber insurer.
Luca Foschini, Andrea Gavagna, Giuseppe Martuscelli, Rebecca Montanari
Hyperledger Fabric, created and supported by the Linux Foundation and IBM, is one of the most popular open-source blockchain permissioned platforms that has been already used in many industrial scenarios. One of the main characteristics of this platform is that it provides a smart contract system that relies on general-purpose languages instead of an ad hoc one. In fact, a chaincode in the Fabric platform (the equivalent of the Ethereum smart contract) is a software program which encapsulates the business logic for the creation and modification of logical assets in the ledger that can be written in different general-purpose programming languages (currently Java, Go, and Node.js). This paper analyses the transaction performance of the Fabric platform by identifying at a fine-grained degree level the factors that most contribute to the overall overhead. In particular, we focus on how the transaction latency is affected by the programming language adopted for implementing the chaincode and by varying the number of participating endorser peers. Finally, the paper shows a thorough test assessment aimed at evaluating the impact of the different chaincode implementation on performance overhead. As it emerges from our experimental results, Go is the most performing programming language.
In public distributed ledger technologies (DLTs), such as Blockchains, nodes can join and leave the network at any time. A major challenge occurs when a new node joining the network wants to retrieve the current state of the ledger. Indeed, that node may receive conflicting information from honest and Byzantine nodes, making it difficult to identify the current state. In this paper, we are interested in protocols that are stateless, i.e., a new joining node should be able to retrieve the current state of the ledger just using a fixed amount of data that characterizes the ledger (such as the genesis block in Bitcoin). We define three variants of stateless DLTs: weak, strong, and probabilistic. Then, we analyze this property for DLTs using different types of consensus.
When Proof-of-Stake (PoS) underlies a consensus protocol, parties who are eligible to participate in the protocol are selected via a public selection function that depends on the stake they own. Identity and stake of the selected parties must then be disclosed in order to allow verification of their eligibility, and this can raise privacy concerns. In this paper, we present a modular approach for addressing the identity leaks of selection functions, decoupling the problem of implementing an anonymous selection of the participants, from the problem of implementing others task, e.g. consensus. We present an ideal functionality for anonymous selection that can be more easily composed with other protocols. We then show an instantiation of our anonymous selection functionality based on the selection function of Algorand.
A distributed ledger is a decentralized database spread across many participants. Various models describe software architecture and represent different architectural views. The paper concentrates on the deployment view. Model-Driven Development (MDD) is a software engineering approach that leverages models and transformations. The paper describes the UML2Deployment transformation of the distributed ledger’s deployment model into its deployment script. The deployment model, expressed in Unified Modeling Language (UML), is augmented with stereotypes and tagged values from UML Profile for Distributed Ledger Deployment. The target of the transformation is Gradle Groovy Domain Specific Language (DSL) deployment script for DLT network configuration. The transformation has been designed for R3 Corda framework. The authors propose the complete solution. The transformation has been incorporated into Visual Paradigm modeling tool.
Florian Jacob, Luca Becker, Jan Grashöfer, Hannes Hartenstein
The Matrix message-oriented middleware (see https://matrix.org) is gaining momentum as a basis for a decentralized, secure messaging system as shown, for example, by its deployment within the French government and by the Mozilla foundation. Thus, understanding the corresponding access control approach is important. This paper provides an ab- straction and an analysis of the access control approach followed by Matrix. We show that Matrix can be seen as a form of Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) based on Transaction-based Directed Acyclic Graphs (TDAGs). TDAGs connect individual transactions to form a DAG, instead of collecting transactions in blocks as in blockchains. These TDAGs only provide causal order, eventual consistency, and no finality. However, unlike conventional DLTs, Matrix does not aim for a strict system-wide consensus. Thus, there is also no guarantee for a strict consensus on access rights. By de- composition of the Matrix approach, we show that a sound decen- tralized access control can be implemented for TDAGs in general, and for Matrix in particular, despite those weak guarantees. In ad- dition, we discovered security issues in popular implementations and emphasize the need for a formal verification of the employed conflict resolution mechanism.
Yanqing Peng, Min Du, Feifei Li, Raymond Cheng · 5 authors
Nowadays an emerging class of applications are based oncollaboration over a shared database among different entities. However, the existing solutions on shared database may require trust on others, have high hardware demand that is unaffordable for individual users, or have relatively low performance. In other words, there is a trilemma among security, compatibility and efficiency. In this paper, we present FalconDB, which enables different parties with limited hardware resources to efficiently and securely collaborate on a database. FalconDB adopts database servers with verification interfaces accessible to clients and stores the digests for query/update authentications on a blockchain. Using blockchain as a consensus platform and a distributed ledger, FalconDB is able to work without any trust on each other. Meanwhile, FalconDB requires only minimal storage cost on each client, and provides anywhere-available, real-time and concurrent access to the database. As a result, FalconDB over-comes the disadvantages of previous solutions, and enables individual users to participate in the collaboration with high efficiency, low storage cost and blockchain-level security guarantees.
The advent of the Bitcoin system has brought another boom in the Internet era. In a very short time, many Blockchain systems come into being successively, whose decentration, consensus mechanisms, intelligent contract, and other characteristics make them applicable to various fields such as finance, education, medical, technology, etc. The consensus mechanism is the core of Blockchain technology. And a good consensus mechanism plays a very important role in the stable operation of the Blockchain system. The continuous improvement of consensus mechanisms such as PoW (proof-of-work), PoS (proof-of-stake), DPoS (delegated-proof-of-stake), and PBFT (Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance) has led to the evolution of Blockchain technology to Blockchain 3.0. Starting from the issue of Byzantine generals, this article analyzes common consensus mechanisms based on existing Blockchain applications and then evaluates their consistency. This paper has a unique perspective, selection and comment on the latest progress and important literature in the field of block chain. At last, it also has a high degree of summary and prospect to the existing problems and the future development trend.
Humans have used prosthetics for a long time, especially to recover lost abilities such as eyesight with glasses. We foresee a near future where more and more human organs and parts will be augmented by implants with computing, storing, and communicating capabilities. Unfortunately, those distributed augmented parts may be attacked, for example, by viruses, and they might have difficulties reaching consensus on the real state of the body's health and which actions to take to try to recover. We propose to use Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT) such as a private blockchain based on practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) algorithm to reach body health consensus between those major, augmented body parts. In doing so, given the BFT algorithm formal guaranties, the augmented body can still rely on a correct body health state if less than one-third of the body parts fail.
Ivan Homoliak, Larangeira, Mario, Peresini, Martin, Szalachowski, Pawel
Distributed ledger systems (i.e., blockchains) have received a lot of attention. They promise to enable mutually untrusted participants to execute transactions while providing the immutability of the data and censorship resistance. Although decentralized ledgers are a disruptive innovation, as of today, they suffer from scalability, privacy, or governance issues. Therefore, they are inapplicable for many important use cases, where interestingly, centralized ledger systems might gain adoption. Unfortunately, centralized ledgers have also drawbacks, e.g., a lack of efficient verifiability or a higher risk of censorship and equivocation. In this paper, we present AQUAREUM, a novel framework for centralized ledgers removing their main limitations. By a unique combination of a trusted execution environment (TEE) with a public blockchain, AQUAREUM provides publicly verifiable non-equivocating censorship-evident private and high-performance ledgers. AQUAREUM is integrated with a Turing-complete virtual machine (e.g., EVM), allowing arbitrary transaction processing logic, such as transfers or client-specified smart contracts. AQUAREUM is fully implemented and can process over 400 transactions per second on a commodity PC. Furthermore, we modeled AQUAREUM using the Universal Composability framework and proved its security.
Proof-of-Work~(PoW) based blockchains typically allocate only a tiny fraction (e.g., less than 1% for Ethereum) of the average interarrival time~($\mathbb{I}$) between blocks for validating transactions. A trivial increase in validation time~($τ$) introduces the popularly known Verifier's Dilemma, and as we demonstrate, causes more forking and increases unfairness. Large $τ$ also reduces the tolerance for safety against a Byzantine adversary. Solutions that offload validation to a set of non-chain nodes (a.k.a. off-chain approaches) suffer from trust issues that are non-trivial to resolve. In this paper, we present Tuxedo, the first on-chain protocol to theoretically scale $τ/\mathbb{I} \approx 1$ in PoW blockchains. The key innovation in Tuxedo is to separate the consensus on the ordering of transactions from their execution. We achieve this by allowing miners to delay validation of transactions in a block by up to $ζ$ blocks, where $ζ$ is a system parameter. We perform security analysis of Tuxedo considering all possible adversarial strategies in a synchronous network with end-to-end delay $Δ$ and demonstrate that Tuxedo achieves security equivalent to known results for longest chain PoW Nakamoto consensus. Additionally, we also suggest a principled approach for practical choices of parameter $ζ$ as per the application requirement. Our prototype implementation of Tuxedo atop Ethereum demonstrates that it can scale $τ$ without suffering the harmful effects of naive scaling in existing blockchains.
Amir Dembo, Sreeram Kannan, Ertem Nusret Tas, David Tse · 7 authors
Nakamoto invented the longest chain protocol, and claimed its security by analyzing the private double-spend attack, a race between the adversary and the honest nodes to grow a longer chain. But is it the worst attack? We answer the question in the affirmative for three classes of longest chain protocols, designed for different consensus models: 1) Nakamoto's original Proof-of-Work protocol; 2) Ouroboros and SnowWhite Proof-of-Stake protocols; 3) Chia Proof-of-Space protocol. As a consequence, exact characterization of the maximum tolerable adversary power is obtained for each protocol as a function of the average block time normalized by the network delay. The security analysis of these protocols is performed in a unified manner by a novel method of reducing all attacks to a race between the adversary and the honest nodes.
One of the alternatives to proof-of-work (PoW) consensus protocols is proof-of- stake (PoS) protocols, which address its energy and cost related issues. But they suffer from the nothing-at-stake problem; validators (PoS miners) are bound to lose nothing if they support multiple blockchain forks. Tendermint, a PoS protocol, handles this problem by forcing validators to bond their stake and then seizing a cheater’s stake when caught signing multiple competing blocks. The seized stake is then evenly distributed amongst the rest of validators. However, as the number of validators increases, the benefit in finding a cheater compared to the cost of monitoring validators reduces, weakening the system’s defense against the problem. Previous work on TontineCoin addresses this problem by utilizing the concept of tontines. A tontine is an investment scheme in which each participant receives a portion of benefits based on their share. As the number of participants in a tontine decreases, individual benefit increases, which acts as a motivation for participants to eliminate each other. Utilizing this feature in TontineCoin ensures that validators (participants of a tontine) are highly motivated to monitor each other, thus strengthening the system against the nothing-at-stake problem. This project implements a prototype of Tendermint using the Spartan Gold codebase and develops TontineCoin based on it. This implementation is the first implementation of the protocol, and simulates and contrasts five different normal operations in both the Tendermint and TontineCoin models. It also simulates and discusses how a nothing-at-stake attack is handled in TontineCoin compared to Tendermint.
Andrew Cullen, Pietro Ferraro, William H. Sanders, Luigi Vigneri · 5 authors
In the Internet of Things (IoT) domain, devices need a platform to transact seamlessly without a trusted intermediary. Although distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) could provide such a platform, blockchains, such as Bitcoin, were not designed with IoT networks in mind, hence are often unsuitable for such applications: they offer poor transaction throughput and confirmation times, put stress on constrained computing and storage resources, and require high transaction fees. In this article, we consider a class of IoT-friendly DLTs based on directed acyclic graphs, rather than a blockchain, and with a reputation system in the place of Proof of Work (PoW). However, without PoW, the implementation of these DLTs requires an access control algorithm to manage the rate at which nodes can add new transactions to the ledger. We model the access control problem and present an algorithm that is fair, efficient, and secure. Our algorithm represents a new design paradigm for DLTs in which concepts from networking are applied to the DLT setting for the first time. For example, our algorithm uses distributed rate setting, which is similar in nature to transmission control used in the Internet. However, our solution features novel adaptations to cope with the adversarial environment of DLTs in which no individual agent can be trusted. Our algorithm guarantees utilization of resources, consistency, fairness, and resilience against attackers. All of these are achieved efficiently and with regard for the limitations of IoT devices. We perform extensive simulations to validate these claims.
Andrew Cullen, Pietro Ferraro, William H. Sanders, Luigi Vigneri · 5 authors
In the Internet of Things (IoT) domain, devices need a platform to transact\nseamlessly without a trusted intermediary. Although Distributed Ledger\nTechnologies (DLTs) could provide such a platform, blockchains, such as\nBitcoin, were not designed with IoT networks in mind, hence are often\nunsuitable for such applications: they offer poor transaction throughput and\nconfirmation times, put stress on constrained computing and storage resources,\nand require high transaction fees. In this work, we consider a class of\nIoT-friendly DLTs based on directed acyclic graphs, rather than a blockchain,\nand with a reputation system in the place of Proof of Work (PoW). However,\nwithout PoW, implementation of these DLTs requires an access control algorithm\nto manage the rate at which nodes can add new transactions to the ledger. We\nmodel the access control problem and present an algorithm that is fair,\nefficient and secure. Our algorithm represents a new design paradigm for DLTs\nin which concepts from networking are applied to the DLT setting for the first\ntime. For example, our algorithm uses distributed rate setting which is similar\nin nature to transmission control used in the Internet. However, our solution\nfeatures novel adaptations to cope with the adversarial environment of DLTs in\nwhich no individual agent can be trusted. Our algorithm guarantees utilisation\nof resources, consistency, fairness, and resilience against attackers. All of\nthis is achieved efficiently and with regard for the limitations of IoT\ndevices. We perform extensive simulations to validate these claims.\n
Andrew Cullen, Pietro Ferraro, William H. Sanders, Luigi Vigneri · 5 authors
Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) (the agnostic term for blockchain) are a potential solution for many pressing issues arising in the Internet of Things (IoT) domain. These issues include facilitating secure transactions between IoT devices and immutably recording data. Most DLT architectures were not designed with IoT in mind and consequentially do not satisfy the requirements of many IoT applications. However, the relatively new class of Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) based DLTs show great promise for IoT networks. These DLTs require the rate at which transactions are issued and disseminated to be explicitly managed in order to ensure fairness among users. We present a congestion control algorithm for these DLTs, which optimises dissemination rate and guarantees that all nodes receive the same information and have fair access even in a dishonest environment, subject to the computing limitations of nodes. Our algorithm takes inspiration from well-known areas of networking research, such as QoS, and TCP. However, an important distinction between the DLT setting and traditional networks is the unique nature of traffic in DLT networks and the fact that nodes cannot trust familiar feedback measurements, such as packet acknowledgements or congestion notifications. Our solution realises a decentralised congestion control algorithm for DLTs without the need for trust among nodes.
With the release of Satoshi Nakamoto's Bitcoin system in 2008 a new decentralized computation paradigm, known as blockchain, was born. Bitcoin promised a trading network for virtual coins, publicly available for anyone to participate in but owned by nobody. Any participant could propose a transaction and a lottery mechanism decided in which order these transactions would be recorded in a ledger with an elegant mechanism to prevent double spending. The remarkable achievement of Nakamoto's protocol was that participants did not have to trust each other to behave correctly for it to work. As long as more than half of the network participants adhered to the correct code, the recorded transactions on the ledger would both be valid and immutable. \n \nEthereum, as the next major blockchain to appear, improved on the initial idea by introducing smart contracts, which are decentralized Turing-complete stored procedures, thus making blockchain technology interesting for the enterprise setting. However, its intrinsically public data and prohibitive energy costs needed to be overcome. This gave rise to a new type of systems called permissioned blockchains. With these, access to the ledger is restricted and trust assumptions about malicious behaviour have been weakened, allowing more efficient consensus mechanisms to find a global order of transactions. One of the most popular representatives of this kind of blockchain is Hyperledger Fabric. While it is much faster and more energy efficient than permissionless blockchains, it has to compete with conventional distributed databases in the enterprise sector. \n \nThis thesis aims to mitigate Fabric's three major shortcomings. First, compared to conventional database systems, it is still far too slow. This thesis shows how the performance can be increased by a factor of seven by redesigning the transaction processing pipeline and introducing more efficient data structures. Second, we present a novel solution to Fabric's intrinsic problem of a low throughput for workloads with transactions that access the same data. This is achieved by analyzing the dependencies of transactions and selectively re-executing transactions when a conflict is detected. Third, this thesis tackles the preservation of private data. Even though access to the blockchain as a whole can be restricted, in a setting where multiple enterprises collaborate this is not sufficient to protect sensitive proprietary data. Thus, this thesis introduces a new privacy-preserving blockchain protocol based on network sharding and targeted data dissemination. It also introduces an additional layer of abstraction for the creation of transactions and interaction with data on the blockchain. This allows developers to write applications without the need for low-level knowledge of the internal data structure of the blockchain system. In summary, this thesis addresses the shortcomings of the current generation of permission blockchain systems.