Blockchain Papers

Enrico Rossi

No abstract is available for this record.

Roman Beck, Marco Schletz, Alvise Baggio, Lorenzo Gentile

No abstract is available for this record.

Cordelia Friesendorf, Alena Blütener

No abstract is available for this record.

Cordelia Friesendorf, Alena Blütener

No abstract is available for this record.

Cordelia Friesendorf, Alena Blütener

No abstract is available for this record.

Andrzej Brzeziński

Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) is a new form of organization, the innovation of which consists in the use of blockchain technology to record the applicable rules governing the project as well as the rights and obligations of its members, usually investors. Moreover, the method of financing the project is also new here, since tokens (cryptocurrency), which are acquired by investors for the capital contributed, are most frequently used. Management in DAO is previously unheard of (until the creation of DAO-2016), since there are no governing bodies, and all decisions are made by the voting of all members of the organization. In the article, an attempt is made to assess the DAO management process, having previously analyzed blockchain technology and the specificity of this new form of organization. The own research was conducted on a selected DAO project, when analyzing the management process implemented by voting by the members of this organization from its launch (May 2022) to 11 May 2023. The obtained results confirmed the dominance of majority shareholders in DAO votes, although the method of voting (Qudratic voting) used in the project under study to protect the rights of small shareholders significantly reduced this impact. The unusual unanimity of decision-makers was also noted (as much as 65% of unanimous votes), which, as it turned out, could be the result of information campaigns conducted before each vote by groups of small investors deeply involved in the project. These activities should also translate into the accuracy of the decisions made, and thus the quality of the DAO management process.

Cordelia Friesendorf, Alena Blütener

No abstract is available for this record.

Cordelia Friesendorf, Alena Blütener

No abstract is available for this record.

Cordelia Friesendorf, Alena Blütener

No abstract is available for this record.

Frank Martela

Abstract Are managers necessary for organizations? Could organizations function without them? To answer, we must separate between two questions: are top managers necessary? And are middle managers necessary? I argue that larger organizations are prone to need someone to have oversight of the wholeness and to take responsibility for its design and development. Given the dedication and time commitment needed to fulfill that role, it is virtually impossible to have a larger organization without any top management. However, a large organization with top management and frontline employees—but no managerial layers in between—is already a much more realistic possibility. It typically requires having autonomous, self-managing teams empowered to make all the necessary decisions related to their own work, accompanied by certain structural solutions (often enhanced by ICT) solving key information- and coordination-related tasks that are traditionally taken care of by middle managers. Often specific coach roles also emerge. In principle, if working substitutes are found to all tasks traditionally taken care of by middle managers, an organization can be functional and successful without any managerial layers. I examine a few successful examples of such organizations, Buurtzorg and Reaktor, while also highlighting key boundary conditions for when, where, and how self-managing organizations can succeed. I conclude by distinguishing between structure and hierarchy, arguing that while self-managing organizations are characterized by high levels of decentralization, their functionality is ensured through having enough structure, thus combining low hierarchy with adequate structure to find the most functional form of organizing in a particular context.

Mark Fenwick, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, Toshiyuki Kono, Tronel Joubert

No abstract is available for this record.

Lars Karbach, Moritz Korte, Nils Orbat, Daniel Muschiol · 5 authors

Games based on a blockchain exist in all variants and facets, mostly as single- or multiplayer games. This chapter deals with the implementation of a multiplayer strategy game (Connect Four), using blockchain technology for decentralized data storage and the entire game logic. The focus is on the use of the decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) principle, for coordination and voting within the teams. The chosen game just stands as an example; other games or gamification approaches in which users can take decisions collaboratively can be used here. A web application was implemented acting as a central interface between players and the blockchain. Hence, it was possible for players to compete against each other in teams and to collectively decide the next move by participating in a roundly voting. With the help of a standardized questionnaire, answered by each player after each match, possible impacts of the voting mechanism on the usability were determined.

Mark Casson

Abstract Research summary International business strategy and international management are two distinct but related fields of study. This article explores the connections between them. It shows how internalization theory can act as a bridge between them. The key is to analyze not only core activities, such as production, marketing and R&D, but support services such as human resource management, information technology, and corporate finance. Internalization decisions and location decisions must be analyzed holistically, and diagrammatic techniques show how this can be done. These diagrams reveal the networks of communication and the hierarchical structures that emerge from such decisions. Managerial summary The organizational structure of a multinational enterprise is inherently complex, making it difficult to determine whether one organizational structure is more efficient than another. Delayering, decentralization, and agility are recommended, but what are their practical implications? Internalization theory addresses these problems in a simple and coherent way. It shows that it is not only core activities, namely production, marketing and R&D, that need to be coordinated, but support services too. Decisions on the location and out‐sourcing of support services must be aligned with similar decisions on core activities. A diagrammatic analysis is presented that facilitates the solution of these problems.

Juliette Kennel

This paper looks at how the securities industry can better manage coexistence between different message formats along with realising the many opportunities presented by available data. This is with a view to arriving at greater efficiency, profitability and interoperability within securities and across financial services. It begins with an overview of the quantities and types of data produced by the industry, discussing the costs and risks this poses if it is not sufficiently well managed. It then moves into a discussion of the need for a common language for all parts of financial services, including securities, to agree on in order to communicate more effectively. The paper focuses on using the global ISO 20022 standard for this purpose. It covers the question of migrating to it as a message format, for which there is little appetite within the securities industry in the short to medium term. ISO 20022’s central repository and data dictionary provide a solution, creating the common language that can help to ensure interoperability between entities. It includes discussion of the many benefits of using ISO 20022 in this way, such as reduced costs, risks and timeframes. It highlights how ISO 20022 as a data model can be applied to developing standardised application programming interfaces and building connections with emerging technologies and industries such as distributed ledger technology and crypto assets. The paper also looks at the risks and limitations posed by a prolonged period of coexistence. The use of a common data dictionary can enable firms to interoperate without having to align data exchanges at the syntax level; however, there are still associated costs, risks and inefficiencies. The conclusion is that securities market participants should collaborate to adopt a common data dictionary that can be integrated into their systems, their software and their processes.

Sylwester Kozak, Seweryn Gajdek

Cryptocurrencies have become an important element of the global financial system and a frequent investment tool in the last decade. The aim of this paper is to compare the efficiency of investments in the cryptocurrency market with investments in global capital markets. The study used the quotations of the analyzed instruments in the years 2011-2020. The investment efficiency was estimated using Sharpe and Sortino ratios. Research has shown that investments in cryptocurrencies were the most effective. They brought, on average, the highest daily rates of return, but on the other hand, they were characterized by the highest risk. Such a result could have been significantly influenced by the widespread persistence of ultra-low interest rates and a decline in the attractiveness of debt securities. The best results were obtained for investments in bitcoin and ethereum, which have the largest share of cryptocurrency market capitalization.

Paula Tekulova

No abstract is available for this record.

Jan Damsgaard

Controversy surrounding whether cryptocurrency is a bubble and whether the price of bitcoin should be zero instead of $40.000 USD ignores a foundational problem: cryptocurrency has been assessed based on the wrong assumptions. This article outlines a method for providing a more suitable and reasonable assessment of the real value of cryptocurrency. The main argument against cryptocurrency has been that there is nothing behind it. Backing a traditional currency is a national bank, a state and the right of taxation. When cryptocurrency is measured these traditional measures it falls short and the value calculation comes to zero. However, a cryptocurrency is not a traditional currency and should not be measured as such. Instead, it is the associated blockchain that provides cryptocurrency its real value and not its properties as a currency. A blockchain is a digital platform. A piece of software that supports the demand of different companies for a common independent ledger. The valuation of a cryptocurrency must, therefore, be based on the value of its blockchain. The right question to ask is “How valuable is the blockchain itself?” From that point of view, it is clear that a cryptocurrency must be priced more like the price of a digital platform company rather than as a regular currency. To demonstrate the usefulness of this approach the value of Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple, Solana, Filecoin, and Cardano is assessed, and it is suggested that several of these cryptocurrencies—when understood and priced as digital platforms—are priced low in relation to their business potential and application area.

Manuel Ammann, Tom Burdorf, Luca J. Liebi, Sebastian Stöckl

No abstract is available for this record.

Ashutosh Kolte, Avinash Pawar, Jewel Kumar Roy, Imre Vida · 5 authors

Cryptocurrency is the blockchain financial technology used for transactions in financial institutions and exchanges. Bitcoin has attracted much coverage from investors and commentators as it represents the maximum market capitalization on a crypto-currency exchange. The study aims to determine the correlation between the daily log-returns and to understand the tendencies in the cryptocurrency market instability of Bitcoin, Litecoin, XRP, Nxt, Dogecoin, Vertcoin, DigiByte, DASH, Counterparty, and MonaCoin. The correlation among the selected cryptocurrencies exists in the study. The analysis is focused primarily upon reference information from the preserved servers of cryptocurrency websites and finance.yahoo.com. This research assesses regular details on the Logarithmic return of Bitcoin, Litecoin, XRP, Nxt, Dogecoin, Vertcoin, DigiByte, DASH, Counterparty, and MonaCoin for a timeframe spanning from October 01st, 2014, to April 30th, 2020. From 131 cryptocurrencies, we considered only 10 Cryptocurrencies due to the availability of data after October 2014. Where there was insufficient information, there were average results determined from preceding and succeeding data. Findings demonstrate that there is GARCH modelling of cryptocurrencies against Bitcoin. Litecoin, XRP, Nxt, Dogecoin, Vertcoin, DigiByte, DASH, Counterparty, and MonaCoin; variability values throughout the duration had a significant effect on the updates from Bitcoin returns. We believe that it helps create information and resources that are valuable to practitioners and scholars who research and form cryptocurrency markets in the future.

Hong Zhang, Hongchang Wang, Amit Mehra, Eric Zheng

No abstract is available for this record.

Tadashi Yamamoto

No abstract is available for this record.

Cristiano Bellavitis, Christian Fisch, Paul P. Momtaz

Blockchain technology and smart contracts are catalysts for decentralization and disintermediation. These new technologies reduce transaction costs, agency costs, and offer a basis for trustless social and economic interactions. They are fueling new business models for decentralized platforms and have revolutionized crowdfunding. A recent trend, Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), stands to fundamentally transform organizing and governance. DAOs are blockchain-native, decentralized organizations that are collectively owned and managed by their members via smart contracts. In this note, we assess the promises and challenges of DAOs, with a focus on decentralized governance and disintermediation, and offer a first empirical glimpse at the rise and functioning of DAOs. Overall, DAOs may introduce a new era in organizational economics, transforming the global corporate landscape from hierarchical organizations to democratic and distributed organizations powered by organizational entrepreneurship and innovations.

J. Yin, Mac Ren

The recently proposed Uniswap v3 replaces the fungible liquidity provider token (LP token) into non-fungible ones, making the design for liquidity mining more difficult. In this paper, we propose a flexible liquidity mining scheme that realizes the overall liquidity distribution through the fine control of local rewards. From the liquidity provider's point of view, the liquidity provision strategy forms a multiplayer zero-sum game. We analyze the Nash Equilibrium and the corresponding strategy, approximately, deploying the liquidity proportional to the reward distribution, in some special cases and use it to guide the general situations. Based on the strategic response above, such a scheme allows the mining rewards provider to optimize the distribution of liquidity for the purpose such as low slippage and price stabilization.

David Gligor, Kishore Gopalakrishna Pillai, İsmail Gölgeci̇

New technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain, and big data analytics, can shape how B2B relationships are managed and how dark side effects are manifested in B2B relationships. Moreover, despite several advances in the dark side of B2B relationships research, concerns have recently been raised that this stream is under theorized, and the focus has been on the manifestations of the dark side and not on the underlying processes. We address these challenges by examining how the emergence of new technologies has the potential to transform B2B relationships and lead to the emergence of dark side effects through processes that have not been hitherto examined or understood. In the process, we further illustrate how theories that have been largely neglected within this literature (i.e., social dominance, organizational inertia, organizational information processing , and role theory) can provide novel insights when exploring the dark side of B2B relationships.