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1,375 results · page 51 of 58
Alicja Mikołajewicz-Woźniak
No abstract is available for this record.
Dirk Andreas Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Douglas W. Arner, Linus FFhr
No abstract is available for this record.
Andrzej Sołoma, Karol Spychalski
The Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer electronic payment system that operates as an independent currency. In this paper, we have examined whether the Bitcoin should be considered a currency according to the criteria widely used by economists. We argue that the Bitcoin does not behave much like major international currencies because the excessive volatility compared to other currencies changes. Our results show that usability of the Bitcoin has increased rapidly. It is traded on many exchanges. Yet, the future of the Bitcoin is still very uncertain.
Morten Linnemann Bech, Yuuki Shimizu, Paul T. P. Wong
This feature looks at technology in payment systems. It compares the diffusion of real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems for wholesale payments with that of faster systems for retail payments (fast payments). RTGS systems emerged in the 1980s and were adopted globally within a span of 30 years. Fast payments followed in the early 2000s, offering instant payments on a 24-hour, seven-day basis. So far, the diffusion of fast payments mirrors that of RTGS, and it is primed to take off. Yet even while adoption of fast payments is under way, the next generation of payment systems, such as those based on distributed ledger technology, is under development.
Roman Beck, Christian Becker, Juho Lindman, Matti Rossi
This report documents the program and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 17132 "Opportunities and Risks of Blockchain Technologies". Blockchain-based applications such as Bitcoin or Ethereum are emerging technologies, but a dramatic increase in industrial and academic interest in the technology is evident. Start-ups and large financial players are working intensely on blockchain-based applications, making this one of the most promising drivers of financial innovation. However, the design and implementation of blockchain-based systems requires deep technical know-how in various areas, as well as consideration of economic and societal issues. These opportunities and challenges provided the starting point for the Dagstuhl Seminar where we analyzed and synthesized the current body of knowledge on the emerging landscape of blockchain technologies. We linked cryptographic economic systems to already established research streams around trust-related issues in payment systems and digital currencies, and digital asset management.
Eva Micheler
No abstract is available for this record.
Ryan J. Davies, Erik R. Sirri
No abstract is available for this record.
Katrin Tinn
No abstract is available for this record.
Dr Craig S Wright
No abstract is available for this record.
Emanuele Borgonovo, Stefano Caselli, Alessandra Cillo, Donato Masciandaro
No abstract is available for this record.
Daniel Heller
Bitcoin is the first digital currency to have received widespread recognition and interest from users, developers, investors, central banks, and regulators, largely because of its “distributed ledger” technology, which allows it to provide relatively low-cost peer-to-peer transfers of money. Users own the bitcoin system and can make changes to the rules and protocol only by consensus or a supermajority of 95 percent. This communitarian ownership model and the fact that payments in bitcoin can be easily made from one end of the globe to another have led many to believe and hope that bitcoin will one day replace sovereign currencies—and the central banks that issue them. In addition, some observers see bitcoin as the origin of a fundamental transformation of the financial system toward a more decentralized structure. As a medium of exchange, bitcoin is still small compared with traditional channels, and it is held largely for speculation rather than transactions. Its lack of a mechanism for dampening the price effect of an increase in demand or reducing supply in case of a demand slump means that adopting bitcoin as a currency would be like reverting to a currency based on gold coins. As long as central banks continue to pursue stability-oriented monetary policies, they will have little reason to fear that the bitcoin system will replace them.
Carl-Ludwig Thiele, Martin Diehl, Patrick May, Dirk Elsner · 7 authors
Anfänglich übersehen und belächelt hat mittlerweile nicht nur das öffentliche Interesse an den Kryptowährungen deutlich zugenommen. Dabei handelt es sich um verschlüsselte und dezentral gespeicherte Datenprotokolle. Sie werden ohne Einflussnahme einer staatlichen Zentralbank produziert, zwischen Zahlungssender und -empfänger übermittelt und lassen sich als Zahlungsmittel einsetzen. Inwieweit substituiert dies die Nachfrage nach Zentralbankgeld? Kann die Stabilität der Zahlungs- und Verrechnungssysteme weiterhin gewährleistet werden? Welche Rückwirkungen auf die Wirkungsweise und die Ausgestaltung der Geldpolitik sind bei zunehmender Bedeutung der Kryptowährungen zu erwarten? Nach Ansicht von Carl-Ludwig Thiele und Martin Diehl, Deutsche Bundesbank, sind die gegenwärtigen virtuellen Währungen, wie z.B. Bitcoin, gemessen an den realen Währungen zumindest in Ländern mit einer stabilitätsorientierten Geldpolitik bislang quantitativ unbedeutend und eher als Spekulationsobjekte anzusehen. Bitcoin erfülle bislang keine der drei Geldfunktionen im ökonomisch relevanten Maße, weil es nicht über eine Nische hinausreiche und extrem wertinstabil sei. Zudem dürften in einer dynamischen Welt starre Algorithmen für die Entwicklung der Geldmenge zu einer suboptimalen Geldmenge führen. Deshalb bestehe die Notwendigkeit einer aktiven Geldpolitik durch eine unabhängige und stabilitätsorientierte Notenbank. Thomas Mayer, Flossbach von Storch Research Institute, sieht als das Bedeutsame an Bitcoin weniger die Währung selbst als vielmehr die hinter dieser Währung stehende Technik. Durch computergestützte Verschlüsselungstechnik könne die Eigentumsübertragung der Währung lückenlos vom Zeitpunkt ihrer Schaffung an dokumentiert werden. Ob sich Bitcoin oder eine andere oder mehrere Kryptowährungen am Markt schließlich durchsetzen werden, sei zwar nicht vorherzusagen, aber Kryptowährungen würden auf Grundlage der Blockchain-Technologie unser Geldsystem verändern. Für Dirk Elsner und Gerrit Pecksen, DZ BANK, sind Kryptowährungen »noch nicht reif für eine weitreichende Umsetzung«. Zwar sei das Interesse an der Verwendung von Kryptowährungen auch in der Finanzwelt stark gestiegen, die bislang erkennbaren Auswirkungen auf das Zahlungs- und Geldsystem seien aber minimal. In letzter Zeit zeichne sich jedoch sowohl in Forschungspapieren als auch in ersten Anwendungsfällen ein hohes Potenzial ab. Volker Brühl, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, ist der Meinung, dass für Bitcoin und andere Kryptowährungen eine konsequente Regulierung und Aufsicht dringend geboten seien. Eine Gefahr sehen sie darin, dass sich angesichts der Kursentwicklung inzwischen auch vermehrt Privatanleger für Kryptowährungen interessieren. Unerfahrene Anleger ließen sich von dem Begriff »Währung« täuschen. Es wäre daher zu begrüßen, wenn sich die europäischen und nationalen Aufsichtsbehörden nicht nur im Hinblick auf die Vermeidung von Geldwäsche, sondern auch unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Anlegerschutzes verstärkt mit dem Thema Kryptowährungen befassen würden. Jochen Michaelis, Universität Kassel, weiß sich mit der Zunft der monetären Ökonomen einig: Der Bitcoin werde den US-Dollar, den Euro, das britische Pfund etc. als dominierendes Zahlungsmittel nicht verdrängen, und zwar aus mehreren Gründen: Der Bitcoin sei ein Asset mit derzeit extrem hoher erwarteter Rendite, aber auch mit extrem hohem Risiko. Die Opportunitätskosten in Form entgangener Wertsteigerungen »verbieten« die Verwendung als Tauschmittel, und die hohe Volatilität mache wertstabile Vermögenstransfers von heute nach morgen und übermorgen p
Christian Pfister
In spite of a still very low volume at the global level, in comparison with the main reserve currencies, digital currencies attract a lot of attention. The paper reminds that it is above all the exchange mechanism incorporated in digital currencies (the distributed ledger technology) which should contribute to their success. It is shown that a widespread use of these currencies is likely to materialize only under conditions that woulDeessentially leave unchanged the capacity of the central bank to pursue the same inflation target using the same instruments as today, by setting an interest rate level. However, some adjustments may have to be made to the definition of monetary aggregates and possibly also to the base and/or the ratios of reserve requirements. Even in the most extreme and unlikely scenario, where the central bank would issue CBDC the public would have access to and massively adopt, banks role in distributing credit would likely not be seriously impaired. Banks might rather have less direct information on their clients. They would possibly also become more dependent on central bank refinancing, which would call for a clear and pre-announced lending of last resort policy in order to limit moral hazard considerations.
Runar Alvseike, Geir Arne Gjersvoll Iversen
Bitcoins original idea proposed a trustless monetary system, without the need of \nintermediaries. In recent years, these very intermediaries it originally tried to circumvent, have \ngained an increased interest in Bitcoin’s underlying technology, the Blockchain. It presents a \ndecentralized database technology, suitable for exchanging value in an untrusted environment. \nConsequently, it introduces an innovation in both economics and information technology. \nIn this explorative study, we aim to investigate how Bitcoin and Blockchain technology may \nimpact the monetary and financial system. By conducting 20 in-depth interviews from a broad \nrange of stakeholders and a literature review in this new topic of interest, we have identified \ntwo main themes introduced with this new technology. First, we seek to understand how the \nfuture of money could unfold with Cryptocurrencies and Central Bank issued Digital Currency \n(CBDC). The former is recognized to have a series of specialized architectures, spanning from \nsimple monetary transactions to complex platforms enabling a decentralized economy to \nevolve. CBDC is not necessarily reliant on blockchain technology, but the of digitally issued \ncurrencies and blockchains introduces new fiscal and monetary policy toolkits. There are \nhowever a series of intricate questions that needs to be addressed before CBDC could act as a \ncomplement or replacement for physical currency. Lastly, we explore how the future of \nfinance will be affected by blockchain technology and the cryptoeconomy. Banks may be \nfacing increased competition from new entrants, where blockchain technology may facilitate \nreduced costs in terms of regulatory compliance, efficiency in transactions and settlement, and \nreconciliation. Moreover, new financial services are introduced by financial technology \ninnovation. This might change the business model of banks and other financial institutions \ndrastically. Furthermore, cryptocurrencies introduce new funding possibilities and enables \norganizations to evolve with no governing body. This might facilitate a new economic system, \ncalled the cryptoeconomy. \nDevelopment in blockchain technology is mentioned to be at the same maturity stage as the \nInternet by the early 1990s. There are several uncertainties regarding its future applications. \nHowever, smart contracts seems to be an interesting application, facilitating automation in a \nrange of applications.
Antti Lehtovirta
The objective of this research is to provide the reader an overview of the distributed ledger technology (DLT), its fundamental challenges, the current and potential future uses in the financial industry, and to suggest future fields of the topic to be researched. The first task of this thesis is trying to answer, “how will the distributed ledger technology impact the financial industry”. Although the thesis will not cover exhaustively all the financial industry’s needs towards the distributed ledger technology, it will give an overview of the DLTs probable usage in the industry. By reading the thesis and especially its use cases from the fields of private equity, and settlement and clearing of public securities’ trading, the reader should get a more accurate answer to the secondary question “how can the public securities and private equity markets use distributed ledger technology in the near future”. The question about the distributed ledger technology’s impact on the whole market is complicated. Despite the amount of financing this technology has acquired in the recent years, there are no new, disruptive or widespread usages for the DLT in the financial industry. However, it is expected that during the next five years, the DLTs become reality. This is due to their enormous potentiality in security, efficiency and automation, which all could save the financial industry up to 50% of their current costs. Additionally, during the same time period, it is highly expectable that some financial service applications, basing on the DLT, will be presented for the consumers by the players from outside the traditional markets. To answer the secondary question, the both markets will face significant changes during the upcoming years: public securities’ post-trade processes will benefit from the more secure and rapid settlement, whereas the private equity market’s whole nature can become a more accessible for both the investors and the businesses seeking for financing.
John O. McGinnis, Kyle Roche
Modern law makes currency a creature of the state and ultimately the value of its currency depends on the public’s trust in that state. While some nations are more capable than others at instilling public trust in the stability of their monetary institutions, it is nonetheless impossible for any legal system to make the pre-commitments necessary to completely isolate the governance of its money supply from political pressure. This proposition is true not only today, where nearly all government institutions manage their money supply in the form of central banking, but also true of past private banking regimes circulating their notes under the shadow of public law. However, bitcoin represents a potential third currency regime far more resistant to state control because it mints currency units that exist in no physical place, places a numerical ceiling on the number of units that can be created, and relies on scientific principles from cryptography to guarantee that ceiling and verify any person-to-person transfer. The trust required is not in any government but in the decentralized order of those who verify bitcoin transactions and those who create the software these verifiers choose to run on their connected computers.\nThis Article explores the fundamental structure of bitcoin, first by demystifying it as a technology, and second by showing how its decentralized order contrasts with other currency regimes. Unlike governments that use the power of law to compel action, bitcoin relies on a system of built-in incentives to encourage behavior that benefits not only those seeking to use bitcoin, but also bitcoin miners—those who voluntarily undertake the task of maintaining the payment network. While currently bitcoin is too volatile to compete with all but the worst government-issued currencies, the qualities of this system may give bitcoin a long-term advantage over many currencies. As the bitcoin ecosystem continues to grow, its nonlegal order can help it climb the rungs of stability created by distrust in government.\nThe technology underpinning bitcoin is the next point of innovation in the digital age—the same era that has already seen software create institutional disruption from Amazon, Facebook, and Uber, among many others. As bitcoin gains in popularity, it offers a platform for other kinds of technological alternatives to traditional legal regimes, like smart contracts. Bitcoin’s order without currency law will facilitate other forms of order with less law.\nThis is a propitious time for fundamental examination of bitcoin. Despite experiencing significant speculation and volatility throughout late 2017 and early 2018, its ten-year history demonstrates a downward trend in volatility and an upward trend in market capitalization.
Alexandros Seretakis
Abstract Distributed ledger technology, a variant of which is blockchain technology, represents one of the most important innovations of the FinTech revolution. Academics, policy-makers, and market participants are experimenting with the technology with the aim of enhancing the functioning of financial markets. Industry consortia are being formed by the biggest financial institutions in the world seeking to leverage the use of the technology, in order to improve the clearing and settlement process. Furthermore, central banks in advanced and developing economies are examining the potential of using the technology in market infrastructures operated by central banks and are even exploring the possibility of issuing digital base money. Nevertheless, the widespread adoption of distributed ledger technology as envisioned by its ardent supporters encounters considerable legal obstacles, including the numerous new regulations imposed on financial markets and market participants in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. This chapter seeks to disentangle the myths from the realities of the so-called distributed ledger technology or blockchain revolution and discusses how the legal regime can act both as an impediment and a catalyst to the widespread adoption of the technology.
Alistair Milne
No abstract is available for this record.
Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Musaad Alwohaibi
No abstract is available for this record.
Usman W. Chohan
No abstract is available for this record.
Thorsten V. Koeppl, Jeremy Kronick
Blockchain technology has the potential to transform dramatically how a modern economy deals with maintaining and updating records. This innovation has already created lots of turbulence in financial markets and beyond. It will be a challenge to let markets figure out how to best use this technology while ensuring consumer safety and efficiency. Our goal in this paper is to unveil the potential of blockchain technology and guide regulators in how to approach the challenges this technology entails. The most well-known examples of blockchains are found in the area of payments systems and, more generally, in financial markets. It is thus understandable that the financial industry is leading the charge to unearth the potential of this technology in order to find cost efficiencies, but also to recapture above normal profits. The potential application of this technology, however, reaches much further than merely being a currency like bitcoin or a record-keeping system. Early applications of this technology include smart contracts and attempts by governments to build universal online identification systems. Blockchain technology also introduces new concepts such as cryptographic communication protocols and distributed data storage that can increase the safety of electronic networks and offer potential cost efficiency. We do not expect distributed ledgers to completely supplant traditional intermediaries, especially in areas where these intermediaries are of systemic importance or provide services that require a high degree of ad hoc coordination. Still, many elements of this new technology offer a unique opportunity for such intermediaries to modernize their infrastructures and offer their clients safer and cheaper systems. It is not clear, however, how to realize such benefits in a way that makes sure they are passed on to the economy as a whole. This leads us to identify three major challenges and priorities for policymakers and regulators arising from blockchain technology: 1. Design a principle-based regulation regime that achieves high safety standards, legal certainty and a stable environment for transactions based on distributed ledger technology; 2. Ensure that this technology leads to appropriate end-user cost efficiencies rather than simply a redistribution of above-normal profits among intermediaries; and 3. Determine areas where government involvement is advisable, be it in the role of facilitator for a private or public distributed ledger, or as a direct central node that applies elements of the technology but retains the monopoly of managing the ledger entries.
Iris H‐Y Chiu
This article analyses the existing institutions and infrastructure for payments. Authoritative settlement based on central bank support is seen as being essential for both large value and retail payment systems; and, in the EU, UK, and US, the importance of regulating for the protection of consumers who use retail payment systems is recognised. In this institutional context, payment innovations (including Bitcoin and distributed ledger or autonomous organisation technologies) are assessed. It is suggested that, while competition at certain levels is likely to bring social benefits through commercial developments, the maintenance of public interest objectives necessarily delineates the scope of competition. While this might limit the disruptive impact of payment innovations, it is argued that, in the light of the public policy needs for a stable and efficient public infrastructure and the social needs of confidence and trust in a predictable and regulated payment system that meets commercial and social expectations such as in consumer protection, this is not necessarily undesirable.
Federico Panisi
No abstract is available for this record.
Jona Derks, Jaap Gordijn, Arjen Siegmann
Bitcoin is a widely-spread payment instrument, but it is doubtful whether the proof-of-work (PoW) nature of the system is financially sustainable on the long term. To assess sustainability, we focus on the bitcoin miners as they play an important role in the proof-of-work consensus mechanism of bitcoin to create trust in the currency. Miners offer their services against a reward while recurring expenses. Our results show that bitcoin mining has become less profitable over time to the extent that profits seem to converge to zero. This is what economic theory predicts for a competitive market that has a single homogenous good. We analyze the actors involved in the bitcoin system as well as the value flows between these actors using the e3value methodology. The value flows are quantified using publicly available data about the bitcoin network. However, two important value flows for the miners, namely hardware investments and expenses for electricity power, are not available from public sources. Therefore, we contribute an approach to estimate the installed base of bitcoin hardware equipment over time. Using this estimate, we can calculate the expenses miner should have. At the end of our analysis period, the marginal profit of mining a bitcoin becomes negative, i.e., to a loss for the miners. This loss is caused by the consensus mechanism of the bitcoin protocol, which requires a substantial investment in hardware and significant recurring daily expenses for energy. Therefore, a sustainable crypto currency needs higher payments for miners or more energy efficient algorithms to achieve consensus in a network about the truth of the distributed ledger.