Blockchain Papers

Андреас Каппелер, Albert Solé‐Ollé, Andreas Stephan, Timo Välilä

No abstract is available for this record.

Izabella Barati-Stec

After 1990, Hungary took steps toward decentralizing public administration and decision-making power. Administrative decentralization, however, was not matched by the same level of fiscal decentralization, creating tension and disparities among Hungarian municipalities. The revenue-raising ability of local governments in Hungary—especially after the economic downturn in 2008—is very low. The debt service of municipalities is also considerably higher than before 2008, a situation that can be explained in part by the change in the value of Hungarian forint relative to the Euro and the Swiss franc, the currencies in which half of Hungarian local debt is denominated. This situation is sharpened by unhealthy municipal financing practices, such as financing operating expenses from investment revenues or from loans. The indebtedness of the municipal sector increased 12.6 times from 2001 to 2007, and in 2007 about 83 percent of municipal borrowing was not backed by immobile assets or any revenue stream. This paper examines the system of municipal finance in Hungary with special attention to the current changes in the regulation and finance of Hungarian municipalities and the change in central control over municipal finances in general after 2008 (in part precipitated by the failure of borrowing rules created during the transitional period to prevent the current crisis in municipal finance), and suggests possible reforms to solve the financing problems of Hungarian municipalities.

Žan Jan Oplotnik, Boštjan Brezovnik, Borut Vojinović

This research paper focuses on the compliance of the actual system of financing local selfgovernment in Slovenia with the basic principles of the theory of decentralization and guidelines of the European Charter of Local Self-Government. It addresses the level of costs coverage within the municipal competence by using the allocated appropriate expenditure resources calculated according to the Law of Financing Municipality Act. The purpose of the paper is, therefore, to look for an answer to the question whether and to what extent the obtained funds correspond to the actual workload that municipalities have for performing statutory tasks and for exercising their competences. Analysis shows that, on an aggregate level, these actual systems ensure enough resources for local governments to cover their actual costs and current expenditures; some groups of municipalities, e.g. larger urban municipalities, municipalities with large proportions of elderly people etc. are faced with lack of funding, according to the actual costs data available, while other groups of municipalities receive more funds than they need.

Arindam Das-Gupta, Richard M. Bird

A “good” tax system for developing countries was once considered one based on progressive income taxes. More recently, the emphasis has been placed on securing revenues from broader bases at lower rates from consumption as well as income taxes. A framework for evaluating public finance structures and institutions in terms of revenue and spending as well as the fiscal balance is set out, and some key areas such as VAT, earmarking, tax evasion, and administration, and non-tax revenues are discussed. Increased globalization challenges national tax bases and makes it even more important to improve local fiscal expertise and institutions in developing countries. Finally, if local governments are sufficiently reliant on own revenue to promote fiscal discipline, decentralization may produce gains in both efficiency and local accountability that may outweigh any costs that might arise from the loss of some macroeconomic control and altered investment priorities.

Gustav Ranis, Ranis, Gustav

Vertical decentralization, either at the deconcentration, delegation or, more rarely, the devolution level, has been instituted in most countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. It usually has the effect of increasing the quantity as well as the quality, in terms of health and education, of public goods. More neglected in the literature is the issue of horizontal decentralization, shifting the decision-making power from the central ministry of finance to the ministries of education and health, as well as strengthening the legislative and judicial branches of government. We examine the relationship between horizontal decentralization with its important ethnic dimension and vertical decentralization. Local governments are accountable to the center under vertical and to democratic forces and civil society under horizontal decentralization. Smaller local units are more likely to be more homogeneous ethnically, leading to a larger quantity and higher quality of public goods.

Jing Jin, Ashley Chunli Shen, Heng‐Fu Zou

This paper sheds light on the heavy financial burden on peasants in China’s fiscal decentralization system. Using a political economy framework, this paper explores the tax-farming nature of China’s fiscally decentralized system and examines why the system incurs a particularly heavy financial burden on peasants. Specifically, it points out that a political hierarchy financed by a tax-farming system in China, fails to contain the exploitative behavior of local officials, which results in the expenditure devolution and revenue centralization within the hierarchy. Ultimately, peasants bear the brunt of the tax burden. As the financial pressure of excessive levies and fees reaches a perilous point, peasants are resorting to violent protests. Unless a fiscally decentralized system with horizontal accountability mechanisms evolves, the country’s ability to sustain a centralized polity may become increasingly undermined. A case study of township finance is used to exemplify the exploitative nature of China’s fiscal decentralization system.

Pablo Simón, Santiago Lago Peñas, Alberto Vaquero García

This paper studies the effect of political variables on the gains obtained by Spanish regions in periodical bargaining of the intergovernmental financing agreements and on the regional distribution of discretional earmarked grants over the period 1987-2008. First, we find that the relationship between gains in transferred revenues and on regional public debt stocks depends on the period and the specific issues discussed in the corresponding negotiation, aside from political affinity. Second, we show that the most discretional program of earmarked grants is strongly driven by electoral strategy. National incumbents tend to allocate intergovernmental transfers where there are competitive regional elections. Moreover, we show that earmarked grants are allocated in those regions where the incumbent performs better in national elections and, especially, in those where there are more seats to be won. Hence we prove that both strategies are complementary rather than exclusive.

Tingting Qi

This chapter integrates current Chinese education reform into the unique socioeconomic context of China in a transitional time and explores the complexity of education decentralization in China through an in-depth analysis on changes in education finance, administration, and curriculum development. Mark Hanson's theory of education decentralization is cited to build a conceptual framework for examining education decentralization in China. Previous studies, government documents, laws, and regulations related to the current wave of Chinese education reform are reviewed to capture a true picture of education decentralization in China. In investigating the background, actual actions, and motive of the current Chinese education reform, the chapter demonstrates that the on-going Chinese education reform is moving toward a centralized decentralization. Linking education with the unified national goal of economic modernization, the paradoxical mixture of centralization and decentralization is a strategic means to avoid loss of centralized control. Literature on decentralization reform in Chinese education primarily concentrates on changed Chinese education policies in the reform. This chapter places the focus on the contextual factors that shape the decentralization trend in current reform.

배준식, 라휘문, 박성문

This study focuses on the tax reform for fiscal decentralization in Korea. In Chapter 1, we present the purpose and methods of this study. In Chapter 2, we study the circumstances of fiscal decentralization and the problems of fiscal structure in Korea. The fiscal state and problems in Seoul Metropolitan City will be analyzed in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the financial relations between the central and local governments, and the local tax system in Korea, and suggest the tax reform solution for the improvement of fiscal decentralization. This study reviews the theoretical and historical background of fiscal decentralization by the survey of relevant literature. Also, we study the major characteristics of the allocation system of tax base between the central and local governments, and analyze the structural problems of local finance in Korea. First, the Korean tax system is concentrated heavily on the national taxes as 80% of the total tax revenue. Thus the central government plays a vital role in resource allocation. Secondly, the local tax revenue is distributed unevenly among local jurisdictions. The regional inequality in revenue-raising capacity is a major policy obstacle to redesign the local tax system depends heavily on the property-related taxes, lack of elastic revenue-raising capacity. Therefore, the overall reform of local tax system revising the allocation of tax bases between the central and local taxes is needed for the fiscal decentralization. In this study, we propose mainly the adjustment between the national and local taxes. We studies liquor tax, transportation-energy-environment tax, transfer income tax and special consumption tax. Also, the improvement of local income tax and local consumption tax will be studied and the effect of the reform in these taxes on the local finance will be simulated. Finally, we suggest an organization for the prior consultation between the central and local governments, because it is important to adjust interests between the two parties before the central government makes local policy decisions.

明 山田

No abstract is available for this record.

Roy Bahl

This paper is about the case for assigning taxing powers to subnational governments, and about the structure of this revenue assignment. As Musgrave (1983) put it in perhaps the seminal paper on this subject, “Who Should Tax, Where and What”? This review reconsiders the Musgrave questions after 25 years, asks whether the international trend in tax assignment is in step with what economists have prescribed, and concludes with some thoughts about the most likely future for the decentralization of tax systems.

Yinghua Jin, Jenny E. Ligthart, Mark Rider

In this article, we compare and contrast the design and performance of China and India’s intergovernmental fiscal systems. We find that there are remarkable similarities in the design and performance of China and India’s intergovernmental fiscal systems. More specifically, both countries have highly decentralized expenditures assignments and highly centralized revenue assignments. As a result, sub-national governments in both countries must rely on fiscal transfers to finance their assigned functions. Finally, there is considerable off the books and hidden borrowing by sub-national governments in both countries. We also find that there are considerable and growing disparities in the rate of expenditure decentralization among sub-national governments within each country. Lack fiscal discipline and growing fiscal disparities among sub-national governments create risks to future economic growth and to social cohesion, absent policy reforms to address these issues.

Lenka Šťastná

Three Essays on Local Public Finanace Lenka Šťastná Abstract The dissertation studies spending decisions of local governments. It consists of three parts; theoretical model is developed in the first part and empirical analyses of Czech municipalities of extended scope are presented in the other two parts. The theoretical model analyzes whether it is beneficial to decentralize policy decision-making when local public goods in two symmetric regions are complements. Strategic delegation when a voter intentionally votes for a politician whose preferences do not coincide with those of the voter and in-kind transfers, used to support local public goods production in the other region, are allowed. According to Oates' decentralization theorem, centralization pareto-dominates decentralization for symmetric regions regardless level of spillovers. However, for complementary public goods and when strategic delegation and in-kind transfers are considered, the tradeoff may be exactly opposite and decentralization may pareto-dominate centralization. The second part aims to test fiscal interaction among local governments in the Czech Republic which can be driven by spillover effects, competition, mimicking, or cooperation. Spatial dependence of local public spending (i.e. whether spending decisions in neighboring...

John R. Bartle, Yuanming Wu, Zhirong Jerry Zhao

To meet the increasing scholarly interest in China, this symposium provides a forum for scholars in public budgeting and finance to exchange research on China-related issues. There have been new initiatives to reform China's public fiscal system in the past two decades. The papers in this symposium examine advances and associated issues in fiscal decentralization, local budgeting, and urban infrastructure financing. The papers not only analyze the existing issues, but also make recommendations on how to develop an accountable local budgeting system, how to finance sustainable urban infrastructure, and how to pursue a more balanced approach to fiscal decentralization in contemporary China.

Rita Rahmawati

Part of Regional Otonomy in finance is giving local government to arrange regional receipt to purchase expenses bugget. Government genuine Receipt is one regional receipt that shows how stronger local goverment finance can handled all the expenditure, not only depend on Central Government. Metro and Lampung Timur same with another local government in Indonesia, wants the higher regional otonomy espescialy in finance. The higher decentralization indicate higher ability on local government to fulfill all expenditure. In can be analized from share of Government Genuine Receipt and Tax and non Tax Share compare Total Regional Receipt and Total Regional Expenditure. Higher fiscal Desentralization needed by Metro and Lampung Timur to get higher Regional otonomy.

Luc Eyraud, Lusine Lusinyan

In many countries the decentralization of spending responsibilities has outpaced the decentralization of revenue powers. Sub-national governments have then to rely on transfers from the center and borrowing to finance their spending. When this occurs, we find that the overall fiscal deficit tends to increase. This result is based on cross-country econometric evidence from OECD countries, and is particularly strong in the presence of regional disparities. Fiscal discipline can be strengthened by ensuring that sub-national taxing powers are adequate to meet spending obligations.

Daniel Kweku Baah Inkoom

No abstract is available for this record.

Wasim A. Al-Habil

The conversations about fiscal federalism, decentralization and devolution have been evolving in the literature since the second half of the 20th century. In the United States and all around the world, the matter of governance and decentralization are on the agenda. This paper aims to find the routes of fiscal federalism by first understanding what is meant by federalism, as it does not simply refer to a form of governance, then laying out the classical foundations of this theory (trumped by Wallace Oates), and followed by some departures from the classical thoughts into some new streams of literature on the matter.   Key words: Public finance, fiscal federalism.

Dodescu Anca

Romania's integration in the European Union implies, apart the complex process of policy transfer, the learning of new modes to make policies characteristic to a multi-level governance and partnership culture. Of the different levels of governance of the European model, the regional level ("regional governance") most faithfully reflects, in our opinion, the complexity of reconfiguring the role of state in economy, at the beginning of this new millennium, in the European Union space and presents the highest practical importance for Romania, as a new Member State of the European Union, for, at the regional level, the structures are more flexible and the good practices are more rapidly assimilable. The selection of the best regional growth and development economic policies, the choosing of the objectives out of a series of competing options, the calibration in time and space of powers, roles, capabilities, and responsibilities and the encouragement of the win-win solutions call upon the choice and combination of some appropriate and efficient instruments. Representative for the new context, the regional growth and development policy must integrate, in Romania too, more knowledge, more creativity, new combinations of capabilities and new fields of expertise. This paper presents preliminary research results afferent to the post-doctoral research project: "Growth and regional development economic policies. Challenges for Romania in the context of economic-financial crisis and European model integration", carried out in the project "Economic scientific research, reliance of human welfare and development in European context", the Romanian Academy, "Costin C. Kiriţescu" National Institute for Economic Research, project financed for the 2010-2013 period from the European Social Fund (EFS) and implemented by the Romanian Academy, Costin C. Kiritescu National Institute for Economic Research, in the period of time 1 December 2010 - 30 November 2012, coordinator: Professor Dr. Valeriu Ioan Franc. The question we intend to answer, in the present phase of our research, based on the comparative analysis of the decentralisation systems of several Member States of European Union, respectively on the analysis of the regional disparities existing at the European Union level and of the effects of the economic integration, is- to what extent the capabilities of the regional policy should rather be concentrated in the hands of regional authorities or of the European Union than to be left individually to the Member States which should conceive their own regional policy? What we intend in this paper, based on the analysis of some experiences to decentralize the capabilities of economic policy at the European Union level, is to identify the regional implications of the interconnection of decentralization, centralization, respectively supra-nationalization tendencies and, implicitly, the analysis of the way to reconfigure the role of state in economy at the regional level, in the context of integration in the European model. The examination of the way to reconfigure the role of state in economy at regional level requires the review of the allocative, distributive, and regulating roles of the state from a regional perspective, the analysis, on one side, of the decentralization of economic policy capabilities from the national level to the regional level (for example, national level: pure public goods supply, for instance, national defence and the centralization of fiscal policy capabilities in order to achieve macroeconomic stability and revenue redistribution; regional level: mixed public goods supply, for instance, waste collection and community policy), on the other hand, the centralization/decentralization of regional capabilities at the European Union level.

Fabio Fiorillo, Agnese Sacchi

We hereby propose a model to analyze the provision of environmental protection activities (United Nation 2005) with positive interregional externalities in order to verify - at least in theory - whether this kind of policy is better accomplished through centralized policymaking, which implies a coordinated solution among local representatives, or a decentralized system, whereby local authorities independently finance and implement their environmental protection policy. The research question concerns the identification of criteria on how to allocate powers and functions to environmental management at different tiers of government. Moreover, modelling interregional externalities as a mechanism contributing to lowering the cost of financing environmental policy in each region (production externality), we can assume that different environmental policies are allowed across regions. Given this general framework, considerations favouring either institutional setting in terms of individuals’ welfare seem to involve interaction among these key elements: the extent of the inter-jurisdictional spillovers, the size of local jurisdictions and the regional preferences for environmental protection policy.

International Monetary Fund

Conventional wisdom postulates that there are benefits from decentralizing government finances but there is little empirical evidence about actual country practices. This paper presents data on fiscal decentralization for about 80 countries over a period of about 20 years (1990-2008) from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (GFSY), the only global database with fiscal data for several levels of government. The data show that in many countries, revenue collection remains relatively more centralized than expenditures and that employment tends to be concentrated in lower levels of government. Except for transition economies, the levels of decentralization are relatively stable over the time period. The findings are shown by degree of economic development, constitutional power arrangements, and geographic area, broadly confirming key factors identified in the literature as determining the extent of fiscal decentralization.

Rodrigo Vilela Rodrigues, Diego Oliveira Peixoto

ABSTRACT This study aims to determine how important the public sector, through their spending, influences the growth rates of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) in the municipalities of Rio de Janeiro. Studies in this line are justified by the growth of the powers of sub-national levels of government, or fiscal decentralization. The base case relates to the decentralization more efficient provision of public goods, a fact allowed by the proximity between demand and supply of public goods. The results suggest that the public sector does not interfere with GDP growth in the cities of Rio de Janeiro. The investments were the largest category with its own momentum of economic growth and a model that included the occurrence of elections as an explanatory variable showed that election lawsuits not only affect the level of GDP, but also how it is affected by public spending. Key words Public Finance; development; cities. Classificacao JEL: O23. Artigo recebido em out. 2009 e aceito para publicacao em dez. 2010.

James Alm

Various trends, including an increasing emphasis on fiscal decentralization; political democratization in many areas; globalization and the financial liberalization that often accompanies it; growing demands for urban services as urbanization continues in major cities around the world; all argue compellingly for finding ways to help municipalities finance large scale infrastructure. Improved urban infrastructure, for water supply, sanitation, urban transportation and solid waste management is widely believed essential in encouraging and facilitating economic growth. Evidence indicates that those countries most successful in sustaining high growth supported their cities with transformative investments to improve urban infrastructure that could accommodate rapid population growth in major economic centers. This evidence suggests that infrastructure has a strong “supplyside†orientation and in practice, it is the effects of infrastructure on “supply†that are most often emphasized. There is also a strong “demand-side†aspect: individuals and businesses value the services that flow from the stock of infrastructure facilities and these demands should be (but are often not) considered in determining the appropriate level of infrastructure investment. In addition to the potential supply-and-demand-side impacts on economic growth, the services of infrastructure also play a significant role in the distribution of income.[Working paper No. 19]

Jorge Martínez-Vázquez

This publication discusses the decentralization issues faced by countries of Asia and the Pacific. It includes practical suggestions on how to proceed in this area to achieve economic growth, macroeconomic stability, poverty and income distribution, services delivery improvements, and political accountability. This note elaborates on adequacy of local revenues and autonomy, expenditure management and clear service delivery mandates, horizontal imbalances and limited use of incentives in intergovernmental transfers, financing needs and local government borrowing, and local management capacities as the major challenges in a decentralized fiscal architecture. The recommendations to address the above challenges also note the long- term nature of these reforms.