Blockchain Papers

Daniel Liebau

No abstract is available for this record.

Soumyajit Sarkar

No abstract is available for this record.

David Krause

No abstract is available for this record.

Francesca Pellegrini

This article examines the transformation of financial intermediation in the digital age, moving beyond the traditional dichotomy between disintermediation and reintermediation to propose a more nuanced, function-based regulatory perspective. It analyses how emerging technologies—such as artificial intelligence, blockchain, smart contracts, and decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs)—are reshaping the architecture of financial markets, altering the allocation of risk, trust, and accountability. The contribution integrates legal, economic, and technological insights to reassess classical theories of financial intermediation in light of algorithmic decision-making, platform-based finance, and embedded governance mechanisms. Particular attention is devoted to the rise of new digital gatekeepers, the persistence of systemic risk, and the challenges posed by algorithmic bias, DAO liability, and quantum-related cybersecurity threats. The article adopts a comparative and forward-looking approach, critically examining recent regulatory developments, including the EU framework under MiCA, PSD2/PSD3, DORA, and the AI Act, alongside regulatory experimentation such as sandboxes and supervisory technologies (SupTech and RegTech). It argues that effective oversight in digital finance requires adaptive legal architectures capable of embedding regulatory objectives directly into technological infrastructures, thereby reconciling innovation, financial inclusion, and systemic stability in an increasingly hybrid financial ecosystem.

Anagha Vinayak

No abstract is available for this record.

Ian Appel, Jillian Grennan

No abstract is available for this record.

Agrawal, Shyam Sunder, Kandpal, Vinay, Dhiman, Babli, Mohd Afjal · 5 authors

No abstract is available for this record.

Farnam Rami

Emerging market governments increasingly prioritize the defense of monetary sovereignty over the liberalization of financial innovation, particularly under conditions of macroeconomic fragility, high inflation, and geopolitical uncertainty. This study analyzes Türkiye's post-COVID financial landscape as a critical case through which to examine state strategies aimed at resisting the systemic adoption of cryptocurrencies. Despite escalating grassroots demand for digital assets-driven by Lira depreciation, inflationary pressures, and declining institutional trust-the Turkish government has leveraged a combination of regulatory, monetary, and legal instruments to preserve the Lira's role as the exclusive legal tender. Utilizing theories of monetary sovereignty and financial statecraft, alongside recent literature on crypto regulation in emerging markets and empirical insights from IMF and BIS analyses on FX interventions, this paper formulates a structured set of research questions and hypotheses to interrogate the relationship between cryptocurrency adoption, FX volatility, and institutional resistance. Methodologically, the study employs ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with Newey-West corrections, lagged models, and event studies centered on Türkiye’s key regulatory milestones (2021–2024) to capture causal dynamics and policy feedback loops. Findings demonstrate a robust correlation between increased BTC/TRY volumes and TRY/USD volatility, underscoring the self-reinforcing nature of speculative feedback loops in fragile monetary environments. The evidence shows that heightened crypto adoption amplifies FX volatility through TRY Volatility Feedback Effects (TFF), particularly during geopolitical crises such as the June 2025 Middle East conflict, where BTC’s decline and USD’s appreciation reaffirmed the persistence of traditional safe-haven behaviors. Türkiye’s institutional response intensified proportionally through bans on crypto payments, licensing regimes, enhanced FX market interventions, and rhetorical strategies aimed at reaffirming sovereign monetary control. Although cryptocurrencies function as informal hedging mechanisms for households, this study confirms they cannot sustainably displace fiat currencies where sovereign defenses remain actively enforced. Instead, they exacerbate volatility, prompting reactive state interventions. This research contributes to broader debates on financial sovereignty in emerging markets by offering Türkiye as a paradigmatic example of how states leverage legal, monetary, and infrastructural tools to constrain decentralized finance amid persistent macroeconomic vulnerabilities. Moreover, the study introduces ValueMesh™, a novel sovereign-aligned alternative developed within Türkiye’s emerging financial ecosystem through the DevPay Türkiye platform. ValueMesh bridges the gap between public demand for high-yield, participatory finance and state imperatives of monetary sovereignty by offering regulated, project-specific micro-equity participation without reliance on blockchain-based assets. This innovation demonstrates that the psychological appeal of crypto speculation can be redirected into legally sanctioned, productive, and sovereign-controlled fintech architectures. Ultimately, Türkiye’s experience illustrates that the future of financial innovation in fragile economies lies not in decentralized disruption but in carefully engineered, state-backed digital ecosystems that integrate speculative incentives within sovereign frameworks. This positions Türkiye’s post-COVID monetary strategy as a critical reference point for policymakers, scholars, and industry leaders examining the evolving interplay between financial sovereignty, decentralized finance, and geopolitical risk.

Anthony Chidi Nzomiwu

Decentralized Finance (DeFi) represents not merely a technological evolution but a fundamental reconfiguration of financial governance-shifting authority from hierarchical intermediaries to self-executing code. Drawing on institutional economics and legal theory, this article argues that DeFi enacts a new governance paradigm wherein trust is no longer vested in persons or institutions but encoded into deterministic protocols. Through analysis of the four core DeFi primitives-decentralized exchanges, lending platforms, programmable derivatives, and automated financial processes-we demonstrate how programmable rules disintermediate traditional fiduciary and enforcement functions. A focused illustration of Compound's governance evolution reveals both the promise of efficiency gains and the emergence of novel accountability deficits. We identify a central tension: while automated rule enforcement reduces transaction costs and principal-agent frictions, it simultaneously attenuates contestability, adaptability, and redress-features essential to resilient financial systems. The article concludes by proposing a framework for hybrid governance that preserves code-based efficiency while reintroducing deliberative safeguards, offering pathways for regulators, protocol designers, and scholars to navigate the institutional re-embedding of finance in the post-intermediary era.

Kuzi Charamba, Joyce Shum, Douglas W. Arner

No abstract is available for this record.

Seth Oranburg

No abstract is available for this record.

Anthony Chidi Nzomiwu

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) have emerged as the de facto governance layer for major decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols and real-world asset (RWA) tokenization platforms, yet they operate in a profound legal and regulatory vacuum. Unlike traditional financial entities, DAOs lack formal legal personality, fiduciary duties, or mechanisms for regulatory accountability, despite managing assets estimated at $25 billion globally as of 2024. This research examines how DAOs are transforming financial governance and identifies the necessary regulatory adjustments to ensure investor protection, market integrity, and systemic resilience without compromising the core innovation of decentralized coordination. Through a mixedmethods approach-including governance mapping of 30+ financial DAOs, comparative legal analysis of emerging regulatory responses (from the EU's MiCA framework to Wyoming's DAO LLC statute), and semi-structured interviews with developers, regulators, and institutional participants-the study proposes a novel "functional equivalence" model for DAO regulation. This model grants legal recognition to DAOs when they engage in regulated financial activities, while preserving code-based autonomy in non-regulated functions. The research offers a pragmatic pathway toward aligning decentralized innovation with public accountability, filling a critical gap in both academic literature and policy design.

Vanessa Villanueva Collao

Decentralized Finance (DeFi) emerged with the promise of eliminating traditional financial intermediaries and hierarchies, replacing them with trustless, automated, and decentralized systems. However, the reality of DeFi governance shows that disintermediation does not eliminate conflicts of interest or the need for trust. Cryptoenterprises—financial Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs)—operate without conventional governance structures such as boards of directors or managerial oversight, relying instead on code-based mechanisms. This absence of internal governance frameworks creates fertile ground for misaligned incentives, governance opacity, and unchecked internal controls, ultimately exacerbating conflicts between insiders (cryptopromoters) and investors (cryptoasset holders). This Article examines the emerging role of cryptogatekeepers: a new category of cryptointermediaries that counterbalances these governance failures. It explores the structural deficiencies of cryptoenterprises, including the absence of internal monitoring mechanisms, and identifies the conflicts. The analysis highlights how cryptopromoters—those in control of DeFi protocols—retain significant decision-making power while obscuring accountability, which leads to agency problems reminiscent of traditional finance, sans regulatory safeguards. By assessing the function of cryptointermediaries as potential de facto governance enforcers, this Article argues that cryptogatekeepers can introduce a layer of oversight that compensates for the current governance void in DeFi. It outlines best practices for mitigating conflicts of interest, enhancing disclosure standards, and improving the monitoring of cryptointermediaries. The Article also considers transnational regulatory approaches to bolster accountability in DeFi by proposing mechanisms such as cryptointermediary registries, mutual recognition of licensed cryptointermediaries, and standardized reporting frameworks. Ultimately, this Article contends that while DeFi presents an innovative model for financial services, it cannot escape fundamental governance challenges. The rise of cryptogatekeepers suggests that some level of reintermediation is inevitable and necessary to balance decentralization with investor protection and market integrity.

Marcelo Emmerich

No abstract is available for this record.

Dirk Zetsche, Douglas W. Arner, R. A. Buckley

No abstract is available for this record.

Anthony Chidi Nzomiwu

The convergence of real-world asset tokenization and decentralized finance protocols represents a paradigm shift in global financial architecture, challenging traditional concepts of monetary policy, financial intermediation, and economic coordination. This research proposal examines how blockchain-based tokenization of physical and financial assets, combined with programmable smart contracts and decentralized protocols, is fundamentally altering the mechanisms through which value is stored, transferred, and governed in modern economies. The study employs a mixedmethods approach combining quantitative analysis of tokenized asset markets with qualitative examination of regulatory frameworks and stakeholder perspectives across major financial jurisdictions. Our investigation addresses four critical research questions: how tokenization alters traditional concepts of ownership and liquidity; the systemic implications of DeFi adoption for monetary policy transmission; the regulatory evolution required to address risks while maintaining financial stability; and the long-term implications for global monetary coordination. The research contributes to emerging literature at the intersection of monetary economics, financial technology, and regulatory policy by providing the first comprehensive analysis of how tokenized assets and DeFi protocols interact to create new forms of financial infrastructure. Expected findings suggest that widespread adoption of asset tokenization and DeFi protocols will necessitate fundamental reconsideration of central bank capabilities, regulatory frameworks, and international monetary coordination mechanisms. The study proposes a hybrid regulatory approach that balances innovation with stability through risk-based supervision, regulatory sandboxes, and enhanced international cooperation. These contributions are essential for policymakers, financial institutions, and researchers seeking to understand and navigate the transformation of global financial systems in the digital age.

Ayoola Olamilekan Sikiru, Onyeka Kelvin Chima, Mary Otunba, Olatunde Gaffar · 5 authors

The landscape of investment banking and capital markets is undergoing a radical transformation, driven by the convergence of blockchain technology and decentralized finance (DeFi). At the heart of this evolution is the tokenization of illiquid assets—a process that converts ownership rights in traditionally non-tradable assets such as real estate, art, private equity, and infrastructure into digital tokens recorded on a blockchain. This innovation offers the promise of increased market accessibility, improved liquidity, enhanced transparency, and operational efficiency. By lowering entry barriers and reducing friction in asset transfer, tokenization is reshaping the traditional paradigms of advisory services and capital raising, especially for mid-market and emerging market issuers. This paper explores how investment banks are beginning to redefine their advisory models and underwriting strategies in response to the growing demand for tokenized securities. It examines regulatory challenges, the evolving investor landscape, and the technical infrastructure required to support these novel instruments. With a focus on developments through 2024, the paper synthesizes global case studies, including efforts by banks, fintechs, and digital asset exchanges to build compliant platforms for token issuance, custody, and secondary trading. Furthermore, it analyzes the intersection of tokenization with Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) objectives, assessing how digital assets can support greater accountability and reporting efficiency. From a capital markets perspective, tokenization offers an opportunity to unbundle traditional services, allowing for fractional ownership, 24/7 trading, automated compliance, and programmable assets. These shifts not only require a new technological architecture but also demand an evolution in legal frameworks and investor protections. Investment banks, thus, face a critical juncture: to either adapt and lead in developing tokenization-enabled capital markets or risk disintermediation by more agile digital-native competitors. This paper proposes a strategic blueprint for how advisory and deal structuring functions can evolve to meet these emerging demands, while also offering policy recommendations for building secure, scalable, and inclusive tokenization ecosystems.

Udo Milkau

This paper attempts to provide a careful and balanced look at some of the benefits and challenges of tokenisation of securities. A fundamental problem is the lack of consistency in how ‘tokenisation’ should be defined. According to a report by McKinsey & Company in 2023, ‘Tokenization adoption was poised for success six years ago, but progress was limited … the path could be different this time’. In the past, tokenisation was: (1) limited to a process of creating a representation of financial, intellectual or physical assets on a blockchain (ie distributed ledger technology [DLT]); and (2) discussed as a narrative of disintermediation and programmability as a basis for efficiency gains. As it became clear that DLT, with its basic game-theoretical approach, comes with high costs and opaque governance, traditional platforms with high efficiency such as the European TARGET2-Security (T2S) with atomic settlement and delivery-versus-payment (DvP) show up as blueprints for efficiency. A proposal of the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) for a unified ledger, Project Guardian of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), both in 2023, and an announcement of the U.S. Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) in 2024 about ‘settlement on a common regulated venue … [of] tokenized assets’ can be regarded as paradigms for a new and pragmatic approach, with coordination and synchronisation as key objectives in the context of financial market infrastructures.

城穂 参川

The rise and fall of the crypto-asset market shares striking similarities with the earlier IT revolution, especially in the context of speculative bubbles and subsequent market corrections. The initial enthusiasm surrounding Bitcoin (BTC) and blockchain technology mirrored the excitement that characterized the New Economy at the dawn of the 21st century. However, just as the IT bubble burst due to unrealistic expectations, the crypto market has faced its own challenges, marked by extreme volatility and a series of high-profile failures, such as the collapse of FTX. The current landscape of crypto-assets is marked by both potential and peril. As interest grows among central banks and regulators, the importance of establishing a robust regulatory framework becomes increasingly clear. The lessons learned from past bubbles, such as the IT crash and the FTX collapse, can guide future approaches to integrating crypto-assets into the broader financial system while mitigating risks.

Eric C. Chaffee

The market of non-fungible tokens (NFTs) is rapidly growing and their potential uses and applications are still being discovered. The rapid growth of this market, coupled with the unique nature of NFTs, which do not fit squarely within the existing regulatory frameworks, creates a regulatory gap between existing and effective regulation of NFTs. This gap, in turn, creates a policy-making dilemma: on the one hand, regulating NFTs too quickly could prevent efficient uses and applications from being discovered and deployed, thus stifling innovation. On the other, leaving NFTs unregulated could leave investors unprotected from the risks posed by this innovation. With this dilemma in mind, this chapter argues that regulation of NFTs should occur sparingly, and to the extent that it does occur, regulatory experimentation and competition emerges as the most promising approach. In the US, one place where regulatory competition exists is between and among the states. State regulation in the areas of securities and virtual currency and money transmission can be used to address some of the prominent present concerns posed by NFTs, such as frauds and money laundering, and states have the opportunity to experiment as NFTs evolve and are refined.

Mark Rüetschi, Carlo Campajola, Claudio J. Tessone

This paper creates a new taxonomy of Decentralized Finance (DeFi) protocols following the methodology specifically tailored to information systems set out by Nickerson et al. (2013). This taxonomy provides a tool to classify DeFi protocols, allowing for a structured comparison with traditional financial mechanisms in the present-day (as included in this paper), as well as providing a repeatable procedure in order to track development of the space in the future. Further, the clustering of classified protocols facilitates the rapid identification of similar protocols beyond the mere identification of functions. The dimensions and characteristics of the taxonomy are discussed, as well as qualitative observations concerning the current DeFi landscape. Comparisons with traditional financial mechanisms highlight not only instances of one-to-one replacement of centralized instruments with decentralized alternatives, but also new innovations and products better suited to DeFi environments. Risks and opportunities around these inventions are also discussed.

Agata Ferreira

Decentralized finance (DeFi) refers to the use of blockchain technology, specifically cryptocurrencies and smart contracts, to create a permissionless, open-source and transparent financial services ecosystem that is available to everyone and operates without the need for intermediaries, such as banks or brokers. The origins of DeFi projects can be traced back to in 2017, with Maker DAO (decentralized autonomous organization) being amongst one of the first significant DeFi projects incorporating stablecoin, decentralized governance and lending protocols. Initially, DeFi’s progress was slow, but it gained momentum rapidly in 2020, with the emergence of advancements in projects such as Bancor, Uniswap v1, Synthetix, Compound, REN, Kyber and 0x. The breakthrough period of 2020 saw a transformative phase, often referred to as the ‘summer of DeFi’, marked by an increase in the popularity of DeFi and included emergence of prominent projects such as Compound, Yearn Finance, SushiSwap and Uniswap v2. Notably, even when DeFi reached its peak capitalization towards the end of 2021, the size of the DeFi ecosystem remained relatively small compared to that of the crypto asset market, constituting less than 10 per cent of the crypto assets market. This disparity becomes even more pronounced when compared with traditional finance (TradFi).1 Market research indicates that the revenue from the DeFi market was approximately US$11.96 billion in 2021, and it is projected to surge to about US$232.20 billion by 2030. This represents a remarkable compound annual growth rate of approximately 42.6 per cent between 2022 and 2030.2 Such growth is a factor that brings DeFi to the attention of regulatory authorities and policymakers. The authorities are not only striving to comprehend this phenomenon but are also exploring ways to establish regulatory access and control and formulate regulatory responses.

Brendan McGurk, Stefan Reichenbach

Building on the conclusion that cryptoassets ought to be treated, in law, as a form of personal property, this chapter delves into the range of regulated activities under FSMA 2000, and highlights which specified activities might be undertaken on a distributed ledger through the use of cryptoassets and to what effect. It finds that those cryptoassets that fall within the definition of securities or e-money, will often fall within the scope of existing regulation.

Scott Timcke, Andrew Rens

Are non-fungible tokens (NFTs) an extreme genre of synthetic assets, free-floating signifiers of speculative capital? Or does the same disconnection color many of the instruments of financialization? These questions are central to explaining why the NFT market experienced a significant decline in the second half of 2022. In early 2022, $17 billion worth of NFTs changed hands, but by November that figure had fallen to $400 million, a collapse of 97%. The fall in demand was catalyzed by a slump in the cryptocurrency market which wiped almost $9 billion from the combined value of all NFTs in circulation. This collapse has not dissuaded advocates from suggesting that these notes will revolutionize the global trade of digital assets by using blockchains to create jurisdiction-agonist notary functions. This chapter evaluates the merit of this view by looking at the current landscape in cross-border data flows in global digital capitalism. It reviews how NFTs are constructed upon underlying layers of digital data, blockchain, and cryptocurrency to try to place them beyond the jurisdiction of national regulators. Thereafter we assess how the “NFT phenomenon” might be a compressed case of the broader features of digital capitalism and the financialization of public administration.