The case of Spain reflects to a marked extent the more general European tendency toward the proliferation of new institutions called on to meet social and demographic challenges. Health care in Spain has traditionally been dispersed among a host of largely autonomous agencies associated with various levels of political authority (national. provincial, or municipal.) The creation of the National Health System (SNS) as a single, albeit decentralized system, has brought important organizational changes and led to a generalized reconsideration of institutional equilibria by establishing the Governments of the Autonomous Communities as the primary interlocutors of the Ministry of Health. Also present are professional associations, labor unions, and other organizations such as NGO’s or patient’s associations. These have, with more or less success, attempted to influence the decision-making process. The present article analyzes the evolution of actor networks involved in the «governance of health» in Spain, an evolution characterized at once by strong decentralizing tendencies and by new forces of public management often bringing a reinforcement of the regulatory role of the state.
A major shift appears to be underway in Europe in the relationship between national, regional, and local control over health sector decision-making. Since World War II, a central thrust of health policy has been to decentralize key dimensions of decision-making authority to increasingly lower levels of government, as well as (in Social Health Insurance systems and recently in some tax-based systems) to private sector organizations.1 This strategy, to adapt Kondratiev's business-cycle framework,2 has been one of two overlapping ‘long waves’ that helped frame structural decisions in most Western European health systems. The second wave—market-influenced-entrepreneurialism—has run simultaneously with decentralization since the late 1980s. However, while this second, market-oriented wave has generated considerable controversy in some health policy circles, the concept of decentralization was readily accepted in many national policy contexts. As a result, over the second half of the 20th century, expanded decentralization of authority to regional, municipal and non-governmental control has become part of the ‘received wisdom’ about what good health policy should include. In the tax-funded health systems in Nordic countries, for example, most administrative and managerial responsibility as well as substantial political (policy) and fiscal decision-making control has been decentralized inside the public sector: from national to regional level (somatic hospitals in Norway in 1970; mental hospitals in Sweden in 1967), from regional to municipal level (elderly residential care in Sweden in 1992), and from national to municipal level (effective decision-making control over central hospitals in Finland in 1993). In the tax-funded health systems in Southern Europe, most administrative and managerial as well as many political (but not key fiscal) responsibilities were devolved from national to regional governments in Spain (to the 17 autonomous communities from 1981 to 2003), and in Italy (to 22 regional governments starting in the late 1980s). In social health insurance funded countries in continental Europe such as Germany and the Netherlands, most administrative and managerial as well as many fiscal (but not key political) decisions have long been delegated to private not-for-profit bodies (sickness funds and hospitals), under a form of ‘enforced self-regulation’ grounded in explicit national statutory responsibilities.3 In many cases, this particular form of decentralization has been in place since those systems’ inception. In the more state-based social insurance systems that have emerged since 1990 in many Central European countries, various forms of decentralization have been utilized. Reacting strongly to the prior highly centralized Semashko model, countries decentralized ownership of hospitals from national to regional (Hungary) and local (Estonia, Poland) governments. The Czech Republic even termed its decentralization of hospital ownership to municipal governments as ‘privatization’. In similar fashion, centralized funding structures of the Communist period were decentralized into regional social health insurance funds in countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The strategic role of decentralization was further strengthened by changes in overall governmental structures in Europe. During the 1980s and 1990s, national governments increasingly ceded areas of sovereign power upward to European Union bodies, while at the same time that they were losing responsibilities downward to increasingly assertive regions—a process captured by the popular 1990s discussion about a ‘Europe of Regions’. This overall reduction in the role of national governments served to reinforce the health sector experience that the era of centralized power at the national level in Europe was fast receding. In the first years of the 21st century, however, this conventional wisdom has started to come undone. Far from continuing to recede, the role of the state in the health sector has begun to strengthen measurably. Instead of reinforcing the continued decentralization of authority away from national governments, state institutions have reversed course and are seizing responsibility for substantive political and fiscal decision-making in European health care systems. It now appears that in the near-term future only administrative and managerial authority—e.g. day-to-day operating decisions—will remain decentralized to lower level and/or non-governmental organizations. These counter-indications can be observed in many of the health systems noted earlier. In the tax-funded system in Norway, the national government took over political and administrative/managerial responsibility for all hospitals in the entire country in January 2002, removing control from the 19 regional governments (counties) that had previously owned and operated the public hospitals and transferring the administrative role to five newly created regional bodies appointed from Oslo. The national government also set out new rules for how these regions were to manage their hospitals—as ‘public enterprises’. Fiscal responsibility for health care remained, as before, a national responsibility. In Denmark, the national government initiated a major re-structuring of the health sector in January 2006. In the new configuration, the number of regional governments was reduced from 14 to 5, and their powers were greatly reduced. Fiscal and most political responsibilities were centralized back to the national government, with certain prevention and chronic care issues being re-allocated to the municipalities (also consolidated, from 271 to 98). At the end of these changes, the new regions retained little more than administrative and managerial responsibility for hospitals. A similar pattern of regional consolidation and a strengthening of the state role appears to be underway in Sweden and Finland. In Sweden, a royal commission is expected to recommend that the number of regional level governments (which have responsibilities for hospital and also primary care) be reduced from the current 21 to between 6 and 8. Similarly, in Finland, the national government is expected to propose that the number of central hospital districts, currently 22, be reduced to 18, and also that the number of municipalities (responsible for primary, nursing home and home care services) be reduced from 450 to about 250. In the United Kingdom, similar recentralization can be seen in the transformation of England's Regional Health Authorities from line to support functions, as well as in current plans to reduce the number of Primary Care Trusts from 300 to 150. In Ireland, key operating responsibilities were recently shifted from regional health care boards to a health executive at central level and the regional boards were abolished. A parallel, if less aggressive, thrust toward more state control over both political and fiscal decisions can also be observed in several social health insurance funded countries. In the Netherlands, the national government in 2006 changed the health system's funding structure from a sliding 50% employee/50% employee paid model to a 100% individually paid fixed premium, supplemented by social assistance funds (e.g. taxes) for low income citizens. The Dutch government also, since the late 1990s, has been ratcheting up the percentage of total expenditures for which the private not-for-profit sickness funds are at risk, forcing funds to manage their money more efficiently. In Germany, the federal government in 2009 is scheduled to take on responsibility for pooling all social health insurance contributions and then allocating them to the sickness funds on a prospective, risk adjusted, capitation basis. While this funding model has been in place in the neighboring Netherlands for many years, in Germany it would represent a major move toward centralizing fiscal responsibilities away from the private not-for-profit sickness funds and into the hands of a national government body. In Central Europe, Poland, in 2003, pulled operating control over its social health insurance system away from 17 regional funds and back into the Ministry of Health. From the perspective of national health policymakers, this process of re-centralization appears to reflect a complex set of concerns. Structurally, there is substantial worry about the aging of their populations (e.g. more elderly), the rapid growth of expensive new clinical technologies, and the economic constraints on health sector funding generated by European regionalization as well as the globalization of markets. Administratively, there is evidence in countries like Finland and Norway (also concerns in Denmark) that local control over health sector decision-making has led to increased disparities in services provided and in outcomes to vulnerable populations—in short, that decentralization has heightened equity problems. Economically, there are worries that local finance bases are insufficient to fund expensive future care needs, and that local administrative arrangements are inefficient and duplicative. Politically—an important factor in Northern European tax-funded countries—there is a sense among national politicians that they are being blamed when the health system fails to meet the expectations of the citizenry, and that national policymakers need to have the necessary organizational levers to correct these problems. Technically, the introduction of electronic medical records and other computerized reporting systems has reduced the transaction costs of information and made it feasible to more closely monitor health system performance from a central level. While many of these dilemmas with decentralization were predicted earlier in theoretical assessments,4 one can see strong elements of their concrete manifestation in the current movement toward re-centralization. Moreover, since these causal factors are long-term in nature, their recent importance lends strength to the argument that re-centralization may indeed represent a long-term structural shift in national health strategies. Several important questions arise from these examples of re-centralizaton in both tax funded as well as social health insurance funded health systems. One is whether the observed changes represent more than just the normal ebb-and-flow of policy development in European health systems, and instead signal a fundamental shift in the overall pattern of these decisions. A related question is whether political and fiscal authority will continue to migrate from regional and municipal to national government, leaving mostly administrative and managerial forms of control at the lower levels. The underlying issue here concerns the mix of national and local authority that typically exists within most European health care systems, and whether the main bias in structuring that mix might be changing from one favouring decentralizing to local governments into one that favors centralizing authority back to national governments. Posed more provocatively, one might ask whether a new “long wave” of re-centralization has now begun, pointing toward a health policy future of stronger national governments and weaker regional, local, and delegated private (SHI) institutions. There are—as Kuhn's theory about the complexities of paradigm shift would predict5—several confounding factors in arriving at satisfactory answers to these questions. One issue concerns whether a new ‘long wave’ of re-centralization can co-exist comfortably—as decentralization did—with the parallel long-wave pattern of market-influenced entrepreneurial measures, particularly in tax-funded health systems. Will re-centralization and entrepreneurialism reinforce each other, as happened previously with decentralized local units? Second, there are several exceptions to this broad pattern of increasing re-centralization across European health systems. One clear exception is in countries with serious ethnic conflicts, for example Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia in the Balkans, and also in Belgium. Recent history suggests that decentralization may be essential in these highly charged political environments, in that various forms of local control are typically linked to the survival of the state itself. Another conceptually messy question concerns the pattern of continued regional decentralization of health sector decisions in Southern European countries like Italy and Spain. Regional governments in these two countries have fiercely defended their recently gained authority in the health sector, and have forced their less convinced central governments (Spain in 2003, for example) to tread carefully in designing new national programs to monitor performance or set standards for quality and outcomes. Of course, Spain and Italy both have histories of earlier regional sovereignty. Moreover, both are geographically larger and have bigger populations than Nordic countries—although they are roughly equal in size to the United Kingdom and also Poland. There is, further, within both Italian and Spanish regions a tendency toward greater internal centralization inside the regions themselves. Despite these caveats, however, it appears that Italy and Spain are pursuing greater decentralization at the same point in time that Northern European countries are shifting away from decentralization in their health systems. This brief review of recent health sector patterns raises a series of questions that do not allow for easy answers. A further complicating factor is the apparent lack of fit between continued local control over services to the elderly (home care, social assistance, also nursing home care) and increasing central control over fiscal and policy decisions in the overall health sector, which implies that re-centralization may soon confront key structural limitations. The current distribution of health sector evidence does suggest, however, that many European health systems will continue to see a tightening of state controls, especially over fiscal and quality-related matters. In this clash between national and local governments, it would appear that, on balance, democratic control at the national level will strengthen, taking increased authority over political and fiscal decisions, while democratic control at the regional and municipal level will weaken, and be increasingly focused only on administrative and managerial decisions. Moreover, given the rapid melting of public–private boundaries within many European health systems, this greater state role will likely be combined with growing public as well as private sector entrepreneurialism, despite the appearance that greater reliance on market-oriented decisions contradicts tighter state control over health system behaviour. While the particular balance between increased state controls and increased entrepreneurial initiatives will vary from country to country, this new blend of two ‘long waves’, with increasing levels of state authority over key health sector decisions, will likely define the future policymaking framework for many European health systems in the near-term future. Earlier versions of this argument were presented at the Third International Health Policy Conference in Jerusalem (December 2006) and the Annual Meeting of the European Public Health Association in Helsinki (October 2007). This version has benefited from comments made by a number of colleagues at both meetings, and especially from Josep Figueras, David Chinitz and Charles Phelps. An earlier version of this article is included in the conference proceedings of the Jerusalem meeting.
Open access
Health Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life
Albert J. Jovell, Robert J. Blendon, María Dolors Navarro, Channtal Fleischfresser · 7 authors
BACKGROUND: Fifteen years ago, public opinion surveys in Spain showed substantial dissatisfaction with the health-care system. Since that time, health-care in Spain has undergone significant changes, including a decentralization of the system, an increase in spending and a change in the way the system is financed. OBJECTIVE: This study examines how Spanish citizens rate the performance of their health system today, both as compared with other sectors of society and as compared with earlier time periods. METHODS: Data are drawn from nationally representative telephone surveys of the non-institutionalized adult Spanish population (age 18 years and over). The study was carried out in two phases: October-November 2005 (n = 3,010) and January 2006 (n = 2,101). RESULTS: The majority of the Spanish population thinks the health system needs to be changed. The problems cited relate mostly to long wait times to get health-care. Nevertheless, over the last 15 years, the proportion of people who have very negative views about the health system has decreased by half. The majority believes that not enough money is spent on health-care, but few people would support an increase in taxes to provide additional funding. The survey finds the National Health System's institutions and health professionals to be more highly trusted than other institutions and professional groups in the country. CONCLUSIONS: Government policy-makers in Spain face a dilemma: the public wants more health spending to decrease wait times, but there is substantial resistance to increasing taxes as a means to finance improvements in the system's capacity.
In many countries health services and/or health insurance are delivered but also partly financed by subnational entities that vary in their fiscal or financial capacity, e.g. local governments and social health insurance schemes. The central government typically mandates a specific (or at least minimum) level of benefit or expenditure per intended beneficiary, and sets rules about enrollment and coverage. It also typically contributes to the cost of the program, partly because the resources of subnational entities may be insufficient, on average, to meet the expenditure requirements, but partly for equity reasons. These two problems are typically addressed through tax-transfer schemes. In practice, there is considerable institutional heterogeneity across countries in the mix of vertical and horizontal schemes, and the way each works. In this Note, we show how the progressivity of health outlays by subnational entities can be decomposed into contributions from vertical and horizontal schemes, and how each of these can be further decomposed into contributions from taxes and transfers. We suggest that, in addition to providing a foundation for future empirical work, the decomposition provides some insights into the reasons for different institutional choices, and into the way vertical and horizontal tax-transfer schemes operate in practice.
Global Health Care Issues
Healthcare Policy and Management
Health Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life
In this paper the main determinants of health care expenditure per capita in Spanish autonomous communities are analyzed. The coexistence of several models concerning the degree of spending power decentralization and financing systems converts Spain in a singular case, allowing to extract interesting conclusions for other countries in ways of decentralizing their health care system. Besides, our results allow to evaluate the incidence of some factors of over-cost underlined by the autonomous communities with a view to future changes in the autonomous communities financing model.
Pakistan has an extensive public sector service delivery infrastructure consisting of a three tiered healthcare delivery system which includes Basic Health Units and Rural Health Centers forming the core of the primary health model, secondary care including first and second referral facilities providing acute, ambulatory and inpatient care through Tehsil Headquarter and District Headquarter hospitals and Tertiary Care comprising teaching hospitals. Notwithstanding, most people receive healthcare through private out-of-pocket payments made directly to the providers at the point of care. Recently, many attempts have been made to mainstream alternative arrangements of service delivery at various levels in order to bridge gaps in the present system of service delivery, albeit with limited success. As one of the core areas of reform-related interventions, the Gateway Paper makes a strong case for introducing change at two levels in order to obviate these issues. Firstly, at the level of hospitals the hospital sustainability reform process calls for major structural and financing adjustments, the development of appropriate policy frameworks, decentralizing hospital management to autonomous hospital boards and providing legal, managerial and fiscal autonomy to hospitals with appropriate community representation. At the primary healthcare level, a system for restructuring BHUs and RHCs has been supported--one that makes a case for appropriate checks and balances in order to ensure sustained improvements by redefining the roles of management, quality assurance, regulation and community oversight the latter through linkages with the devolution initiative. The Gateway Paper dovetails these alternative service delivery arrangements with parallel financing models.
Contracting is one of the tools increasingly being used to enhance the performance of health systems in both developed and developing countries; it takes different forms and cannot be limited to the mere purchase of services. Actors adopt contracting to formalize all kinds of relations established between them. A typology for this approach will demonstrate its diversity and provide a better understanding of the various issues raised by contracting. In recent years the way health systems are organized has changed significantly. To remedy the under-performance of their health systems, most countries have undertaken reforms that have resulted in major institutional overhaul, including decentralization of health and administrative services, autonomy for public service providers, separation of funding bodies and service providers, expansion of health financing options and the development of the profit or nonprofit private sector. These institutional reshuffles lead not only to multiplication and diversification of the actors involved, but also to greater separation of the service provision and administrative functions. Health systems are becoming more complex and can no longer operate in isolation. Actors are gradually realizing that they need to forge relations. The simplest way to do that is through dialogue, although some prefer a more formal commitment. Interaction between actors may take various forms and be on different scales. There are several types of contractual relations: some are based on the nature of the contract (public or private), others on the parties involved and yet others on the scope of the contract. Here they are classified into three categories according to the object of the contract: delegation of responsibility, act of purchase of services, or cooperation.
In the past five years most of the countries have begun or are continuing with processes of health sector reform which are intended to modify the management and financing of health services provision. Most of the legislative changes relating to health have altered the balance between private and public health services. There has also been some degree of re–establishing the role of the state as provider and regulator, with decentralizing of services management, promotion of the private sector and the control of escalating costs.
Health quasi-markets aim to introduce competition into the public sphere by separating functions in order to improve efficiency and quality. In different public-private mixes, according to the morphology of health systems, different regulations can govern insurance, financing, and provision of services. The objective is to link financing to productivity, coverage, performance, and accomplishment of goals. Specifying guarantees to provide services for determined beneficiaries implies the formation of a purchase function based on strategic criteria involves three financing decisions: which interventions will be purchased, how they will be purchased, and from which providers. Some health systems in the region have established a separation of functions and some initial finance mechanisms based on results that allow them to be considered developing quasi-markets. On the other hand, some of them have introduced guarantees for various health services. Although such guarantees in all cases aim to improve equity in the level of health enjoyed by the population, they have very different repercussions in terms of the general organization of the related health systems depending on the level of development and the characteristics of the health coverage that the population already has. This study considers in the first place the introduction of health benefits guarantees in quite underdeveloped health systems, analyzing with more detail the case of Guatemala and briefly, Bolivia. Afterwards, a thorough analysis of Chile is done, showing how the health guarantees imply a partial overcome of the fundamental duality of the health system. Finally is considered the recent experience of the popular health insurance in Mexico, whose health insurance system is highly segmented. As we shall see in all the experiences, both the decentralization process and the specific public-private mix play an important role in the organisation of the health guarantees.
China's transition into a market economy has exerted some influence on the health sector in terms of a significant growth of facilities, but it has also produced a range of destabilizing social costs. \n \n \n \nThis thesis analyzes the relations between healthcare pricing and payment reforms and the different delivery aspects such as the exemption program for the poor, public health programs for tuberculosis control and the provision of hospital services. A health economics and systems conceptual framework is used for analyzing aspects of the health systems in terms of market failures and the institutional response from governments and regulators. \n \n \n \nIn study I, the exemption programs for hospitals where the poor are relieved of paying the price or user charges are analyzed. The study is a case study where patient records from nine hospitals were reviewed, together with interviews with key informants and community representatives. The study showed that the discount offered was limited, where only a minority of indigents received discounts and the hospitals lacked incentives for efficiently carrying out the programs. \n \n \n \nStudy II investigates the effect of the new urban health insurance system on hospital charges. The study uses two tracers, acute appendicitis and normal childbirth, at six hospitals from two cities with different insurance systems. The result showed a lower rate of increase in hospitals charges in the city implementing the urban health insurance reform. Regression analysis showed contracting mechanisms and length of stay to be the main determinants for hospital charges. \n \n \n \nStudy III analyzes the operation of TB control programs in a decentralized financial system. A case study was conducted in four counties with different economic developments in the Shandong province. Data was collected from a review of documents and interviews with patients and key informants. The study showed weak government support to the TB control program and less developed DOT (directly observed therapy) programs in the poorer counties. TB patients suffered heavy financial burdens. The decentralized financing system had negatively affected the provision of public health programs such as TB control programs. \n \n \n \nIn study IV, the impact of retail price control of drugs on hospital drug expenditures was examined. The study is a case study at two hospitals. Total drug expenditures were analyzed based on financial records and a tracer, cerebral infarction, was used for an in-depth examination of prices, volume, expenditures and rationality of drug use. Findings showed that after the implementation of the drug pricing policy, total drug expenditures increased as rapidly as before. Drug expenditure per patient for cerebral infarction showed indistinct results, indicating that the regulation was not effective. Utilization rather than price was more determinative for drug expenditures. \n \n \n \nStudy V investigates the development of revenues, costs and performance in the hospital sector. In a sample of 41 hospitals in two cities, the use of inputs, investments and productivity was estimated. The findings showed that hospitals had expanded their staff and invested in new medical equipment. The corresponding change of outputs in terms of outpatient and inpatient performance showed a slower increasing rate, resulting in a diminishing productivity rate over time. \n \n \n \nThe market-oriented health care system in China is faced with different 'market failures' problems such as limited access to health services for the poor and the inaccuracy in relying on market mechanisms for services characterized by positive externalities, such as the public health programs. Financial autonomy has given health providers the incentives to maximize revenues. Government interventions to contain costs and improve efficiency show that a sole reliance on the price mechanism is insufficient and must be combined with other tools set by regulators and insurers.
In Lao PDR, lack of skilled manpower and financial resources in the central government, plus the policy urging local authorities to be self-sufficient and self-reliant caused the central government to decentralize all sectors to the provincial level in 1987. After 1987, the provinces took over all responsibilities such as planning, financing and provision of health services, only informing the Ministry of Health (MOH) about their activities. Because of economic differences between the 18 provinces, health services became unequal between the richer and poorer provinces. Some provinces generated high revenues, leading to over spending. The decentralized system had some negative impacts on the health service. The technical and planning functions managed from the ministry level became separated from management and financial decision making at the local level, and the ministry lost influence on the direction of health policy. Salaries from the local government were often delayed. Because health budgets were not allocated centrally by the Ministry of Health, there were no mechanisms by which health resources could be distributed preferentially to poorer areas with greater need. However, donors continued to support health programs through the Ministry of Health, sending drugs, vaccines, and other supplies to the provinces. The implementation of decentralization faced many difficulties due to the lack of experienced staff and insufficient training required for practicing decentralization. Similar problems in other sectors, such as agriculture, education, and communication, caused the central government to retake control from the provinces in 1992. During the recentralization period, utilization of health facilities increased. The Ministry of Health set rules and established regulations to strengthen the health system. A cost-recovery system was introduced to obtain additional funds, and conditions in the provinces gradually improved. The unique situation of decentralization followed by recentralization provides an excellent opportunity for study. We reviewed documents relating to these periods and interviewed officials at all levels who were concerned with the process.
Decentralization of health services in Uganda, driven by the structural adjustment programme of the World Bank, was embraced by government as a means to change the health institutional structure and process delivery of health services in the country.Arising from the decentralization process, the transfer of power concerning functions from the top administrative hierarchy in health service provision to lower levels constitutes a major shift in management, philosophy, infrastructure development, communication as well as other functional roles by actors at various levels of health care.This study focused its investigation on ways and levels to which the process of decentralization of health service delivery has attained efficient and effective provision of health services.The study also examined the extent to which the shift of health service provision has influenced the role of local jurisdictions and communities.Challenges faced by local government leaders in planning and raising funds in response to decentralized health service delivery were examined.The study used a descriptive survey research design employing qualitative techniques, namely questionnaires, structured interviews, observation, and document analysis to establish the extent to which the decentralized approach to health service delivery has impacted on local governments and the vulnerable target groups such as the rural and urban poor, children, mothers, HIV/AIDS victims, orphans and refugees.Key respondents were government officials in health related management in the country at various levels.Health workers and beneficiaries of health services were interviewed to share their views and experiences of decentralized health care service provision.iii Using a conceptual framework of "Community as Client", the findings illustrate that while some local governments in the country have extended health units closer to some communities, the pursuit of a decentralized health service delivery system in Uganda over-assumed the benefits of decentralizing health care.The observations indicated that health care is not better organized; neither has decentralization provided greater involvement of local communities in mobilization and capacity building of community-based health workers.The acclaimed cost containment and reduction through duplication of services, reduction of inequities, integration of activities of different agencies and organizations involved in health care have not been achieved in concert with original expectations and assumptions of decentralization.These include: strengthened health policy and planning functions of the ministry of health, improved implementation of health programmes, greater community control and financing (ownership) and improved inter-sectoral coordination.From the findings, it would appear that the motivation for decentralizing health care was not intrinsically guided by how the decentralized health system can better serve the poor majorities in the country.The study concludes that the decentralization of health services in Uganda was not matched with commitment for provision of necessary health supplies, and delivery of health care services through a centrally coordinated national network of health facilities.The Ugandan Government in particular Ministry of Health and the government needs to evaluate the achievements and challenges faced by the health care system under decentralization within the broader perspective of health for all, as a means to establish appropriate refocusing of health care delivery for optimal benefit of the client communities.
Bunnan Men, John Grundy, Jeff Cane, Lon Chan Rasmey · 10 authors
The following study was conducted as part of a review of management systems at a Provincial Health Department (Kampong Cham Province) and a National Health Programme (National Immunization Program) in 2002-2003 in Cambodia. The aim of this paper is to identify, analyse and recommend those management system factors that are critical to the success of health management performance, with a particular focus on provincial management. The review has identified critical success factors associated with health management performance at the sub-national level that include a stronger role for effective human resource management in health sector reform, elevation of the status of planning in senior level management, and the development of a more comprehensive and transparent finance system. These success factors will position the provincial level of health management to respond more effectively to the reform challenges of administrative de-concentration and political decentralization that are currently underway across a range of government sectors in Cambodia.
One of the limitations of cross-country health expenditure analysis refers to the fact that the financing, the internal organization and political restraints of health care decision-making are country-specific and heterogeneous. Yet, a way through is to examine the influence of such effects in those countries that have undertaken decentralization processes. In such a setting, it is possible to examine potential expenditure spillovers across the geography of a country as well as the influence of the political ideology of regional incumbents and institutional factors on public health expenditure. This paper examines the determinants of public health expenditure within Spanish region-states (Autonomous Communities, ACs), most of them subject to similar financing structures although exhibiting significant heterogeneity as a result of the increasing decentralization, region-specific political factors along with different use of health care inputs, economic dimension and spatial interactions.
Advocates of health system reform are calling for, among other things, decentralized, autonomous managerial and financial control, use of contracting and incentives, and a greater reliance on market mechanisms in the delivery of health services. The family planning and sexual health (FP&SH) sector already has experience of these. In this paper, we set forth three typical means of service provision within the FP&SH sector since the mid-1900s: independent not-for-profit providers, vertical government programmes and social marketing programmes. In each case, we present the context within which the service delivery mechanism evolved, the management techniques that characterize it and the lessons learned in FP&SH that are applicable to the wider debate about improving health sector management. We conclude that the FP&SH sector can provide both positive and negative lessons in the areas of autonomous management, use of incentives to providers and acceptors, balancing of centralization against decentralization, and employing private sector marketing and distribution techniques for delivering health services. This experience has not been adequately acknowledged in the debates about how to improve the quality and quantity of health services for the poor in developing countries. Health sector reform advocates and FP&SH advocates should collaborate within countries and regions to apply these management lessons.
ABSTRACT - The Portuguese National Health Service (SNS), a universal, centralized and public owned health care system, exhibits an extraordinary record of equalization in the access to health care and health gains in the late thirty years. However, the most recent history of the Portuguese health reform is pervaded by the influence of decentralization and privatization. Decentralization has been present in the system design since the 1976 Constitution, at least in theory. Private ownership of health care suppliers and out-ofpocket expenditures, on the financing side, both have a long tradition of relevance in the NHS mix of services. The initial aim of this study was to demonstrate expected parallelism between health reforms and public administration reforms, where a common pattern of joint decentralization and privatization was observed in many countries. Observers would be tempted to consider these two movements as common signs of new public management (NPM) developments. They have common objectives, are established around the core concepts of gains in effectiveness, efficiency, equity and quality of public services, through improved accountability. However, in practice, in Portugal, each movement was developed in a totally separated way. Besides those rooted in the NPM theory, there are few visible signs of association between decentralization and privatization. Decentralization, in the Portuguese SNS, was never intended to be followed by a privatization movement; it was seen merely as a public administration tool. Private management of health services, as stated in the most recent SNS legislation, was never intended to have decentralization as a condition or as a consequence. Paradoxically, in the Portuguese context, it has led invariably to centralized control. While presented as separate instruments for a common purpose, the association between decentralization and privatization still lacks a convincing demonstration. Many common health care management stereotypes remain to be checked out if we want to look for eventual associations between these two organizational tools.
The government dominates health care in Britain, France and Germany, but there are a number of significant differences between the three countries. In Britain, health care is financed by general taxation, whereas the French and German systems are both insurance-based. Spending on health is higher, and the health systems are more decentralized, in France and Germany than in Britain. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
ABSTRACT - The Portuguese National Health Service (SNS), a universal, centralized and public owned health care system, exhibits an extraordinary record of equalization in the access to health care and health gains in the late thirty years. However, the most recent history of the Portuguese health reform is pervaded by the influence of decentralization and privatization. Decentralization has been present in the system design since the 1976 Constitution, at least in theory. Private ownership of health care suppliers and out-ofpocket expenditures, on the financing side, both have a long tradition of relevance in the NHS mix of services. The initial aim of this study was to demonstrate expected parallelism between health reforms and public administration reforms, where a common pattern of joint decentralization and privatization was observed in many countries. Observers would be tempted to consider these two movements as common signs of new public management (NPM) developments. They have common objectives, are established around the core concepts of gains in effectiveness, efficiency, equity and quality of public services, through improved accountability. However, in practice, in Portugal, each movement was developed in a totally separated way. Besides those rooted in the NPM theory, there are few visible signs of association between decentralization and privatization. Decentralization, in the Portuguese SNS, was never intended to be followed by a privatization movement; it was seen merely as a public administration tool. Private management of health services, as stated in the most recent SNS legislation, was never intended to have decentralization as a condition or as a consequence. Paradoxically, in the Portuguese context, it has led invariably to centralized control. While presented as separate instruments for a common purpose, the association between decentralization and privatization still lacks a convincing demonstration. Many common health care management stereotypes remain to be checked out if we want to look for eventual associations between these two organizational tools.
Nicaragua has embarked on a reform of the way in which publicly provided medical care is organized and financed. A principal feature of the reforms includes a decentralization of decision-making authority coupled with an increase in local accountability. Local decision-making authority has been increased by allowing managers more freedom to allocate inputs. Accountability has been strengthened by stipulating what is expected of hospitals and health centres in the form of performance agreements, and tying rewards (i.e. bonuses) to the satisfaction of these requirements provides incentives. This paper provides a critical assessment of these reforms, and presents some early evidence of their effects.
District health systems, comprising primary health care and first referral hospitals, are key to the delivery of basic health services in developing countries. They should be prioritized in resource allocation and in the building of management and service capacity. The relegation in the World Health Report 2000 of primary health care to a 'second generation' reform--to be superseded by third generation reforms with a market orientation--flows from an analysis that is historically flawed and ideologically biased. Primary health care has struggled against economic crisis and adjustment and a neoliberal ideology often averse to its principles. To ascribe failures of primary health care to a weakness in policy design, when the political economy has starved it of resources, is to blame the victim. Improvement in the working and living conditions of health workers is a precondition for the effective delivery of public health services. A multidimensional programme of health worker rehabilitation should be developed as the foundation for health service recovery. District health systems can and should be financed (at least mainly) from public funds. Although in certain situations user fees have improved the quality and increased the utilization of primary care services, direct charges deter health care use by the poor and can result in further impoverishment. Direct user fees should be replaced progressively by increased public finance and, where possible, by prepayment schemes based on principles of social health insurance with public subsidization. Priority setting should be driven mainly by the objective to achieve equity in health and wellbeing outcomes. Cost effectiveness should enter into the selection of treatments for people (productive efficiency), but not into the selection of people for treatment (allocative efficiency). Decentralization is likely to be advantageous in most health systems, although the exact form(s) should be selected with care and implementation should be phased in after adequate preparation. The public health service should usually play the lead provider role in district health systems, but non-government providers can be contracted if needed. There is little or no evidence to support proactive privatization, marketization or provider competition. Democratization of political and popular involvement in health enhances the benefits of decentralization and community participation. Integrated district health systems are the means by which specific health programmes can best be delivered in the context of overall health care needs. International assistance should address communicable disease control priorities in ways that strengthen local health systems and do not undermine them. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria should not repeat the mistakes of the mass campaigns of past decades. In particular, it should not set programme targets that are driven by an international agenda and which are achievable only at the cost of an adverse impact on sustainable health systems. Above all the targets must not retard the development of the district health systems so badly needed by the rural poor.
Open access
Healthcare Policy and Management
Health Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life