This article examines the mechanics and attributes of concerted debt reduction agreements that offer creditors a choice between exit and relending options. The menu approach sets prices for different choices that implement a decentralized equilibrium. When banks can commit to choose from the menu and are not allowed to free ride, a menu can be designed that assures that the price paid for debt repurchased is equal to the marginal value of the debt claims. This can be achieved by taxing the gains that accrue to nonexiters with a request for new money. The equilibrium amount of debt reduction rises when the new money request is increased. The importance of banks' heterogeneity for menus to dominate simple concerted buybacks and the case in which debt reduction can be financed by loans from international financial institutions are discussed.
U.S.-Japanese Corporate Finance For at least two decades, Japanese corporate investment consistently has outpaced U.S. corporate investment. One of the leading explanations of this phenomenon--and a favorite among U.S. corporate managers--is that the cost of capital is lower in Japan than in the United States. The combination of lower real interest rates and higher stock prices makes it cheaper for Japanese firms to borrow money and issue equity, enabling them to invest more. But how do we square this explanation with the view held by many economists that capital is mobile across national borders? If capital is indeed cheaper in Japan than in the United States, why don't U.S. companies go bargain hunting for capital in Japan? The answer may lie in differences in the structure of corporate financial markets between the two countries. 1) In 1977, the average debt-equity ratio of Japanese companies was roughly four times that of U.S. companies; it is now about the same. 2) Until fairly recently, about 90 percent of all Japanese corporate debt took the form of short-term bank loans; during the same period, only about 30 percent of U.S. corporate debt was financed by banks. 3) In a sample of financially distressed U.S. public companies, roughly one-half filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code; in a comparable sample of Japanese companies, none filed for bankruptcy protection. These stark differences in financing behavior suggest tha there is more to understanding the cost of capital differences than a simple comparison of interest rates and stock prices. I have conducted research with Takeo Hoshi, Anil K. Kashyap, and David N. Weil that may shed some light on how structural differences in the two financial markets--many of which are quickly disappearing--could explain in part why corporate investment in Japan has been higher than in the United States. Relationship Banking in Japan Historically, the linchpin of Japanese corporate finance has been the close relationship between a firm and its main bank. The main bank provides debt financing, owns some of the company's equity (by statute, no more than 5 percent), and may even place bank executives in top management positions. This system is similar in many respects to West Germany's, but it contrasts sharply with U.S. financing practices. Here, large companies generally have a more arm's-length relationship with the capital market; their debt and equity tend to be held diffusely. Japanese banking practices are driven more by relationships, while U.S. banking practices are driven more by price. For many Japanese companies, the main bank relationship is part of a larger industrial structure known as the keiretsu, a group of companies centered around affiliated banks and other financial institutions. These companies also have strong product--market ties to each other that are strengthened by cross-share ownership. Historically, the links have been strongest in the six largest keiretsu--Mitsubishi, Mitsui, sumitomo, Fuyo, Dai-ichi Kangyo, and Sanwa. This corporate financial structure can facilitate investment through at least two distinct channels. first, the main bank and keiretsu system can provide a ready source of funds to companies that otherwise would be unable to raise capital in a decentralized market. Thus, even though the system may not affect the cost of capital, it can affect the availability of capital. Second, the main bank and keiretsu system can lower the costs of financial distress. This facilitates investment in two ways: by ensuring that companies with valuable investment opportunities are able to exploit them; and by enabling companies to take on more debt, which generally is thought to be cheaper than equity. I consider each of these channels in turn. Liquidity Constraints and Investment In a frictionless capital market, companies with valuable investment projects should have to trouble raising the funds they need to finance these projects. …
The Hungarian banking system developed from the first third of the nineteenth century along the continental path, leading to the predominance of universal banks, the department stores of finance. This system of a large number of small banks with numerous branches, a sizable part of them at county and town levels, was controlled by a handful of big banks that were tightly intertwined with large foreign banks. This situation created many well-trained and broadly-skilled bank officers because, especially in the provincial banks and in branches with a limited staff, the bank employees had to be jacks of all trades, mastering all banking and stock exchange operations. Due to the fact that the Association of Banking Employees, a trade-union-like organization, had a strong left-wing audience which had considerable influence among bankers, the higher echelons of banking staffs consisted largely of pro-Allies liberals who had not been associated with Nazism. Thus, to a considerable extent, the new regime was able to draw its banking cadres from professionally well-trained, and politically loyal or neutral people. From 1949 on, even after the filling of the controlling posts with cadres of the labor movement, the lion's share of the former banking staff remained in lower posts as deputies of the new upper-level managerial staff, or in influential advisory jobs. Thus, the correctness and the professionality of banking operations, accounting, calculation, compilation of balance sheets, correspondence, both domestic and foreign, has been maintained at very high standards. Nevertheless, by having eliminated former top-level managers to a large extent, there was and is a scarcity of bankers who are specialists in allocating loans so as to optimize the safety and profitability of a portfolio. This lack was not obvious until the present decentralization because, even after the reform of the economic mechanism in 1968, the autonomy of the banks continued to be severely curtailed. There is a justified hope that Hungary can fill this gap since, from 1951 on, there has been university training for banking, and
PLANNING AUTHORITIES in less developed countries (LDCs) often regard financial market intervention as an efficient way to induce gr()wth and structural change. Elaborate regimes of interest ceilings and subsidies have been used to promote industrialization, exporting, geographic decentralization, and other national priorities. Some of these programs have doubtless achieved their intended objectives. However, with inflation frequently exceeding controlled interest rates, they have also tended to generate an excess demand for loans. Legally prohibited from price discrimination, creditors have been obliged to allocate their portfolios according to various criteria, and loan applicants whom creditors find relatively unappealing have been forced to rely heavily on self-finance or the unregulated curb markets. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) have argued that such rationing regimes lead to serious factor misallocations, inappropriate technology choices, and unnecessarily low growth rates. In the past decade their perspective has been formalized with macro models of financially repressed economies, and numerous supportive empirical studies have been reported (Fry (1982) surveys the literature). Surprisingly, however, several fundamental micro issues have received little attention: what is the nature of the bias in credit allocation that nonprice rationing induces; and how does