Dan Boneh, Elette Boyle, Henry Corrigan-Gibbs, Niv Gilboa · 5 authors
We introduce and study the notion of fully linear probabilistically checkable proof systems. In such a proof system, the verifier can make a small number of linear queries that apply jointly to the input and a proof vector.
Intelligent Cyber-physical systems can be modelled as multi-agent systems\nwith planning capability to impart adaptivity for changing contexts. In such\nmulti-agent systems, the protocol for plan execution must result in the proper\ncompletion and ordering of actions in spite of their distributed execution.\nHowever, in untrusted scenarios, there is a possibility of agents not\nrespecting the protocol either due to faults or due to malicious reasons\nthereby resulting in plan failure. In order to prevent such situations, we\npropose to implement the execution of agents through smart contracts. This\npoints to a generic architecture seamlessly integrating intelligent\nplanning-based CPS and smart-contracts.\n
Intelligent Cyber-physical systems can be modelled as multi-agent systems with planning capability to impart adaptivity for changing contexts. In such multi-agent systems, the protocol for plan execution must result in the proper completion and ordering of actions in spite of their distributed execution. However, in untrusted scenarios, there is a possibility of agents not respecting the protocol either due to faults or due to malicious reasons thereby resulting in plan failure. In order to prevent such situations, we propose to implement the execution of agents through smart contracts. This points to a generic architecture seamlessly integrating intelligent planning-based CPS and smart-contracts.
Blockchain systems and smart contracts provide ways to securely implement multi-party transactions without the use of trusted intermediaries, which currently underpin many commercial transactions. However, they do so by transferring trust to computer systems, raising the question of whether code can be trusted. Experience with high value losses resulting from incorrect code has already shown that formal verification of smart contracts is likely to be beneficial. This note investigates the specification and verification of a simple form of multi-party transaction, atomic swaps. It is argued that logics with the ability to express properties of strategies of players in a multi-agent setting are conceptually useful for this purpose, although ultimately, for our specific examples, the less expressive setting of temporal logic suffices for verification of concrete implementations. This is illustrated through a number of examples of the use of a model checker to verify atomic swap smart contracts in on-chain and cross-chain settings.
Zaynah Dargaye, Antonella Del Pozzo, Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni
The paper presents Pluralize a formal logical framework able to extend the execution of blockchain transactions to events coming from external oracles, like external time, sensor data, human-made declarations, etc. These events are by essence non-reliable, since transaction execution can be triggered by information whose veracity cannot be established by the blockchain. To overcome this problem, the language features a first-order logic and an authority algebra to allow formal reasoning and establish accountability of agents for blockchain-enabled transactions. We provide an accountability model that allows to formally prove the accountability of agents by a formal proof locally executable by each agent of the blockchain.
We present two models of the block chain of Bitcoin in the interactive theorem prover Agda. The first one is based on a simple model of bank accounts, while having transactions with multiple inputs and outputs. The second model models transactions, which refer directly to unspent transaction outputs, rather than user accounts. The resulting blockchain gives rise to a transaction tree. That model is formalised using an extended form of induction-recursion, one of the unique features of Agda. The set of transaction trees and transactions is defined inductively, while simultaneously recursively defining the list of unspent transaction outputs. Both structures model standard transactions, coinbase transactions, transaction fees, the exact message to be signed by those spending money in a transaction, block rewards, blocks, and the blockchain, and the second structure models as well maturation time for coinbase transactions and Merkle trees. Hashing and cryptographic operations and their correctness are dealt with abstractly by postulating corresponding operations. An indication is given how the correctness of this model could be specified and proven in Agda.
In multi-prover interactive proofs (MIPs), the verifier can provide non-local resources for the provers intrinsically. In most cases, this is undesirable. Existing proofs of soundness do not account for the verifier's non-local potential. We show that this may be a problem for many MIPs. We provide a solution by constructing a generalization of the MIP model, of which standard MIPs are a special case. This new model accounts for both the prover and the verifier's non-local correlations. A new property of multi-prover zero-knowledge naturally emerges as a result.
Starting with a trustworthy theory T, Galvan (1992) suggests to read off, from the usual hierarchy of theories determined by consistency strength, a finer-grained hierarchy in which theories higher up are capable of âexplainingâ, though not fully justifying, our commitment to theories lower down. One way to ascend Galvanâs âhierarchy of explanationâ is to formalize soundness proofs: to this extent it often suffices to assume a full theory of truth for the theory T whose soundness is at stake. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of an extension of this method. Our ultimate goal will be to extend T not only with truth axioms, but with a combination of axioms for predicates for truth and necessity.We first consider two alternative strategies for providing possibleworlds semantics for necessity as a predicate, one based on classical logic, the other on a supervaluationist interpretation of necessity. We will then formulate a deductive system of truth and necessity in classical logic that is sound with respect to the given (nonclassical) semantics.
The existing multi-prover interactive proof framework suffers from incompleteness in terms of soundness and zero-knowledge that is not completely addressed in the literature. The problem is that the existing definitions of what is local, entangled and no-signalling are not rich enough to capture the full generality of multi-prover interaction. In general, existing proofs do not take into account possible changes in locality either during a protocol's execution or when protocols are composed together. This is especially problematic for zero-knowledge, as composing commitments is the only known way of achieving zero-knowledge outside of some NP-intermediate languages.
In this work, we introduce the locality hierarchy for multiparty (multi-round) interaction, and for the first time a complete definition of multi-round multiparty no-signalling distributions and strategies. Within this framework, we define the locality of a protocol which involves the provers, verifiers, simulators and distinguishers. We show that an existing protocol for NEXP [BFL90] and a zero-knowledge variant we introduce are sound in a local sense, but are zero-knowledge in a sense that is even stronger than usually understood. All prior claims of zero-knowledge proofs in the multi-prover model were actually incorrect. Finally, we present similar constructions for entangled and no-signalling prover sets for NEXP and EXP based on [IV12] and [KRR14] using new multi-prover commitment schemes.
Non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs are fundamental to modern cryptography. Numerous NIZK constructions are known in both the random oracle and the common reference string (CRS) models. In the CRS model, there exist constructions from several classes of cryptographic assumptions such as trapdoor permutations, pairings, and indistinguishability obfuscation. However, at the time of the initial publication of this work, we did not have constructions of NIZKs from standard lattice assumptions. In this work, we take an initial step toward constructing multi-theorem NIZKs for general $$\mathsf {NP}$$ languages from standard lattice assumptions by considering a relaxation to the preprocessing model and a new model we call the designated-prover model. In the preprocessing model, a setup algorithm generates secret proving and verification keys for the prover and the verifier, respectively. In the designated-prover model, the proving key is secret, but the verification key is public. In both settings, the proving key is used to construct proofs and the verification key is used to check proofs. Finally, in the multi-theorem setting, both the proving and verification keys should be reusable for an unbounded number of theorems without compromising soundness or zero-knowledge. Previous constructions of NIZKs in the preprocessing model that rely on weaker assumptions like one-way functions or oblivious transfer are only secure in a single-theorem setting. Thus, constructing multi-theorem NIZKs in these relaxed models does not seem to be inherently easier than constructing them in the CRS model. In this work, we first construct a multi-theorem preprocessing NIZK argument from context-hiding homomorphic signatures. In fact, the construction is a designated-prover NIZK. We also show that using homomorphic commitments, we can get statistically sound proofs in the preprocessing and designated-prover models. Together with lattice-based instantiations of homomorphic signatures and commitments, we obtain the first multi-theorem NIZKs in the preprocessing and designated-prover models from standard lattice assumptions. Finally, we show how to generalize our construction to obtain a universally composable NIZK (UC-NIZK) in the preprocessing model from standard lattice assumptions. Our UC-NIZK relies on a simple preprocessing protocol based on a new primitive we call blind homomorphic signatures.
We study the problem of argument systems, where a computationally weak verifier outsources the execution of a computation to a powerful but untrusted prover, while being able to validate that the result was computed correctly through a proof generated by the prover. In addition, the zero-knowledge property guarantees that proof leaks no information about the potential secret input from the prover. Existing efficient zero-knowledge arguments with sublinear verification time require an expensive preprocessing phase that depends on a particular computation, and incur big overhead on the prover time and prover memory consumption. This thesis proposes new constructions for zero-knowledge arguments that overcome the above problems. The new constructions require only a one time preprocessing and can be used to validate any computations later. They also reduce the overhead on the prover time and memory by orders of magnitude. We apply our new constructions to build a verifiable database system and verifiable RAM programs, leading to significant improvements over prior work.
Bitcoin is one of the first decentralized, peer to peer, payment systems based on the so-called Proof-of-Work (PoW). PoW is an algorithm that requires the computation of a hard function in order to gain access to a resource but, at the same time, the correctness of the computed result should be easily checked. The use of a PoW removes the necessity of a centralized third party and so the consistency of the network may be altered directly by the involved users. Peers, to solve the PoW more efficiently, usually organize themselves into mining pools, to increase the overall computational power: this situation, unfortunately, leads to a network centralization. In this paper we consider two typical scenarios of a Bitcoin network and we model them by probabilistic logic programming (PLP): the centralization of the hashing power by large pools and the âdouble spending attackâ. In the first one, we verify the effectiveness of a protocol that attempts to discourage the formation of large pools. In the second one, we compute the probability of success of an attacker. Both scenarios are modeled using the PLP package cplint.
We present an unconditional transformation from any honest-verifier statistical zero-knowledge (HVSZK) protocol to standard SZK that preserves round complexity and efficiency of both the verifier and the prover. This improves over currently known transformations, which either rely on some computational assumptions or introduce significant computational overhead. Our main conceptual contribution is the introduction of instance-dependent SZK proofs for NP, which serve as a building block in our transformation. Instance-dependent SZK for NP can be constructed unconditionally based on instance-dependent commitment schemes of Ong and Vadhan (TCCâ08).
In joint work with Rainer Steinwandt and Dominique Unruh, we look at how the notion of perfect zero-knowledge proof leads to an assumption about probabilistic Turing machines. We prove a theorem in commutative algebra which shows that this assumption is not valid.
The two most common ways to design non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs are based on Sigma protocols and QAP-based SNARKs. The former is highly efficient for proving algebraic statements while the latter is superior for arithmetic representations.
Blockchain is a new type of decentralized technology, causing more and more attention because of the huge number of implicit revolutionary applications in many fields, especially in the finance field. The DAO was a crowdfunding project based on blockchain. It was one of the most widely-known blockchain applications in 2016, not only because of the most amount of crowdfunded money (i.e., ETH tokens) so far, in a very short period, but also due to the attack event. In this paper, a brief introduction of The DAO attack event is presented. We also present an acute analysis of the result that âthe hacker stole large quantity of money from The DAOâ, as well as the analysis of the suggested solution that âthe wallet address of the hacker should be frozenâ to the event given by The DAO community. Accordingly, two logical paradoxes are formulated on the event results and the proposed solution. Finally, The DAO paradoxes are formally described, analyzed, and proved in propositional logic.
Abstract Blockchains are distributed data structures that are used to achieve consensus in systems for cryptocurrencies (like Bitcoin) or smart contracts (like Ethereum). Although blockchains gained a lot of popularity recently, there are only few logic-based models for blockchains available. We introduce $\mathsf{BCL}$, a dynamic logic to reason about blockchain updates, and show that $\mathsf{BCL}$ is sound and complete with respect to a simple blockchain model.
We demonstrate that the Bitcoin Script language allows not only for primitive recursion, but in the deployment of an Ackerman function and hence the ability to simply recurse in Bitcoin script, we show that the script system is Turing complete. From this, we introduce a new class of Turing Machine, the PTTM or probabilistic Total Turing machine and note that Bitcoin acts as a decider or Total Turing Machine which allows us to find a NIZKPoK that can act as a TM based verifier to a Non-Interactive Proof that is run on an external and non-associated TM as a proof system. Bitcoin can extend to securely offer contracts such as best fit solutions to common logistic systems and optimisation problems including the Travelling Salesman class of problems and to the optimisation of systems. This can be offered as an open or time bound contract that guarantees payment and can be solved which allowing Pseudonymity of the bidder.
Several Multi-Prover Interactive Proofs (MIPs) found in the literature contain proofs of soundness that are lacking. This was first observed [1] in which a notion of Prover isolation is defined to partly address the issue. Furthermore, some existing Zero-Knowledge MIPs suffer from a catastrophic flaw: they outright allow the Provers to communicate via the Verifier. Consequently, their soundness claims are now seriously in doubt, if not plain wrong. This paper outlines the lack of isolation and numerous other issues found in the (ZK)MIP literature. A follow-up paper will resolve most of these issues in detail.