The Italian general government expenditure is empirically modeled by considering demand-side, supply-side, and institutional factors. The authors estimate a long-run relationship with government expenditure driven by the demand-side and supply-side effects of domestic income and bureaucratic power, respectively, as well as by an institutional factor, namely, the decentralization of public expenditure. The disequilibrium error positively affects income growth and local spending, implying that when government expenditure is above its equilibrium level, both economic growth and local governments benefit. However, tighter government spending within the European Monetary Union environment suggests that local governments will have to become more efficient to find additional resources for their financing.
The Indonesian authorities are exploring options for the establishment of subnational government endowment funds and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) has drafted regulations in that context. However, the motivations and objective for establishing an endowment fund at the subnational level diverge across various stakeholders. Clarity of the objectives and purpose of the endowment fund will be critical for informing features of its architecture, and the endowment fund should be aligned with the national fiscal policy objectives. Establishing such funds at a time of fiscal deficit entails a “borrowing-to-save” approach which is not optimal from a fiscal policy perspective. Currently, there is a misalignment between the design of inflow and outflow rules, the endowment fund’s objectives, and the fiscal/economic context. In addition, the current draft MoF regulations restrict the investment policy to conform with the law on decentralization enacted in 2022. This report emphasizes that regardless of the structure of the endowment fund, it needs to be fully integrated within the budget. The report also provides recommendations on assessing the full cost of the subnational government endowment fund, its design and implementation, and provides suggestions to improve the draft MoF regulations.
Carlos Eduardo Frickmann Young, Carlos A. Roncisvalle
The objective of this study is to examine the evolution and characteristics of the financing for the nvironment in Brazil, in order to identify the advances and retreats after the Rio 92 Conference. Brazil has a very decentralized administration, composed of three independent levels of public administration: the federal government, 27 state governments, and more than 5000 municipios, " or municipalities; all of them with specific environmental institutions. However, at the time of the completion of this report, there were no indicators that aggregate information from these different institutional levels for the 1992-2001 period.(1) Thus, this study was a first effort to generate this kind of figures. Given the very short time for its completion, the main priority was to identify the resource flows from the federal government and some selected states. Efforts to estimate spending on pollution control and other environmental activities by the private sector were also made. In addition, the issue of funding sources is also discussed. Despite many methodological problems involved in the elaboration of these indicators, it was possible to identify trends and conclusions for environmental spending. At the federal government level, it was estimated that environmental expenditures were between 0.4% and 1% of the federal spending. Another important finding was that, although there was an official commitment to increase efforts in this area after the Rio 92 Conference, the overall federal government expenditures in environmental issues did not increase during the 1993-2000 period. Moreover, a matter of concern was the declining quality of this spending, with fewer resources directed to end-activities and more money diverted to means-expenditures. An important cause of this was the increasing share of debt related expenditures (interests and amortization) in the total budget. On the other hand, investments suffered cutbacks, particularly in the more recent period, and the expenditures in personnel fell systematically by 25% in constant prices during the second half of the nineties. Environmental projects are the most important single element in international cooperation agreements. However, the flow of foreign resources presented a declining trend since 1994, oscillating between 6% and 17% of total expenditures. Most of these resources come from external credit operations (loans), which means that in the long term, they represent an extra pressure of financial expenses in the budget. The proportion of international donations/total expenditures in 2000 fell to the lowest level in the series (2.0%), clearly indicating the decline of international support for environmental projects in Brazil. Results for the 1996-98 period show that, if sanitation costs are included (an overestimate since it also considers water supply), environmental expenditures are relatively more important for local governments: around 9% of the total public spending in the sample of municipios considered. State governments are in the second position, spending around 1.5% of their budget on environmental issues, in contrast to the less than 1% of the federal government. For this reason, there remains a clear need to generate better aggregate figures for the states and municipios for the whole period. The methodologies used for public budgeting and expenditure control vary widely, making it very hard to supply compatible aggregate numbers. In the three states where longer time series were estimated (São Paulo, Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul), there was no consistent trend of increasing expenditures on environmental objectives. Another gap that needs to be fulfilled refers to the private sector environmental spending. There were positive signals which indicated that the private sector is getting more concerned with the environmental issues, particularly those agents that have interests/responsibilities at the international level. It was calculated that the environmental spending of the industry sector was around R$ 160 million per year, slightly less than 1% of its value added. Although it is expected that this number will increase in the future, it is considerably lower than the public sector spending on environmental issues. It is very difficult to aggregate all these figures, but assuming for the year 2000 that the public spending on environmental issues was of 1.5% of the total, the public environmental spending would be of 0.33% of GDP, and an annual expenditure per capita of R$ 22.9 per capita (US$ 9.2 per capita). If the estimated industrial environmental spending (R$ 160 million) is added, the total spending becomes R$ 4.1 billion (0.34% of GDP), or R$ 23.9 per capita (US$ 9.6 per capita). Most of the funding for environmental projects comes from the government (mainly federal, through BNDES), international development agencies, or from companies' own resources. The private financial sector has a minor role on the financing of environmental expenditures but, gain, there are signals of positive changes, with the creation of innovative private funds specialized in environmentally friendly projects that combine financial and "green" interests as an example. The consolidation of economic instruments in international environmental agreements, particularly the Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gases emissions, may accelerate this new financial market. Another potential source of funding for environmental projects is connected to the implementation of economic instruments in the environmental management system. Command-andcontrol procedures, such as licensing and emission standards, largely dominate the environmental regulation in Brazil. However, some interesting experiences, such as the "green" tax rebound (ICMS verde) and the recent changes in the water resources policy adopting the user/polluter-pays principle, indicate that the role of economic instruments will increase and, consequently, that there is potential for developing self-sustained financial mechanisms to sponsor environmental expenditures. (1) After the completion of this research, the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) published estimates of public spending for the 1996-98 period (IBGE 2001). Whenever relevant, these figures were also added to the analysis, but with an alert that they were obtained using different methodological procedures."
Fernando Filgueira, Herman Kamil, Fernando Lorenzo, Juan Andrés Moraes · 5 authors
This paper analyzes the reasons behind Central Government (CG) bailouts of Subnational Governments (SNGs) in the case of Uruguay. We argued that Uruguay represents a good example of the risks of fiscal decentralization, in the context of adjustment policies, and when SNGs` responsibilities and resources have not been carefully defined. We show that, in unitary countries where SNGs lack the opportunities to misbehave that they have in federal countries (e. g. , public debt issuance, international borrowing), SNG officials find ways to finance deficits through non-compliance with politically contestable obligations. In particular, SNGs in Uruguay finance their deficits by accumulating debts with other government agencies and obtaining discretionary transfers from the CG. Through statistical analyses we show that debts and deficits are mainly related to vertical fiscal imbalances and economic conditions in the SN jurisdictions. Yet, the analysis of recent bailout episodes suggests that institutions and political factors play a role (i. e. , they are important ex-post factors). This implies that bailouts have been more than simple compensations for structural imbalances, thus creating opportunities for strategic behavior on the part of SNG authorities (partly confirmed by the disparate fiscal performance of Montevideo vis-à-vis the rest of the country).
Fiscal decentralization reform, the reform of fiscal relations between different levels of government, is an important fiscal policy issue in many African countries. While for many African nations the decentralized delivery of government goods and services is a relatively new concept, the issue of intergovernmental fiscal relations has been a constant and important fiscal policy consideration in Nigeria since the country's independence in 1960. Despite Nigeria's long history with a federal government structure, until recently it was hard to truly consider Nigeria as an effectively decentralized country. For much of the country's history, successive military regimes dismissed elected officials and legislative bodies at all levels of government and replaced them with military appointees; since under military rule subnational governments in Nigeria were accountable to the country's military authorities rather than to state or local electorates, we cannot properly speak of political and fiscal decentralization during this period. Nonetheless, in many respects Nigeria's basic decentralized federal administrative structure was maintained by successive military regimes. Under military rule, state and local governments continued to operate as distinct government units, provide important government services, collecting own source revenues and receiving intergovernmental transfers, albeit at the direction of military governors and appointed local executives rather than at the discretion of the local electorate. However, with the return of civilian rule to Nigeria in 1999, which entailed the adoption of a new constitution and the election of government officials and legislative assemblies at all levels of government, Nigeria instantaneously became one of the most decentralized countries in Africa.To this effect, this paper presents a broad overview of intergovernmental fiscal relations in Nigeria. This paper follows the main conceptual building blocks or pillars of fiscal decentralization and subnational publc finance. After a brief overview of Nigeria's federal system, Section 2 discusses the assignment of functional responsibilities in Nigeria's federal system. Section 3 presents an analysis of revenue assignments, considering what revenue sources are available to each level of government. Section 4 looks at the design and implementation of Nigeria's system of intergovernmental transfers. Section 5 considers subnational fiscal management issues, including the importance of capital "development" budgets in the Nigerian budget process. Finally, Section 6 considers the role and status of local governments and state-local government relations.
* Infrastructure investment may indirectly affect firm productivity and household welfare through its impact on the location of economic activity. * State infrastructure policies currently favor decentralization--the opening of new territory to development and the movement of firms and households from dense urban environments to the surrounding suburbs. * Recent research, however, suggests that the clustering of producers and consumers in a given geographic area is economically and socially beneficial. * In light of this research, institutional reforms that would change the management and direction of public infrastructure investment may be in order. Agencies authorized to choose and finance investments that promote regional well-being would most likely target more investment to central cities and less to the surrounding suburbs. Public infrastructure is an important part of a well-functioning urban economy. Such infrastructure--defined here as publicly owned and maintained physical capital--has historically played a central role in allowing cities to grow by mitigating or reducing problems such as congested roadways, potholes, water-main breaks, and overcrowded schools. Yet while the benefit of some public works can hardly be disputed, a key policy issue is whether additions to our stock of public infrastructure provide overall benefits that exceed their costs. (1) That is to say, is the amount of infrastructure we have sufficient, or would we benefit from an increase? Another important question is, do our institutional structures promote efficient infrastructure investment decisions? As these questions suggest, the status of urban public infrastructure is an important topic. Education and highway facilities are being stretched to their limits in fast-growing cities and suburbs, while concerns are being raised about the level and physical condition of public works in slower growing, older central cities. (2) No doubt, public investment is an important function of government, and it is particularly crucial at the state and local level. In 1999, states and localities invested more than $210 billion in equipment, software, and structures (Table 1). By combining this amount with the nearly $43 billion in nondefense investments made by the federal government, we see that new gross public investment in 1999 exceeded a quarter-trillion dollars, or 2.7 percent of GDP. Moreover, the stock of publicly owned nondefense capital in 1999 exceeded $4.5 trillion, or nearly 50 percent of GDP. (3) Although complete data on the geographic distribution of this spending are not available, it is certain that a large share of these national totals, particularly the state and local portions, is going to public investment in and around America's metropolitan areas. More than 200 million people reside in these areas, and the public investments made there affect the lives of a large and growing share of the U.S. population. (4) Accordingly, the question of whether we should increase the amount of infrastructure available has received much attention from economists. This article puts that research into a broad perspective, attempts to draw policy conclusions from what is known, and suggests some directions for further research. Infrastructure investments can affect social welfare in two ways (see Appendix A). One way is by adding to economic growth. The relationship between infrastructure and economic growth has been the subject of intensive economic research over the past decade. The second way in which infrastructure investments can affect social welfare is by potentially improving the quality of life of those living in the invested area. For example, public parks, water systems, and other facilities can improve social welfare without having any effect on residents' incomes. This article also examines this second channel, which has received less attention in the research, in part because the value of quality-of-life improvements is difficult to measure. …
Teresa García-Milá, Timothy J. Goodspeed, Therese J. McGuire
As part of a process of democratization, many countries spanning Europe, Latin Amertica, Africa, and Asia are reorganizing their governments bydevolving fiscal responsibility and authority to newly empowered regionaland local governments. Although decentralization in each country proceedsdifferently, a common element tends to be an initially heavy relianceon central government grants to fund regional spending. We develop atheoretical model of regional borrowing decisions in which the incentivesfor regional borrowing depend crucially on how the regions expect thefederal system of finance to evolve. We examine the implications of themodel using data on Spanish regions for the period 1984-1995 and findevidence that regions may be borrowing inefficiently in response toincentives imbedded in the Spanish system of fiscal decentralization.
South Africa is at a crossroads in its decentralization policy. On the one hand, it has declared its intention to strengthen the fiscal powers of local governments. On the other hand, the institutional arrangement necessary to guarantee fiscal decentralization, the power to raise local revenues, has not yet been fully defined. Nor has a target been set for the vertical division of resources between the central and lower levels of government. The revenue dimension of fiscal decentralization in South Africa is the subject of this paper. In this paper, we describe the system of local government and local government finance in South Africa. We turn then to a discussion of the normative criteria for proper revenue assignment in an intergovernmental system, and to an evaluation of each of the major revenue sources. In that context, we consider the potential role of the property tax as a source of financing local government in South Africa.
South Africa is at a crossroads in its decentralization policy. On the one hand, it has declared its intention to strengthen the fiscal powers of local governments. On the other hand, the institutional arrangements to guarantee fiscal decentralization -- revenue powers and expenditure responsibility -- have not yet been fully defined. Nor has a target been set for the vertical division of resources between the central and lower levels of government. The revenue dimension of fiscal decentralization in South Africa, particularly the question of an equitable vertical share for local governments, is the subject of this paper.In the first section of the paper, we ask how South Africa fits the profile of countries that are “good” candidates for decentralization. We then turn to a description of vertical revenue sharing as it presently exists in South Africa. We also offer a proposal about how an equitable vertical share for South Africa should be determined. A final section summarizes the results. The policy question raised in this paper is straightforward: What percent of all tax and non-tax revenues should be assigned to the central government and what percent should be assigned to the local government? The implementation question is also straightforward: Once the assignment is decided, how do we structure each revenue instrument to guarantee the “desired” assignment of resources?
Based on cross-country data for up to 78 countries, this paper shows that fiscal decentralization-the assignment of expenditure and revenue mobilization functions to subnational levels of government-is associated with various indicators of governance, such as corruption, rule of law, and government effectiveness. Unlike previous studies in the decentralization/governance literature, which focus primarily on expenditure-based measures of decentralization, the results reported in this paper show that the relationship between decentralization and governance depends on how subnational expenditures are financed. The higher the share in total subnational revenues of nontax revenues and grants and transfers from higher levels of government, the stronger the association between decentralization and governance.
The biggest tax story of the last third of the 20 th century was the value-added tax (VAT). From its tentative beginnings in the reform of the French production tax in the early 1950s, by August 2000 some form of VAT existed in at least 123 countries. Few fiscal innovations have been adopted so widely and so quickly. Towards the close of the century, another striking trend was the increasing decentralization of the public sector in many countries around the world. In this process, increasing responsibility for delivering such important and expensive public services as education and health has been devolved to sub-national governments, often to regional governments such as states or provinces. Such decentralization may make good sense in many respects, but experience suggests that it is essential to devolve responsibility not only for expenditures but also for some significant revenues if adequate fiscal accountability is to be maintained.The traditional literature on tax assignment suggests that the best form of taxation for intermediate-level governments is a sales tax. Some form or another of sales tax does in fact constitute the major source of finance for intermediate governments in many countries. Indeed, in developing countries in which income taxes do not play a major role, it is hard to see what other major revenue sources such governments could utilize. The retail sales tax once favored as a regional tax, and still in place in most U.S. states (and some Canadian provinces) is now an aberrationfrom a worldwide perspective. The only good sales tax is now generally considered to be a VAT.There appear to be at least three reasons why the question of sub-national consumption VATs needs to bereconsidered, particularly in federal countries with important regional governments. First, there are few other major revenue options open to countries in which, for whatever reason, substantial expenditure responsibilities have been shifted to lower levels of government, if those governments are to behave in a fiscally responsible manner. Second, sub-national VATs have now in fact been successfully operating in Canada for a decade and have also existed, if to less general acclaim, in Brazil for over 30 years. Finally, several novel proposals have recently been made to overcome certain problems that some see with applying the system used in Canada to other countries in which tax administration is less well developed.
Abstract Decentralization in Latin America has dramatically transformed the public sector, producing a quiet revolution of popular participation in public choices at the local level. The process of decentralization has had its share of frustra tions, dangers, and false starts in the Latin American region. Fuzzy or overlap ping divisions of labor, associated threats of fiscal instability, and sustained finance for urban infrastructure still remain to be resolved in many countries. But decentralization has also produced a new generation of leaders, particularly at the local level. Several opinion polls have shown that local, elected officials were more trusted by voters and more responsive than ever to their constituents. They were also energetic, proactive, and vocal. New leaders exhibited a drive to deliver, and this made them eager consumers of new ideas and techniques. They have invented or adopted many ways to mobilize local participation, strengthen organizational capacities, and even raise local taxes, despite increasing fiows of shared revenues from central governments.
This paper analyzes financial dual track in China. We show that the co-existence of a soft-budget track (under centralized financing) and a hard-budget track (under decentralized financing) can be strictly more efficient than the two pure cases. Our argument is as follows. First, a hard budget constraint alone is not sufficient to induce sound firm performances, positive incentives in terms of firms' profitability are needed as well. Second, for an economy such as China where many firms are hopeless money losers, there is pecuniary externality in financing. That is, the total number of firms financed into operation in the economy can affect the profitability of all firms. This paper offers a number of examples of such externality. In such an economy, centralized financing helps internalize the externality, improving firms' profitability, and yet it leads to a soft budget constraint. Under decentralized financing, budget constraint is hard, but firms suffer from low profitability. A financial dual track does better: the existence of the soft-budget sector improves profitability, enhancing the disciplinary effect in the hard-budget sector. Based on this analysis, the paper sheds light on the complementary relation between soft budget constraint syndrome in the state sector and the remarkable growth of the non-state sector in China
The purpose of this paper is to examine the redistributive effects of interregional transfer of local taxes and grants from central to local government. We also examine the redistributive consequences of decentralization in the local public finance system. Especially, we focus on the impacts of the devolution of revenue instruments on the local governments. To analyze the redistributive effects, we employ the Reynolds-Smolensky index based on the Lorenz function and its decomposition. Our results show that the devolution of revenue instruments to local governments may increase the income differences among the regions
An alternative to centralized top‐down city governance is a multi‐level bottom‐up structure based on small neighborhood contractual communities. This paper analyzes the voting rules and public finances of decentralized, contractual urban governance and the likely outcome of such a constitutional structure, substantially reduced transfer seeking or rent seeking. Tax and service substitution, with lower‐level funding and services substituting for higher‐level public finance, is the general process by which the governance would devolve. Land rent is the most feasible source of such decentralized public finance, and local communities could also engage in local currency and credit services. Some empirical examples demonstrate the implementation of some of these governance structures.
The author studies the \n allocation-between a central government and a local \n authority--of responsibility for planning, financing, and \n operations for the delivery of health services, in the \n context of an incomplete contracts model. In this model, \n inputs are required of both the central government and local \n authorities but they are unable to write down, and commit \n to, a complete and binding contract describing the actions \n both should take. The model is meant to capture the tradeoff \n between central and local authority in decisions about both \n financing and the provision of services. Each party provides \n a specific input--for example, the central government \n establishes a drug procurement system while the local \n authority designs and implements an incentive scheme to get \n doctors to carry out their responsibilities appropriately. \n The responsibility for delivery of services is identified \n with the ownership of essential infrastructure, such as the \n clinic or hospital. The author finds that to maximize the \n joint surplus of the two public bodies: Ownership of the \n facility should be given to the party that most values the \n well-being of local residents. (This way, if ex post \n bargaining breaks down, each still enjoys some benefits from \n the other's actions.) Financing authority and \n responsibility for delivering services should be negatively \n correlated. Generally it is optimal to allocate tax \n authority to the party that values the residents' \n well-being less--in other words, separate spending \n responsibility (ownership) from financing authority. A \n heavier financing burden (access to a small and inefficient \n tax base) has the same incentive effect as asset ownership: \n It increases the return to effort. If transferring ownership \n of the physical asset is costly (because the party that \n builds the asset has an inherent advantage in operating \n it-that is, there is some human capital embodiment), it may \n be optimal for the party with the higher construction costs \n to have planning authority. Somewhat paradoxically, the \n greater the costs of transferring assets from one party to \n the other, the more likely that ownership of the facilities \n and their provision should be separated.
Stan Chervin, Kelly D. Edmiston, Matthew N. Murray
Decentralized systems of government finance give rise to fiscal disparities due to interjurisdictional variations in tax bases and expenditure needs. Intergovernmental aid is used to address such disparities. This article explores changes in local tax capacity and intergovernmental aid resulting from urban shopping malls that extract retail sales and sales tax revenue away from surrounding areas, especially rural counties. A model is developed and estimated to determine the impact of urban malls on local government sales tax bases, controlling for sales tax rate differentials and other factors. The results reveal a 15.9% decline in the sales tax base for counties in close proximity to two newmalls. The analysis is extended to examine impacts of changing local tax capacity on state education aid. Based on the programconsidered here, less than 20% of the loss in own-source revenue is recovered through increased aid.
This paper takes a fresh look at the trade-off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods. The point of departure is to model a centralized system as one in which public spending is financed by general taxation, but districts can receive different levels of local public goods. In a world of benevolent governments, the disadvantages of centralization stressed in the existing literature disappear, suggesting that the case for decentralization must be driven by political economy considerations. Our political economy analysis assumes that under decentralization public goods are selected by locally elected representatives, while under a centralized system policy choices are determined by a legislature consisting of elected representatives from each district. We then study the role of taste heterogeneity, spillovers and legislative behaviour in determining the case for centralization.
this paper was presented at the Institute for Social and Economic Change (ISEC)-World Bank Institute Conference on "Decentralization and the Making of Sub-national Policy" at Bangalore on May 25, 1999.