Rodrigo Couto de Souza, Edimara Mezzomo Luciano, Guilherme Costa Wiedenhöft
The increasing demands for more transparency in public administration worldwide ask for open data, and the establishing of other mechanisms as well as keep using the contributions of new technologies to increment the management capacity, focusing on better controls and governance mechanisms. One of the new technologies that presents potential to be used to protect organizations from corruption is Blockchain. An important point when dealing with corruption perpetrated by frauds is the use of technology to avoid wrongdoing or to reduce its impact. Contracts are a very complex subject provided they are the main way governments transfer money to other organizations, including private ones. This document presents a study proposal about the use of Smart Contracts technology in Blockchain environments as a way to face corruption in governmental instances. Smart Contracts can be used to all government payments as a way to increase transactions transparency, as well as to avoid overbilling, provided that contracts and bids are typical ways to exert frauds and money misappropriation. As future researches it is important to verify barriers to Blockchain adoption as well as its main vulnerabilities.
This study examines the relationship between decentralization, democratic governance, and the working of local self-government institutions in India. The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments established Panchayats and Municipalities as constitutionally recognized bodies of grassroots governance, intended to promote participation, accountability, and locally responsive development. However, the quality of decentralization continues to vary because the transfer of authority, finance, and personnel remains uneven across states. The study adopts a descriptive and analytical design to assess how local self-government influences democratic participation, administrative responsiveness, and service satisfaction. For academic demonstration, a structured survey framework using a sample of 63 respondents was prepared, including elected representatives, officials, and citizens. Three dimensions were examined: the link between citizen participation and accountability, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and service delivery satisfaction, and differences in perceptions of responsiveness among stakeholder groups. The analysis applies Chi-square, Spearman rank correlation, one-way ANOVA, and multiple regression to interpret the data. The results indicate that decentralization improves democratic governance when it is accompanied by meaningful devolution, transparent institutions, trained local leadership, and active community engagement. The study concludes that local self-government can become a more effective instrument of inclusive development when constitutional design is supported by administrative capacity, fiscal autonomy, and regular citizen oversight.
Five billion people in the world do not have the kind of ledgers that provide the documented information that allows them to transfer, partition, and aggregate assets and talents in such a way that they can be scaled up, secure investment, guarantee credit, certify reputation, and capture abstract surplus value. The difficulty that most people have in making combinations is a major cause of global inequality and unnecessary poverty.
The study attempted to investigate how leadership can be used to combat corruption in decentralized governance structures of Ghana. In conducting the study, purposive sampling technique was employed to select key officials of GA south municipal assembly whose duties often promote corrupt practices. The questionnaire technique was the research instrument while a statistical package for social science was used to facilitate the analysis of data captured from the field. Findings of the study noted that under invoicing, over invoicing, payment for works not done among others are serious corrupt practices prevailing within the decentralized grassroots governance structures. It also came to light that political interference, appointing political operatives to key positions in governance units all promotes corrupt practices. The study noted that if political interference can be removed in the administration of these decentralized structures, effective leaders who are mainly technocrats can offer sound management framework for carrying out the developmental agenda of these decentralized structures. The study called on government of African countries to endeavour to finance the activities of political parties so as to remove the need for amassing wealth through fair or foul means for strengthen political structures to win elections. Strong leaders are required towards combating corruptions, however there is the need to ameliorate completely the effect of political interference in the administration of decentralized governance structures.
Decentralized service delivery refers to the mode in which service delivery is done through delegation and devolution of power from center to local governments whereby efficiency and effectiveness are likely to be achieved. The purpose of this study was to assess the improvements in education and health services delivery in Yeka sub city of Addis Ababa city government. To realize the purpose of the study, case study research method was conducted. The study is qualitative whereby simple quantitative tools were employed so as to complement the qualitative narrations. The study primarily utilized secondary data obtained, from policy documents, constitution, proclamations, intervention plans and performance reports, etc. The study was supported with primary data obtained through interviews and questionnaires. The data results revealed that there is achievement in health and education service delivery as well as there are gaps in the services delivered. The findings of the study revealed that various functions of education and health services have been devolved to the lowest tier of government. The study has indicated that there are multiple bodies established at lower levels of government to support school and health centers activities. As a result, the services provided have expanded; there is now an increased availability and accessibility of the services in both education and health. The study also observed constraints; the constraints consider human resource, finance and facilities . Key Words concepts: service delivery, education & health, decentralization
There are three chapters in my dissertation. In chapter one I study the impact of government corruption on tax avoidance by corporations with tax liability in China. I begin by developing a model of a firm's choice of tax avoidance based on the level of corruption in the firm's province. I show that a higher level of government corruption and a higher tax rate are predicted to increase a firm's tax avoidance. My empirical estimates show that a one-standard-deviation increase in government corruption corresponds to a 6% increase in tax avoidance by firms, based on data from nearly 600,000 firms from 1998 to 2007. When I separate the sample by type of ownership of firms, I find that domestic private firms tend to avoid a larger portion of their tax liabilities than foreign or state-owned firms. I also find that tax avoidance increases when the effective tax rate increases. The size of the firm, age of the firm, and whether the firm exports from China also influence tax avoidance. In chapter two, a joint work with Sergey Mityakov, we study the impact of competition on tax avoidance by corporations in Mexico. Using more than 2,000 firm level data, we show that firms tend to avoid more taxes in less competitive markets, that is more concentrated market. A one standard deviation increase in competition leads to a 7.7% increase in tax avoidance. By splitting the sample based on ownership structure, we show that domestic firms avoid more taxes. When we separate the firms according to the plant size, we find that larger firms tend to avoid more taxes. We find robust and consistent results by using different competition measures and other robustness tests. In chapter three, I theoretically demonstrate how fiscal decentralization affects corruption. The theory predicts that fiscal decentralization reduces corruption. This result is then tested using a panel data set of 31 provincial level government from 1998 to 2007 in China. My estimates suggest that fiscal decentralization in government expenditures and government revenue is negatively correlated with corruption. Using leader and location dummy variables, I find that central government leaders can influence the corruption level in China. I also find that more developed regions in China tend to be less corrupt.
During the past three decades, a large number of countries have introduced reforms to decentralize public decision making. Such reforms have proved controversial. Critics of these reforms argue that decentralized provision of infrastructure enhances vulnerability to corruption. Proponents of these reforms counter that corruption arises from lack of people empowerment and decentralization by bringing decision making closer to people shines sunlight on government operations and empowers people to hold government to account and thereby offers potential for combating corruption in the long run. They further state that decentralized provision of infrastructure holds a great promise in upgrading infrastructure to underserviced especially rural areas with local self-government. In theory such decentralization is also expected to improve integrity of such operations especially in the event of local financing. These debates, nevertheless, remain unsettled as empirical evidence on the impact of decentralization on infrastructure provision is scant or non-existent. Empirical work is hampered by a lack of reliable data on the incidence of corruption. This paper presents conceptual underpinnings of the impact of decentralized provision of infrastructure on the incidence of corruption and synthesizes scant available empirical evidence to make a case for further empirical research to document the real world experiences to update our current state of knowledge on this subject. Much work lies ahead to limit our wide zone of ignorance in this area.
Fiscal and financial decentralization consists of devolution of the financial resources and decision-making powers to sub-national governments that will allow them to implement the functions and responsibilities that have been delegated to them. In principle, every new responsibility must be followed with the appropriate level of resources and a precise definition of the resources of revenue for the execution of that new responsibility. In other words, finance must follow functions. The present research study entitled “The decentralized taxes as a tool for raising revenue from decentralized entities”. A case study of Gasabo District was been carried out with a purpose of helping decentralized entities to maximize their revenue collections. In this way, the specific objectives of this study were to identify various decentralized taxes collected by the districts, to compare the revenue collections before the Fiscal decentralization of 2006 (2003-2006) and the revenue collections after Fiscal decentralization (2008-2012), to determine the match between the annual collection targets and the revenue collections from decentralized taxes, and to come up with possible strategies on how decentralized taxes can increase revenue from decentralized entities. This research project is significant to policy makers at central government level to assess the level of success in meeting the targeted objective of fiscal decentralization policy. It will be significant to local government for identifying relevant strategies for better improvement of local taxation and to the researcher it serves as a partial fulfillment of the award of a degree in MBA and enriches the knowledge of researcher on the topic of study. Relevant literature related to the theories and models of other writers. As methodology, the study used both secondary and primary data. The researcher used the stratified random sampling technique to determine the sample size of 80. Quantitative method, comparative method, historical methods were used in this research. Secondary data was got from journals, documentation, which is in relation to the study objectives. Data entered in excel was presented by use of frequencies and percentages in tables. Data was been analyzed by using Statistical Package for Social scientists (SPSS. 18), was presented in table which showed the positive relationship between two variables. The research concluded that decentralized taxes have played a significant role for raising revenues from decentralized entities in Rwanda. Recommendation is made on focus to the channels that are more effective in mobilizing decentralized taxes in effective way such as focusing on cell channel and village channel as these are more effective channels for mobilizing decentralized taxes in order to get or raise more revenue, this can help districts to reduce the degree of dependency. The government should set appropriate strategies of tax recovery and improve database of taxpayers.
Built on the theories about talent competition between rent-seeking and entrepreneurship, and the theories about constitutional environment and rent-seeking, this dissertation explores empirically the effects of a country's constitutional settings on entrepreneurship, in terms of the quantity of entrepreneurs and the quality of their performance. Both the de facto and de jure constitutional environments are studied. In particular, with respect to the de facto constitutional environment, I considered the property rights protection, decentralization, and the factors suggested by the "selectorate theory". In relation to the de jure constitutional environment, I focused on six aspects including electoral rules, form of government, federalism, property rights protection, judicial independence and antidiscrimination provisions. Three indexes were constructed to measure the de jure property rights protection, judicial independence and antidiscrimination provisions, using the data set provided by the Comparative Constitution Project.The empirical study first shows that the quantity of entrepreneurs is inversely correlated with the quality of entrepreneurship in a country. If entrepreneurship does serve as the engine of economic growth, it is perhaps the quality, rather than quantity, that matters. This study then demonstrates that the de facto property rights protection is associated negatively with the quantity of entrepreneurs, but positively with the quality of entrepreneurship. The effects of the two key factors of the selectorate theory, the size of the winning coalition and the ratio of this size to the size of the selectorate, also appear to be compatible with what the theory is to predict. On the other hand, neither fiscal nor political decentralization is found to significantly affect entrepreneurship. Among the de jure constitutional features, two have significant influence on entrepreneurship. First, the constitutional design of judicial independence has a negative effect on the quantity of entrepreneurs, but a positive one on the quality of their performance. Second, majoritarian electoral rules, compared with non-majoritarian rules, have a negative effect on the quality of entrepreneurship. In contrast, the presumed effects of the other three formal constitutional attributes, federalism, presidentialism and property rights protection, cannot be ascertained.Apart from the cross-country study, I also conducted a detailed research on China. Entrepreneurship in China is a case of entrepreneurial development in an authoritarian state lack of secure property rights and the rule of law, hence afflicted with profuse rent-seeking activities. Under these circumstances, entrepreneurship hinges on both the rent-seeking and the entrepreneurial abilities. Drawing on the private enterprise surveys, I found that, in China, the politically connected were systematically advantaged in terms of bank finance, entry to regulated industries and judicial treatment, when they plunged into the business world. The Chinese case also indicates that, when entrepreneurs cannot trust the commitment made by the state in the constitution, they will be eager to scoop profits as soon as possible and exit swiftly with accumulated wealth.Finally, this dissertation concludes by suggesting that a healthy development of entrepreneurship should be sustainable rather than aiming merely at quick money and instant success. It should allow all talented people to reach their full potentials, rather than keep the politically disconnected away from resources needed to make the best use of their potentials. Above all, it wants a constitutional environment with reliable property rights and equal access to opportunities, neither of which is seen in today's China.
The revolutionary Chinese institutional order has given way to a more liberal governance regime, which continues to evolve. Nevertheless, as changing patterns of micro-economic regulation illustrate, this has not been a linear and straightforward process. Rather, waves of decentralization and recentralization have unfolded in close succession, and liberalization and reregulation have often been pursued simultaneously. This apparently unique policy configuration seems to be impinging on governance in other parts of the world, given that the “emerging giant” responsible for the “product” is increasingly acting as an active global “rule maker,” as distinct from a merely passive “rule taker.” Yet, it is inadequately understood and is subject to insufficiently critical evaluation. A detailed and probing examination of the substantial academic literature on the subject reveals lingering ambiguities, noticeable gaps, a significant scope for further integration of the various threads, and an uneven picture pointing to potentially less favorable lessons than commonly drawn. * Adjunct Professor of Economics and Finance, Syracuse University (Hong Kong Program) and Adjunct Professor of Global Finance and Governance, Chinese University of Hong Kong. ** Professor of International Law, Hopkins-Nanjing Center, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University and Honorary Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. BYU Journal of Public Law [Vol. 27
One of the fundamental tenets of fiscal federalism is that, absent various sorts of externalities, decentralized governments that rely on own-source revenues should be more fiscally efficient than decentralized governments that rely on grant financing. The argument relies in part on the idea that sub-national governments, being closer to the people, are more accountable to its citizens. Accountability to citizens is also important in understanding the presence of corruption in government. This suggests that the financial structure and institutions of decentralized governments can potentially influence the degree and extent of corrupt activity. Financial structures that make governments more accountable should be associated with less corruption (other things equal), while financial structures with less accountability should be associated with more corrupt activities. We develop a simple model in which the use of grants rather than locally raised taxes increases corruption. We then use a panel data set of Mexican states to study the relationship between funding sources for Mexican states and the level of corruption in those states. We find that greater use of own tax revenues lowers corruption while greater use of grants increases corruption. This suggests that expenditure decentralization that is accompanied by revenue decentralization is likely to discourage corruption while expenditure decentralization that is funded by grants tends to encourage corruption. We also find that poverty, a measure of uninformed citizens, leads to greater corruption.
Decentralization has the potential to lower corruption and alleviate poverty across the world. The true effects of this process are unclear since there are relatively few studies on decentralization and many of these studies, both theoretical and empirical, give conflicting results. One major problem in the literature for the effects of decentralization on corruption has been sample selection bias. The main cross-country dataset for decentralization, the IMF's Government Finance Statistics (GFS), has data for only about 40 countries, and most of these are developed. I attempt to mitigate this sample-selection problem by first estimating a Heckman model for decentralization in order to predict values for unobserved countries and then using these predicted values to estimate decentralization's impact on corruption. My results show that decentralization has an insignificant effect on corruption, suggesting that decentralization alone may not be a useful tool for mitigating corruption.
Corruption in higher education has long been neglected as an area of research in the US. The processes of decentralization, commoditization, and privatization in higher education rise questions of accountability, transparency, quality, and access. Every nation solves problems of access, quality, and equity differently. Thus, although prosecuting corruption in higher education is part of the legal process in every country, the ways in which legal actions are undertaken differ. This paper addresses the question: How is corruption in higher education understood and defined in legal cases, what particular cases receive more attention, and how these cases correlate with the major educational reforms, changes, and socio-economic context in the nation? Specifically, it analyses records of selected legal cases devoted to corruption in the US higher education. Decentralized financing of higher education anticipates cost sharing based in part on educational loans. The US higher education sector grows steadily, and so do opportunities for abuse, including in educational loans. The rapid expansion of education sector leaves some grey areas in legislation and raises issues of applicability of certain state and federal laws and provisions to different forms of misconduct, including consumer fraud, deception, bribery, embezzlement, etc. Higher Education Act, False Claims Act, and Consumer Protection Act cover corruption as related to the state and the public sector; corruption as related to client, business owner, and an agent; and corruption as related to consumer-business relations. However, the legal frame is simplistic, while the system of interrelations in the higher education industry is rather complex.
This short note provides a framework for looking at public sector governance and productivity improvements. It argues that the role of government in enhancing productivity growth is two-fold. First, government should provide an environment that is conducive in improving total factor productivity in private sector production. Second, government should work to increase the productivity of the public sector itself. In terms of providing the appropriate economic setting that is favorable to private-sector-led development, government needs (1) to provide the macroeconomic and the microeconomic environment that will establish incentives for firms/individuals to act in accordance with the invisible hand had there been no market imperfection, (2) to provide the institutional infrastructure (i.e., property rights, law and order, rules and even application and enforcement of the same) that markets need to work efficiently; and (3) to ensure the financing/provision of adequate basic health care and education, and basic physical infrastructure (World Bank 1992). In particular, the instruments that government may use in this regard are include (1) direct government interventions in the product markets as defined by the regulatory structure in strategic sectors, and (2) economy-wide policies like financial liberalization, trade liberalization, and foreign investments liberalization. On the other hand, (1) budget reform (2) the installation of a system of performance measurement and incentive in the public sector, (3) the re-engineering of the bureaucracy, (4) the combating of corruption, and (5) decentralization are the key features of a program that will increase the productivity of government operations.
Formalization of personnel procedures in 229 city, country, and state finance agencies is a function of era of origin and subsequent effects of the environment. Whereas origins and the environment account for the extent of formal personnel procedures, formalization in turn gives rise to multitier hierarchies and hierarchy to decentralized decision making. The effects of origins are due to greater openness to environmental pressures at the time of formation than later on.