Today, financial system and all its services are completely centralized. Banks, exchanges, insurance companies and other financial institutions have someone in charge that controls these services. This centralized financial system, or CeFi, has its own risks. What if we decentralized the financial system in the same way that Bitcoin decentralized money?
One of the benefits of decentralized finance (DeFi) – an alternative financial system built on blockchain – is composability, which means the system's building blocks (tokens) can freely interact with one another to form new services. One example is stablecoin, a token with fixed exchange rate, which is backed by token collaterals. While stablecoins can be used to facilitate payments and exchanges, in DeFi they can be used to earn returns (“yield farming†), potentially multiplicatively. We use transaction-level blockchain data to analyze a stablecoin's flows between protocols and provide suggestive evidence of DeFi yield-chasing behavior. We shed light on what DeFi total value locked might really measure and highlight the complexity in DeFi analysis and market surveillance.
Bank runs are a natural phenomenon for financial institutions that issue fixed value liabilities (e.g. money) that are backed by assets with uncertain value. I analyze Iron Finance, a decentralized finance (DeFi) protocol that issues stablecoin (a token with fixed nominal exchange rate: IRON) liabilities in exchange for a basket of other tokens (including a token issued by the protocol itself: TITAN). A combination of mathematical algorithms and incentive to arbitrage is used to maintain the exchange rate peg, but a shock to the protocol sent it into a downward spiral – much like a bank run. The incentives built into the protocol to defend the peg exacerbated its unravelling, raising the challenge of how DeFi protocols can address this vulnerability while remaining decentralized.
Depending on the chosen perspective, cryptocurrencies either constitute a unique opportunity to end national patronizing built on debt-based fiat money (currency) or a menace to a well-established financial order that ensures economic stability. A central issue in the heated debate surrounding cryptocurrencies is whether they have any intrinsic value at all. In this conceptual position paper, we briefly summarize existing standpoints and suggest three alternative propositions: (1) to avoid using the term “intrinsic value” for the valuation of cryptocurrencies, (2) to refer to the sum total of all properties that could potentially qualify them as money, and (3) to consider the amount of capital and energy that is needed to create them. These suggestions bear substantial implications for the economic classification of cryptocurrencies.
Uniswap is a decentralized exchange (DEX) and was first launched on November 2, 2018 on the Ethereum mainnet [1] and is part of an Ecosystem of products in Decentralized Finance (DeFi). It replaces a traditional order book type of trading common on centralized exchanges (CEX) with a deterministic model that swaps currencies (or tokens/assets) along a fixed price function determined by the amount of currencies supplied by the liquidity providers. Liquidity providers can be regarded as investors in the decentralized exchange and earn fixed commissions per trade. They lock up funds in liquidity pools for distinct pairs of currencies allowing market participants to swap them using the fixed price function. Liquidity providers take on market risk as a liquidity provider in exchange for earning commissions on each trade. Here we analyze the risk profile of a liquidity provider and the so called impermanent (unrealized) loss in particular. We provide an improved version of the commonly denoted impermanent loss function for Uniswap v2 on the semi-infinite domain. The differences between Uniswap v2 and v3 are also discussed.
Christian Catalini, Alonso de Gortari, Nihar B. Shah
Stablecoins have the potential to drastically increase competition and innovation in financial services by reducing our reliance on traditional intermediaries. But they also introduce new challenges, as regulators rely on intermediaries to ensure financial stability, market integrity, and consumer protection. Because they operate at the interface between traditional banking and cryptocurrencies, stablecoins also represent an ideal setting for understanding the key trade-offs cryptocurrencies involve, and insights from robust stablecoin design and regulation are highly relevant for related innovations in decentralized finance (DeFi), nonfungible tokens, and Web3 protocols. In this review, we describe the following: key stablecoin design choices, from reserve composition to stability mechanism; legal claim against the issuer; noninterference with macroeconomic stability; and interoperability with public sector payment rails and central bank digital currencies. Last, we cover the key benefits of stablecoins in the context of real-time, low-cost programmable payments, financial inclusion, and DeFi.
Permissionless blockchains offer an information environment where users can interact privately without fear of censorship. Financial services can be programmatically coded via smart contracts to automate transactions without the need for human intervention or knowing user identity. This new paradigm is known as decentralized finance (DeFi). We investigate Compound (a leading DeFi lending protocol) to show how it works in this novel information environment, who its users are, and what factors determine their participation. On-chain transaction data shows that loan durations are short (31 days on average), and many users borrow to support leveraged investment strategies (yield farming). We show that systemic risk in DeFi arises from concentration and interconnection, and how traditional risk management practices can be challenging for DeFi.
During the global financial crisis in 2008, trust in established financial intermediaries declined sharply. In reaction, blockchain technology was developed as an alternative system to facilitate financial transactions devoid of intermediaries. The application of blockchain in the financial sector brought a new paradigm called Decentralized Finance. Employing a modified technology acceptance model, our study aims at examining the relationship of distrust in financial intermediaries and consumer’s behavioral intention to use Decentralized Finance. Even though this relationship is well-documented regarding the motivation of the development of blockchain technology, as well as in cases of unstable financial systems, empirical data from our survey research does not support this relationship in the context of consumer adoption. Our study contributes to the theory on the foundations of DeFi and the impact of blockchain technology, which must be revised by future research. Further, we propose a trust paradox in the financial sector.
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) offers the promise of an emergent alternative financial architecture that prioritizes disintermediation and decentralization to empower individuals along cryptoanarchist principles. Yet it is mired in considerable difficulties including market manipulation, distortionary incentives, excess short-termism, Ponzi-schemes, and money-laundering challenges that also foment a considerable level of dissuasion against DeFi’s wider adoption. This paper critically evaluates many of these important facets at a time when DeFi is emerging as a disintermediated and experimental financial praxis.
Bitcoin was conceptualized in response to perceived shortcomings in the monetary and financialsystem, not only related to large financial institutions but also to discretionary decision makingin monetary policy. Using high-frequency data and a weekly proxy VAR model, I study theimpact of monetary policy on Bitcoin. The paper shows that monetary shocks have sizableeffects on Bitcoin prices, but that these differ in sign: a disinflationary monetary tightening bythe ECB lowers valuations - consistent with the notion of Bitcoin as a digital gold -, whereasa Fed tightening increases Bitcoin prices. I document similar differences with respect to cen-tral bank information shocks and explore potential explanations by studying various aspects ofthe Bitcoin ecosystem. Exploiting both differences in Bitcoin valuations across currencies andblockchain transaction data, the paper shows that the increased demand for Bitcoin following aUS monetary tightening is primarily driven by emerging markets. I argue that this likely reflectsthe technological and institutional particularities of Bitcoin that make it sought after as globaldigital cashwhen international economic and financial conditions deteriorate.
Abstract We address the determination of bitcoin prices and decentralized security. Users forecast the transactional and resale values of holdings, pricing the risk of systemic attacks. Miners contribute resources to protect against attackers and compete for block rewards. Bitcoin’s design leads to multiple equilibria: the same blockchain technology is consistent with sharply different price and security levels. Bitcoin’s monetary policy can lead to welfare losses and deviations from quantity theory. Price-security feedback amplifies fundamental shocks’ volatility impact and leads to boom and busts unconnected to fundamentals. We characterize how viability versus fiat currency depends on bitcoin’s relative acceptability and inflation protection.
Multiagent incentive contracts are advanced techniques for solving decentralized decision-making problems with asymmetric information. The principal designs contracts aiming to incentivize non-cooperating agents to act in his or her interest. Due to the asymmetric information, the principal must balance the efficiency loss and the security for keeping the agents. We prove both the existence conditions for optimality and the uniqueness conditions for computational tractability. The coupled principal-agent problems are converted to solving a Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation with equilibrium constraints. Extending the incentive contract to a multiagent setting with history-dependent terminal conditions opens the door to new applications in corporate finance, institutional design, and operations research.
EIP-1559 is a proposal to make several tightly coupled additions to\nEthereum's transaction fee mechanism, including variable-size blocks and a\nburned base fee that rises and falls with demand. This report assesses the\ngame-theoretic strengths and weaknesses of the proposal and explores some\nalternative designs.\n
Uncertainties might compel many investors to hedge by buying globally traded assets, such as Bitcoin, which has also been used as a means of payment in several countries. Bitcoin does not originate from any centralized authority and cannot entirely be controlled; therefore, Bitcoin usage might potentially pose issues to the monetary authorities within a country. This paper analyzes the effect of both global and domestic uncertainty on Bitcoin's demand in Indonesia. Our result suggests that Bitcoin is used for hedging against uncertainties. The monetary policy implications of our results are also discussed.
The technologies underlying money and payment systems are evolving rapidly. Both the emergence of distributed ledger technology (DLT) and rapid advances in traditional centralised systems are moving the technological horizon of money and payments. These trends are embodied in private "stablecoins": cryptocurrencies with values tied to fiat currencies or other assets. Stablecoins - in particular potential "global stablecoins" such as Facebook's Libra proposal - pose a range of challenges from the standpoint of financial authorities around the world. At the same time, regulatory responses to global stablecoins should take into account the potential of other stablecoin uses, such as embedding a robust monetary instrument into digital environments, especially in the context of decentralised systems. Looking forward, in such cases, one possible option from a regulatory standpoint is to embed supervisory requirements into stablecoin systems themselves, allowing for "embedded supervision". Yet it is an open question whether central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and other initiatives could in fact provide more effective solutions to fulfil the functions that stablecoins are meant to address.