We study a game-theoretic model of blockchain mining economies and show that griefing, a practice according to which participants harm other participants at some lesser cost to themselves, is a prevalent threat at its Nash equilibria. The proof relies on a generalization of evolutionary stability to non-homogeneous populations via griefing factors (ratios that measure network losses relative to deviator's own losses) which leads to a formal theoretical argument for the dissipation of resources, consolidation of power and high entry barriers that are currently observed in practice. A critical assumption in this type of analysis is that miners' decisions have significant influence in aggregate network outcomes (such as network hashrate). However, as networks grow larger, the miner's interaction more closely resembles a distributed production economy or Fisher market and its stability properties change. In this case, we derive a proportional response (PR) update protocol which converges to market equilibria at which griefing is irrelevant. Convergence holds for a wide range of miners risk profiles and various degrees of resource mobility between blockchains with different mining technologies. Our empirical findings in a case study with four mineable cryptocurrencies suggest that risk diversification, restricted mobility of resources (as enforced by different mining technologies) and network growth, all are contributing factors to the stability of the inherently volatile blockchain ecosystem.
Rati Gelashvili, Lefteris Kokoris-Kogias, Alberto Sonnino, Alexander Spiegelman · 5 authors
Existing committee-based Byzantine state machine replication (SMR) protocols, typically deployed in production blockchains, face a clear trade-off: (1) they either achieve linear communication cost in the happy path, but sacrifice liveness during periods of asynchrony, or (2) they are robust (progress with probability one) but pay quadratic communication cost. We believe this trade-off is unwarranted since existing linear protocols still have asymptotic quadratic cost in the worst case. We design Ditto, a Byzantine SMR protocol that enjoys the best of both worlds: optimal communication on and off the happy path (linear and quadratic, respectively) and progress guarantee under asynchrony and DDoS attacks. We achieve this by replacing the view-synchronization of partially synchronous protocols with an asynchronous fallback mechanism at no extra asymptotic cost. Specifically, we start from HotStuff, a state-of-the-art linear protocol, and gradually build Ditto. As a separate contribution and an intermediate step, we design a 2-chain version of HotStuff, Jolteon, which leverages a quadratic view-change mechanism to reduce the latency of the standard 3-chain HotStuff. We implement and experimentally evaluate all our systems. Notably, Jolteon's commit latency outperforms HotStuff by 200-300ms with varying system size. Additionally, Ditto adapts to the network and provides better performance than Jolteon under faulty conditions and better performance than VABA (a state-of-the-art asynchronous protocol) under faultless conditions. This proves our case that breaking the robustness-efficiency trade-off is in the realm of practicality.
We previously proposed a cross-referencing method for enabling multiple peer-to-peer network domains to manage their own public blockchains and periodically exchanging the state of the latest fixed block in the blockchain with hysteresis signatures among all the domains via an upper network layer. In this study, we evaluated the effectiveness of our method from three theoretical viewpoints: decentralization, scalability, and tamper resistance. We show that the performance of the entire system can be improved because transactions and blocks are distributed only inside the domain. We argue that the transaction processing capacity will increase to 56,000 transactions per second, which is as much as that of a VISA credit card system. The capacity is also evaluated by multiplying the number of domains by the average reduction in transaction-processing time due to the increase in block size and reduction in the block-generation-time interval by domain partition. For tamper resistance, each domain has evidence of the hysteresis signatures of the other domains in the blockchain. We introduce two types of tamper-resistance-improvement ratios as evaluation measures of tamper resistance for a blockchain and theoretically explain how tamper resistance is improved using our cross-referencing method. With our method, tamper resistance improves as the number of domains increases. The proposed system of 1,000 domains are 3-10 times more tamper-resistant than that of 100 domains, and the capacity is 10 times higher. We conclude that our method enables a more scalable and tamper-resistant public blockchain balanced with decentralization.
Amirmohammad Pasdar, Zhongli Dong, Young Choon Lee
Blockchain is a form of distributed ledger technology (DLT) where data is shared among users connected over the internet. Transactions are data state changes on the blockchain that are permanently recorded in a secure and transparent way without the need of a third party. Besides, the introduction of smart contracts to the blockchain has added programmability to the blockchain and revolutionized the software ecosystem leading toward decentralized applications (DApps) attracting businesses and organizations to employ this technology. Although promising, blockchains and smart contracts have no access to the external systems (i.e., off-chain) where real-world data and events resides; consequently, the usability of smart contracts in terms of performance and programmability would be limited to the on-chain data. Hence, \emph{blockchain oracles} are introduced to mitigate the issue and are defined as trusted third-party services that send and verify the external information (i.e., feedback) and submit it to smart contracts for triggering state changes in the blockchain. In this paper, we will study and analyze blockchain oracles with regard to how they provide feedback to the blockchain and smart contracts. We classify the blockchain oracle techniques into two major groups such as voting-based strategies and reputation-based ones. The former mainly relies on participants' stakes for outcome finalization while the latter considers reputation in conjunction with authenticity proof mechanisms for data correctness and integrity. We then provide a structured description of patterns in detail for each classification and discuss research directions in the end.
There are different kinds of blockchains, which have been applied in various areas. Blockchains are relatively independent systems that are apt to form isolated data islands. Then cross-chain interaction is proposed to connect different blockchains. However, the current cross-chain methods do not maintain the security of the original blockchain. They either depend on a less secure third-party system or a less secure method. This makes the cross-chain interaction less secure than the original blockchains (the security downgrade issues), or the cross-chain interaction can be done even if the paired blockchain does not exist (the blockchain invisible issue). In this paper, we first propose a system interaction model and use it to analyze the possible security issues. Based on conclusions got from the proposed model, we propose the cross-chain method that verifies the data of the paired blockchain by the consensus algorithm of the paired blockchain (the CIFuV method). With this method, the cross-chain interaction can be as the same security as in the paired blockchain. At last, we evaluate the security issues during the system interaction process, and the possibility to have the CIFuV model on the public blockchains.
Shantanu Pal, Ambrose Hill, Tahiry Rabehaja, Michael Hitchens
There has been tremendous interest in the development of formal trust models and metrics through the use of analytics (e.g., Belief Theory and Bayesian models), logics (e.g., Epistemic and Subjective Logic) and other mathematical models. The choice of trust metric will depend on context, circumstance and user requirements and there is no single best metric for use in all circumstances. Where different users require different trust metrics to be employed the trust score calculations should still be based on all available trust evidence. Trust is normally computed using past experiences but, in practice (especially in centralised systems), the validity and accuracy of these experiences are taken for granted. In this paper, we provide a formal framework and practical blockchain-based implementation that allows independent trust providers to implement different trust metrics in a distributed manner while still allowing all trust providers to base their calculations on a common set of trust evidence. Further, our design allows experiences to be provably linked to interactions without the need for a central authority. This leads to the notion of evidence-based trust with provable interactions. Leveraging blockchain allows the trust providers to offer their services in a competitive manner, charging fees while users are provided with payments for recording experiences. Performance details of the blockchain implementation are provided.
With the rapid development of wireless sensor networks, smart devices, and traditional information and communication technologies, there is tremendous growth in the use of Internet of Things (IoT) applications and services in our everyday life. IoT systems deal with high volumes of data. This data can be particularly sensitive, as it may include health, financial, location, and other highly personal information. Fine-grained security management in IoT demands effective access control. Several proposals discuss access control for the IoT, however, a limited focus is given to the emerging blockchain-based solutions for IoT access control. In this paper, we review the recent trends and critical needs for blockchain-based solutions for IoT access control. We identify several important aspects of blockchain, including decentralised control, secure storage and sharing information in a trustless manner, for IoT access control including their benefits and limitations. Finally, we note some future research directions on how to converge blockchain in IoT access control efficiently and effectively.
Blockchain technologies can enable secure computing environments among mistrusting parties. Permissioned blockchains are particularly enlightened by companies, enterprises, and government agencies due to their efficiency, customizability, and governance-friendly features. Obviously, seamlessly fusing blockchain and cloud computing can significantly benefit permissioned blockchains; nevertheless, most blockchains implemented on clouds are originally designed for loosely-coupled networks where nodes communicate asynchronously, failing to take advantages of the closely-coupled nature of cloud servers. In this paper, we propose an innovative cloud-oriented blockchain -- CloudChain, which is a modularized three-layer system composed of the network layer, consensus layer, and blockchain layer. CloudChain is based on a shared-memory model where nodes communicate synchronously by direct memory accesses. We realize the shared-memory model with the Remote Direct Memory Access technology, based on which we propose a shared-memory consensus algorithm to ensure presistence and liveness, the two crucial blockchain security properties countering Byzantine nodes. We also implement a CloudChain prototype based on a RoCEv2-based testbed to experimentally validate our design, and the results verify the feasibility and efficiency of CloudChain.
The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic has deeply influenced the lifestyle of the general public and the healthcare system of the society. As a promising approach to address the emerging challenges caused by the epidemic of infectious diseases like COVID-19, Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) deployed in hospitals, clinics, and healthcare centers can save the diagnosis time and improve the efficiency of medical resources though privacy and security concerns of IoMT stall the wide adoption. In order to tackle the privacy, security, and interoperability issues of IoMT, we propose a framework of blockchain-enabled IoMT by introducing blockchain to incumbent IoMT systems. In this paper, we review the benefits of this architecture and illustrate the opportunities brought by blockchain-enabled IoMT. We also provide use cases of blockchain-enabled IoMT on fighting against the COVID-19 pandemic, including the prevention of infectious diseases, location sharing and contact tracing, and the supply chain of injectable medicines. We also outline future work in this area.
This work presents the design and implementation of a blockchain system that enables the trustable transactive energy management for distributed energy resources (DERs). We model the interactions among DERs, including energy trading and flexible appliance scheduling, as a cost minimization problem. Considering the dispersed nature and diverse ownership of DERs, we develop a distributed algorithm to solve the optimization problem using the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) method. Furthermore, we develop a blockchain system, on which we implement the proposed algorithm with the smart contract, to guarantee the transparency and correctness of the energy management. We prototype the blockchain in a small-scale test network and evaluate it through experiments using real-world data. The experimental results validate the feasibility and effectiveness of our design.
Demand for blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum is far larger than supply, necessitating a mechanism that selects a subset of transactions to include "on-chain" from the pool of all pending transactions. This paper investigates the problem of designing a blockchain transaction fee mechanism through the lens of mechanism design. We introduce two new forms of incentive-compatibility that capture some of the idiosyncrasies of the blockchain setting, one (MMIC) that protects against deviations by profit-maximizing miners and one (OCA-proofness) that protects against off-chain collusion between miners and users. This study is immediately applicable to a recent (August 5, 2021) and major change to Ethereum's transaction fee mechanism, based on a proposal called "EIP-1559." Historically, Ethereum's transaction fee mechanism was a first-price (pay-as-bid) auction. EIP-1559 suggested making several tightly coupled changes, including the introduction of variable-size blocks, a history-dependent reserve price, and the burning of a significant portion of the transaction fees. We prove that this new mechanism earns an impressive report card: it satisfies the MMIC and OCA-proofness conditions, and is also dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) except when there is a sudden demand spike. We also introduce an alternative design, the "tipless mechanism," which offers an incomparable slate of incentive-compatibility guarantees -- it is MMIC and DSIC, and OCA-proof unless in the midst of a demand spike.
Automated market makers (AMMs) are automata that trade electronic assets at rates set by mathematical formulas. AMMs are usually implemented by smart contracts on blockchains. In practice, AMMs are often composed: and outputs from AMMs can be directed into other compatible AMMs. This paper proposes a mathematical model for AMM composition. We define sequential and parallel composition operators for AMMs in a way that ensures that AMMs are closed under composition, in a way that works for "higher-dimensional" AMMs that manage more than two asset classes, and so the composition of AMMs in "stable" states remains stable.
Xiumei Deng, Jun Li, Chuan Ma, Kang Wei · 8 authors
The blockchain technology has been extensively studied to enable distributed and tamper-proof data processing in federated learning (FL). Most existing blockchain assisted FL (BFL) frameworks have employed a third-party blockchain network to decentralize the model aggregation process. However, decentralized model aggregation is vulnerable to pooling and collusion attacks from the third-party blockchain network. Driven by this issue, we propose a novel BFL framework that features the integration of training and mining at the client side. To optimize the learning performance of FL, we propose to maximize the long-term time average (LTA) training data size under a constraint of LTA energy consumption. To this end, we formulate a joint optimization problem of training client selection and resource allocation (i.e., the transmit power and computation frequency at the client side), and solve the long-term mixed integer non-linear programming based on a Lyapunov technique. In particular, the proposed dynamic resource allocation and client scheduling (DRACS) algorithm can achieve a trade-off of [$\mathcal{O}(1/V)$, $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{V})$] to balance the maximization of the LTA training data size and the minimization of the LTA energy consumption with a control parameter $V$. Our experimental results show that the proposed DRACS algorithm achieves better learning accuracy than benchmark client scheduling strategies with limited time or energy consumption.
Silvia Bonomi, Antonella Del Pozzo, Álvaro García-Pérez, Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni
This paper revisits the ubiquitous problem of achieving state machine replication in blockchains based on repeated consensus, like Tendermint. To achieve state machine replication in blockchains built on top of consensus, one needs to guarantee fairness of user transactions. A huge body of work has been carried out on the relation between state machine replication and consensus in the past years, in a variety of system models and with respect to varied problem specifications. We systematize this work by proposing novel and rigorous abstractions for state machine replication and repeated consensus in a system model that accounts for realistic blockchains in which blocks may contain several transactions issued by one or more users, and where validity and order of transactions within a block is determined by an external application-dependent function that can capture various approaches for order-fairness in the literature. Based on these abstractions, we propose a reduction from state machine replication to repeated consensus, such that user fairness is achieved using the consensus module as a black box. This approach allows to achieve fairness as an add-on on top of preexisting consensus modules in blockchains based on repeated consensus.
Decentralized payment systems such as Bitcoin have become massively popular in the last few years, yet there is still much to be done in understanding their formal properties. The vast majority of decentralized payment systems work by achieving consensus on the state of the network; a natural question to therefore ask is whether this consensus is necessary. In this paper, we formally define a model of payment systems, and present two main results. In Theorem 1, we show that even though there exists a single step black box reduction from Payment Systems to Byzantine Broadcast, there does not exist any black box reduction in the other direction which is significantly better than a trivial reduction. In Theorem 2, we show how to construct Payment Systems which only require a very small number of messages to be sent per transaction. In particular, global consensus about which transactions have occurred is not necessary for payments in this model. We then show a relation between the construction in Theorem 2 and the Lightning Network, relating the formal model constructions we have given to a practical algorithm proposed by the cryptocurrency community.
Pravuil is a robust, secure, and scalable consensus protocol for a permissionless blockchain suitable for deployment in an adversarial environment such as the Internet. Pravuil circumvents previous shortcomings of other blockchains: - Bitcoin's limited adoption problem: as transaction demand grows, payment confirmation times grow much lower than other PoW blockchains - higher transaction security at a lower cost - more decentralisation than other permissionless blockchains - impossibility of full decentralisation and the blockchain scalability trilemma: decentralisation, scalability, and security can be achieved simultaneously - Sybil-resistance for free implementing the social optimum - Pravuil goes beyond the economic limits of Bitcoin or other PoW/PoS blockchains, leading to a more valuable and stable crypto-currency
Jiahui Geng, Neel Kanwal, Martin Gilje Jaatun, Chunming Rong
We have entered the era of big data, and it is considered to be the "fuel" for the flourishing of artificial intelligence applications. The enactment of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) raises concerns about individuals' privacy in big data. Federated learning (FL) emerges as a functional solution that can help build high-performance models shared among multiple parties while still complying with user privacy and data confidentiality requirements. Although FL has been intensively studied and used in real applications, there is still limited research related to its prospects and applications as a FLaaS (Federated Learning as a Service) to interested 3rd parties. In this paper, we present a FLaaS system: DID-eFed, where FL is facilitated by decentralized identities (DID) and a smart contract. DID enables a more flexible and credible decentralized access management in our system, while the smart contract offers a frictionless and less error-prone process. We describe particularly the scenario where our DID-eFed enables the FLaaS among hospitals and research institutions.
A *sore loser attack* in cross-blockchain commerce rises when one party decides to halt participation partway through, leaving other parties' assets locked up for a long duration. Although vulnerability to sore loser attacks cannot be entirely eliminated, it can be reduced to an arbitrarily low level. This paper proposes new distributed protocols for hedging a range of cross-chain transactions in a synchronous communication model, such as two-party swaps, $n$-party swaps, brokered transactions, and auctions.
For applications of Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) consensus protocols where the participants are economic agents, recent works highlighted the importance of accountability: the ability to identify participants who provably violate the protocol. At the same time, being able to reach consensus under dynamic levels of participation is desirable for censorship resistance. We identify an availability-accountability dilemma: in an environment with dynamic participation, no protocol can simultaneously be accountably-safe and live. We provide a resolution to this dilemma by constructing a provably secure optimally-resilient accountability gadget to checkpoint a longest chain protocol, such that the full ledger is live under dynamic participation and the checkpointed prefix ledger is accountable. Our accountability gadget construction is black-box and can use any BFT protocol which is accountable under static participation. Using HotStuff as the black box, we implemented our construction as a protocol for the Ethereum 2.0 beacon chain, and our Internet-scale experiments with more than 4000 nodes show that the protocol achieves the required scalability and has better latency than the current solution Gasper, which was shown insecure by recent attacks.
It is widely accepted that blockchain systems cannot execute calls to external systems or services due to each node having to reach a deterministic state. However, in this paper we show that this belief is preconceived by demonstrating a method that enables blockchain and distributed ledger technologies to perform calls to external systems initiated from the blockchain/DLT itself.
Petr Kuznetsov, Yvonne-Anne Pignolet, Pavel Ponomarev, Andrei Tonkikh
Most modern asset transfer systems use consensus to maintain a totally ordered chain of transactions. It was recently shown that consensus is not always necessary for implementing asset transfer. More efficient, asynchronous solutions can be built using reliable broadcast instead of consensus. This approach has been originally used in the closed (permissioned) setting. In this paper, we extend it to the open (permissionless) environment. We present Pastro, a permissionless and asynchronous asset-transfer implementation, in which quorum systems, traditionally used in reliable broadcast, are replaced with a weighted Proof-of-Stake mechanism. Pastro tolerates a dynamic adversary that is able to adaptively corrupt participants based on the assets owned by them.
Luciano Freitas de Souza, Petr Kuznetsov, Thibault Rieutord, Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni
An accountable distributed system provides means to detect deviations of system components from their expected behavior. It is natural to complement fault detection with a reconfiguration mechanism, so that the system could heal itself, by replacing malfunctioning parts with new ones. In this paper, we describe a framework that can be used to implement a large class of accountable and reconfigurable replicated services. We build atop the fundamental lattice agreement abstraction lying at the core of storage systems and cryptocurrencies. Our asynchronous implementation of accountable lattice agreement ensures that every violation of consistency is followed by an undeniable evidence of misbehavior of a faulty replica. The system can then be seamlessly reconfigured by evicting faulty replicas, adding new ones and merging inconsistent states. We believe that this paper opens a direction towards asynchronous "self-healing" systems that combine accountability and reconfiguration.
It is impossible to solve the Byzantine consensus problem in an open network of $n$ participants if only $2n/3$ or less of them are correct. As blockchains need to solve consensus, one might think that blockchains need more than $2n/3$ correct participants. But it is yet unknown whether consensus can be solved when less than $2n/3$ participants are correct and $k$ participants are rational players, which misbehave if they can gain the loot. Trading correct participants for rational players may not seem helpful to solve consensus since rational players can misbehave whereas correct participants, by definition, cannot. In this paper, we show that consensus is actually solvable in this model, even with less than $2n/3$ correct participants. The key idea is a baiting strategy that lets rational players pretend to misbehave in joining a coalition but rewards them to betray this coalition before the loot gets stolen. We propose TRAP, a protocol that builds upon recent advances in the theory of accountability to solve consensus as soon as $n>\max\bigl(\frac{3}{2}k+3t,2(k+t)\bigr)$: by assuming that private keys cannot be forged, this protocol is an equilibrium where no coalition of $k$ rational players can coordinate to increase their expected utility regardless of the arbitrary behavior of up to $t$ Byzantine players. Finally, we show that a baiting strategy is necessary and sufficient to solve this, so-called rational agreement problem. First, we show that it is impossible to solve this rational agreement problem without implementing a baiting strategy. Second, the existence of TRAP demonstrates the sufficiency of the baiting strategy. Our TRAP protocol finds applications in blockchains to prevent players from disagreeing, that could otherwise lead to "double spending".
A decentralized federated learning architecture is proposed to apply to the Businesses-to-Businesses scenarios by introducing the consortium blockchain in this paper. We introduce a model verification mechanism to ensure the quality of local models trained by participators. To analyze the latency of the system, a latency model is constructed by considering the work flow of the architecture. Finally the experiment results show that our latency model does well in quantifying the actual delays.