Lioba Heimbach, Eric Schertenleib, Roger Wattenhofer
Lending protocols in decentralized finance enable the permissionless exchange of capital from lenders to borrowers without relying on a trusted third party for clearing or market-making. Interest rates are purely set by the supply and demand of capital according to a pre-defined function. In the lead-up to The Merge: Ethereum blockchain's transition from proof-of-work (PoW) to proof-of-stake (PoS), a fraction of the Ethereum ecosystem announced plans of continuing with a PoW-chain. Owners of ETH - whether their ETH was borrowed or not - would hold the native tokens on each chain. This development alarmed lending protocols. They feared spiking ETH borrowing rates would lead to mass liquidations which could undermine their viability. Thus, the decentralized autonomous organization running the protocols saw no alternative to intervention - restricting users' ability to borrow. We investigate the effects of the merge and the aforementioned intervention on the two biggest lending protocols on Ethereum: AAVE and Compound. Our analysis finds that borrowing rates were extremely volatile, jumping by two orders of magnitude, and borrowing at times reached 100% of the available funds. Despite this, no spike in mass liquidations or irretrievable loans materialized. Further, we are the first to quantify and analyze hard-fork-arbitrage, profiting from holding debt in the native blockchain token during a hard fork. We find that arbitrageurs made in excess of 13 Mio US$, money that was effectively extracted from the platforms' lenders. Finally, we identify alarming security risks to the entire Ethereum ecosystem. Around one-fifth of the staked ETH through LIDO (stETH) was locked as collateral on lending protocols. Mass liquidations caused by spiking rates would have devastating effects on the stETH price and pose security concerns for the consensus layer, as staking power could be bought at a significant discount.
Blockchain technology has facilitated the emergence of a new type of organizational form, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs). In contrast to corporations and other types of business organizations, DAOs do not have managers or directors with formal decision rights. Instead, the members of DAOs collectively make decisions by voting on proposals. The governance process is encoded and executed via a smart contract, negating the need for centralized leadership. We examine the control of DAOs by analyzing 10,639 proposals across 151 DAOs. We find that, rather than democratizing decision-making, a small number, often three or fewer, of entities exert control over most decisions.
The decentralized finance (DeFi) industry hosts billions of dollars in cryptocurrency deposits across protocols that autonomously and independently execute financial transactions. However, little is known about how these protocols raise capital or conduct their governance. This paper examines the token distribution mechanisms of the top-50 DeFi protocols and documents significant variation in how tokens are allocated to users, investors, and developers. We find that several protocols distribute a greater share of tokens to insiders, such as through private sales and developer allocations, rather than to users via incentives and airdrops. We present evidence that protocols with greater insider control exhibit fewer deposits, lower token values, and increased risk. Using an event-study analysis, we find significant increases in protocol deposits post-airdrops. Our results suggest that DeFi users prefer user-centric governance models and are sensitive to the risks of insider control. Lastly, this paper discusses the risks and challenges of DeFi governance.
We construct a tractable general equilibrium model of DeFi lending to shed light on the role of pricing rules. We determine how the rule controls key equilibrium variables such as the utilization rate. Our model delivers a measure of welfare which incorporates the DeFi borrowing rate and the security of the underlying (Proof-of-Stake) blockchain, which we use to find welfare-maximizing pricing rules. Using a genuine function of the utilization rate becomes meaningful when there is parameter uncertainty. We establish conditions under which the first-best can be implemented by such a function, which we exhibit explicitly. When these conditions are not met, allowing the rule to also depend on the staking level restores efficiency. Our analysis leads to several other practical recommendations and conceptual clarifications.
Guangqian Ren, Yifan Mo, Li Liu, Minna Zheng · 5 authors
The innovation efficiency of an enterprise is subject to the behavior of the innovation subject, while the equity pledge behavior of the controlling shareholder not only brings convenience for innovation investment and financing, but also brings risks which has an impact on the innovation output of the enterprise. In this paper, we investigate how equity pledge of controlling shareholders affect the enterprise innovation efficiency using the data of China’s A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2020, and examine the effect of property right structure on the relationship between them from the two dimensions of equity nature and equity concentration. We find that equity pledge of controlling shareholders are signifcantly negatively related to innovation efficiency, meaning that equity pledge inhibits the innovation behavior of enterprises and reduces the innovation efficiency. We further provide evidence to show that the impediment effect of equity pledge of controlling shareholder on enterprise innovation efficiency is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises and decentralized equity enterprises. Moreover, our analysis shows that different equity concentration levels have different effects in the process of equity pledge affecting enterprise innovation efficiency and the effect of concentrated equity enterprises is lower than that of decentralized enterprises.
This research investigates the short-term and long-term performance and volatility of publicly traded firms engaged in blockchain business. In particular, it examines how ownership structure impacts performance and volatility in such firms. We manually collected the data of Chinese A-listed companies participating in blockchain development during 2013–2018 as samples, and find that both short- and long-term performance and volatility significantly decrease among these firms after involvement in blockchain business. Ownership concentration has a positive correlation with stock returns, return on assets, and volatilities, whereas the state as a controlling shareholder strengthens these positive links.
In this paper, we evaluate the economic value of a blockchain application. In the context of asset-backed securities (ABS) issuance in China, where some ABS are issued with blockchain technology and others are not, we find that the use of blockchain significantly reduces the coupon yield at issuance. Compared with other ABS, those issued using blockchain technology experience a decrease of 31.4 basis points in the yield spread, which corresponds to a relative decrease of 13%. We further document that the effect of blockchain is more pronounced for ABS deals rated by less reputable credit rating agencies and agencies that rely more on issuers for their rating business, for revolving ABS, and for ABS with a larger number of underlying assets. We also find that the use of blockchain can reduce the level of retained interest and number of credit enhancement mechanisms. This paper contributes to the literature by providing a small-sample analysis of the economic value of a blockchain application in financial markets. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting. Funding: X. Chen and Q. Cheng acknowledge funding provided by the Lee Kong Chian Professorship at Singapore Management University. This work was supported by Singapore Ministry of Education [Grant MOE-T2EP40120-0005]. Supplemental Material: Data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4671 .
Kanis Saengchote, Tālis J. Putniņš, Krislert Samphantharak
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) is built on a fundamentally different paradigm: rather than having to trust individuals and institutions, participants in DeFi potentially only have to trust computer code that is enforced by a decentralized network of computers. We examine a natural experiment that exogenously stress tests this alternative paradigm by revealing the identities of individuals associated with a DeFi protocol, including a convicted criminal. We find that, in practice, DeFi does not (yet) fully remove the need for trust in individuals. Our findings suggest that that because smart contracts are incomplete, they are subject to run risk (Allen and Gale, 2004) and personal character and trust of individuals are still relevant in this alternative financial system.
This paper investigates the market reaction to large positive or negative liquidity shocks on the value of tokens traded on decentralized exchanges (DEXes) on the Ethereum blockchain. Automated market makers (AMMs) and constant product markets provide transparent and decentralized ways to directly swap two blockchain tokens for each other via the use of liquidity pools. Using trade-by-trade data of 2.77 million swaps of 14 different tokens traded on Uniswap v2, v3 and SushiSwap, we find that the size of sell orders significantly correlates with negative future token returns, while buy size positively correlates with future token returns. Using an event study approach, we quantify the market reaction of unusually large sell and buy orders (top 1% percentile) and identify that the market reaction outweighs the economic value of the event by a factor of -7.4 for sell orders and +4.4 for buy orders over a short-span trading window. In the case of sell orders, a high proportion of the abnormal return is already realized before the event, which indicates informed trading in the form of arbitrage or frontrunning via Miner Extractable Value (MEV). Looking at individual crypto assets, we find a mean reassessment of token value following short sales of up to 0.79% within just one follow-up trade (buy orders up to 0.50%). The findings indicate that price shocks may have a signaling effect but also that market capitalization may be an insufficient metric for assessing the liquidity and valuation of (inefficient) crypto assets. The results suggest multiple challenges for investor protection in decentralized finance (DeFi) markets.
Christine R. Martell, Tima T. Moldogaziev, Salvador Espinosa
Abstract Chapter 1 introduces the book by presenting the main arguments that information resolution is a necessary component of SNG capital market development and access to external financing. It also argues that local policy and management agency vis-à-vis financial sector firms is critical to achieve SNG governance tasks in the face of decentralized governance and growing local service pressures. This chapter defines the key terminology of information problems, information institutions, and information resolution. It situates the focus on SNGs, and more narrowly on policy makers at the city level, that are embedded within the national contexts and financial markets. Finally, the chapter identifies the book’s contributions and details the organization of the book’s remaining chapters.
This paper integrates vertical fiscal imbalance, transfer payments and fiscal sustainability into the framework of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization, and systematically interprets the relationship among them. Then we use the concept of effective fiscal space to quantify fiscal sustainability, and empirically study whether and to what extent the local public finance in China is sustainable, as well as the impact of fiscal vertical imbalance and transfer payment system on local fiscal sustainability. The results show that the current fiscal behaviors of China's local governments are unsustainable, but most of them have sufficient space to establish a positive fiscal feedback mechanism through fiscal adjustment to achieve sustainable development of debt. Moreover, the comprehensive impact of transfer payment on fiscal sustainability is positive, which suggests that the positive effect of transfer payments on governments' fiscal behaviors through incentives and accountability mechanisms and filling fiscal gap is greater than the distorting effect of the moral hazard and “flypaper effect.”
In our model, a venture seeks capital through an initial coin offering (ICO). The ICO enables the venture to collect demand information from decentralized investors. The venture makes a tradeoff between ensuring the project’s success and forecasting market demand through token size and token price. We find that the higher the demand uncertainty and production cost, the greater the venture’s incentive to learn from its investors. To identify when the venture has an incentive to raise funds through an ICO, we compare it with traditional bank financing and analyze the venture’s preference between the two financing options. The results show that when demand uncertainty is high, an ICO can provide both financing and information benefits, whereas when demand uncertainty is low, although the venture does not collect information through an ICO, it can still get financing benefit. Only when demand uncertainty is intermediate, the venture prefers bank financing. In addition, we find that although the revenue sharing effect of the ICO results in an underinvestment issue, it can also alleviate the loss caused by the increased cost of production. Therefore, with high information accuracy, as production cost goes up, ICOs become more attractive than bank financing for the venture.