Greece's residual type of welfare model is facing the past six years an intense pressure caused by the economic crisis (2008) and the emergence of new social risks. Restrictive policies and internal devaluation process adopted to restructure economy, underestimated the social impact. The State, choosing a different welfare model with emphasis on commodification and selective services, gradually withdraws from the implementation of social policy, seeking, through administrative reforms, to transfer responsibilities to local government, without, however, the necessary funding. At the same time, European Union's social policy, despite its rhetoric and some initially ambitious efforts, particularly with the Treaty of Lisbon, shows inability to create a âcommunity acquisâ, which would contribute decisively to the Europeanization of the southern countries. By applying âsoft lawâ measures and always based on the principle of subsidiarity, European strategy is confined, almost entirely, to an application of employment support measures, primarily seeking to improve competitiveness and meet the financial objectives of Monetary Union. The study of basic economic and social EU-28 indices for the period 2008-2012, confirms that diversification of welfare models has a crucial effect in mitigating income inequality and reducing the risk of poverty, enhancing therefore, the dispute over theoretical approaches that support the adequacy of policies related to economic growth. This paper attempts, given the aforementioned conditions, to present the current situation in local government organizations, both from the structures and the financing means perspective, based on a primary research, conducted for this purpose using a structured questionnaire filled by competent executives of all municipalities in the Prefecture (now regional unit) of Thessaloniki. Research findings, though highlighting the efforts to substitute central government's role in an institutional context, constantly under reform, indicate that municipalities are facing significant efficiency problems. Social policy is exercised by different organizational units without integrated strategic planning, new structures which were created primarily to address poverty are inadequate to meet the actual needs and funding is limited in an effort to replace the reduced own resources through European programs, without seeking future alternative sources. The acute lack of human resources and coordination, adversely affects evaluation of local government's social policy. The findings also intensify the concern about structures sustainability and the capacity of municipalitiesâ overall support, but at the same time detect needed interventions in order to implement an efficient decentralized policy, which will become an essential factor of social cohesion and prevent escalation of social exclusion.
This article focuses on the impact of the process of financialization on two central labor market institutions, workers' bargaining power and employment protection legislation, in 16 OECD countries from 1970 to 2009. Financialization is described as a finance-led regime of accumulation and as the emergence of a shareholder value maximization strategy. Using various mechanisms at the micro and macro levels, empirical work has investigated the relationship between the type of financial relations and the agents' capacities of maintaining strong encompassing labor market institutions. I argue that the process of financialization will exert strong pressures on labor markets toward more eroded/decentralized bargaining institutions and more flexible employment relations. This article proposes an updated indicator of workers' bargaining power and various measures of financialization. Using panel data models, our main results point out that increased financialization is clearly associated with a reduction in workers' bargaining power and in the strictness of employment protection.
THE POLICIES OF THE NEW DEAL DRAMATICALLY changed political economy of nations urban areas, initiating, as one urban historian aptly characterized, the overdevelopment of suburbs and underdevelopment of cities.1 In very quick succession, federal government adopted new and sweeping policies-regulation of financial industry, extensive public works programs building all manner of infrastructure, a dramatic increase in public employment, creation of nationally funded relief for unemployed, financial assistance to states and cities, a national industrial planning effort, an emergency program to refinance homes, development of a national housing program, and many others-each responding to one or more of host of daunting problems brought on by Depression.2 Many of these new federal programs became permanent fixtures in American administrative landscape, laying foundations for new (and different) patterns of economic development in future.Housing policy was especially important in creating basis for wide scale shifts of investments and population as well as dramatic changes in demography of urban core and its suburban rings. New Deal policies, designed to re-establish investment confidence in housing sector as well as to restore employment in home construction in depths of Depression3, achieved these objectives (sometimes, much later) but in so doing brought about large scale disinvestment from housing markets across urban cores of American metropolitan areas while at same time creating a powerful set of incentives for developers to construct, financial institutions to lend, realtors to sell, and large swaths of American social strata to purchase newly developed housing that were located in increasingly decentralized areas away from America's central cities.4One particularly important outcome of these policies is home mortgage redlining-the publicly created disinvestment of a surprisingly large portion of standing housing stock across wide swaths of central city neighborhoods. Historical redlining was geographic in character and resulted from public policies formulated at national level and actions of federal agencies that implemented these policies.5 Federal agencies established empirically based risk assessments of community housing markets based on both quality, amenities, basic structural features, and upkeep of housing stock as well as social class, ethnic, and racial makeup of residents of a neighborhood.6 On basis of these assessments, a large portion of nation's neighborhood housing markets were determined to pose too high a risk for newly established long term, fully amortized mortgages that were created by New Deal legislation. These areas were denied mortgage insurance and redlined. Relatively few neighborhoods, communities where housing at that time was relatively new, had a full complement of amenities and were in good repair, were deemed an acceptable risk. In these areas, mortgage insurance was granted and conventional mortgages were available to purchasers to facilitate exchange of real estate. Additionally, almost all newly constructed housing from this time forward-in suburban locations-would be beneficiaries of this federal insurance program.The New Deal Policy Sources of Mortgage RedliningTwo pieces of New Deal legislation transformed regulation of financial institutions and revolutionized housing financing in U.S. These were Banking Act (1933) and National Housing Act (1934) that respectively created a national system of deposit guaranty and mortgage insurance, and new agencies, Federal Deposit Insurance (FDIC) and Federal Housing Administration (FHA), to implement these programs. The FDIC (and later Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation [FSLIC]) and FHA were established as public corporations that were financed not from appropriations from Congress but from fees these agencies were permitted to charge to financial institutions and mortgagees. âŠ
The new, decentralized, anonymous digital currency Bitcoin has in less than three years gone from a proof-of-concept to being traded for about âŹ78 million on a daily basis. Its ascendancy offers up a puzzle for financial regulators and other law-enforcers worldwide, while also promising to fulfill the political visions of a group of market-anarchist cryptographers. While it is still a very small economy in absolute terms, Bitcoin also poses some interesting challenges to traditional economic institutions, and is thus an interesting case for economic sociology. Using the notion of material embeddedness, this paper examines the possible implications of a further propagation of Bitcoin. If the currency proves a success, this will have ramifications for a large number of economic institutions, such as the possibility of taxation of untraceable money, the credit economy and interest rates, and international currency control.
âWe are poised between an old world that no longer works and a new one struggling to be born. Surrounded by centralized hierarchies on the one hand and predatory markets on the other, people around the world are searching for alternativesâ. This is the starting point for what David Bollier and Silke Helfrich, the editors of The Wealth of the Commons: A World Beyond Market and State (2012), describe as âan extended global exercise in commoningâ â Peter Linebaugh's term for âthe self-determination of commoners in managing their shared resourcesâ (p. 396). In other words, the book itself is offered as an active process of âmaking the pathâ by presenting âsome of the most promising new paths now being developedâ. It is intended to be ârigorous enough for academic readers yet accessible enough for the laypersonâ. In this, it more than achieves its ambitions. The Wealth of the Commons is an edited collection of seventy-three short papers from thirty countries: âa collective venture of sharing, collaboration, negotiation and creative production among some of the most diverse commons scholars, activists and projects leaders imaginableâ. This rich and diverse source of knowledge and inspiration could be described as âpolyvocalâ in the sense that it presents a multiplicity of voices improvising around a single theme â sometimes in harmony, sometimes discordant, but always interesting. The book brings together an impressive collection of contributors from different places, backgrounds and interests to explore the meaning of the commons and to advocate for it âas a new paradigmâ for the organization of public and private life. In this sense, it represents a project rather than an analysis: essentially espousing a cause with imperative urgency. This is not necessarily a weakness, but it does raise specific questions about what is included and what is absent or marginalized in this particular selection of accounts, and what might be lost along the way. What counts as âcommonsâ or âthe commonsâ or âthe commonâ (all used in the text) is a subject of discussion and contestation here, as elsewhere. The effort to âname and claimâ is an integral aspect of the project. As Jeffrey et al. (2012, p. 10) comment, âthe struggle for the commons has never been without its own politics of separation and divisionâ, raising valid questions about the prospects for a coherent paradigm at this stage. At the very least, however, this rich resource may prove seminal in countering those dominant paradigms of growth and development in which structural and cultural adjustments âserve as a justifying rhetoric for continuity in plunderâ of common resources (Mattei, p. 41). The contributions fall into three general categories: those offering a critique of existing âincreasingly dysfunctionalâ market/state relations; those that âenlarge theoretical understandings of the commons as a way to change the worldâ; and those that âdescribe innovative working projects which demonstrate the feasibilityâ of the commons. As acknowledged in many of the chapters, defining the commons in any consistent and convincing way can be deeply problematic. Like âcommunityâ itself, it can be regarded to some degree as an ideological portmanteau which contains a variety of meanings. Nonetheless, there is a general commitment to confront such difficulties in an open way, and to be as clear as possible about what the commons might represent, what it might replace, and what it should not be confused with. Put most simply, the commons refers to what human beings share in nature and society that should be cherished for all now and for the future: âthe term ⊠provides the binding element between the natural and the social or cultural worldsâ (Weber p.11). Its profound challenge to the logic of competitive capitalist relations, therefore, is to âvalidate new schemes of human relations, production and governance ⊠commonanceâ (Bollier and Helfrich, p. xiv) that penetrate all levels of public and private life. This idea is explored in detail in many of the contributions. The commons, then, claims to represent a philosophical stance, an intellectual framework, a moral and economic imperative, a set of organizing principles and commitments, a movement, and an emerging âglobal community of practiceâ (O'Connell, 2012). It has also developed an increasingly shared discourse, which is designed to unsettle institutionalized norms and values and to reclaim or remake the language of co-operation, fairness and social justice. As the editorial points out, the language of capitalism is one that becomes âencoded into the epistemology of our language and internalized by peopleâ. In community development, and elsewhere, we have become sensitized to the way in which progressive language can be appropriated to support individualistic market values. When empowerment can mean facilitated asset-stripping of local communities, and solidarity targets can be set by government (e.g. Scottish Government, 2007), then we must be wary about assuming proprietorial closure on the term âcommonsâ itself. As Federici, in a particularly persuasive chapter, warns: â⊠capital is learning about the virtues of the common goodâ (p. 46). She argues that, âsince at least the 1990s, the language of the commons has been appropriated ⊠by the World Bank and put at the service of privatizationâ. For this reason, it is important to think of the commons as a âquality of relations, a principle of co-operation and of responsibility to each other and to the earth, the forests, the seas, the animalsâ (p. 50). This produces a different operational logic, which is explored in depth across the collection. To advance the commons as âa new paradigmâ, it is necessary to locate it historically and to show the ways in which it has been colonized and compromised, as some of these pieces do. It may seem ironic that the meaning of âthe commonsâ to many people in the UK, for example, is that bear pit of parliamentary business, the House of Commons, in which adversarial rather than consensual politics is the order of the day. Reclaiming such foundational ideas is a lengthy and demanding process, as David Graeber shows in The Democracy Project, his recent account of the Occupy Movement, which for a time commanded considerable international interest. Drawing on Linebaugh, Federici contends that âcommons have been the thread that has connected the history of the class struggle into our timeâ. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the volume fails to address the relationship between organized labour and the commons, as highlighted in the introduction, because there is a distinctive contribution to be made here. As Harvey (2012) argues, decentralization and autonomy are also primary vehicles for reinforcing neoliberal class strategies of social reproduction and producing greater inequality. For example, in urban environments in particular, âthe better the common qualities a social group creates, the more likely it is to be raided and appropriated by private profit-maximising interestsâ leading inexorably to economic cleansing of whole areas. Gentrification and tourism are the clearest examples. The salience of class in general is an underdeveloped line of argument. If this authoritative collection is anything to go by, this may be a significant deficiency in the commons framework. Without historical continuity â honouring the contribution of those âcommonersâ who came before in various guises and places â there is a danger of falling into the contemporary trap of regarding âinnovationâ as a way of separating us from our past. History in the past as well as in the making is as essential a part of our commons as is the present and the future â material, temporal and spiritual. Some of the chapters are conceptual, some practical, some poetic, but all have at their heart the âdutyâ not only to describe the problems of contemporary life, but to develop alternative ways of thinking about and living the relationship between individual and society, state and market, policy and politics. Since these relationships are, in broad terms, the primary focus of community development in theory and practice, commons perspectives have much to offer. Given the breadth of vision represented in this impressive book, and the restrictions of space here, I have limited myself to those chapters and issues that have particular relevance to community development. A fundamental concern is the tension between public and private spheres, and how these relate to the idea of the commons. The subtitle of the book makes clear that the âthe wealth of the commonsâ lies âbeyond the market and the stateâ, emphasizing the private, communal or community spheres. However, it is important to acknowledge that âcommunityâ has traditionally been as much a fiction of political contrivance as a real search for communal relationships. For example, in the current context, community is being systematically deployed as an alibi for decentralizing responsibility from the âpublicâ to the gendered âprivateâ community sector, en route to the âprivateâ commercial sector. If the potential for more democratic and meaningful social relationships is to be realized, then at the very least there needs to be recognition of the anti-democratic potential of community development in facilitating a âlocalismâ agenda which may deprive the poorest of key state services (a vital part of their particular commons heritage). There is clearly a qualitative difference between municipal co-operatives as an extension of âthe publicâ and community engagement strategies which are likely to lead to an extension of âthe privateâ in both senses of the word. The need for âreflexive decentralizationâ in making these distinctions is beyond question (Graeber, 2013). Whilst community has always been a contested term, there is now a very real possibility that it becomes a victim of enclosure itself, in the sense that a âspace for political empowermentâ is extinguished by default or by design, to be replaced by a process of managed compliance and privatization. At the same time, Harvey (2012, p. 70) argues, not all forms of enclosure can be dismissed as bad by definition. In fact, âsome sort of closure is often the best way to preserve certain kinds of valued commonsâ. Kratzwald (p. 55), in her compelling chapter on rethinking the social welfare state in light of the commons, argues that one strategic way of avoiding wholesale appropriation of âcommonsâ ideology in the service of privatization agendas is to reconsider how services are provided â âby the state, controlled by those affected; by citizens, through various forms of government support and financing; or in self-organised social networksâ â and that such decisions must be made âanew in every individual caseâ. The precondition in all cases would be the strengthening of âpolitical empowermentâ against privatization. This is essentially a call for âclarity through specificityâ (Cornwall, 2008), which could act as a very concrete corrective to some of the more grandiose claims of community development. In addition, the strategic application of the kind of filtering process suggested by Kratzwald may offer sustenance to beleaguered practitioners working with long-suffering communities to understand where their best interests might lie. It also validates the case for speaking out collectively âwhen the idea of the commons is used to justify cutting public expendituresâ (Kratzwald, p. 59) as in various versions of âthe big societyâ. Re-theorizing both âthe publicâ and âthe privateâ in community development would help to expose the shallowness of much of the current drive towards community governance worldwide and help to repoliticize participatory democracy. Any serious case for a commons-based approach must be at least partially measured by the extent to which it expands democratic political space for those most removed from power. As Quilligan in particular argues (p. 73), there is always a tension between representative and participatory democracy, with community development often positioned as a mediator between state and civil society. However, in a global environment in which private âcorporations have substantially invaded the sphere of government, demanding that the state functions mainly for their benefitâ (Rustin, 2013), that mediating position is severely compromised, if not rendered almost impossible. In this process poor people everywhere have been âresponsibilizedâ and âdemonizedâ while, at the same time, some sections of civil society have been âentrepreneurializedâ by being expected to take over substantial state functions, sometimes through competitive tendering processes, which produce low wages, poor services and increasingly divided communities. This creates the sharpest of tensions, considering that âthe community solutionâ has traditionally been framed within the politics of the state. There is a strong temptation therefore to regard the marketized state as beyond redemption, a central cause of the problems that currently beset democratic life. In this respect, Mattei (p. 39) argues that the conventional state/market dichotomy is a âdistinction without a differenceâ. And there is no shortage of evidence of the combination of market economics and bureaucratic politics that have so undermined democratic structures and cultures. Nonetheless, an insistent question remains as to whether the state should be surrendered so readily, and what might take its place as an institutionalized expression of the collective will of citizens in defence of âtheir sovereign rights ⊠to their common goodsâ (Quilligan, p. 81). The state is essentially an ambivalent formation, which has been fought over and fought for in many different contexts over time. As it has been gradually hollowed out by the virus of neoliberalism, it is tempting to erase from collective memory those democratic struggles over the state through which marginalized groups have fought their way towards some degree of social protection, cultural recognition and material redistribution. Through representing their claims in and outside of state structures, social and political movements have shifted the balance of power in many situations for the better. There is a dialectical relationship between the state and civil society, between representative and participatory democracy. To construct the state as the enemy, or at least as an unwanted encumbrance, is to reduce confidence in collective social and economic solutions as they may be expressed and evolved through democratic politics. As Kratzwald argues, what is required is a reclaiming of the state and the public sphere by âstepping out of the private sphereâ and into the sphere of politics. This could be a promising position for community development workers to put to the test. Operating both within the âinvited spacesâ of policy and the âdemanded spacesâ of politics, practitioners and community groups continuously need to make a critical assessment of the opportunities and challenges of both strategic participation and strategic non-participation in existing structures and programmes. Indeed, society from the as it (p. presents a key challenge for and community development (p. approach to reclaiming the state a and for thinking about the politics of take are in a and people over their and are to take responsibility for also a central for the state, as citizens active in such various to the state or the In is through the and the people In this way the democratic state is from the of the market through the made of it by an and active civil society. It is also different to those contemporary versions of in which the of power is through the of representative has always its history us that people with their that which they could never to in the market and other public 2012). To and for a democratic state that on the of human and social need as a central of the commons its because it provides a political focus for the kind of of and communal necessary to public in any way. This reclaiming the state as a shared a is regarded by some as a lost or but it is no more so than the commons project itself. Whilst there is an to be by with what is as the project of the social welfare state, it is where there is of this position that the commons idea at its and least There is no from politics, and it to that ideas are at their best they are made argues that of the of the of is that the very idea of a and of a alternative has been almost from the of It is for example, that there is not a single in the of this to is there much of other political and in at any What are we to make of The commons could be to a broad an which has an important in and to an alternative social However, there is a broad commitment to are framed in ways that its is essentially ideological and cultural rather than This is not in the contribution it could make to the development of a project. As (2012) argues in his assessment of social movements in the âthe fundamental power struggle is the for the of meaning in the of peopleâ. one of the most about the collection of ideas and which the commitment to is that it is an active which does not in the in which all often to politics community development. At the same time, this may also be one of the in to a coherent commons of âthe commonsâ is a of claims therefore, always such social and political As in his critique of the urban commons (2012, p. argues, the of it the is often with a are common interests to and by what are essentially political The potential for the rich to lead and to in communities and to an commons is all A more epistemology may be required to take account of or The of commons may be necessary in to and a vision of an alternative moral which would for but an of of power a more dialectical of cause and For example, the and of certain sections of the are as of â be they welfare at one of the or and at the Whilst it is clearly that and can the kind of wealth which in some world over whole are increasingly on their it is the of economic in order to produce those very that is the to the kind of commons which would society. In a of by â from public through to â the of an must confront the of an for enclosure has always been the default and who autonomy to their one of the most significant contributions of the commons then, is in the ideological and cultural challenge it presents for community development. In this respect, it is important to that capitalism itself is if not an ideological with profound cultural in of how people to and Graeber makes a but between the and the in politics, both as an and the Occupy Movement, in the The as are with structures, process being a The on the other are in of which will construct the as yet important of politics therefore is that it through its in the and to offer a of the future it is â to it as it This kind of politics is also in much commons thinking and community development. The dialectical process of in of power by the claims of marginalized groups expressed through is what community development should be In other words, greater to democratic democratic structures that in the in which those are or As it (p. need a state that expands our for community To what might be a which practitioners to the of and critical framed within an of collective and and to an of the structural of could help to community This book provides a to ways of thinking and that at the very least, our from and beyond the and in which many of us are It us of the of the of in our to rather than or of a more world â and then to for
We are calling for comparisons of banking and banking systems from a spatial perspective. Therefore, this paper develops a classification identifying decentralized and centralized banking according to two characteristics: geographical market orientation (regional vs. supraregional) â to determine whether banks facilitate regional savings-investment cycles â and place of decision-making (proximity vs. distance) â to identify whether the flow of soft information is supported in SME lending. The degree of banksâ centralization is also approximated by the spatial concentration of bank employees and shows remarkable explanatory power in Germany, as de-centralized banks increase lending at the expense of centralized banks.
In einem Umfeld kriseninduzierter Verunsicherung ĂŒber das Funktionieren des Geld-und Finanzsystems finden Forderungen nach einer grundsĂ€tzlichen Reform des Geldwesens verstĂ€rkte media-le Beachtung. Das elektronische WĂ€hrungsprojekt Bitcoin und das Konzept Vollgeld sind zwei Varianten von Ideen zur Geldreform. Im Prinzip können diese Reformideen auf zwei Positionen der ordoliberalen Diskussion zurĂŒckgefĂŒhrt werden. Der Beitrag diskutiert ihre Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede sowie Möglichkeiten und Grenzen ihrer Verwirklichung auf Basis einer Analyse ihres GeldverstĂ€ndnisses. <bold>Summary</bold> The recent economic crisis has shattered widely held beliefs in the functioning of the current monetary and financial system. In this context, calls for a fundamental reform of money have received considerable attention in the media. Bitcoin, a project for a private electronic currency, and the âpositive moneyâ (in German: âVollgeldâ) concept are two variants of ideas for monetary reform. Their roots can be traced back to two views held within ordoliberal economics. The paper discusses their commonalities and differences, as well as their limits based on an analysis of their concepts of money. JEL Classification: E42, E 52, E 58
The transition from a communist to a post-communist society ushered in major changes in the housing system in Estonia. Processes and reforms connected with the decentralization of power, housing, and land privatization appeared in all Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries but each country (group of countries) has had its own specific features throughout the reform process and its own specific outcomes determined by the path dependence of specific policies and cultural patterns ( HegedĂŒs and Tosics 1998 ; Pichler-Milanovich 2001 ). The communist system treated housing as a public asset that is not part of the market and to which every citizen should have access ( HegedĂŒs and Tosics 1996 ; Kornai 1992 ). The principles of the system aimed at ensuring egalitarian living standards for all ( Smith 1996 ). The extensive nationalization of private housing was launched in Estonia in 1941 soon after its incorporation into the Soviet Union. At the end of the socialist period, two-thirds of the housing stock belonged to the state. The communist system did not use term social housing because state-owned dwellings were in principle accessible to all.
Joan CostaâFont, Cristiano Gori, Silvina Santana
The progressive ageing of the European population and the transformation of family care giving arrangements bring to the fore the question of how best to Finance long-term care (LTC). Particularly important is the specific financial organization of LTC systems when both social and demographic constraints compete with economic motivations to rationalize public insurance schemes. LTC provides support for old age dependants that need some health care, but primarily social care. However, Southern European countries are facing the paradox of health care being a top policy priority as in almost all European countries, whilst social care is nearly privatized or has been heavily decentralized to local authorities, and subject to means- as well as needs-testing (Costa-Font and Font-Vilalta, 2006; Gil, 2009; CostaFont, 2010a; Santana, 2010). Private financing is primarily dominated by intra-household interactions and self Financing. The role of private financing alternatives is developing in some countries such as Spain, but is still far from taking off. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
In the last three decades, the supply of housing in Argentina has not kept pace with demand. This study analyzes the main drivers of Argentina's housing market and relates them to the macroeconomic environment in order to advance a policy agenda for housing policy reform. The demand for housing was calculated and tenure choice was analyzed. Structural characteristics affecting Argentina's housing market include the high concentration of the urban population in a few large metropolitan areas, te association of urban poverty with the housing deficit, and overcrowding. The mortgage market lost its appeal following the 2001-02 crisis due to widespread breaches of contract legitimized through protective legislation (still in place), insufficient long-term financing, and high inflation. The housing deficit could be eliminated in five to eight years if well-coordinated policy initiatives to develop the mortgage market and provide low-income housing were adopted under a decentralized, demand-driven, subsidized program.
First, Veblen's distinction between industrial and pecuniary employments with special regard to speculation is introduced. Second, investment banking as a prime example for pecuniary activities is presented. Third, a dominant fundamentalist, market efficiency and a heterodox speculation paradigm of financial markets are distinguished. Fourth, ten proposals for financial market reform (e.g., decentralization) are proposed. Finally, it is asked why these reforms, which should support a productive-serviceable function of finance, will not be realized. This is due to a capturing of the public sector and the prevailing scientific and ideological habits of thought.
Two broad and interlinking themes have dominated much of the recent literature on local governance1 and participation: the dynamics, spatialities and temporalities of the âneoliberalizationâ of local governance; and the relationship between local governance and democracy, especially the âmeanings, potentials and pitfalls of âparticipationâ â (Melo and Baiocchi, 2006: 596). Taking the latter first, Beaumont and Nicholls (2008) in identifying new research issues emerging from a symposium have highlighted a range of questions: frictions between representative and participative local democracy; distinctions and overlaps between participation, democratization and social movements in cities; and the tools for deepening democratic engagement with impoverished and marginalized communities in cities of the global North and South. Purcell (2007) argues that there is a need for more and more sustained work on the political as well as the economic dynamics of city regions, and that this means engaging with questions of democracy as well as of citizenship. Melo and Baiocchi suggest there are two key questions: whether deliberative, âhorizontalâ governance structures favour middle-class and elite interests; and what are the conditions under which participatory arrangements can be both democratic and governance-enhancing. A related issue is the potentially problematic power relationship between elite forms of local governance â for example the influence of unelected local notables in institutions such as local partnerships â and participatory practices (Geddes, 2006). The abundant literature on decentralization initiatives in many Southern states frequently questions the extent to which such initiatives have been able to embed effective and democratically accountable institutions at the subnational level (Stren, 2004; Batterbury and Fernando, 2006). These issues of the politics of local governance â the interplay of participation and partnership, social movements and the representative democracy of political parties and leaders â are central to this symposium. Many, if not all, of the contributors to the above debates position issues of democracy and participation in the context of processes of neoliberalization, and the âmarket democracyâ or âmarket citizenshipâ associated with neoliberalism (Kohl and Farthing, 2006). The concept of neoliberalism is complex, diverse and contested, and works on a number of levels. These range from institutionalized cognitive principles ââa deep, taken-for-granted belief in neoclassical economicsâ, through consequent normative principles favouring free market solutions to economic problems, to a set of policies implemented during the 1980s and 1990s to promote a lean welfare state, low taxation and flexible labour markets (Dumenil and Levy, 2001: 5). In an important recent contribution, Harvey (2005: 19) argues that neoliberalism should not be understood as a bundle of characteristics, but as a political project, a process of neoliberalization âto re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elitesâ, and specifically to disembed capital from the constraints of the âembedded liberalismâ of social democracy and the Keynesian welfare state (ibid.: 11). When theoretical neoliberal principles clash with the need to restore or sustain capitalist class power, or when such principles lead to tensions and contradictions, âthen the principles are either abandoned or become so twisted as to be unrecognisableâ (ibid.: 19). He cites the rhetorical commitment of neoconservatives to democracy as an example. Harvey reflects on the important role of urban crisis â such as the New York fiscal crisis of the 1970s â in paving the way for neoliberalism, and also points to neoliberal forms of elite, closed governance such as partnership, which circumscribe both âoldâ representative and ânewâ participatory democratic processes (Fuller and Geddes, 2008). In this vein, other key contributions have resonated widely in the recent literature. Jessop (2002: 466) noted how key global neoliberal strategies envisage a growing ârole for cities in managing the interface between the local economy and global flows, between the potentially conflicting demands of local sustainability and local wellbeing and those of international competitiveness, and between the challenges of social exclusion and global polarization and the continuing demands for liberalization, deregulation, [and] privatizationâ. Along similar lines, Brenner and Theodore (2002: 369â72) referred to the âneoliberalization of urban spaceâ (or âneoliberal localizationâ) as one of destructive creation in which the old local state apparatus is replaced by new forms of local governance â including ânetworkedâ forms of governance based upon publicâprivate partnerships; ânew public managementâ strategies; privatization and competitive contracting of municipal services. In a widely cited formulation, Peck and Tickell (2007) distinguished two phases of neoliberalism in the UK context: roll-back (when a primary objective was to roll back the pre-existing political economy of the social democratic welfare state, via deregulation and public expenditure cuts) and roll-out (the extension and deepening of neoliberal forms such as networked governance, fiscal responsibility and reregulation). Cerny (2008), emphasizing the importance of place in the global evolution of neoliberalism, identifies a âsocial neoliberalismâ in which welfare is not rolled back but restructured and marketized in highly complex ways. Thus: the neoliberal ascendancy of the past three decades has been associated with a series of paradoxical and contradictory âdouble movementsâ . . . neoliberalism involves the simultaneous and iterative roll-back of institutional and social forms (especially those associated with Keynesianism) together with the roll-out of restructured institutional and state forms (Peck and Tickell, 2007). While this literature initially focused primarily on the changes encountered by urban institutions across countries and regions in Europe and North America, there is now increasing recognition that the neoliberalization of local governance is a global phenomenon (Leitner et al., 2007). An insistent skein in the increasingly globalized literature has been the call to recognize the diversity of âactually existing neoliberalismsâ. Larner (2005: 17), for example, is concerned to move beyond neoliberalism as a monolithic hegemonic entity in order to understand its uneven, contested and contingent nature, and recognizes that institutional landscapes are characterized by diverse, âcontradictory spatialities, socialities and subjectivitiesâ, operating through divergent political, institutional and regulatory strategies that are characterized by contradiction and contestation. It is also important to recognize that policy change can involve a degree of the âpragmatic and opportunisticâ (Peck and Tickell, 2007: 30). There are, though, important differences between perspectives which essentially identify variants of neoliberalism, and others which talk in terms of hybrids between neoliberalism and other political projects. In this perspective, many rationalities and approaches are prioritized by the state, which come to form a âhybridity of approaches and rationalitiesâ (Purcell and Nevins, 2005; Raco, 2005: 325), in which there is no assumption of the dominance of neoliberalism (Barnett, 2005). Exploring both the temporal and spatial dynamics of neoliberalization, Geddes (2005) suggests that the transition to a neoliberalized local governance remains highly differentiated. Beyond a neoliberal heartland (US, UK, Australia, New Zealand) there are marked differences between a ânew Europeâ eager to embrace neoliberalism, a social Europe still as yet with a markedly different vision, and a transitional Europe, itself divided into several trajectories. Beyond Europe, there can be not just mimicry of European/US models, but also very different local governance initiatives, some of which challenge neoliberal prescriptions. Summarizing a symposium on the geographies of neoliberalism in America, (2005: that spatial and . . . processes of state and the of neoliberal landscapes and a but also that is a as well as destructive . . . which for or social emphasizing that such of are at the by neoliberal In and neoliberalization has been associated with the deepening and of market the role of the state and its relationship with its in order to and and 2005; and Farthing, 2006). In no a local been on the social its role has been in with the neoliberal by recent 2008). The spatial and temporal dynamics of neoliberalization can a contested and (Leitner et al., in which of neoliberalism can itself a not as a to neoliberalism, but also of the of neoliberalism by and practices and with (ibid.: 5). that to in terms of neoliberalism are (2005: for example, argues that of neoliberalism to of which are not to neoliberalism and from the not how this While that not is to neoliberalism, in that neoliberalism has the to with such which in the context of phases of symposium with debates local governance, and especially participatory in global from the UK and this to and this and (Geddes, this While and the cities on which of the not of more a of global to issues in a set of very different â including the and different past the global and countries and with both and very different governance and this of by to the literature. In this with the issue of what to the of âactually forms of local governance under suggest that such an to two of both of the upon which the process of neoliberalization and other to that of neoliberalization, which are also on local latter in to local governance are processes of with a in contradictory relationship to neoliberalism, as Harvey is one of with in which are in both and in formulation, . . . . . . the of across and when and are In the of this primarily on which to of in local also reflects the that the contributors to the symposium different the extent to which neoliberalization of and the of a of The in the symposium primarily on neoliberalism â that is to in one on the extent to which processes in local governance in very different local not understand a to and the in which both tensions and neoliberalism, and forms of in complex of local governance both and now under â the social and political and and the process â which are in different in the of the The of the state, including the extent â or â of democratic political institutions is a primary local noted Jessop and Brenner and Theodore to the process of the local neoliberal Harvey the neoliberal state is a contested political form a number of and tensions to the between and democracy; in the of the existing social order which neoliberal and extension of between and In to the of and forms of The countries and cities in this symposium such tensions and the local of both and Southern and and and in which the extension of democratic forms markedly different The of the states which the cities are are important in of local governance in at three which are the of the state, the of the local state and its In the UK the countries in the the social democratic state a form of âembedded liberalismâ 2005: which the neoliberal has to the extent of this the of the UK state, to the of neoliberalism to on the of social democracy and its in have for neoliberal local state forms and In in the other states â and â the transition neoliberalism has place or state there are also important differences between The states in and very of political in the state to its the was and still is characterized by a level of political and and 2006: The characterized by social that in local political and in the of the of and the of local et al., In in the can be that when with neoliberal to have complex of participation urban In forms of have in the important on local state policy in movements have participatory local institutions by the neoliberal In both and the of neoliberal state forms with the transition from has been a in this still be to In the of argues that in the the transition to a neoliberal urban governance was as was the to be to a new state the of economic and In the of the transition from of its with the of has also with with and as and and is is In neoliberalism in the 1980s in the crisis of an and but the neoliberal with local participatory to its was to the changes of which the neoliberal to the of democratic processes the The a of from those neoliberalism characterized by an of political and has been able to a degree of from its with the transition to democracy, to those its with democracy is and its more It is also as for similar to from political strategies by states with different and in social democratic and have similar participation as of and similar competitive economic The to are in at to the influence of the state in the form of the in neoliberal urban economic and social different social democratic of the countries and cities in the degree of decentralization of political power to the local level governance and in terms of is for example, with the of and based on from across America, of the complex between neoliberalism, democratization and and the that decentralization is associated with either neoliberalism or there is a between the decentralization of power in which has more for local in to the position in the urban has been to with and this local governance in both and is well and In the of local is into the but the to local in in to the of means that the of local governance arrangements is more contested in cities local state is of or are complex and of are much In (Geddes, this local across the in the and constraints have been especially The in the the and of the state at both and local levels. It is also important to recognize the role of state institutions and now an increasingly important role in policy and such as the and its the the of Europe, and international have been important in the of and neoliberal policies different global regions example under the of the which from the neoliberal in and The of governance principles by is for many countries to of the which and to is upon with the neoliberal economic principles which 2007). the key points of have in of what is between and the and in and more participatory forms of democracy and political emphasizing the principles of and local democracy similar with forms of participation, to promote of participation 2007). there is growing recognition of the which frequently between the of participatory institutions and and 2005). The some contributions to for more to how democratically local are and to the issues by Beaumont and Nicholls frictions and distinctions between participation and democratization and the need for deepening democratic engagement of marginalized movements and have been key in local governance, as was the with the in during the and the in one perspective, the of social movements in more recent is a to the of social movements have the political of the by neoliberalism to of the neoliberal state and politics et al., 2007). the of neoliberalism, local strategies have been and social capital to be as a to state and in which and are are in neoliberal local (2005: the is the extent to which social movements have become into a of neoliberal state argues â with many others â that participatory processes such as those in and well more as for the of social as means of that much of the governance literature on a of power an in the power of a in state power, argues that engagement with the literature is the of power beyond a and emphasizing the continuing of in governance is at to that such for participation, be what was on The latter a neoliberal forms of engagement well more social democratic local is also is to such local participatory initiatives the of neoliberalism and neoliberal local In for example, on such initiatives is with that on economic In the context of the UK, the New for across by the New have no on the economic context of economic in one such participatory processes can be as one in a âsocial neoliberalismâ primarily class to social be more to the of state policy in with on the of the neoliberal state, in to which such participatory social are of be from and In this the of the latter for a local state are The of and are also of the way in which social can be local state which are to and by the central state, in a relationship as et is . . . are to to of but are to to neoliberal A very different is in the local social movements of the and are in and at from the assumption that is by the state, to influence local state policy is in a context of social and at the of the local and (2007) the of of and engagement in as to both and the These very different be the for local social movements of a position which is both and the state â in a position in which can influence the state in The challenge to social movements has (2007) to that should to participation in institutions such as local which that such an engagement is â such as participatory in â to have on the of local social movements with a local to and with or in the of from in countries the UK, social demands to be into a and increasingly by the local state there are still important â such as in and â of participation in a range of forms of across local and global which or by the In the of many social movements both in communities and in urban both with a of to the state, has not social movements to but has to form the for of the neoliberal and 2007). governance has the on social movements to to the of partnerships and forms of neoliberal participation, and in so has to the participation of the 1980s in countries such as and beyond 2005; 2007). others 2005; and Farthing, and the not but to forms of and to forms of political participation by the not an neoliberal practices of the of neoliberal institutions by in very different by different or local governance has increasingly the of the has been the of the power and of local and political The of and political parties via local has been by and has been with participative and forms of local democratic The of partnerships has to local to the of one many the primary in local political leaders have been on the one to become more and on the other to new based on the of political and more on or in a In countries such as the UK, local political is increasingly concerned with in the of the different a the and of local political has been as important in and to from of and 2005). local is not to the political leaders in cities in and have also this to power et al., with as and The of and in have local and public to with the creation of new forms of and such as and participation There is much though, of by political leaders in the by and the of which have the of also local of is the local of the literature on local suggests in the context of a neoliberal local politics of governance, should be or the contributions of local leaders from and In some countries has been that local political has to from a to a range of different in a more democratic (Melo and Baiocchi, can also be the that and of old have of in many of America, the of leaders still remains In for example, the of as has the of and that remains between the of political and of a politics in which and in some countries such as the UK, policies have to promote the importance of in one as a way to local democratic and and 2005). the which is one in which local and parties â of both and and in countries â have to of the new of local governance, but in the process different and to governance such as the by of political parties of partnerships in which theoretical of and the and competitive of local this through the example of the in which in the 1980s a more for the of the the city the and as the the that has been to the city and the urban the political of the by the in In America, both and parties have been concerned with and effective While is the that the of has been more in including and social and the that neoliberal can local participatory structures which new to local not be The of the and policies in and how the process of a between the of a a social and the social as well as across and can have for the of local the of a policy or either the or to a different can also a in the of governance of the political in The of the participatory process from to other but also to many cities is the example of how local can the of a governance et al., 2008). and the global urban the important spatial of the economic and social across the by the neoliberal a set of that local that by the the urban of In that the of Europe, North and and the be the and be with and the and the regions the in between and 2007). In the of and These are local governance in an increasingly and has been with urban governance an of the extension and of urban as a of and with the of in strategies to a global competitive are a more competitive and local have to place and new forms of local but have also for new strategies of social and place policies have been by the creation of and and with other cities the and the Southern et al., 2006). cities are the international and are not at the of the global urban but are cities at the level of the that is a dominated by the city of the and important at a level the power of of the global and the initiatives which have been are a continuing of local governance In and in a context of strategies have the a city and of old the for the of 2006). the urban influence the extent to which different cities strategies the local governance in terms of the of institutions and from and beyond and the of and across different the of local governance institutions to to is also by the of the other three which cities have example, of of between the and levels. the of and have as much in with the of as with the in to global changes in and which of and that level cities have and social and are highly in and and have governance the of in and is much in the of urban governance to such is more and some strategies of social by the state â such as participatory participation, partnerships and social â have become to urban social 2004; and many of have been by social movements and forms of other more and also the of the and in cities and of in the the of communities in and 2004; 2004; and increasing in the North are other such as in the UK, which have and spatial on marginalized 2004; this is a that has been associated with and the economic and social The has the role of as a to the of the at the as the has to policies in political in have to institutions and of as a way of a democratic and and this In and political of both and have in the of based on to partnerships and in this symposium are emphasizing the urban is also important to recognize the of In the between the and many of the social movements of should that the is not with social The of movements in in the 1990s and of this have been central to to neoliberalism, and have in structures in urban as a of (Kohl and Farthing, 2006). the of as well as urban local governance the importance of of the of the of has been to a in which very different and urban have been to to a political that and have become of ânew and the processes change in both how and to local governance in city in and ways. The key between the two cities was the political context in by the transition from the to a democratic that of urban governance, characterized by decentralization and a of participation, was from The on of to two the governance that a of state and and across to a of not a of state that an in participation not an in on and the for local governance of a at the urban those related to issues such as or urban which call and to the on the of the for the urban and the of neoliberalism in the to with the state, a more especially for cities in to a more for In this the importance of as the of public at the subnational and the central place of or in the urban and for In the Geddes suggests that is to the of two of local governance â neoliberal and is not to or the diversity of existing but to to the terms of He reflects on local governance in in the 1980s and 1990s a for the new neoliberal but now a of as a of the recent of the the of the neoliberal on He suggests a of and of neoliberalism is in the tensions and complex temporalities of the between neoliberalism and to in and
Abstract The development field is currently dominated by two powerful and interconnected ideas: the idea of participation, and the idea of a bottom-up approach. The idea of participation emphasizes the process of development, and claims that development is more likely to be successful if as many as possible of its beneficiaries are actively involved in improving their own conditions. The bottom-up approachâwhich has a parallel in fiscal decentralization in public financeâmaintains that the beneficiaries should choose democratically the means and objectives of the development strategies that concern them.
Social assistance as the technique providing means-tested income guaranteed financed by general taxation in Spain is composed by different benefits. There is not a only one policy, but different measures oriented to different groups of population and organised by different public administrations. During the last two decades, the different levels of public administration have implemented a set of benefits, which observed together can considered as the Spanish âsafety netâ. The main lines of this development has been: a) fragmented in different protection systems (unemployment, pensions, social services), b) subsidiary of the development of these systems and c) decentralized in different levels of public administration (mainly in regional level, i.e. Autonomous Communities).
Financial services industries have been an important source of central-city employment, including new jobs. Although decentralization occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, widespread national growth in the sector generally resulted in central-city employment gains. In the 1990s, despite continuing national growth in the sector overall, financial services became a key source of job losses in many cities. From 1991 to 1996, financial services employment declined by 5% in a sample of 40 large cities but increased by 9% in corresponding suburbs. Twenty-five of these cities lost finance jobs, with losses exceeding 10% in 11 cities. Moreover, financial services were often a disproportionate contributor to total employment losses. This article describes these trends and explores the relationship between industrial structure, city size, and region on the suburbanization of financial services employment.
Evaluates changes in the welfare system in Sweden, the UK and the USA over a decade, basing arguments on the divergence of economic globalization and domestic forces. Presents brief economic snapshots of each country, stating quite categorically that the welfare state is an impediment to capitalist profitâmaking, hence all three nations have retrenched welfare systems in the hope of remaining globally economically competitive. Lays the responsibility for retrenchment firmly at the door of conservative political parties. Takes into account public opinion, national institutional structures, multiculturalism and class issues. Explores domestic structures of accumulation (DSA) and refers to changes in the international economy, particularly the Bretton Woods system (Pax Americana), and notes how the economic health of nations mirrors that of the US. Investigates the roles of multinationals and direct foreign investment in the global economy, returning to how economic policy affects the welfare state. Points out the changes made to the welfare state through privatization, decentralization and modification of public sector financing. Concludes that the main result has been an increase in earnings inequality and poverty.
Pluralism and elitism are the two prevailing theories of policy making in the United States. The purposes of this article are to suggest an alternative framework linkage political economy and to evaluate that framework against both pluralist and elitist policy explanations. The evaluation will take place within the medium of a case study on housing policy. The linkage political economy framework addresses some of the weaknesses evident in both pluralist and elitist studies of public policy. For example, in the housing policy field, elite theorists assert that policy making is dominated by a cohesive, politically powerful corporate bloc made up of the construction, finance, and realty industries.I But the elite theorists are then hard pressed to explain policy failures of this dominant coalition such as the passage of the 1937 public housing program or the original low-income thrust of the 1949 urban redevelopment program. On the other hand, pluralist analysts find a much more open and balanced policy process with a wide spectrum of interests able to be heard through multiple channels available in a decentralized political process.2 Yet, this pluralist analysis cannot adequately explain the consistent bias in U.S. housing policies and out-
Key Settlement Policy divides rural settlements into two types?those in which expansion is allowed and those in which it is not. Although suitability for residential expansion is not completely synonymous with suitability for infrastructure investment (nor vice versa) the designation of Key Settlement or non-Key Settlement status does not have a significant impact on infrastructure and service provision. In the light of central and local public expenditure economies and of the 1985 Transport Act, therefore, key Settlement Policy takes on a renewed political importance. In 1982 the Warwickshire policy was changed, involving some changes in designation, and also a beginning of decentralization of designation decisions away from the county to the constituent districts. The change was justified by the argument that the policy had previously been ineffective. However, analysis of the 17 key settlements and 17 control non-key settlements from 1966 to 1981, with respect to population change, refusal rates, Planning Inspectors' decision letters, and appeal decisions, shows that the policy was effective. It is argued that the reason for the policy change in 1982 stems from central government and County Council political objectives, and that decentralization of designation powers to districts constitutes a loss of accountability for rural policy in Warwickshire. PRESENT GOVERNMENT POLICIES toward rural areas emphasize efficiency, rationalization, and cost-cutting of rural services. Many village schools are closing as school rolls fall nationally, and as local authorities search for economies. The national bill for subsidizing the bus companies is threatening to reach ?1 billion annually, and legislation now before Parliament seeks radically to reduce this vast sum by means of privatization, a measure which will cut unprofitable bus routes considerably, mainly in rural areas. Also, as the Post Office looks for greater efficiency, an acceleration of closures of rural post offices may occur. It is in this context that we investigate Warwickshire County Council's rural settlement policy. Rural settlement policies, because of the trend towards cutbacks in services, are increasingly coming to the forefront of politics in rural areas. Such policies are, and will increasingly become, the main instrument for deciding which settlements should suffer from loss of rural services, since they indicate settlement hierarchies, and therefore serve as a means of discriminating between those settlements which should be favoured ('key settlements') and those which should suffer from cutbacks. Although many of the threatened services are being privatized and thus are moving ostensibly out of the local political arena, any decision on specific cutbacks in specific areas will necessarily implicate local government. Local politicians will be unable to avoid the political storms and subsequent unpopularity thus created. The government has repeatedly made clear that any loss of services resulting from privatization should occur only after consultation with the relevant local authority. Other services, such as education and social services, obviously implicate local politicians more directly, in their continuing search for economies. Moreover, changes in government thinking on the financing of local government continually emphasize the need to make local politicians more accountable for the costs of local services to the local voters. The present Conservative Government has, since 1979, carried an election pledge to implement this change?by reforming the rating system. Furthermore, suggestions currently being considered emphasize a
This paper investigates corporate headquarters relocation in the United States for the period 1957-1980. Corporate relocations are one explanatory element in the overall spatial process of headquarters evolution within post industrial urban systems. All major corporate relocations, mergers, bankruptcies, and new incorporations that effectively transfer corporate decision making to or from any metropolitan area are recorded for the five major sectors of the economy. A series of cartograms and bargraphs provide a summary of corporate headquarters relocations for the resource, manufacturing, and service, as well as utility and financial sectors of the economy. The cartographs indicate the magnitude and direction of all headquarters relocations as well as the location of major bankruptcies and new incorporations. The bargraphs indicate the relative gains and losses through move and merger activity for all members of the urban system. The findings indicate that, in contrast to other Western economies, the dominant national center, New York, is in absolute decline as a home for corporate headquarters. This decline and decentralization is seen as a response to the general maturation of the American urban system and emergence of an entire system of urban centers rapidly acquiring large corporate headquarters status. The decentralization process is evident in all sectors of the economy except finance.