Samuel H. Christie, Amit K. Chopra, Munindar P. Singh
Current blockchain approaches for business contracts are based on smart contracts, namely, software programs placed on a blockchain that are automatically executed to realize a contract. However, smart contracts lack flexibility and interfere with the autonomy of the parties concerned. We propose Hercule, an approach for declaratively specifying blockchain applications in a manner that reflects business contracts. Hercule represents a contract via regulatory norms that capture the involved parties' expectations of one another. It computes the states of norms (hence, of contracts) from events in the blockchain. Hercule's novelty and significance lie in that it operationalizes declarative contracts over semistructured databases, the underlying representation for practical blockchain such as Hyperledger Fabric and Ethereum. Specifically, it exploits the map-reduce capabilities of such stores to compute norm states. We demonstrate that our implementation over Hyperledger Fabric can process thousands of events per second, sufficient for many applications.
Blockchains have witnessed widespread adoption in the past decade in various fields. The growing demand makes their scalability and sustainability challenges more evident than ever. As a result, more and more blockchains have begun to adopt proof-of-stake (PoS) consensus protocols to address those challenges. One of the fundamental characteristics of any blockchain technology is its crypto-economics and incentives. Lately, each PoS blockchain has designed a unique reward mechanism, yet, many of them are prone to free-rider and nothing-at-stake problems. To better understand the ad-hoc design of reward mechanisms, in this paper, we develop a reward mechanism framework that could apply to many PoS blockchains. We formulate the block validation game wherein the rewards are distributed for validating the blocks correctly. Using evolutionary game theory, we analyze how the participants' behaviour could potentially evolve with the reward mechanism. Also, penalties are found to play a central role in maintaining the integrity of blockchains.
We study learning dynamics in distributed production economies such as blockchain mining, peer-to-peer file sharing and crowdsourcing. These economies can be modelled as multi-product Cournot competitions or all-pay auctions (Tullock contests) when individual firms have market power, or as Fisher markets with quasi-linear utilities when every firm has negligible influence on market outcomes. In the former case, we provide a formal proof that Gradient Ascent (GA) can be Li-Yorke chaotic for a step size as small as $Θ(1/n)$, where $n$ is the number of firms. In stark contrast, for the Fisher market case, we derive a Proportional Response (PR) protocol that converges to market equilibrium. The positive results on the convergence of the PR dynamics are obtained in full generality, in the sense that they hold for Fisher markets with \emph{any} quasi-linear utility functions. Conversely, the chaos results for the GA dynamics are established even in the simplest possible setting of two firms and one good, and they hold for a wide range of price functions with different demand elasticities. Our findings suggest that by considering multi-agent interactions from a market rather than a game-theoretic perspective, we can formally derive natural learning protocols which are stable and converge to effective outcomes rather than being chaotic.
The current electricity networks were not initially designed for the high integration of variable generation technologies. They suffer significant losses due to the combustion of fossil fuels, the long-distance transmission, and distribution of the power to the network. Recently, \emph{prosumers}, both consumers and producers, emerge with the increasing affordability to invest in domestic solar systems. Prosumers may trade within their communities to better manage their demand and supply as well as providing social and economic benefits. In this paper, we explore the use of Blockchain technologies and auction mechanisms to facilitate autonomous peer-to-peer energy trading within microgrids. We design two frameworks that utilize the smart contract functionality in Ethereum and employ the continuous double auction and uniform-price double-sided auction mechanisms, respectively. We validate our design by conducting A/B tests to compare the performance of different frameworks on a real-world dataset. The key characteristics of the two frameworks and several cost analyses are presented for comparison. Our results demonstrate that a P2P trading platform that integrates the blockchain technologies and agent-based systems is promising to complement the current centralized energy grid. We also identify a number of limitations, alternative solutions, and directions for future work.
Any community in which membership is optional may eventually break apart, or fork. For example, forks may occur in political parties, business partnerships, social groups, cryptocurrencies, and federated governing bodies. Forking is typically the product of informal social processes or the organized action of an aggrieved minority, and it is not always amicable. Forks usually come at a cost, and can be seen as consequences of collective decisions that destabilize the community. Here, we provide a social choice setting in which agents can report preferences not only over a set of alternatives, but also over the possible forks that may occur in the face of disagreement. We study this social choice setting, concentrating on stability issues and concerns of strategic agent behavior.
Lam Duc Nguyen, Amari N. Lewis, Israel Leyva-Mayorga, Amelia Regan · 5 authors
Urban areas are negatively impacted by Carbon Dioxide (CO2 ) and Nitrogen Oxide (NOx) emissions. In order to achieve a cost-effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and to combat climate change, the European Union (EU) introduced an Emissions Trading System (ETS) where organizations can buy or receive emission allowances as needed. The current ETS is a centralized one, consisting of a set of complex rules. It is currently administered at the organizational level and is used for fixed-point sources of pollution such as factories, power plants, and refineries. However, the current ETS cannot efficiently cope with vehicle mobility, even though vehicles are one of the primary sources of CO2 and NOx emissions. In this study, we propose a new distributed Blockchain-based emissions allowance trading system called B-ETS. This system enables transparent and trustworthy data exchange as well as trading of allowances among vehicles, relying on vehicle-to-vehicle communication. In addition, we introduce an economic incentive-based mechanism that appeals to individual drivers and leads them to modify their driving behavior in order to reduce emissions. The efficiency of the proposed system is studied through extensive simulations, showing how increased vehicle connectivity can lead to a reduction of the emissions generated from those vehicles. We demonstrate that our method can be used for full life-cycle monitoring and fuel economy reporting. This leads us to conjecture that the proposed system could lead to important behavioral changes among the drivers
Large-scale power systems are composed of regional utilities with assets that stream sensor readings in real time. In order to detect cyberattacks, the globally acquired, real-time sensor data needs to be analyzed in a centralized fashion. However, owing to operational constraints, such a centralized sharing mechanism turns out to be a major obstacle. In this article, we propose a blockchain-based decentralized framework for detecting coordinated replay attacks with full privacy of sensor data. We develop a Bayesian inference mechanism employing locally reported attack probabilities that is tailor made for a blockchain framework. We compare our framework to a traditional decentralized algorithm based on the broadcast gossip framework both theoretically as well as empirically. With the help of experiments on a private Ethereum blockchain, we show that our approach achieves good detection quality and significantly outperforms gossip-driven approaches in terms of accuracy, timeliness, and scalability.
This article proposes a self-organizing collaborative computing network with an approach to enhance the expectation of a collaborating node for joining the self-organizing network. The proposed approach relies on Ethereum cryptocurrency and Smart Contract to enhance the expectation of collaborating nodes by monetizing the services provided to the self-organizing network. Furthermore, an escrow based smart contract is formalized in the proposed framework to sustains the monetary trust issue between collaborating nodes. The proposed scheme can enforce an autonomic incentive management mechanism to any type of self-organizing networks such as self-organizing clouds, ad-hoc networks, self-organizing federated cloud networks, self-organizing federated learning networks, and self-organizing D2D networks to name a few. Considering the distributed nature of these self-organizing networks and the Ethereum blockchain network, a distributed agent-based methodology is materialized in the proposed framework. Following this, a proof of concept implementation for the general case of a self-organizing cloud is presented. Lastly, the article provides some insights into possible future directions using the proposed framework.
Maya Dotan, Yvonne-Anne Pignolet, Stefan Schmid, Saar Tochner · 5 authors
Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin are realized using distributed systems and hence critically rely on the performance and security of the interconnecting network. The requirements on these networks and their usage, however can differ significantly from traditional communication networks, with implications on all layers of the protocol stack. This paper is motivated by these differences, and in particular by the observation that many fundamental design aspects of these networks are not well-understood today. In order to support the networking community to contribute to this emerging application domain, we present a structured overview of the field, from topology and neighbor discovery to block and transaction propagation. In particular, we provide the context, highlighting differences and commonalities with traditional networks, review the state-of-the-art, and identify open research challenges. Our paper can hence also be seen as a call-to-arms to improve the foundation on top of which cryptocurrencies are built.
Jovan Nikolić, Nursultan Jubatyrov, Evangelos Pournaras
Large-scale decentralized systems of autonomous agents interacting via asynchronous communication often experience the following self-healing dilemma: fault detection inherits network uncertainties making a remote faulty process indistinguishable from a slow process. In the case of a slow process without fault, fault correction is undesirable as it can trigger new faults that could be prevented with fault tolerance that is a more proactive system maintenance. But in the case of an actual faulty process, fault tolerance alone without eventually correcting persistent faults can make systems underperforming. Measuring, understanding and resolving such self-healing dilemmas is a timely challenge and critical requirement given the rise of distributed ledgers, edge computing, the Internet of Things in several energy, transport and health applications. This paper contributes a novel and general-purpose modeling of fault scenarios during system runtime. They are used to accurately measure and predict inconsistencies generated by the undesirable outcomes of fault correction and fault tolerance as the means to improve self-healing of large-scale decentralized systems at the design phase. A rigorous experimental methodology is designed that evaluates 696 experimental settings of different fault scales, fault profiles and fault detection thresholds in a prototyped decentralized network of 3000 nodes. Almost 9 million measurements of inconsistencies were collected in a network, where each node monitors the health status of another node, while both can defect. The prediction performance of the modeled fault scenarios is validated in a challenging application scenario of decentralized and dynamic in-network data aggregation using real-world data from a Smart Grid pilot project. Findings confirm the origin of inconsistencies at design phase and provide new insights how to tune self-healing at an early stage. Strikingly, the aggregation accuracy is well predicted as shown by high correlations and low root mean square errors.
Many blockchain systems today, including Bitcoin, rely on Proof of Work (PoW). Proof of work is crucial to the liveness and security of cryptocurrencies. The assumption when using PoW is that a lot of trial and error is required on average before a valid block is generated. One of the main concerns raised with regard to this kind of system is the inherent need to "waste" energy on "meaningless" problems. In fact, the Bitcoin system is believed to consume more electricity than several small countries. In this work we formally define three properties that are necessary for wasteless PoW systems: (1) solve "meaningful" problems (2) solve them efficiently and (3) be secure against double-spend attacks. These properties aim to create an open market for problem-solving, in which miners produce solutions to problems in the most efficient way (wasteless). The security of the system stems from the economical incentive created by the demand for solutions to these problems. We analyze these properties, and deduce constraints that must apply to such PoW systems. In our main result, we conclude that under realistic assumptions, the set of allowed problems must be preimage resistant functions in order to keep the system secure and efficient.
A key performance metric in blockchains is the latency between when a transaction is broadcast and when it is confirmed (the so-called, confirmation latency). While improvements in consensus techniques can lead to lower confirmation latency, a fundamental lower bound on confirmation latency is the propagation latency of messages through the underlying peer-to-peer (p2p) network (inBitcoin, the propagation latency is several tens of seconds). The de facto p2p protocol used by Bitcoin and other blockchains is based on random connectivity: each node connects to a random subset of nodes. The induced p2p network topology can be highly suboptimal since it neglects geographical distance, differences in bandwidth, hash-power and computational abilities across peers. We present Perigee, a decentralized algorithm that automatically learns an efficient p2p topology tuned to the aforementioned network heterogeneities, purely based on peers' interactions with their neighbors. Motivated by the literature on the multi-armed bandit problem, Perigee optimally balances the tradeoff between retaining connections to known well-connected neighbors, and exploring new connections to previously-unseen neighbors. Experimental evaluations show that Perigee reduces the latency to broadcast by $33\%$. Lastly Perigee is simple, computationally lightweight, adversary-resistant, and compatible with the selfish interests of peers, making it an attractive p2p protocol for blockchains.
Marcin Abram, David Galindo, Daniel Honerkamp, Jonathan Ward · 5 authors
We propose a novel consensus protocol based on a hybrid approach, that combines a directed acyclic graph (DAG) and a classical chain of blocks. This architecture allows us to enforce collective block construction, minimising the monopolistic power of the round-leader. In this way, we decrease the possibility for collusion among senders and miners, as well as miners themselves, allowing the use of more incentive compatible and fair pricing strategies. We investigate these possibilities alongside the ability to use the DAG structure to minimise the risk of transaction censoring. We conclude by providing preliminary benchmarks of our protocol and by exploring further research directions.
A companion paper defined the notion of digital social contracts, presented a design for a social-contracts programming language, and demonstrated its potential utility via example social contracts. The envisioned setup consists of people with genuine identifiers, which are unique and singular cryptographic key pairs, that operate software agents thus identified on their mobile device. The abstract model of digital social contracts consists of a transition system specifying concurrent, non-deterministic asynchronous agents that operate on a shared ledger by performing digital speech acts, which are cryptographically-signed sequentially-indexed digital actions. Here, we address the distributed-ledger implementation of digital social contracts in the presence of faulty agents: we present a design of a fault-tolerant distributed-ledger transition system and show that it implements the abstract shared-ledger model of digital social contracts, and discuss its resilience to faulty agents. The result is a novel ledger architecture that is distributed with a blockchain-per-person (as opposed to centralized with one blockchain for all), partially-ordered (as opposed to totally-ordered), locally-replicated (as opposed to globally-replicated), asynchronous (as opposed to globally-synchronized), peer-to-peer with each agent being both an actor and a validator (as opposed to having dedicated miners, validators, and clients), environmentally-friendly (as opposed to the environmentally-harmful Proof-of-Work), self-sufficient (as opposed to the energy-hogging Proof-of-Work or capital-hogging Proof-of-Stake) and egalitarian (as opposed to the plutocratic Proof-of-Work and Proof-of-Stake).
Cryptocurrencies are a digital medium of exchange with decentralized control that renders the community operating the cryptocurrency its sovereign. Leading cryptocurrencies use proof-of-work or proof-of-stake to reach consensus, thus are inherently plutocratic. This plutocracy is reflected not only in control over execution, but also in the distribution of new wealth, giving rise to ``rich get richer'' phenomena. Here, we explore the possibility of an alternative digital currency that is egalitarian in control and just in the distribution of created wealth. Such currencies can form and grow in grassroots and sybil-resilient way. A single currency community can achieve distributive justice by egalitarian coin minting, whereby each member mints one coin at every time step. Egalitarian minting results, in the limit, in the dilution of any inherited assets and in each member having an equal share of the minted currency, adjusted by the relative productivity of the members. Our main theorem shows that a currency network, where agents can be members of more than one currency community, can achieve distributive justice globally across the network by joint egalitarian minting, whereby each agent mints one coin in only one community at each timestep. Specifically, we show that a sufficiently large intersection between two communities -- relative to the gap in their productivity -- will cause the exchange rates between their currencies to converge to 1:1, resulting in global distributive justice.
Venkata Sriram Siddhardh Nadendla, Lav R. Varshney
Blockchain systems often employ proof-of-work consensus protocols to validate and add transactions into hashchains. These protocols stimulate competition among miners in solving cryptopuzzles (e.g. SHA-256 hash computation in Bitcoin) in exchange for a monetary reward. Here, we model mining as an all-pay auction, where miners' computational efforts are interpreted as bids, and the allocation function is the probability of solving the cryptopuzzle in a single attempt with unit (normalized) computational capability. Such an allocation function captures how blockchain systems control the difficulty of the cryptopuzzle as a function of miners' computational abilities (bids). In an attempt to reduce mining costs, we investigate designing a mining auction mechanism which induces a logit equilibrium amongst the miners with choice distributions that are unilaterally decreasing with costs at each miner. We show it is impossible to design a lenient allocation function that does this. Specifically, we show that there exists no allocation function that discourages miners to bid higher costs at logit equilibrium, if the rate of change of difficulty with respect to each miner's cost is bounded by the inverse of the sum of costs at all the miners.
The confluence of Internet of Things(IoT) , Blockchain(BC) and Artificial Intelligence(AI) acts as a key accelerator for enabling Machine Economy. To be ready for future businesses these technologies needs to be adapted by extending the IoT capabilities to Economy of Things (EoT) capabilities. In this paper we focus on one such implementation experience for Smart Toll Transaction application in the domain of mobility. Our paper showcases a possible solution by leveraging negotiations, decision making, distributed learning capabilities at the devices level using AI-enabled Multi-Agent Systems and the real-time smart contracts between the Cars and Tolls using Blockchain. This solution also showcases the monetization of real time data coming from various IoT devices which are part of vehicles and infrastructure. While blockchain secures the privacy of the participants it also acts as an economic transactional layer and governance layer between the devices in the networ
The paper develops a logical understanding of processes for signature of legal contracts, motivated by applications to legal recognition of smart contracts on blockchain platforms. A number of axioms and rules of inference are developed that can be used to justify a ``meeting of the minds'' precondition for contract formation from the fact that certain content has been signed. In addition to an ``offer and acceptance'' process, the paper considers ``signature in counterparts'', a legal process that permits a contract between two or more parties to be brought into force by having the parties independently (possibly, remotely) sign different copies of the contract, rather than placing their signatures on a common copy at a physical meeting. It is argued that a satisfactory account of signature in counterparts benefits from a logic with syntactic self-reference. The axioms used are supported by a formal semantics, and a number of further properties of the logic are investigated. In particular, it is shown that the logic implies that when a contract has been signed, the parties do not just agree, but are in mutual agreement (a common-knowledge-like notion) about the terms of the contract.
Marek Laskowski, Michael Zargham, Hjalmar Turesson, Matt Barlin · 6 authors
We present a methodology for evidence based design of cryptoeconomic systems, and elucidate a real-world example of how this methodology was used in the design of a blockchain network. This work provides a rare insight into the application of Data Science and Stochastic Simulation and Modelling to Token Engineering. We demonstrate how the described process has the ability to uncover previously unexpected system level behaviors. Furthermore, it is observed that the process itself creates opportunities for the discovery of new knowledge and business understanding while developing the system from a high level specification to one precise enough to be executed as a computational model. Discovery of performance issues during design time can spare costly emergency interventions that would be necessary if issues instead became apparent in a production network. For this reason, network designers are increasingly adopting evidence-based design practices, such as the one described herein.
Ariah Klages‐Mundt, Dominik Harz, Lewis Gudgeon, Junyou Liu · 5 authors
Stablecoins are one of the most widely capitalized type of cryptocurrency. However, their risks vary significantly according to their design and are often poorly understood. We seek to provide a sound foundation for stablecoin theory, with a risk-based functional characterization of the economic structure of stablecoins. First, we match existing economic models to the disparate set of custodial systems. Next, we characterize the unique risks that emerge in non-custodial stablecoins and develop a model framework that unifies existing models from economics and computer science. We further discuss how this modeling framework is applicable to a wide array of cryptoeconomic systems, including cross-chain protocols, collateralized lending, and decentralized exchanges. These unique risks yield unanswered research questions that will form the crux of research in decentralized finance going forward.
As smart contract platforms autonomously manage billions of dollars of capital, quantifying the portfolio risk that investors engender in these systems is increasingly important. Recent work illustrates that Proof of Stake (PoS) is vulnerable to financial attacks arising from on-chain lending and has worse capital efficiency than Proof of Work (PoW) \cite{fanti_pos_econ}. Numerous methods for improving capital efficiency have been proposed that allow stakers to create fungible derivative claims on their staked assets. In this paper, we construct a unifying model for studying the security risks of these proposals. This model combines birth-death Pólya processes and risk models adapted from the credit derivatives literature to assess token inequality and return profiles. We find that there is a sharp transition between 'safe' and 'unsafe' derivative usage. Surprisingly, we find that contrary to \cite{fanti2019compounding} there exist conditions where derivatives can \emph{reduce} concentration of wealth in these networks. This model also applies to Decentralized Finance (DeFi) protocols where staked assets are used as insurance. Our theoretical results are validated using agent-based simulation.
One of the key challenges in the collaboration within heterogeneous multi-robot systems is the optimization of the amount and type of data to be shared between robots with different sensing capabilities and computational resources. In this paper, we present a novel approach to managing collaboration terms in heterogeneous multi-robot systems with blockchain technology. Leveraging the extensive research of consensus algorithms in the blockchain domain, we exploit key technologies in this field to be integrated for consensus in robotic systems. We propose the utilization of proof of work systems to have an online estimation of the available computational resources at different robots. Furthermore, we define smart contracts that integrate information about the environment from different robots in order to evaluate and rank the quality and accuracy of each of the robots' sensor data. This means that the key parameters involved in heterogeneous robotic collaboration are integrated within the Blockchain and estimated at all robots equally without explicitly sharing information about the robots' hardware or sensors. Trustability is based on the verification of data samples that are submitted to the blockchain within each data exchange transaction and validated by other robots operating in the same environment. Initial results are reported which show the viability of the concepts presented in this paper.
Decentralisation is one of the promises introduced by blockchain technologies: fair and secure interaction amongst peers with no dominant positions, single points of failure or censorship. Decentralisation, however, appears difficult to be formally defined, possibly a continuum property of systems that can be more or less decentralised, or can tend to decentralisation in their lifetime. In this paper we focus on decentralisation in quorum-based approaches to open (permissionless) consensus as illustrated in influential protocols such as the Ripple and Stellar protocols. Drawing from game theory and computational complexity, we establish limiting results concerning the decentralisation vs. safety trade-off in Ripple and Stellar, and we propose a novel methodology to formalise and quantitatively analyse decentralisation in this type of blockchains.
Georgios Birmpas, Ηλίας Κουτσουπιάς, Philip Lazos, Francisco J. Marmolejo-Cossío
Bitcoin is a decentralised digital currency that serves as an alternative to existing transaction systems based on an external central authority for security. Although Bitcoin has many desirable properties, one of its fundamental shortcomings is its inability to process transactions at high rates. To address this challenge, many subsequent protocols either modify the rules of block acceptance (longest chain rule) and reward, or alter the graphical structure of the public ledger from a tree to a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Motivated by these approaches, we introduce a new general framework that captures ledger growth for a large class of DAG-based implementations. With this in hand, and by assuming honest miner behaviour, we (experimentally) explore how different DAG-based protocols perform in terms of fairness, i.e., if the block reward of a miner is proportional to their hash power, as well as efficiency, i.e. what proportion of user transactions a ledger deems valid after a certain length of time. Our results demonstrate fundamental structural limits on how well DAG-based ledger protocols cope with a high transaction load. More specifically, we show that even in a scenario where every miner on the system is honest in terms of when they publish blocks, what they point to, and what transactions each block contains, fairness and efficiency of the ledger can break down at specific hash rates if miners have differing levels of connectivity to the P2P network sustaining the protocol.