The ‘blockchain’ is the core mechanism for the Bitcoin digital payment system. It embraces a set of inter-related technologies: the blockchain itself as a distributed record of digital events, the distributed consensus method to agree whether a new block is legitimate, automated smart contracts, and the data structure associated with each block. We propose a permanent distributed record of intellectual effort and associated reputational reward, based on the blockchain that instantiates and democratises educational reputation beyond the academic community. We are undertaking initial trials of a private blockchain or storing educational records, drawing also on our previous research into reputation management for educational systems.
Nakamoto’s famous blockchain protocol enables achieving consensus in a so-called permissionless setting—anyone can join (or leave) the protocol execution, and the protocol instructions do not depend on the identities of the players. His ingenious protocol prevents “sybil attacks” (where an adversary spawns any number of new players) by relying on computational puzzles (a.k.a. “moderately hard functions”) introduced by Dwork and Naor (Crypto’92).
ABSTRACT: Motivated by the recent explosion of interest around Blockchains, we examine whether they make a good t for the Internet of Things (IoT) sector. Blockchains allow us to have a distributed peer-to-peer network where non-trusting members can interact with each other without a trusted intermediary, in a variable manner. We review how this mechanism works and also look into smart contracts scripts that reside on the Blockchain that allow for the automation of multi-step processes. We then move into the IoT domain, and describe how a Blockchain-IoT combination: 1) facilitates the sharing of services and resources leading to the creation of a marketplace of services between devices and 2) allows us to automate in a cryptographically variable manner several existing, time- consuming work owns. We also point out certain issues that should be considered before the deployment of a Blockchain network in an IoT setting: from transactional privacy to the expected value of the digitized assets traded on the network. Wherever applicable, we identify solutions and workarounds. Our conclusion is that the Blockchain-IoT combination is powerful and can cause sign cant transformations across several industries, paving the way for new business models and novel, distributed applications.
The Internet has now become an environment and source for innovation development that has impacted a wide range of industries. The platform has enabled entrepreneurs to create groundbreaking solutions that have had a disruptive and transformative effect on the lives of many people. While banking had dealt with several innovations such as internet payment providers, more recently a virtual alternative to cash has begun to emerge. Although the notion of true electronic cash has been considered for some time, the availability of a practical electronic currency has only recently gained actual adoption that is forcing many financial institutions to reconsider the potential long-term impact. We provide some insight into the latest trends in cryptocurrency and propose a reference architecture for adopting this form of financial asset in a central banking scenario; i.e. a Fiat based cryptocurrency. The presently used cryptocurrency are based on a peer to peer scheme and hence we outline an IT solution that will accommodate a centrally issued electronic currency.
Eli Ben‐Sasson, Alessandro Chiesa, Ariel Gabizon, Madars Virza
The seminal result that every language having an interactive proof also has a zero-knowledge interactive proof assumes the existence of one-way functions. Ostrovsky and Wigderson (ISTCS 1993) proved that this assumption is necessary: if one-way functions do not exist, then only languages in BPP have zero-knowledge interactive proofs. Ben-Or et al. (STOC 1988) proved that, nevertheless, every language having a multi-prover interactive proof also has a zero-knowledge multi-prover interactive proof, unconditionally. Their work led to, among many other things, a line of work studying zero knowledge without intractability assumptions. In this line of work, Kilian, Petrank, and Tardos (STOC 1997) defined and constructed zero-knowledge probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs). While PCPs with quasilinear-size proof length, but without zero knowledge, are known, no such result is known for zero knowledge PCPs. In this work, we show how to construct “2-round” PCPs that are zero knowledge and of length ~ O(K) where K is the number of queries made by a malicious polynomial time verifier. Previous solutions required PCPs of length at leastK 6 to maintain zero knowledge. In this model, which we call duplex PCP (DPCP), the verifier first receives an oracle string from the prover, then replies with a message, and then receives another oracle string from the prover; a malicious verifier can make up toK queries in total to both oracles. Deviating from previous works, our constructions do not invoke the PCP Theorem as a blackbox but instead rely on certain algebraic properties of a specific family of PCPs. We show that if the PCP has a certain linear algebraic structure — which many central constructions can be shown to possess, including [BFLS91,ALMSS98,BS08] — we can add the zero knowledge property at virtually no cost (up to additive lower order terms) while introducing only minor modifications in the algorithms of the prover and verifier. We believe that our linear-algebraic characterization of PCPs may be of independent interest, as it gives a simplified way to view previous well-studied PCP constructions.
M. Albrecht, Pooya Farshim, Shuai Han, Dennis Hofheinz · 6 authors
Abstract We provide constructions of multilinear groups equipped with natural hard problems from indistinguishability obfuscation, homomorphic encryption, and NIZKs. This complements known results on the constructions of indistinguishability obfuscators from multilinear maps in the reverse direction. We provide two distinct, but closely related constructions and show that multilinear analogues of the $${\text {DDH}} $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mtext>DDH</mml:mtext></mml:math> assumption hold for them. Our first construction is symmetric and comes with a $$\kappa $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mi>κ</mml:mi></mml:math> -linear map $$\mathbf{e }: {{\mathbb {G}}}^\kappa \longrightarrow {\mathbb {G}}_T$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mrow><mml:mi>e</mml:mi><mml:mo>:</mml:mo><mml:msup><mml:mrow><mml:mi>G</mml:mi></mml:mrow><mml:mi>κ</mml:mi></mml:msup><mml:mo>⟶</mml:mo><mml:msub><mml:mi>G</mml:mi><mml:mi>T</mml:mi></mml:msub></mml:mrow></mml:math> for prime-order groups $${\mathbb {G}}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mi>G</mml:mi></mml:math> and $${\mathbb {G}}_T$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:msub><mml:mi>G</mml:mi><mml:mi>T</mml:mi></mml:msub></mml:math> . To establish the hardness of the $$\kappa $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mi>κ</mml:mi></mml:math> -linear $${\text {DDH}} $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mtext>DDH</mml:mtext></mml:math> problem, we rely on the existence of a base group for which the $$\kappa $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mi>κ</mml:mi></mml:math> -strong $${\text {DDH}} $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mtext>DDH</mml:mtext></mml:math> assumption holds. Our second construction is for the asymmetric setting, where $$\mathbf{e }: {\mathbb {G}}_1 \times \cdots \times {\mathbb {G}}_{\kappa } \longrightarrow {\mathbb {G}}_T$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mrow><mml:mi>e</mml:mi><mml:mo>:</mml:mo><mml:msub><mml:mi>G</mml:mi><mml:mn>1</mml:mn></mml:msub><mml:mo>×</mml:mo><mml:mo>⋯</mml:mo><mml:mo>×</mml:mo><mml:msub><mml:mi>G</mml:mi><mml:mi>κ</mml:mi></mml:msub><mml:mo>⟶</mml:mo><mml:msub><mml:mi>G</mml:mi><mml:mi>T</mml:mi></mml:msub></mml:mrow></mml:math> for a collection of $$\kappa +1$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mrow><mml:mi>κ</mml:mi><mml:mo>+</mml:mo><mml:mn>1</mml:mn></mml:mrow></mml:math> prime-order groups $${\mathbb {G}}_i$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:msub><mml:mi>G</mml:mi><mml:mi>i</mml:mi></mml:msub></mml:math> and $${\mathbb {G}}_T$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:msub><mml:mi>G</mml:mi><mml:mi>T</mml:mi></mml:msub></mml:math> , and relies only on the 1-strong $${\text {DDH}} $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mtext>DDH</mml:mtext></mml:math> assumption in its base group. In both constructions, the linearity $$\kappa $$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:mi>κ</mml:mi></mml:math> can be set to any arbitrary but a priori fixed polynomial value in the security parameter. We rely on a number of powerful tools in our constructions: probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscation, dual-mode NIZK proof systems (with perfect soundness, witness-indistinguishability, and zero knowledge), and additively homomorphic encryption for the group $$\mathbb {Z}_N^{+}$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"><mml:msubsup><mml:mi>Z</mml:mi><mml:mi>N</mml:mi><mml:mo>+</mml:mo></mml:msubsup></mml:math> . At a high level, we enable “bootstrapping” multilinear assumptions from their simpler counterparts in standard cryptographic groups and show the equivalence of PIO and multilinear maps under the existence of the aforementioned primitives.
Kriptovalute su digitalni novac utemeljen na kriptografiji i decentraliziranom sustavu. Postoje samo u elektroničkom obliku kao jedinstveni digitalni novčići ("tokeni"). Iza njih ne stoji autoritet države niti ih je moguće svojevoljno proizvesti. Rad se fokusira na značajkama, postavkama, razvoju i svim međuodnosima važnih ekonomskih faktora koji utječu na kriptovalute. U prvom poglavlju navedena su obilježja kriptovaluta. Drugo poglavlje daje primjere i govori o primjeni kriptovaluta u svakodnevnom životu. U trećem poglavlju je raspravljano o trenutnim i budućim regulacijama najmoćnijih zemalja svijeta (G20) , kao i njihovoj zajedničkoj suradnji u želji za jedinstvenim i standardiziranim pravilima, a sve u svrhu što kvalitetnijeg nadzora nad kriptovalutama kako bi se spriječile malverzacije i zaštitili potrošači. Četvrto poglavlje govori o inicijalnoj ponudi kovanica, a peto poglavlje je namijenjeno sigurnosti kriptovaluta. Cilj istraživanja je utvrditi koliko je studentska populacija upoznata i usmjerena prema novim oblicima digitalnog novca, koje značajke kriptovaluta smatraju pozitivnima, a koje negativnima i u kojoj su mjeri investirali ili su spremni investirati dio svojih ulaganja u kriptovalute i sl. Metode istraživanja korištene u radu su kompilacija na temelju proučavanja postojeće literature o temi rada, prikupljanje i analiza podataka vezanih uz kriptovalute, ponajprije podataka vezanih uz cijene i tržišnu kapitalizaciju, anketiranje studenata Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci i metoda dedukcije putem koje su pokazane sve važne karakteristike i obilježja kriptovaluta. Na temelju provedene ankete u kojoj je sudjelovalo 90 studenata Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci zaključak toga dijela istraživanja je da je mlada populacija dobro upoznata s kriptovalutama i njenim glavnim značajkama, ali i određenim nedostatkom informiranosti o tehnologiji (trećina studenata nije čula za pojam "blockchain") i nedovoljnoj odlučnosti oko investiranja i trgovanja u kriptovalute. Povrh toga, dokazan je i negativan utjecaj hakerskih napada i određenih kriminalnih radnji, kao i nestabilnost tržišne cijene na povjerenje studenata, ali i ukupne populacije vezane uz globalni financijski sustav u kriptovalute. Ishod istraživanja omogućio je da zaključimo kako su kriptovalute trenutno u ranoj fazi razvoja i nisu se dovoljno implementirale za široku primjenu u trgovini roba i usluga ili općenito kao sredstvo razmjene. Faktor koji je uključen u istraživanje kako bi opisao veličinu, odnosno obujam neke kriptovalute je tržišna kapitalizacija u dolarima. Temeljna ideja ovog rada je informirati čitatelja o pozitivnim i negativnim značajkama koje se se vežu uz kriptovalute. Na taj način čitatelji će biti bolje informirani i educirani o potencijalnom riziku ulaganja u kriptovalute, kao i većoj razini zaštite prilikom posjedovanja neke digitalne valute.
This paper presents the first generalized reputation system that can be applied to multiple networks that is based on the blockchain. We first discuss current reputation systems, conducting a critical analysis of their current security vulnerabilities, before looking at how new blockchain based technologies are used. We propose an innovative new reputation system that is based on blockchain technologies which aims to solve many unanswered questions in today's current generation reputation systems. We then consider the limitations of such a system, before using simulations and analyses to demonstrate methods of overcoming these limitations. We conclude by suggesting areas for future studies, and summarizing our findings.
Kaylash Chaudhary, Ansgar Fehnker, Jaco van de Pol, Mariëlle Stoelinga
Bitcoin is a popular digital currency for online payments, realized as a decentralized peer-to-peer electronic cash system. Bitcoin keeps a ledger of all transactions; the majority of the participants decides on the correct ledger. Since there is no trusted third party to guard against double spending, and inspired by its popularity, we would like to investigate the correctness of the Bitcoin protocol. Double spending is an important threat to electronic payment systems. Double spending would happen if one user could force a majority to believe that a ledger without his previous payment is the correct one. We are interested in the probability of success of such a double spending attack, which is linked to the computational power of the attacker. This paper examines the Bitcoin protocol and provides its formalization as an UPPAAL model. The model will be used to show how double spending can be done if the parties in the Bitcoin protocol behave maliciously, and with what probability double spending occurs.
In this paper, a new notion which we call verifiably anonymous data collection protocol is introduced and formalized in the client-server model where each respondent uses a web interface to communicate with a server operated by the data miner. A construction leveraging a combination of semantically secure double trap-door encryption and OR zero-knowledge proof system is proposed and analyzed, where data sent from a respondent Alice is first encrypted using her personal partial key; Alice then proves to the data miner that the resulted ciphertext is valid and is sent by one of respondents dynamically formed by the respondent without getting the consent or assistance of the other respondents. A rigorous proof of the soundness and the zero-knowledge property of our data collection protocol in the presence of malicious adversary is presented.
We introduce LOCATHE (Location-Enhanced Authenticated Key Exchange), a generic protocol that pools location, user attributes, access policy and desired services into a multi-factor authentication, allowing two peers to establish a secure, encrypted session and perform mutual authentication with pre-shared keys, passwords and other authentication factors. LOCATHE contributes to: (1) forward secrecy through ephemeral session keys; (2) security through zero-knowledge password proofs (ZKPP), such that no passwords can be learned from the exchange; (3) the ability to use not only location, but also multiple authentication factors from a user to a service; (4) providing a two-tiered privacy authentication scheme, in which a user may be authenticated either based on her attributes (hiding her unique identification), or with a full individual authentication; (5) employing the expressiveness and flexibility of Decentralized or Multi-Authority Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption, allowing multiple service providers to control their respective key generation and attributes.
Ittay Eyal, Adem Efe Gencer, Emin Gün Sirer, Robbert van Renesse
Cryptocurrencies, based on and led by Bitcoin, have shown promise as infrastructure for pseudonymous online payments, cheap remittance, trustless digital asset exchange, and smart contracts. However, Bitcoin-derived blockchain protocols have inherent scalability limits that trade-off between throughput and latency and withhold the realization of this potential. This paper presents Bitcoin-NG, a new blockchain protocol designed to scale. Based on Bitcoin's blockchain protocol, Bitcoin-NG is Byzantine fault tolerant, is robust to extreme churn, and shares the same trust model obviating qualitative changes to the ecosystem. In addition to Bitcoin-NG, we introduce several novel metrics of interest in quantifying the security and efficiency of Bitcoin-like blockchain protocols. We implement Bitcoin-NG and perform large-scale experiments at 15% the size of the operational Bitcoin system, using unchanged clients of both protocols. These experiments demonstrate that Bitcoin-NG scales optimally, with bandwidth limited only by the capacity of the individual nodes and latency limited only by the propagation time of the network.
Electronic financial transactions in the US, even those enabled by Bitcoin, have relatively high transaction costs. As a result, it becomes infeasible to make micropayments, i.e. payments that are pennies or fractions of a penny. In order to circumvent the cost of recording all transactions, Wheeler (1996) and Rivest (1997) suggested the notion of a probabilistic payment, that is, one implements payments that have expected value on the order of micro pennies by running an appropriately biased lottery for a larger payment. While there have been quite a few proposed solutions to such lottery-based micropayment schemes, all these solutions rely on a trusted third party to coordinate the transactions; furthermore, to implement these systems in today's economy would require a a global change to how either banks or electronic payment companies (e.g., Visa and Mastercard) handle transactions.
We show that equivocation, i.e., making conflicting statements to others in a distributed protocol, can be monetarily disincentivized by the use of crypto-currencies such as Bitcoin. To this end, we design completely decentralized non-equivocation contracts, which make it possible to penalize an equivocating party by the loss of its money. At the core of these contracts, there is a novel cryptographic primitive called accountable assertions, which reveals the party's Bitcoin credentials if it equivocates. Non-equivocation contracts are particularly useful for distributed systems that employ public append-only logs to protect data integrity, e.g., in cloud storage and social networks. Moreover, as double-spending in Bitcoin is a special case of equivocation, the contracts enable us to design a payment protocol that allows a payee to receive funds at several unsynchronized points of sale, while being able to penalize a double-spending payer after the fact.
Gaby G. Dagher, Benedikt Bünz, Joseph Bonneau, Jeremy Clark · 5 authors
Bitcoin exchanges function like banks, securely holding customers' bitcoins on their behalf. Several exchanges have suffered catastrophic losses with customers permanently losing their savings. A proof of solvency demonstrates cryptographically that the exchange controls sufficient reserves to settle each customer's account. We introduce Provisions, a privacy-preserving proof of solvency whereby an exchange does not have to disclose its Bitcoin addresses; total holdings or liabilities; or any information about its customers. We also propose an extension which prevents exchanges from colluding to cover for each other's losses. We have implemented Provisions and it offers practical computation times and proof sizes even for a large Bitcoin exchange with millions of customers.
Loi Luu, Jason Teutsch, Raghav Kulkarni, Prateek Saxena
Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and the more recent Ethereum system allow users to specify scripts in transactions and contracts to support applications beyond simple cash transactions. In this work, we analyze the extent to which these systems can enforce the correct semantics of scripts. We show that when a script execution requires nontrivial computation effort, practical attacks exist which either waste miners' computational resources or lead miners to accept incorrect script results. These attacks drive miners to an ill-fated choice, which we call the verifier's dilemma, whereby rational miners are well-incentivized to accept unvalidated blockchains. We call the framework of computation through a scriptable cryptocurrency a consensus computer and develop a model that captures incentives for verifying computation in it. We propose a resolution to the verifier's dilemma which incentivizes correct execution of certain applications, including outsourced computation, where scripts require minimal time to verify. Finally we discuss two distinct, practical implementations of our consensus computer in real cryptocurrency networks like Ethereum.
We provide a research-oriented introduction to the cryptographic currencies. We start with a description of Bitcoin and its main design principles. We then discuss some of its weaknesses, and show some ideas for dealing with them. We also talk about the mechanics of the mining pools and ideas for discouraging the mining pool creation. We provide an introduction to the smart contracts, and give some examples of them, including the multiparty lotteries.
2 source records
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Cryptography and Data Security
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
Andrew Miller, Ahmed E. Kosba, Jonathan Katz, Elaine Shi
An implicit goal of Bitcoin's reward structure is to diffuse network influence over a diverse, decentralized population of individual participants. Indeed, Bitcoin's security claims rely on no single entity wielding a sufficiently large portion of the network's overall computational power. Unfortunately, rather than participating independently, most Bitcoin miners join coalitions called mining pools in which a central pool administrator largely directs the pool's activity, leading to a consolidation of power. Recently, the largest mining pool has accounted for more than half of network's total mining capacity. Relatedly, "hosted mining" service providers offer their clients the benefit of economies-of-scale, tempting them away from independent participation. We argue that the prevalence of mining coalitions is due to a limitation of the Bitcoin proof-of-work puzzle -- specifically, that it affords an effective mechanism for enforcing cooperation in a coalition. We present several definitions and constructions for "nonoutsourceable" puzzles that thwart such enforcement mechanisms, thereby deterring coalitions. We also provide an implementation and benchmark results for our schemes to show they are practical.
Back and Bentov (arXiv 2014) and Andrychowicz et al. (Security and Privacy 2014) introduced techniques to perform secure multiparty computations on Bitcoin. Among other things, these works constructed lottery protocols that ensure that any party that aborts after learning the outcome pays a monetary penalty to all other parties. Following this, Andrychowicz et al. (Bitcoin Workshop 2014) and concurrently Bentov and Kumaresan (Crypto 2014) extended the solution to arbitrary secure function evaluation while guaranteeing fairness in the following sense: any party that aborts after learning the output pays a monetary penalty to all parties that did not learn the output. Andrychowicz et al. (Bitcoin Workshop 2014) also suggested extending to scenarios where parties receive a payoff according to the output of a secure function evaluation, and outlined a 2-party protocol for the same that in addition satisfies the notion of fairness described above. In this work, we formalize, generalize, and construct multiparty protocols for the primitive suggested by Andrychowicz et al. We call this primitive secure cash distribution with penalties. Our formulation of secure cash distribution with penalties poses it as a multistage reactive functionality (i.e., more general than secure function evaluation) that provides a way to securely implement smart contracts in a decentralized setting, and consequently suffices to capture a wide variety of stateful computations involving data and/or money, such as decentralized auctions, market, and games such as poker, etc. Our protocol realizing secure cash distribution with penalties works in a hybrid model where parties have access to a claim-or-refund transaction functionality FCR}* which can be efficiently realized in (a variant of) Bitcoin, and is otherwise independent of the Bitcoin ecosystem. We emphasize that our protocol is dropout-tolerant in the sense that any party that drops out during the protocol is forced to pay a monetary penalty to all other parties. Our formalization and construction generalize both secure computation with penalties of Bentov and Kumaresan (Crypto 2014), and secure lottery with penalties of Andrychowicz et al. (Security and Privacy 2014).
Liang-Ao Zhang, Xingming Sun, Zhihua Xia, Qiuju Ji
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) is a promising cryptographic primitive to implement access control for secure data storage in the cloud. Since the data owner may frequently change the access policies defined in the ciphertext, it is significant to provide the capacity for dynamic policy updating. However the cloud should also authenticate the owner because the adversary may modify the access policies of the files in the cloud to prevent the legal users from accessing them. In this paper, we focus on the owner's authentication in the ABE systems and propose a novel scheme which enables access control with authenticated dynamic policy updating in the cloud. We adapt the Pedersen commitment and Zero Knowledge Proof of Knowledge (ZKPK) to realize the anonymous authentication of the owner's policy updating key without increasing any secret information to the owner side. The analysis shows that our scheme is authentic and efficient as well as adaptive to different types of access policies.