A blockchain-based decentralized application (DApp) refers to an application typically using web pages or mobile applications as the front-end and smart contracts as the back-end. The front-end of the DApp helps users generate transactions and send them to the user’s blockchain wallet. After the user signs and confirms the transaction using the blockchain wallet, the transaction will invoke the smart contract of the DApp. However, users bear the following risks when using DApps because of the potential inconsistent behaviors in DApps. First, the DApp front-end may generate incorrect transactions inconsistent with users’ intentions. Second, the smart contract may have misbehaviors when executing the transactions. Inconsistent behaviors of DApps not only lead to user confusion but also cause significant financial losses. In this paper, we proposed a novel approach to identify inconsistent behaviors of DApps on EVM-compatible blockchains by contrasting the behaviors of DApps that derived from the front-end, blockchain wallet, and smart contracts, respectively. We implemented our approach into a prototype named DAppHunter. We have applied DAppHunter on 92 real-world DApps of Ethereum and Binance Smart Chain and successfully identified 37 DApps with inconsistent behaviors. We confirmed that 35 of them are scam DApps and over 5 million blockchain addresses are at risk of becoming victims of these inconsistent DApps.
Decentralized apps (DApps) often hold significant cryptocurrency assets. In order to manage these assets and coordinate joint investments, shareholders leverage the underlying smart contract functionality to realize a transparent, verifiable, and secure decision-making process. That is, DApps implement proposal-based voting. Permissionless blockchains, however, lead to a conflict between transparency and anonymity; potentially preventing free decision-making if individual votes and intermediate results become public. In this paper, we therefore present Tornado Vote, a voting DApp for anonymous, fair, and practical voting on the Ethereum blockchain. We propose to use a cryptocurrency mixer such as Tornado Cash to reconcile transparency and anonymity. To this end, we adapt Tornado Cash and develop a voting protocol that implements a fair voting process. While Tornado Vote can technically process 10 k votes on Ethereum in approximately two hours, this is not feasible under realistic conditions: Third-party transactions on the Ethereum Mainnet reduce the possible throughput, and transaction fees make it infeasible to use all available block capacities. We therefore present various Gas cost models that yield lower bounds and economic estimations with respect to the required number of blocks and voting costs to assess and adjust Tornado Vote's feasibility trade-off.
Decentralizing crowdsourcing using blockchain removes the trusted mediator who may cause social biases in data aggregation and uncertainties in ensuring proper rewards to workers. Permissionless blockchain discloses all data on public ledgers, which compromises the privacy and anonymity of workers and induces free-riders. State-of-the-art anonymous crowdsourcing systems enable anonymity through identity registration of workers and a trusted setup for key generation. However, these systems fail to support anonymous payments to workers, which may compromise the identities of workers. In this paper, we incorporate anonymous payments in crowdsourcing and dispense with identity registration and trusted setup to support open anonymous participation from any worker. Our solution is based on the decentralized anonymous payment systems (e.g., Zerocoin), commitment schemes, and efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs.
Sacha Servan-Schreiber, Simon Beyzerov, Eli Yablon, Hyojae Park
Function Secret Sharing (FSS; Eurocrypt 2015) allows a dealer to share a function f with two or more evaluators. Given secret shares of a function f, the evaluators can locally compute secret shares of f (x) for any input x, without learning information about f in the process.In this paper, we initiate the study of access control for FSS. Given the shares of f, the evaluators can ensure that the dealer is authorized to share the provided function. For a function family $\mathcal{F}$ and an access control list defined over the family, the evaluators receiving the shares of $f \in \mathcal{F}$ can efficiently check that the dealer knows the access key for f.This model enables new applications of FSS, such as: (1) anonymous authentication in a multi-party setting, (2) access control in private databases, and (3) authentication and spam prevention in anonymous communication systems.Our definitions and constructions abstract and improve the concrete efficiency of several recent systems that implement ad-hoc mechanisms for access control over FSS. The main building block behind our efficiency improvement is a discrete-logarithm zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge over secret-shared elements, which may be of independent interest.We evaluate our constructions and show a 50–70× reduction in computational overhead compared to existing access control techniques used in anonymous communication. In other applications, such as private databases, the processing cost of introducing access control is only 1.5–3×, when amortized over databases with 500,000 or more items.
The biased distribution of cryptocurrency nodes across Autonomous Systems (ASes) increases the risk of spatial partitioning attacks, allowing an adversary to isolate nodes by hijacking AS prefixes. Prior works on spatial partitioning attacks have mainly focused on the Bitcoin network, showing that the prominent cryptocurrency network can be paralyzed by disrupting the physical topology through BGP hijacks.Despite the persisting threat of BGP hijacks, Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have not been frequently targeted, likely due to their shielded overlay topology, which limits the exposure of physical network anomalies. In this paper, we present a new perspective by examining the security of cryptocurrency networks, considering shared network resources (network interdependence). We conduct measurements extending beyond the Bitcoin network and analyze commonalities in Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Ripple node hosting patterns. We observe that all three networks are highly centralized, predominantly sharing the common ASes. We also note that among the three cryptocurrencies, Ripple does not shield its overlay topology, which can be exploited to learn about the physical network anomalies. The observed network anomalies present practical attack strategies that can be launched to target all three cryptocurrencies simultaneously.1We supplement our analysis by surveying recent BGP attacks on high-profile ASes and recognizing a need for application-level countermeasures. We propose attack countermeasures that reduce the risk of spatial partitioning, notwithstanding the increasing centralization of nodes and network interdependence.
Michael L. Rosenberg, Jacob White, Christina Garman, Ian Miers
Frequently, users on the web need to show that they are, for example, not a robot, old enough to access an age restricted video, or eligible to download an ebook from their local public library without being tracked. Anonymous credentials were developed to address these concerns. However, existing schemes do not handle the realities of deployment or the complexities of real-world identity. Instead, they implicitly make assumptions such as there being an issuing authority for anonymous credentials that, for real applications, requires the local department of motor vehicles to issue sophisticated cryptographic tokens to show users are over 18. In reality, there are multiple trust sources for a given identity attribute, their credentials have distinctively different formats, and many, if not all, issuers are unwilling to adopt new protocols.We present and build zk-creds, a protocol that uses general-purpose zero-knowledge proofs to 1) remove the need for credential issuers to hold signing keys: credentials can be issued to a bulletin board instantiated as a transparency log, Byzantine system, or even a blockchain; 2) convert existing identity documents into anonymous credentials without modifying documents or coordinating with their issuing authority; 3) allow for flexible, composable, and complex identity statements over multiple credentials. Concretely, identity assertions using zk-creds take less than 150ms in a real-world scenario of using a passport to anonymously access age-restricted videos.
Payment Channel Hub (PCH) is a promising solution to the scalability issue of first-generation blockchains or cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. It supports off-chain payments between a sender and a receiver through an intermediary (called the tumbler). Relationship anonymity and value privacy are desirable features of privacy-preserving PCHs, which prevent the tumbler from identifying the sender and receiver pairs as well as the payment amounts. To our knowledge, all existing Bitcoin-compatible PCH constructions that guarantee relationship anonymity allow only a (predefined) fixed payment amount. Thus, to achieve payments with different amounts, they would require either multiple PCH systems or running one PCH system multiple times. Neither of these solutions would be deemed practical.In this paper, we propose the first Bitcoin-compatible PCH that achieves relationship anonymity and supports variable amounts for payment. To achieve this, we have several layers of technical constructions, each of which could be of independent interest to the community. First, we propose BlindChannel, a novel bi-directional payment channel protocol for privacy-preserving payments, where one of the channel parties is unable to see the channel balances. Then, we further propose BlindHub, a three-party (sender, tumbler, receiver) protocol for private conditional payments, where the tumbler pays to the receiver only if the sender pays to the tumbler. The appealing additional feature of BlindHub is that the tumbler cannot link the sender and the receiver while supporting a variable payment amount. To construct BlindHub, we also introduce two new cryptographic primitives as building blocks, namely Blind Adaptor Signature (BAS), and Flexible Blind Conditional Signature (FBCS). BAS is an adaptor signature protocol built on top of a blind signature scheme. FBCS is a new cryptographic notion enabling us to provide an atomic and privacy-preserving PCH. Lastly, we instantiate both BlindChannel and BlindHub protocols and present implementation results to show their practicality.
Voting is an important procedure in democratic societies in different countries, including Iraq. Electronic voting (E-voting) is becoming more prevalent due to reducing administrative costs and burdens. E-voting systems have many restrictions that affect the electoral process. For example, fraud, tampering with ballot boxes, taking many hours to announce results, and the difficulty of reaching polling stations. Over the last decade, blockchain and smart contract technologies have gained widespread adoption in various sectors, such as cryptocurrencies, finance, banking, and most notably in e-voting systems. If utilized properly, the developer demonstrates properties that are promising for their properties, such as security, privacy, transparency, and decentralization. Moreover, these technologies allow citizens to vote wherever they are via digital technology (computers, smartphones). This paper explains the nature of blockchain and smart contracts and systematically reviews several important e-voting studies. Comparative analysis is conducted on recent related papers in the last five years (published in highly ranked journals and international conferences) regarding blockchain types, frameworks, security requirements, and the implemented algorithms.
Voting is an essential component of democratic regimes because it allows every member of a community to express their opinions. Voter turnout has decreased recently, while worries about the reliability, security, and accessibility of the current voting technologies have grown. Voting was introduced to address those concerns, however, it still requires full supervision by a central authority. The blockchain is an emerging, decentralized, and distributed technology. A shared, distributed record of all finished transactions or digital activities between all parties involved. Each vote is viewed as a separate transaction in this instance. We store voting transactions on a private blockchain that is built using a peer-to-peer network. Voting specifics are abstracted from the user by programming of this application. While system is running, users will have adequate time to cast their votes. This study is about (decentralized voting system) that protects voters privacy while maintaining transparency and security. The system has three implementation layers: a user interface for voters to register and vote a smart contract and MetaMask wallet for automatic vote transactions on the Ethereum blockchain, and an administrator function for managing the election. The smart contract is programmed to check for registration and validity, and once deployed on the blockchain, it cannot be tampered with. The administrator adds candidate information and manages the election.
Bitcoin transactions include unspent transaction outputs (UTXOs) as their inputs and generate one or more newly owned UTXOs at specified addresses. Each U TXO can only be used as an input in a transaction once, and using it in two or more different transactions is referred to as a double-spending attack. Ultimately, due to the characteristics of the Bitcoin protocol, double-spending is impossible. However, problems may arise when a transaction is considered final even though i ts finality has not been fully guaranteed in order to achieve fast payment. In this paper, we propose an approach to detecting Bitcoin double-spending attacks using a graph neural network (GNN). This model predicts whether all nodes in the network contain a given payment transaction in their own memory pool (mempool) using information only obtained from some observer nodes in the network. Our experiment shows that the proposed model can detect double-spending with an accuracy of at least 0.95 when more than about 1% of the entire nodes in the network are observer nodes.
R. A. Zamare, Pramey Deshmukh, Chinmay Gulhane, Mohd Meeran Iqbal · 6 authors
The use of E-Voting systems has become popular in these recent years due to the ability of Blockchain environment to provide a more efficient and convenient voting process. Earlier, the security and integrity of e-voting systems has been very concerning, as they are vulnerable to cyber-attacks and manipulation. On the contrary, Blockchain technology provides a decentralized and distributed platform that can ensure the integrity and immutability of data. This research paper proposes an e-voting system based on blockchain technology. The proposed system aims to provide a secure, transparent, and tamper-proof voting process. The system utilizes smart contracts, which automates the voting processes and ensures the accuracy of the results. The system also provides transparency and accuracy, allowing voters to verify their vote and ensuring that the results are accurate and trustworthy. The proposed system will be tested and evaluated to determine its effectiveness and feasibility. The evaluation will focus on the security, scalability, and usability of the system. The security evaluation will test the system's ability to prevent attacks and ensure the confidentiality of the votes. The scalability evaluation will test the system's ability to handle a large number of voters and transactions. The usability evaluation will test the ease of use and accessibility of the system for all types of voters
Open access
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
With the development of science and technology, the traditional centralized ballot management will lead to the risk of an opaque voting process and tampering of back-end data, and it can no longer meet the requirements of e-voting transparency and anonymity, while the distributed blockchain technology, with its features of being transparent and tamper-proof, can well solve the problems in traditional e-voting and make the ballot firmly in the hands of users. To make each node reach consensus, each node can access the complete shared ledger, and malicious nodes can analyze the transaction information in the ledger to obtain users’ voting information, which makes anonymity impossible to guarantee. We propose a blockchain technology-based voting record synchronization model and an anonymous authentication model, using zk-SNARK and Merkle tree technology, that achieve user authentication and anonymous voting. In this scheme, the user’s random identity address is inserted into the Merkle tree, and when voting, it is only necessary to prove that the user’s identity address is in the tree to complete anonymous voting without revealing the user’s real identity. This scheme meets the basic requirements of electronic voting and ensures the reliability and security of voting.
Open access
Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
As a promising Internet censorship circumvention technique, refraction networks have attracted the wide attention of researchers in recent years. However, it remains a crucial issue to be tackled, i.e., how to motivate more service providers, known as decoy routers, and clients to join refraction networks, especially with guaranteed security and privacy. To address the issue, we develop a decentralized service auction framework based on the blockchain constructed through clients and decoy routers. Further, we design a multi-stage service auction (MSSA) smart contract composed of multiple functions and events, which are triggered and executed autonomously to complete the tasks, including registration, double auction, first-price sealed auction, and payment clearing. Moreover, we implement the designed MSSA smart contract in the Remix integrated development environment and run a test case on Ethereum virtual machines. The experiment results verify the modest gas and ether cost of the smart contract-based solution and its effectiveness.
As the first blockchain platform to support smart contracts, Ethereum has gained popularity and breeds various cybercrimes. Many phishing accounts on Ethereum take advantage of the blockchain’s anonymity to participate in illegal acts. To this end, to solve the transaction security problem caused by phishing accounts on Ethereum, this brief proposes a network embedding-based phishing account detection model. Firstly, we crawl the history of transactions from both labeled phishing and non-phishing accounts and use a new method to build these transactions as a transaction network, where each transaction edge is accompanied by additional transaction information for all source nodes of the target node. Then we propose a new random walk-based network embedding algorithm named bias2vec to obtain the embeddings of nodes as the feature inputs. Finally, we classify the accounts into phishing and non-phishing ones by different classifiers such as lightGBM and XGBoost. Experiments show that our proposed phishing account detection model achieves effective detection performance under different classifiers.
Threshold signatures are a fundamental cryptographic primitive used in many practical applications. As proposed by Boneh and Komlo (CRYPTO'22), TAPS is a threshold signature that is a hybrid of privacy and accountability. It enables a combiner to combine t signature shares while revealing nothing about the threshold t or signing quorum to the public and asks a tracer to track a signature to the quorum that generates it. However, TAPS has three disadvantages: it 1) structures upon a centralized model, 2) assumes that both combiner and tracer are honest, and 3) leaves the tracing unnotarized and static. In this work, we introduce Decentralized, Threshold, dynamically Accountable and Private Signature (DeTAPS) that provides decentralized combining and tracing, enhanced privacy against untrusted combiners (tracers), and notarized and dynamic tracing. Specifically, we adopt Dynamic Threshold Public-Key Encryption (DTPKE) to dynamically notarize the tracing process, design non-interactive zero knowledge proofs to achieve public verifiability of notaries, and utilize the Key-Aggregate Searchable Encryption to bridge TAPS and DTPKE so as to awaken the notaries securely and efficiently. In addition, we formalize the definitions and security requirements for DeTAPS. Then we present a generic construction and formally prove its security and privacy. To evaluate the performance, we build a prototype based on SGX2 and Ethereum.
N. Krishnamoorthy, Shakthi Murugan K H, C. Gnanaprakasam, M. Swarna · 5 authors
Voting is the primary right to every citizen and that should be loyal enough to select a correct leader to the respective country. Every person has the duty to choose the proper leader for their nation by exercising their fundamental right to vote. When voting at a polling place that uses paper ballots, citizens must be present in order to deposit their vote. The vast majority of people throughout the world has neglected this need and has avoided doing their civic responsibility. In these cases, electronic voting systems are generally viewed as a viable option. The challenge here is protecting voters' privacy and ensuring their votes get to the right people. This study presented Blockchain Assisted Enhanced Cyber Norms (BAECN), a revolutionary electronic voting system that ensures voters' ballots are cast accurately and without delay. One possible answer is Blockchain technology, which uses a distributed ledger in which many people share ownership of the data. The Bitcoin protocol, also referred as the decentralized Banking network, has incorporated Blockchain technology. To perform a transaction or carry out a transaction over the Blockchain network, gas is the charge that must be paid. One kind of voter fraud in electronic voting systems can be mitigated by the use of Blockchain: the redistribution of voter registration data. The proposed methodology, on the other hand, offers a revolutionary online voting mechanism built on Blockchain technology, which fixes all the issues that were found. This research describes the findings of a real-world use of Blockchain technology implementation of a smart-contracts application that increases election security while also lowering associated costs.
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
In this work, we provide a comprehensive survey of smart contract upgradability patterns using proxies. A primary characteristic of smart contracts on the Ethereum blockchain is that they are immutable once implemented, no changes can be made. Taking human error into account, as well as technology improvements and newly discovered vulnerabilities, there has been a need to upgrade these smart contracts, which may hold enormous amounts of Ether and hence become the target of attacks. Several such attacks have caused tremendous losses in the past, as well as millions of dollars in Ether which has been locked away in broken contracts. Thus far we have collected many upgradable proxy patterns and studied their features to build a comprehensive catalog of patterns. We present a summary of these upgradable proxy patterns which we collected and studied. We scraped the source code for approximately 100000 verified contracts from Etherscan.io, the most popular block explorer for Ethereum, out of which we extracted around 64k unique files - most containing multiple contracts. We have begun to automate the analysis of these contracts using the popular static analysis tool Slither, while at the same time implementing much more robust detection of upgradable proxies using this framework. Comparing the results of the original implementation to our own, we have found that approximately 70 percent of the contracts which were initially flagged as upgradeable proxies are false positives which we have eliminated.
An eclipse attack is a sort of cyberattack in which attackers aim to isolate a local node on blockchain network layers and eclipse its connections from neighbor nodes. Detection of eclipse attacks is challenging because there is no dataset that can be used as input features for machine learning algorithms to make predictions. In addition, most of the network traffic is normal, but very few network traffic is eclipse network traffic. This condition is an unequal distribution of classes, which is considered an imbalanced dataset. At the same time, the boundary of normal and eclipse network traffic cannot be considered independent, which is regarded as overlapping sample data. To cope with these challenges, this paper introduces a new approach to distinguish normal and eclipse network traffic on the Ethereum network layers. To obtain datasets, an eclipse attack environment is established and launched on the real Ethereum blockchain platforms. Network traffic is captured under three conditions; before the eclipse attacks are launched, while the eclipse codes are launched, and after the eclipse attacks are launched. The collected data considered imbalanced and overlapped data is used as input datasets for iForest algorithms to learn and construct the principal profile of the eclipse network traffic. At the same time, a Dynamic Weighted Entropy algorithm is deployed to measure and enhance the quality of the overlapping subset generated by the iForest algorithms from the original dataset. Finally, the overlapping subset is used as an input feature for the Random Forest algorithm to distinguish eclipse network traffic from normal network traffic. This paper lays the groundwork for implementing an efficient mechanism to detect eclipse attacks in Ethereum network layers.
Internet of things (IoT) development tends to reduce the reliance on centralized servers. The zero-trust distributed system combined with blockchain technology has become a hot topic in IoT research. However, distribution data storage services and different blockchain protocols make network interoperability and cross-platform more complex. Relay chain is a promising cross-chain technology that solves the complexity and compatibility issues associated with blockchain cross-chain transactions by utilizing relay blockchains as cross-chain connectors. Yet relay chain cross-chain transactions need to collect asset information and implement asset transactions via two-way peg. Due to the release of user transaction information, there is the issue of privacy leakage. In this article, we propose a cross-chain privacy protection protocol based on the Groth16 zero-knowledge proof algorithm and coin-mixing technology, which changes the authentication mechanism and uses a combination of generating functions to map virtual external addresses in transactions. It allows fast cross-chain anonymous transactions while hiding the genuine user’s address. The experiment shows that, in a zero-trust IoT context, our scheme can effectively protect user privacy information, accomplish controlled transaction traceability operations, and guarantee cross-chain transaction security.
Privacy and verifiability are crucial security requirements in e-voting systems and combining them is considered to be a challenge given that they seem to be contradictory. On one hand, privacy means that cast votes cannot be traced to the corresponding voters. On the other hand, linkability of voters and their votes is a requirement of verifiability which has the consequence that a voter is able to check their vote in the election result. These two contradictory features can be addressed by adopting privacy-preserving cryptographic primitives, which at the same time as achieving privacy, achieve verifiability. Many end-to-end schemes that support verifiability and privacy have the need for some voter action. This makes ballot casting more complex for voters. We propose the PVPBC voting system, which is an e-voting system that preserves privacy and verifiability without affecting voter usability. The PVPBC voting system uses an effective and distributed method of authorization, which is based on revocable anonymity, by making use of a permissioned distributed ledger and smart contract. In addition, the underlying PVPBC voting system satisfies election verifiability using the Selene voting scheme. The Selene protocol is a verifiable e-voting protocol. It publishes votes in plaintext accompanied by tracking numbers. This enables voters to confirm that their votes have been captured correctly by the system. Numerical experiments support the claim that PVPBC scales well as a function of the number of voters and candidates. In particular, PVPBC’s authorization time increases linearly as a function of the population size. The average latency associated with accessing the system also increases linearly with the voter population size. The latency incurred when a valid authentication transaction is created and sent on the DLT network is 6.275 ms. Empirical results suggest that the cost in GBP for casting and storing an encrypted ballot alongside a tracker commitment is a linear function of the number of candidates, which is an attractive aspect of PVPBC.
A smart contract is a self-executing program on a blockchain to ensure an immutable and transparent agreement without the involvement of intermediaries. Despite its growing popularity for many blockchain platforms like Ethereum, no technical means is available even when a smart contract requires to be protected from being copied. One promising direction to claim a software ownership is software watermarking. However, applying existing software watermarking techniques is challenging because of the unique properties of a smart contract, such as a code size constraint, non-free execution cost, and no support for dynamic allocation under a virtual machine environment. This paper introduces a novel software watermarking scheme, dubbed Smartmark, aiming to protect the ownership of a smart contract against a pirate activity. Smartmark builds the control flow graph of a target contract runtime bytecode, and locates a collection of bytes that are randomly elected for representing a watermark. We implement a full-fledged prototype for Ethereum, applying Smartmark to 27,824 unique smart contract bytecodes. Our empirical results demonstrate that Smartmark can effectively embed a watermark into a smart contract and verify its presence, meeting the requirements of credibility and imperceptibility while incurring an acceptable performance degradation. Besides, our security analysis shows that Smartmark is resilient against viable watermarking corruption attacks; e.g., a large number of dummy opcodes are needed to disable a watermark effectively, resulting in producing an illegitimate smart contract clone that is not economical.
S.B. Gopal, M Jayaprasath, C. Poongodi, S Johnson. · 6 authors
Voting is a crucial component of daily living in the modern world. Everyone belongs to social groups, which might vary in size, and in the majority of them, voting has a significant impact on key decisions. Technology advancements have simplified the voting process. Present voting system has lot of issues concerning to transparency, privacy etc., To solve these issues, both the polling and counting of ballots can be done using blockchain technology. In-depth information is provided on the development of the BlockVote electronic voting system. Application of Ethereum technology in e-voting leads to scalability issues. POW (proof of work) mining concept leads to inefficient time management operation. This study has proposed a Hyperledger fabric framework for the implementation of e-voting application. The Hyperledger Fabric network is a middleware program and an interface that make up the system. Both of the smart contracts: EVotingContract and CodesContract are a part of the Hyperledger Fabric blockchain. The connection between the blockchain network and the user interface is made possible by a gateway application.
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
Lewis Golightly, Paolo Modesti, Rémi Garcia, Victor Chang
Access Control is a crucial defense mechanism organizations can deploy to meet modern cybersecurity needs and legal compliance with data privacy. The aim is to prevent unauthorized users and systems from accessing protected resources in a way that exceeds their permissions. The present survey aims to summarize state-of-the-art Access Control techniques, presenting recent research trends in this area. Moreover, as the cyber-attack landscape and zero-trust networking challenges require organizations to consider their Information Security management strategies carefully, in this study, we present a review of contemporary Access Control techniques and technologies being discussed in the literature and the various innovations and evolution of the technology. We also discuss adopting and applying different Access Control techniques and technologies in four upcoming and crucial domains: Cloud Computing, Blockchain, the Internet of Things, and Software-Defined Networking. Finally, we discuss the business adoption strategies for Access Control and how the technology can be integrated into a cybersecurity and network architecture strategy.