This paper examines the response of major cryptocurrencies to macroeconomic news announcements (MNA). While other cryptocurrencies exhibit no reaction to major MNA, Bitcoin responds negatively to inflation surprise. Price of Bitcoin decreases by 24 bps in response to a 1 standard deviation inflationary surprise. This reaction is inconsistent with widely-held beliefs of practitioners that Bitcoin can hedge inflation. I do not find support for the hypothesis that the negative response of Bitcoin to inflation is due to its negative exposure to interest rates. Instead, I find support for the hypothesis that Bitcoin is strongly affected by the shift in consumption-savings decisions, driven by the rise in inflation. Consistent with this view, Bitcoin has negative exposure to a proxy for the consumption-savings ratio.
This whitepaper introduces RIV Coin, a cryptocurrency that is fully stabilized by a diversified portfolio of invested reserves that are evaluated by professional independent third parties, and auditable and provable by the protocol. It is born and managed as a decentralized token, minted by a Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO). All wealthier Users are then accepting a redistribution of income, to the benefit of those who have purchased less tokens. In cooperative Game Theory, maximization of the economic benefit of the ecosystem is achieved when players' incentives are perfectly aligned. The proposed model allows for alignment of incentives: decreasing the risk exposure by wealthier Users, but implicitly increasing that of smaller ones to a level perceived by them as still sustainable and never creating ultra-speculative positions. In other words, wealthier Users stabilize the risk associated with the market value of portfolios in which the reserves are invested in Centralized and Decentralized Finance, without falling into the bet scheme. Users indirectly benefit from the access to the rewards of sophisticated cryptocurrency portfolios hitherto precluded to them, as well as having access to a real redistribution of wealth, without this turning into a disadvantage for the wealthy User, who benefits from the greater stability created by the huge influx of smaller Users. Therefore, the progressive growth becomes additional value that tends to stabilize over time, optimizing RIV Coin on the systemic risk level.
Pietro Saggese, Esther Segalla, Michael Sigmund, Burkhard Raunig · 6 authors
Entities like centralized cryptocurrency exchanges fall under the business category of virtual asset service providers (VASPs). As any other enterprise, they can become insolvent. VASPs enable the exchange, custody, and transfer of cryptoassets organized in wallets across distributed ledger technologies (DLTs). Despite the public availability of DLT transactions, the cryptoasset holdings of VASPs are not yet subject to systematic auditing procedures. In this paper, we propose an approach to assess the solvency of a VASP by cross-referencing data from three distinct sources: cryptoasset wallets, balance sheets from the commercial register, and data from supervisory entities. We investigate 24 VASPs registered with the Financial Market Authority in Austria and provide regulatory data insights such as who are the customers and where do they come from. Their yearly incoming and outgoing transaction volume amount to 2 billion EUR for around 1.8 million users. We describe what financial services they provide and find that they are most similar to traditional intermediaries such as brokers, money exchanges, and funds, rather than banks. Next, we empirically measure DLT transaction flows of four VASPs and compare their cryptoasset holdings to balance sheet entries. Data are consistent for two VASPs only. This enables us to identify gaps in the data collection and propose strategies to address them. We remark that any entity in charge of auditing requires proof that a VASP actually controls the funds associated with its on-chain wallets. It is also important to report fiat and cryptoasset and liability positions broken down by asset types at a reasonable frequency.
Lioba Heimbach, Eric Schertenleib, Roger Wattenhofer
Lending protocols in decentralized finance enable the permissionless exchange of capital from lenders to borrowers without relying on a trusted third party for clearing or market-making. Interest rates are purely set by the supply and demand of capital according to a pre-defined function. In the lead-up to The Merge: Ethereum blockchain's transition from proof-of-work (PoW) to proof-of-stake (PoS), a fraction of the Ethereum ecosystem announced plans of continuing with a PoW-chain. Owners of ETH - whether their ETH was borrowed or not - would hold the native tokens on each chain. This development alarmed lending protocols. They feared spiking ETH borrowing rates would lead to mass liquidations which could undermine their viability. Thus, the decentralized autonomous organization running the protocols saw no alternative to intervention - restricting users' ability to borrow. We investigate the effects of the merge and the aforementioned intervention on the two biggest lending protocols on Ethereum: AAVE and Compound. Our analysis finds that borrowing rates were extremely volatile, jumping by two orders of magnitude, and borrowing at times reached 100% of the available funds. Despite this, no spike in mass liquidations or irretrievable loans materialized. Further, we are the first to quantify and analyze hard-fork-arbitrage, profiting from holding debt in the native blockchain token during a hard fork. We find that arbitrageurs made in excess of 13 Mio US$, money that was effectively extracted from the platforms' lenders. Finally, we identify alarming security risks to the entire Ethereum ecosystem. Around one-fifth of the staked ETH through LIDO (stETH) was locked as collateral on lending protocols. Mass liquidations caused by spiking rates would have devastating effects on the stETH price and pose security concerns for the consensus layer, as staking power could be bought at a significant discount.
The Ethereum blockchain network enables transaction processing and smart-contract execution through levies of transaction fees, commonly known as gas fees. This framework mediates economic participation via a market-based mechanism for gas fees, permitting users to offer higher gas fees to expedite processing. Historically, the ensuing gas fee volatility led to critical disequilibria between supply and demand for block space, presenting stakeholder challenges. This study examines the dynamic causal interplay between transaction fees and economic subsystems leveraging the network. By utilizing data related to unique active wallets and transaction volume of each subsystem and applying time-varying Granger causality analysis, we reveal temporal heterogeneity in causal relationships between economic activity and transaction fees across all subsystems. This includes (a) a bidirectional causal feedback loop between cross-blockchain bridge user activity and transaction fees, which diminishes over time, potentially signaling user migration; (b) a bidirectional relationship between centralized cryptocurrency exchange deposit and withdrawal transaction volume and fees, indicative of increased competition for block space; (c) decentralized exchange volumes causally influence fees, while fees causally influence user activity, although this relationship is weakening, potentially due to the diminished significance of decentralized finance; (d) intermittent causal relationships with maximal extractable value bots; (e) fees causally influence non-fungible token transaction volumes; and (f) a highly significant and growing causal influence of transaction fees on stablecoin activity and transaction volumes highlight its prominence. These results inform strategic considerations for stakeholders to more effectively plan, utilize, and advocate for economic activities on Ethereum, enhancing the understanding and optimization of within the rapidly evolving economy.
We study a mechanism design problem in the blockchain proof-of-stake (PoS) protocol. Our main objective is to extend the transaction fee mechanism (TFM) recently proposed in Chung and Shi (SODA, p.3856-3899, 2023), so as to incorporate a long-run utility model for the miner into the burning second-price auction mechanism $\texttt{BSP}(γ)$ proposed in Chung and Shi (where $γ$ is a key parameter in the strict $γ$-utility model that is applied to both miners and users). First, we derive an explicit functional form for the long-run utility of the miner using a martingale approach, and reveal a critical discontinuity of the utility function, namely a small deviation from being truthful will yield a discrete jump (up or down) in the miner's utility. We show that because of this discontinuity the $\texttt{BSP}(γ)$ mechanism will fail a key desired property in TFM, $c$-side contract proofness ($c$-SCP). As a remedy, we introduce another parameter $θ$, and propose a new $\texttt{BSP}(θ)$ mechanism, and prove that it satisfies all three desired properties of TFM: user- and miner-incentive compatibility (UIC and MIC) as well as $c$-SCP, provided the parameter $θ$ falls into a specific range, along with a proper tick size imposed on user bids.
In this paper, we propose a fully decentralized and smart contract-based insurance protocol. We identify various issues in the Decentralized Finance (DeFi) insurance context and propose a solution to overcome these shortcomings. We introduce an economic model that allows for risk transfer without any external dependencies or centralized intermediaries. In particular, our proposal does not need any sort of subjective claim assessment, community voting or external data providers (oracles). Moreover, it solves the problem of over-insurance and proposes various ways to mitigate the capital inefficiencies usually seen with DeFi collateral. The work takes inspiration from peer-to-peer (P2P) insurance and collateralized debt obligations (CDO). We formally describe the protocol, assess its efficiency and key properties and present a reference implementation. Finally, we address limitations, extensions and ideas for further research.
Songrun He, Asaf Manela, Omri Ross, Victor von Wachter
Perpetual futures are the most popular cryptocurrency derivatives. Perpetuals offer leveraged exposure to their underlying without rollover or direct ownership. Unlike fixed-maturity futures, perpetuals are not guaranteed to converge to the spot price. To minimize the gap between perpetual and spot prices, long investors periodically pay shorts a funding rate proportional to this difference. We derive no-arbitrage prices for perpetual futures in frictionless markets and bounds in markets with trading costs. Empirically, deviations from these prices in crypto are larger than in traditional currency markets, comove across currencies, and diminish over time. An implied arbitrage strategy yields high Sharpe ratios.
Investments in cryptocurrencies (CCs) remain risky due to high volatility. Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) are a suitable tool to diversify risk and to benefit from the growth of the whole CC sector. We construct an ETF on the CRIX, the CRyptocurrency IndeX that maps the non-stationary CC dynamics closely by adapting its constituents weights dynamically. The scenario analysis considers the fee schedules of regulated CC exchanges, spreads obtained from high-frequency order book data, and models capital deposits to the ETF stochastically. The analysis yields valuable insights into the mechanisms, costs and risks of this new financial product: i) although the composition of the CRIX ETF changes frequently (from 5 to 30 constituents), it remains robust in its core, as the weights of Bitcoin (BTC) and Ethereum (ETH) are robust over time, ii) on average, a portion of 5.2% needed to be rebalanced at the rebalancing dates, iii) trading costs are low compared to traditional assets, iv) the liquidity of the CC sector has increased significantly during the analysis period, spreads occur especially for altcoins and increase by the size of the transactions. But since BTC and ETH are most affected by rebalancing, the cost of spreads remains limited.
Xiaotong Sun, Xi Chen, Charalampos Stasinakis, Georgios Sermpinis
Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) provides a decentralized governance solution through blockchain, where decision-making process relies on on-chain voting and follows majority rule. This paper focuses on MakerDAO, and we find three voter coalitions after applying clustering algorithm to voting history. The emergence of a dominant voter coalition is a signal of governance centralization in DAO, and voter coalitions have complicated influence on Maker protocol, which is governed by MakerDAO. This paper presents empirical evidence of multicoalition democracy in DAO and further contributes to the contemporary debate on whether decentralized governance is possible.
Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs) have recently surged to mainstream attention by allowing the exchange of digital assets via blockchains. NFTs have also been adopted by artists to sell digital art. One of the promises of NFTs is broadening participation to the art market, a traditionally closed and opaque system, to sustain a wider and more diverse set of artists and collectors. A key sign of this effect would be the disappearance or at least reduction in importance of seller-buyer preferential ties, whereby the success of an artist is strongly dependent on the patronage of a single collector. We investigate NFT art seller-buyer networks considering several galleries and a large set of nearly 40,000 sales for over 230 M USD in total volume. We find that NFT art is a highly concentrated market driven by few successful sellers and even fewer systematic buyers. High concentration is present in both the number of sales and, even more strongly, in their priced volume. Furthermore, we show that, while a broader-participation market was present in the early phase of NFT art adoption, preferential ties have dominated during market growth, peak and recent decline. We consistently find that the top buyer accounts on average for over 80% of buys for a given seller. Similar trends apply to buyers and their top seller. We conclude that NFT art constitutes, at the present, a highly concentrated market driven by preferential seller-buyer ties.
Abrar Rahman, Victor Shi, Matthew Ding, Elliot H. Choi
Synthetic assets are decentralized finance (DeFi) analogues of derivatives in the traditional finance (TradFi) world - financial arrangements which derive value from and are directly pegged to fluctuations in the value of an underlying asset (ex: futures and options). Synthetic assets occupy a unique niche, serving to facilitate currency exchange, giving traders a means to speculate on the value of crypto assets without directly holding them, and powering more complex financial tools such as yield optimizers and portfolio management suites. Unfortunately, the academic literature on this topic is highly disparate and struggles to keep up with rapid changes in the space. We present the first Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) in this area, focusing on presenting the key mechanisms, protocols, and issues in an accessible fashion to highlight risks for participants as well as areas of research interest. This paper takes a broad perspective in establishing a general framework for synthetic assets, from the ideological origins of crypto to legal barriers for firms in this space, encapsulating the basic mechanisms underpinning derivatives markets as well as presenting data-driven analyses of major protocols.
Antonio Briola, David Vidal-Tomás, Yuanrong Wang, Tomaso Aste
We quantitatively describe the main events that led to the Terra project's failure in May 2022. We first review, in a systematic way, news from heterogeneous social media sources; we discuss the fragility of the Terra project and its vicious dependence on the Anchor protocol. We hence identify the crash's trigger events, analysing hourly and transaction data for Bitcoin, Luna, and TerraUSD. Finally, using state-of-the-art techniques from network science, we study the evolution of dependency structures for 61 highly capitalised cryptocurrencies during the down-market and we also highlight the absence of herding behaviour analysing cross-sectional absolute deviation of returns.
Tether Limited has the sole authority to create (mint) and destroy (burn) Tether stablecoins (USDT). This paper investigates Bitcoin's response to USDT supply change events between 2014 and 2021 and identifies an interesting asymmetry between Bitcoin's responses to USDT minting and burning events. Bitcoin responds positively to USDT minting events over 5- to 30-minute event windows, but this response begins declining after 60 minutes. State-dependence is also demonstrated, with Bitcoin prices exhibiting a greater increase when the corresponding USDT minting event coincides with positive investor sentiment and is announced to the public by data service provider, Whale Alert, on Twitter.
We investigate logarithmic price returns cross-correlations at different time horizons for a set of 25 liquid cryptocurrencies traded on the FTX digital currency exchange. We study how the structure of the Minimum Spanning Tree (MST) and the Triangulated Maximally Filtered Graph (TMFG) evolve from high (15 s) to low (1 day) frequency time resolutions. For each horizon, we test the stability, statistical significance and economic meaningfulness of the networks. Results give a deep insight into the evolutionary process of the time dependent hierarchical organization of the system under analysis. A decrease in correlation between pairs of cryptocurrencies is observed for finer time sampling resolutions. A growing structure emerges for coarser ones, highlighting multiple changes in the hierarchical reference role played by mainstream cryptocurrencies. This effect is studied both in its pairwise realizations and intra-sector ones.
The evolution of the pandemic and people's concern over it have an impact on the Bitcoin market, while the extent of individualism could differentiate investor behaviors in the financial market during the pandemic. This paper examines whether public attention to COVID-19 in individualistic countries versus collectivistic countries Granger causes Bitcoin returns between February 11, 2020 and May 09, 2022. To this end, eight large economies with a individualistic or collectivistic tradition are chosen for analyses. By using rolling and recursive-evolving algorithms, it accounts for the timing of COVID-19 issues that vary by country and circumvents the potential estimation bias that a traditional Granger causality test may suffer due largely to Google's sampling variation for different time frames. In general, collectivistic countries are found to have stronger causal impacts on Bitcoin returns than individualistic countries.
Ji Liu, Zheng Xu, Yanmei Zhang, Wei Dai · 6 authors
Since the emergence of blockchain technology, its application in the financial market has always been an area of focus and exploration by all parties. With the characteristics of anonymity, trust, tamper-proof, etc., blockchain technology can effectively solve some problems faced by the financial market, such as trust issues and information asymmetry issues. To deeply understand the application scenarios of blockchain in the financial market, the issue of securities issuance and trading in the primary market is a problem that must be studied clearly. We conducted an empirical study to investigate the main difficulties faced by primary market participants in their business practices and the potential challenges of the deepening application of blockchain technology in the primary market. We adopted a hybrid method combining interviews (qualitative methods) and surveys (quantitative methods) to conduct this research in two stages. In the first stage, we interview 15 major primary market participants with different backgrounds and expertise. In the second phase, we conducted a verification survey of 54 primary market practitioners to confirm various insights from the interviews, including challenges and desired improvements. Our interviews and survey results revealed several significant challenges facing blockchain applications in the primary market: complex due diligence, mismatch, and difficult monitoring. On this basis, we believe that our future research can focus on some aspects of these challenges.
This paper proposes an important extension to Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR), the popular systemic risk measure, and investigates its properties on the cryptocurrency market. The proposed Vulnerability-CoVaR (VCoVaR) is defined as the Value-at-Risk (VaR) of a financial system or institution, given that at least one other institution is equal or below its VaR. The VCoVaR relaxes normality assumptions and is estimated via copula. While important theoretical findings of the measure are detailed, the empirical study analyzes how different distressing events of the cryptocurrencies impact the risk level of each other. The results show that Litecoin displays the largest impact on Bitcoin and that each cryptocurrency is significantly affected if an event of joint distress among the remaining market participants occurs. The VCoVaR is shown to capture domino effects better than other CoVaR extensions.
Marcelo de A. Borges, Guido L. de S. Filho, Cicero Inacio da Silva, Anderson M. P. Barros · 7 authors
This article describes a proposal to create a digital currency that allows the decentralized collection of resources directed to initiatives and activities that aim to protect the Brazilian Amazon ecosystem by using blockchain and digital contracts. In addition to the digital currency, the goal is to design a smart contract based in oracles to ensure credibility and security for investors and donors of financial resources invested in projects within the Standing Forest Coin (SFC - standingforest.org).
Transactions submitted through the blockchain peer-to-peer (P2P) network may leak out exploitable information. We study the economic incentives behind the adoption of blockchain dark venues, where users' transactions are observable only by miners on these venues. We show that miners may not fully adopt dark venues to preserve rents extracted from arbitrageurs, hence creating execution risk for users. The dark venue neither eliminates frontrunning risk nor reduces transaction costs. It strictly increases the payoff of miners, weakly increases the payoff of users, and weakly reduces arbitrageurs' profits. We provide empirical support for our main implications, and show that they are economically significant. A 1% increase in the probability of being frontrun raises users' adoption rate of the dark venue by 0.6%. Arbitrageurs' cost-to-revenue ratio increases by a third with a dark venue.
We are witnessing the emergence of a new digital art market, the art market 3.0. Blockchain technology has taken on a new sector which is still not well known, Non-Fungible tokens (NFT). In this paper we propose a new methodology to build a NFT Price Index that represents this new market on the whole. In addition, this index will allow us to have a look on the dynamics and performances of NFT markets, and to diagnose them.
Abstract With the explosive development of decentralized finance, we witness a phenomenal growth in tokenization of all kinds of assets, including equity, funds, debt, and real estate. By taking advantage of blockchain technology, digital assets are broadly grouped into fungible and non-fungible tokens (NFT). Here non-fungible tokens refer to those with unique and non-substitutable properties. NFT has widely attracted attention, and its protocols, standards, and applications are developing exponentially. It has been successfully applied to digital fantasy artwork, games, collectibles, etc. However, there is a lack of research in utilizing NFT in issues such as Intellectual Property. Applying for a patent and trademark is not only a time-consuming and lengthy process but also costly. NFT has considerable potential in the intellectual property domain. It can promote transparency and liquidity and open the market to innovators who aim to commercialize their inventions efficiently. The main objective of this paper is to examine the requirements of presenting intellectual property assets, specifically patents, as NFTs. Hence, we offer a layered conceptual NFT-based patent framework. Furthermore, a series of open challenges about NFT-based patents and the possible future directions are highlighted. The proposed framework provides fundamental elements and guidance for businesses in taking advantage of NFTs in real-world problems such as grant patents, funding, biotechnology, and so forth.
Recently, Indian Finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman announced in Union budget 2022-23 that Indian government will put 30% tax (the highest tax slab in India) on income generated from cryptocurrencies. Big financial institutions, experts and academicians have different opinions in this regard. They claim that it would be the end of cryptocurrency market in India or it would be possible that RBI (Reserve Bank of India) may launch its own crypto or digital currency. So in this context, in this article, the journey and future aspects of cryptocurrency in India are discussed and we hope that it will be a reference for further research and discussion in this area.
The Sandbox metaverse LAND non-fungible token (NFT) prices increased by than 300 times (in USD) between December 2019 and January 2022, but when measured in its native utility token (SAND), the increase is only 3 times. Depending on how prices are denominated, investment returns and effective transaction prices vary. We analyze more than 71,000 transactions and find that users are willing to pay 3-4% more when transactions are settled in SAND, and 30% less when settled in wETH (a smart contract version of ETH) when compared to ETH, so unit of account matters. Our results contribute to the discussions of blockchain-based, virtual economy management and the digitalization of money (Brunnermeier et al., 2019).