Abstract Blockchain technology is transforming traditional financial systems. Cross-border money remittance industry is in a crossroad being challenged. The traditional SWIFT system is facing new comers like Ripple system which is based on the blockchain distributed ledger technology with its own crypto tokens. This paper conducts a SWOT analysis on both technologies to find out whether the blockchain technology has the potential to transform a traditional industry and how this may be possible. We conclude that Ripple has all of the advantages over SWIFT despite some minor issues. In short-term, SWIFT will still take the lead in the remittance market due to the economy of scale. However, in long-term, emerging technology like Ripple will eventually revolutionize the remittance industry or even other financial systems.
Distributed ledger technology (DLT), commonly referred to as 'blockchain' and originally invented to create a peerto-peer digital currency, is rapidly attracting interest in other sectors. The aim in this paper is (1) to investigate the applications of DLT within the built environment, and the challenges and opportunities facing its adoption; and (2) develop a multi-dimensional emergent framework for DLT adoption within the construction sector.
Sina Rafati Niya, Florian Schüpfer, Thomas Bocek, Burkhard Stiller
Abstract This work introduces the design and implementation of an Android-based Peer-to-peer Purchase and Rental Application termed PuRSCA, which leverages Smart Contracts (SC) and the Ethereum public blockchain (BC). As a Device-to-device (D2D) communication protocol, WiFi-Direct is chosen to enable the P2P data transmission between two parties. This work results in a cost-efficient, secure, SC-based, P2P, and Decentralized application (Dapp). Evaluations on performance of this Dapp is specified in terms of its D2D deployment, transaction costs, scalability, security, and privacy.
Fintech (or financial technology) is the current driving force behind innovations in the financial services industry. One of the most debated innovations is cryptocurrency, or digital currency, which uses blockchain technology to make a direct electronic payment between two people possible, without going through a third party (like a bank) or expensive intermediaries in order to save costs. This future money is pressurising central banks to manage the looming threat of redundancy as it overshadows fiat currency in a world of infinite fintech possibilities. Bitcoin, being the first decentralised cryptocurrency, will be the focus of this research. This digital currency is not produced by minting money in an unlimited supply, but through a virtual mining process designed to control the supply of money and make it more valuable. The increasing pace in financial innovation is pushing regulators to make a change in the way they define money and what money can be. Traditionally money is used to serve as a medium of exchange, legal tender for repayment of debt, standard of value, unit of accounting measure and a means to save or store purchasing power. Bitcoin may not fulfill all the functions of money but its scarcity value, anonymity (or pseudonymity), transparency, and autonomy from the government, make it attractive to users who are speculators, traders, merchants, consumers and netizens disenchanted with fiat money. Despite the alluring features of Bitcoin, it is not spared from potential abuses such as webcrimes, tax evasion, fraud, online black markets, money laundering and terrorism financing. In this paper, a forensic examination of Bitcoins benefits and risks will help regulators decide whether to adopt cryptocurrency and provide an appropriate framework to regulate it based on other jurisdictions approach. This paper recommends that Malaysia should fully embrace cryptocurrency due to global trends - the Islamic Development Bank is developing Shariah compliant contracts using blockchain technology; China is leading the drive to develop its own national cryptocurrency to complement fiat money; and a Shariah-compliant cryptocurrency has already entered the market backed by gold (Onegram). Financial and regulatory architectures in Malaysia should accommodate these changes to remain relevant. In addition, future research is recommended focusing on developing a Shariah compliant national cryptocurrency that is unique to Malaysia.
JT Hamrick, Farhang Rouhi, Arghya Mukherjee, Amir Feder · 7 authors
The surge of interest in cryptocurrencies has been accompanied by a proliferation of fraud. This paper examines a pervasive tactic long known to financial markets: pump and dump schemes. While the fundamentals of the ruse have not changed in the last century, the recent explosion of nearly 2, 000 cryptocurrencies in a largely unregulated environment has greatly expanded the scope for abuse. The paper first quantifies the scope of cryptocurrency pump and dump on Discord and Telegram, two widely popular group messaging platforms with 130 million users and 200 million users respectively. Both platforms can handle large groups with thousands of users, and they are the most popular outlets for pump and dump schemes involving cryptocurrencies. We identified 3, 767 different pump signals advertised on Telegram and another 1, 051 different pump signals advertised on Discord during a six-month period in 2018. The schemes promoted more than 300 cryptocurrencies. These comprehensive data provide the first measure of the scope of pump and dump schemes across cryptocurrencies and suggest that this phenomenon is widespread and often quite profitable. This should raise concerns among regulators. We then examine which factors that affect the "success" of the pump, as measured by the percentage increase in price near the pump signal. We find that the coin's rank (market capitalization/volume) is the most important factor in determining the profitability of the pump: pumping obscure coins (with low volume) is much more profitable than pumping the dominant coins in the ecosystem.
Decentralised issued crypto "currencies", like bitcoin, have the potential to drastically change the existing retail payment system and even the monetary system. Insights into the factors that influence their adoption are therefore crucial. Using a large representative sample of retailers that sell their products online, we find that acceptance of crypto payments is currently modest (2%), but there is substantial interest among retailers to adopt crypto payments in the near future. Consumer demand, net transactional benefits and perceived adoption effort influence adoption intention and actual acceptance by retailers. Regarding non-financial factors, our findings suggest that service providers who act as intermediaries between retailers, their customers, and providers of payment instruments play a crucial role as facilitators of competition and innovation in the online retail payments market by lowering such barriers. The most serious barrier for crypto acceptance seems to be a lack of consumer demand. Information from consumers indicate that those who possess cryptos, don't use it for online payments. It seems therefore unlikely that the adoption of cryptos by retailers will increase substantially, making it highly unlikely that cryptos like bitcoin will drastically change the existing retail payment system.
Implementing smart contracts to automate the performance of high-value over-the-counter (OTC) financial derivatives is a formidable challenge. Due to the regulatory framework and the scale of financial risk if a contract were to go wrong, the performance of these contracts must be enforceable in law and there is an absolute requirement that the smart contract will be faithful to the intentions of the parties as expressed in the original legal documentation. Formal methods provide an attractive route for validation and assurance, and here we present early results from an investigation of the semantics of industry-standard legal documentation for OTC derivatives. We explain the need for a formal representation that combines temporal, deontic and operational aspects, and focus on the requirements for the temporal aspects as derived from the legal text. The relevance of this work extends beyond OTC derivatives and is applicable to understanding the temporal semantics of a wide range of legal documentation.
Governments across the world are testing different uses of the blockchain for the delivery of their public services. Blockchain hashing–or the insertion of data in the blockchain–is one of the potential applications of the blockchain in this space. With this method, users can apply special scripts to add their data to blockchain transactions, ensuring both immutability and publicity. Blockchain hashing also secures the integrity of the original data stored on central governmental databases. The paper starts by analysing possible scenarios of hashing on the blockchain and assesses in which cases it may work and in which it is less likely to add value to a public administration. Second, the paper also compares this method with traditional digital signatures using PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) and discusses standardisation in each domain. Third, it also addresses issues related with concepts such as “distributed ledger technology” and “permissioned blockchains.” Finally, it raises the question of whether blockchain hashing is an effective solution for electronic governance, and concludes that its value is controversial, even if it is improved by PKI and other security measures. In this regard, we claim that governments need first to identify pain points in governance, and then consider the trade-offs of the blockchain as a potential solution versus other alternatives.
The authors discuss several uses of blockchain and, more generally, distributed ledger technologies outside of cryptocurrencies. They take a pragmatic view, focusing on three main areas: the role of coin economies for “data malls” (specialized data marketplaces), data provenance (a historical record of data and its origins), and “keyless payments,” which are payments that can be made without having to know other users’ cryptographic keys. They also discuss voting and other areas and give a sizable list of academic and nonacademic references. <b>TOPICS:</b>Currency, quantitative methods
At the beginning of 2018, there is a growing belief that blockchain technologies constitute a revolutionary innovation in how we transfer value electronically. In that vein, blockchain may be a suitable complement to ontologies to achieve a big part of the vision of the semantic Web by Tim Berners-Lee. We believe that if this complementarity is to be achieved blockchain and ontologies must co-evolve. In this paper, we focus on what and how to engineer models, methods, designs, and implementations for this co-evolution. As a first step in this co-evolution, we propose a conceptual design of a governance ontology represented as meta-data tags to be embedded and instantiated in a smart contract at the blockchain protocol level. We develop this design by examining and analyzing smart contracts from the infamous The DAO experiment on the Ethereum blockchain. We believe there are two contributions of this paper: it serves to inform and implore the blockchain and ontology communities to recognize and collaborate with each other; and it outlines a roadmap for engineering artifacts to bridge the gap between blockchain community focus on protocol-level blockchain interoperability and the ontology community focus on semantic-level interoperability.
The invention of crypto-currencies as an online means of transactions has lured many IT companies, freelancers and coders to this new form of currency. Nakamoto’s consensus protocol and the invention of the idea behind the blockchain network have given a new platform for this exchange to take place. The growth of blockchain can be accounted by the fact that in 2017, the total global market capital of blockchain based tokens was reported to have reached over $150B. This growth in online transactions and crypto-currencies has invited researchers and developers to work on increasing the efficiency and security of this system. This paper revolves around the 2 hop blockchain model to increase the efficiency and reduce the physical resource requirements of the system. This paper describes the shift from proof of stake (PoS) to proof of authority (PoA) in the 2 hop model proposed by Tuyet Duong. Proof of authority guarantees safety and faster working of the system by using identity as a proof to validate blocks in the blockchain network. This paper also discusses the shortcomings of proof of work (PoW) and proof of stake models. A sequential execution of PoW and PoA is suggested as an alternative in this paper.
Besides simple transfers of currency, Bitcoin also enables various forms of smart contracts, i.e. protocols where users interact within pre-agreed rules, which determine (possibly depending on the actual interaction) how currency is eventually distributed. This paper provides a gentle introduction to Bitcoin smart contracts, which we specify by abstracting from the underlying Bitcoin machinery. To this purpose we exploit BitML, a recent DSL for smart contracts executable on Bitcoin.
Now that you are proficient in smart contract development using Solidity, let’s deploy a contract on an Ethereum network. Deployment can be done in many ways. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
The interrelatedness between computer systems, networks, code, and traditional law and legal frameworks continues to pose a number of important and vexed questions. This report will consider one area of the relationship: legal recognition of distributed ledger technology (DLT) or blockchain applications. Specifically, registers appended to blockchains (thereby creating “blockchain registries”), and “smart contracts” executed on blockchains
Shaen Corbet, Brian M. Lucey, Andrew Urquhart, Larisa Yarovaya
This paper provides a systematic review of the empirical literature based on the major topics that have been associated with the market for cryptocurrencies since their development \nas a financial asset in 2009. Despite astonishing price appreciation in recent years, cryptocurrencies have been subjected to accusations of pricing bubbles central to the trilemma \nthat exists between regulatory oversight, the potential for illicit use through its anonymity \nwithin a young under-developed exchange system, and infrastructural breaches influenced \nby the growth of cybercriminality. Each influence the perception of the role of cryptocurrencies as a credible investment asset class and legitimate of value.
Yunhua He, Hong Li, Xiuzhen Cheng, Yan Liu · 6 authors
In distributed peer-to-peer (P2P) applications, peers self-organize and cooperate to effectively complete certain tasks such as forwarding files, delivering messages, or uploading data. Nevertheless, users are selfish in nature and they may refuse to cooperate due to their concerns on energy and bandwidth consumption. Thus each user should receive a satisfying reward to compensate its resource consumption for cooperation. However, suitable incentive mechanisms that can meet the diverse requirements of users in dynamic and distributed P2P environments are still missing. On the other hand, we observe that Blockchain is a decentralized secure digital ledger of economic transactions that can be programmed to record not just financial transactions and Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies get more and more market capitalization. Therefore in this paper, we propose a Blockchain based truthful incentive mechanism for distributed P2P applications that applies a cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin to incentivize users for cooperation. In this mechanism, users who help with a successful delivery get rewarded. As users and miners in the Blockchain P2P system may exhibit selfish actions or collude with each other, we propose a secure validation method and a pricing strategy, and integrate them into our incentive mechanism. Through a game theoretical analysis and evaluation study, we demonstrate the effectiveness and security strength of our proposed incentive mechanism.