Blockchain Papers

Kaoru Kurosawa, Shigeo Tsujii

No abstract is available for this record.

Donald Beaver, Joan Feigenbaum, Victor Shoup

No abstract is available for this record.

Tatsuaki Okamoto, Kazuo Ohta

No abstract is available for this record.

Dror Lapidot, Adi Shamir

No abstract is available for this record.

Tianjie Cao, Shi Ming Huang, Hui Cui, Yipeng Wu · 5 authors

How to leak authoritative secrets in an elegant way? The paper aims to solve this problem. The desired security properties i.e. Semantic-Security; Recipient-Designation; Verification-Dependence; Designated-Verifier Signature-Verifiability; Public Signature-Verifiability; Recipient-Ambiguity; Designated-Verifier Recipient-Verifiability; Public Recipient-Verifiability; Signer-Ambiguity; Signer- Verifiability are specified in secret leakage. Based on Chow-Yiu-Hui's ID-based ring signature scheme and techniques of zero-knowledge proof, an ID-based controlled secret leakage scheme is proposed. The proposed scheme satisfies all specified security properties and can be used in trust negotiation.

Shaohui Wang, Wang Mei-qin

In this paper, we give an efficient short constant-size group signature scheme that is secure in standard model based on strong Diffie-Hellman assumption. We achieve this result by combining a variant signature scheme of the one presented by Okamoto and non-interactive zero knowledge proof used by Boyen and Waters. Compared with the most efficient group signature scheme without random oracle, our scheme has a much shorter public key length and signature length, and needs less computation.

Chunming Tang, Dingyi Pei, Zheng‐an Yao

The concept of Zaps, two-round witness indistinguish- able proofs, was introduced by Dwork and Naor in 2000. They constructed Zaps based on non-interactive zero- knowledge proof. This left open the following problem: does there exist a non-interactive Zaps? Barak et al. and Groth et al. answered this question affirmatively under the assumption of the existence of Hitting Set Generators against co-nondeterministic circuits and Decisional Linear Assumption, respectively. In this paper, we will construct ef- ficient non-interactive Zaps under the existence of one-way function. In 2006, Chase and Lysyanskaya defined and con- structed signatures of knowledge based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. We prove that their signature is not secure and point out that they exist under the existence of trapdoor permutation. Feige and Shamir stated that digi- tal signature cannot be zero-knowledge(otherwise they are forgeable) and it can be witness hiding. In this paper, we will revise the definition of the signatures of knowledge by using witness hiding protocol and construct them under the existence of one-way function.

André Chailloux, Iordanis Kerenidis

In quantum zero knowledge, the assumption was made that the verifier is only using unitary operations. Under this assumption, many nice properties have been shown about quantum zero knowledge, including the fact that Honest-Verifier Quantum Statistical Zero Knowledge ($HVQSZK$) is equal to Cheating-Verifier Quantum Statistical Zero Knowledge ($QSZK$) (see ~\cite{Wat02,Wat06}). In this paper, we study what happens when we allow an honest verifier to flip some coins in addition to using unitary operations. Flipping a coin is a non-unitary operation but doesn\'t seem at first to enhance the cheating possibilities of the verifier since a classical honest verifier can flip coins. In this setting, we show an unexpected result: any classical Interactive Proof has an Honest-Verifier Quantum Statistical Zero Knowledge proof with coins. Note that in the classical case, honest verifier $SZK$ is no more powerful than $SZK$ and hence it is not believed to contain even $NP$. On the other hand, in the case of cheating verifiers, we show that Quantum Statistical Zero Knowledge where the verifier applies any non-unitary operation is equal to Quantum Zero-Knowledge where the verifier uses only unitaries. One can think of our results in two complementary ways. If we would like to use the honest verifier model as a means to study the general model by taking advantage of their equivalence, then it is imperative to use the unitary definition without coins, since with the general one this equivalence is most probably not true. On the other hand, if we would like to use quantum zero knowledge protocols in a cryptographic scenario where the honest-but-curious model is sufficient, then adding the unitary constraint severely decreases the power of quantum zero knowledge protocols.

Mike Burmester, Fred Piper, Yvo Desmedt, Michael J. Walker

No abstract is available for this record.

Gilles Brassard, Claude Crépeau

No abstract is available for this record.

Tatsuaki Okamoto, Kazuo Ohta

No abstract is available for this record.

Moti Yung

No abstract is available for this record.

Oded Goldreich, Hugo Krawczyk

No abstract is available for this record.

Donald Beaver

No abstract is available for this record.

Michael Ben-Or, Shafi Goldwasser, Joe Kilian, Avi Wigderson

No abstract is available for this record.

Mihir Bellare, Silvio Micali

No abstract is available for this record.

Joan Boyar, René Peralta

No abstract is available for this record.

Ivan Damgård

No abstract is available for this record.

Uriel Feige, Adi Shamir

No abstract is available for this record.

Yacov Yacobi, Zahava Shmuely

No abstract is available for this record.

Adi Shamir

No abstract is available for this record.

Mihir Bellare, Shafi Goldwasser

No abstract is available for this record.

Jens Groth, Steve Lu

No abstract is available for this record.

Rui Xue, Ninghui Li, Jiangtao Li

Zero knowledge sets is a new cryptographic primary in- troduced by Micali, Rabin, and Kilian in FOCS 2003. It is intensively investigated recently. However all schemes follow the basic frame by Micali et al. That is, the schemes employ Merkle tree as basic frame and mercurial com- mitments as commitment units to nodes of the tree. The proof for any query constitutes of an authentication chain. We propose in this paper a new algebraic scheme that is completely different from all existing schemes. The new scheme is computationally secure under standard assump- tion: Strong RSA assumption. It employs neither mercurial commitments nor tree frame as all previous schemes did. In fact, the prover (also as the committer) in our construc- tion commits the desired set without trapdoor information, which is another important difference from the previous ap- proaches.