Random K-out graphs are receiving attention as a model to construct sparse yet well-connected topologies in distributed systems including sensor networks, federated learning, and cryptocurrency networks. In response to the growing heterogeneity in emerging real-world networks, where nodes differ in resources and requirements, inhomogeneous random K-out graphs, denoted by $H(n;Ό,K_n)$, were proposed recently. Motivated by practical settings where establishing links is costly and only a bounded choice of $K_n$ is feasible ($K_n = O(1)$), we study the size of the largest connected sub-network of $H(n;Ό,K_n)$, We first show that the trivial condition of $K_n \geq 2$ for all $n$ is sufficient to ensure that $H(n;Ό,K_n)$, contains a giant component of size $n-O(1)$ whp. Next, to model settings where nodes can fail or get compromised, we investigate the size of the largest connected sub-network in $H(n;Ό,K_n)$, when $d_n$ nodes are selected uniformly at random and removed from the network. We show that if $d_n=O(1)$, a giant component of size $n- \OO(1)$ persists for all $K_n \geq 2$ whp. Further, when $d_n=o(n)$ nodes are removed from $H(n;Ό,K_n)$, the remaining nodes contain a giant component of size $n(1-o(1))$ whp for all $K_n \geq 2$. We present numerical results to demonstrate the size of the largest connected component when the number of nodes is finite.
In this paper, we provide a new theoretical framework of pyramid Markov processes to solve some open and fundamental problems of blockchain selfish mining under a rigorous mathematical setting. We first describe a more general model of blockchain selfish mining with both a two-block leading competitive criterion and a new economic incentive mechanism. Then we establish a pyramid Markov process and show that it is irreducible and positive recurrent, and its stationary probability vector is matrix-geometric with an explicitly representable rate matrix. Also, we use the stationary probability vector to study the influence of many orphan blocks on the waste of computing resource. Next, we set up a pyramid Markov reward process to investigate the long-run average profits of the honest and dishonest mining pools, respectively. As a by-product, we build three approximative Markov processes and provide some new interesting interpretation on the Markov chain and the revenue analysis reported in the seminal work by Eyal and Sirer (2014). Note that the pyramid Markov (reward) processes can open up a new avenue in the study of blockchain selfish mining. Thus we hope that the methodology and results developed in this paper shed light on the blockchain selfish mining such that a series of promising research can be developed potentially.
LÄcrÄmioara AĆtefÄnoaei, Pierre Chambart, Antonella Del Pozzo, Thibault Rieutord · 6 authors
First-generation blockchains provide probabilistic finality: a block can be revoked, albeit the probability decreases as the block "sinks" deeper into the chain. Recent proposals revisited committee-based BFT consensus to provide deterministic finality: as soon as a block is validated, it is never revoked. A distinguishing characteristic of these second-generation blockchains over classical BFT protocols is that committees change over time as the participation and the blockchain state evolve. In this paper, we push forward in this direction by proposing a formalization of the Dynamic Repeated Consensus problem and by providing generic procedures to solve it in the context of blockchains. Our approach is modular in that one can plug in different synchronizers and single-shot consensus. To offer a complete solution, we provide a concrete instantiation, called {{Tenderbake}}, and present a blockchain synchronizer and a single-shot consensus algorithm, working in a Byzantine and partially synchronous system model with eventually synchronous clocks. In contrast to recent proposals, our methodology is driven by the need to bound the message buffers. This is essential in preventing spamming and run-time memory errors. Moreover, {{Tenderbake}} processes can synchronize with each other without exchanging messages, leveraging instead the information stored in the blockchain.
Cryptocurrency networks, such as Bitcoin, have emerged as a distributed alternative to traditional centralized financial transaction networks. However, there are major challenges in scaling up the throughput of such networks. Lightning network and Spider network are alternates that build bidirectional payment channels on top of cryptocurrency networks using smart contracts, to enable fast transactions that bypass the Blockchain. In this article, we study the problem of routing transactions in such a payment processing network. We first propose a Stochastic model to study such a system, as opposed to a fluid model that is studied in the literature. Each link in such a model is a two-sided queue, and unlike classical queues, such queues are not stable unless there is an external control. We propose a notion of stability for the payment processing network consisting of such two-sided queues using the notion of on-chain rebalancing. We then characterize the capacity region and propose a throughput optimal algorithm that stabilizes the system under any load within the capacity region. The stochastic model enables us to study closed-loop policies, which typically have better queuing/delay performance than the open-loop policies (or static split rules) studied in the literature. We investigate this through simulations.
Nakamoto double spend strategy, described in Bitcoin foundational article, leads to total ruin with positive probability and does not make sense from the profitability point of view. The simplest strategy that can be profitable incorporates a stopping threshold when success is unlikely. We solve and compute the exact profitability for this strategy. We compute the minimal amount of the double spend that is profitable. For a given amount of the transaction, we determine the minimal number of confirmations to be requested by the recipient such that this double spend strategy is non-profitable. We find that this number of confirmations is only 1 or 2 for average transactions and a small hashrate of the attacker. This is substantially lower than the original Nakamoto numbers that are widely used and are only based on the success probability instead of the profitability.
This paper presents a novel leaderless protocol (FPC-BI: Fast Probabilistic Consensus within Byzantine Infrastructures) with a low communicational complexity and which allows a set of nodes to come to a consensus on a value of a single bit. The paper makes the assumption that part of the nodes are Byzantine, and are thus controlled by an adversary who intends to either delay the consensus, or break it (this defines that at least a couple of honest nodes come to different conclusions). We prove that, nevertheless, the protocol works with high probability when its parameters are suitably chosen. Along this the paper also provides explicit estimates on the probability that the protocol finalizes in the consensus state in a given time. This protocol could be applied to reaching consensus in decentralized cryptocurrency systems. A special feature of it is that it makes use of a sequence of random numbers which are either provided by a trusted source or generated by the nodes themselves using some decentralized random number generating protocol. This increases the overall trustworthiness of the infrastructure. A core contribution of the paper is that it uses a very weak consensus to obtain a strong consensus on the value of a bit, and which can relate to the validity of a transaction.
This paper deals with the design of the secure network in an Enhanced Internet of Vehicles by using the Blockchain Governance Game (BGG). The BGG is a system model of a stochastic game to find best strategies towards preparation of preventing a network malfunction by an attacker and the paper applies this game model into the connected vehicle security. Analytically tractable results for decision-making parameters enable to predict the moment for safety operations and to deliver the optimal combination of the number of reserved nodes with the acceptance probability of backup nodes to protect a connected car. This research helps for whom considers the enhanced secure IoV architecture with the BGG within a decentralized network.
Apr 20, 2019·MaxEnt 2019 - Proceedings of the 39th International Workshop on Bayesian Inference and Maximum Entropy Methods in Science and Engineering, Garching, Germany, 30 June - 5 July 2019
Randomization is an integral part of well-designed statistical trials, and is also a required procedure in legal systems. Implementation of honest, unbiased, understandable, secure, traceable, auditable and collusion resistant randomization procedures is a mater of great legal, social and political importance. Given the juridical and social importance of randomization, it is important to develop procedures in full compliance with the following desiderata: (a) Statistical soundness and computational efficiency; (b) Procedural, cryptographical and computational security; (c) Complete auditability and traceability; (d) Any attempt by participating parties or coalitions to spuriously influence the procedure should be either unsuccessful or be detected; (e) Open-source programming; (f) Multiple hardware platform and operating system implementation; (g) User friendliness and transparency; (h) Flexibility and adaptability for the needs and requirements of multiple application areas (like, for example, clinical trials, selection of jury or judges in legal proceedings, and draft lotteries). This paper presents a simple and easy to implement randomization protocol that assures, in a formal mathematical setting, full compliance to the aforementioned desiderata for randomization procedures.
Dorje C. Brody, Lane P. Hughston, Bernhard K. Meister
A term structure model in which the short rate is zero is developed as a candidate for a theory of cryptocurrency interest rates. The price processes of crypto discount bonds are worked out, along with expressions for the instantaneous forward rates and the prices of interest-rate derivatives. The model admits functional degrees of freedom that can be calibrated to the initial yield curve and other market data. Our analysis suggests that strict local martingales can be used for modelling the pricing kernels associated with virtual currencies based on distributed ledger technologies.
This paper deals with design of the alternative secure Blockchain network framework to prevent damages from an attacker. The concept of the strategic alliance of the management is applied on the top of the recent developed stochastic game framework. This new enhanced hybrid theoretical model has been developed based on the combination of the conventional game theory, the fluctuation theory and the Blockchain Governance Game to find best strategies towards preparation for preventing a network malfunction from an attacker by making the strategic alliance with other genuine miners. Analytically tractable results for decision making parameters are fully obtained which enable to predict the moment for operations and deliver the optimal number of the alliance with other nodes to protect the Blockchain network. This research helps for whom considers the initial coin offering or launching new blockchain based services with enhancing the security features by alliance with the trusted miners within the decentralized network.
Abstract A shared ledger is a record of transactions that can be updated by any member of a group of users. The notion of independent and consistent record-keeping in a shared ledger is important for blockchain and more generally for distributed ledger technologies. In this paper we analyze a stochastic model for the shared ledger known as the tangle, which was devised as the basis for the IOTA cryptocurrency. The model is a random directed acyclic graph, and its growth is described by a non-Markovian stochastic process. We first prove ergodicity of the stochastic process, and then derive a delay differential equation for the fluid model which describes the tangle at high arrival rate. We prove convergence in probability of the tangle process to the fluid model, and also prove global stability of the fluid model. The convergence proof relies on martingale techniques.
We give a straightforward proof for the formula giving the long-term apparent hashrate of the Selfish Mining strategy in Bitcoin using only elementary probabilities and combinatorics, and more precisely, Dyck words. There is no need to compute stationary probabilities on Markov chain nor stopping times for Poisson processes as it was previously done. We consider also several other block withholding strategies.
Motivated by applications in blockchains and sensor networks, we consider a model of $n$ nodes trying to reach consensus on their majority bit. Each node $i$ is assigned a bit at time zero, and is a finite automaton with $m$ bits of memory (i.e., $2^m$ states) and a Poisson clock. When the clock of $i$ rings, $i$ can choose to communicate, and is then matched to a uniformly chosen node $j$. The nodes $j$ and $i$ may update their states based on the state of the other node. Previous work has focused on minimizing the time to consensus and the probability of error, while our goal is minimizing the number of communications. We show that when $m>3 \log\log\log(n)$, consensus can be reached at linear communication cost, but this is impossible if $m<\log\log\log(n)$. We also study a synchronous variant of the model, where our upper and lower bounds on $m$ for achieving linear communication cost are $2\log\log\log(n)$ and $\log\log\log(n)$, respectively. A key step is to distinguish when nodes can become aware of knowing the majority bit and stop communicating. We show that this is impossible if their memory is too low.
We compute the revenue ratio of the Trail Stubborn mining strategy in the Bitcoin network and compare its profitability to other block-withholding strategies. We use for this martingale techniques and a classical analysis of the hiker problem. In this strategy the attacker could find himself mining in a shorter fork, but we prove that for some parameter values it is still profitable to not give up. This confirms previous numerical studies.
Blockchain has many benefits including decentralization, availability, persistency, consistency, anonymity, auditability and accountability, and it also covers a wide spectrum of applications ranging from cryptocurrency, financial services, reputation system, Internet of Things, sharing economy to public and social services. Not only may blockchain be regarded as a by-product of Bitcoin cryptocurrency systems, but also it is a type of distributed ledger technology through using a trustworthy, decentralized log of totally ordered transactions. By summarizing the literature of blockchain, it is found that more papers focus on engineering implementation and realization, while little work has been done on basic theory, for example, mathematical models (Markov processes, queueing theory and game models), performance analysis and optimization of blockchain systems. In this paper, we develop queueing theory of blockchain systems and provide system performance evaluation. To do this, we design a Markovian batch-service queueing system with two different service stages, while the two stages are suitable to well express the mining process in the miners pool and the building of a new blockchain. By using the matrix-geometric solution, we obtain a system stable condition and express three key performance measures: (a) The number of transactions in the queue, (b) the number of transactions in a block, and (c) the transaction-confirmation time. Finally, We use numerical examples to verify computability of our theoretical results. Although our queueing model is simple under exponential or Poisson assumptions, our analytic method will open a series of potentially promising research in queueing theory of blockchain systems.
We compute and compare profitabilities of stubborn mining strategies that are variations of selfish mining. These are deviant mining strategies violating Bitcoin's network protocol rules. We apply the foundational set-up from our previous companion article on the profitability of selfish mining, and the new martingale techniques to get a closed-form computation for the revenue ratio, which is the correct benchmark for profitability. Catalan numbers and Catalan distributions appear in the closed-form computations. This marks the first appearance of Catalan numbers in the Mathematics of the Bitcoin protocol.
We review the so called selfish mining strategy in the Bitcoin network and compare its profitability to honest mining.We build a rigorous profitability model for repetition games. The time analysis of the attack has been ignored in the previous literature based on a Markov model,but is critical. Using martingale's techniques and Doob Stopping Time Theorem we compute the expected duration of attack cycles. We discover a remarkable property of the bitcoin network: no strategy is more profitable than the honest strategy before a difficulty adjustment. So selfish mining can only become profitable afterwards, thus it is an attack on the difficulty adjustment algorithm. We propose an improvement of Bitcoin protocol making it immune to selfish mining attacks. We also study miner's attraction to selfish mining pools. We calculate the expected duration time before profit for the selfish miner, a computation that is out of reach by the previous Markov models.
We analyse the Tangle --- a DAG-valued stochastic process where new vertices get attached to the graph at Poissonian times, and the attachment's locations are chosen by means of random walks on that graph. These new vertices, also thought of as "transactions", are issued by many players (which are the nodes of the network), independently. The main application of this model is that it is used as a base for the IOTA cryptocurrency system (www.iota.org). We prove existence of "almost symmetric" Nash equilibria for the system where a part of players tries to optimize their attachment strategies. Then, we also present simulations that show that the "selfish" players will nevertheless cooperate with the network by choosing attachment strategies that are similar to the "recommended" one.
The synchronization process inherent to the Bitcoin network gives rise to an infinite-server model with the unusual feature that customers interact. Among the closed-form characteristics that we derive for this model is the busy period distribution which, counterintuitively, does not depend on the arrival rate. We explain this by exploiting the equivalence between two specific service disciplines, which is also used to derive the model's stationary distribution. Next to these closed-form results, the second major contribution concerns an asymptotic result: a fluid limit in the presence of service delays. Since fluid limits arise under scalings of the law-of-large-numbers type, they are usually deterministic, but in the setting of the model discussed in this paper the fluid limit is random (more specifically, of growth-collapse type).
We correct the double spend race analysis given in Nakamotoâs foundational Bitcoin article and find the exact closed-form formula for the probability of success of a double spend attack using the regularized incomplete beta function. We give the first proof of its exponential decay on the number of confirmations, often cited in the literature, and find an asymptotic formula. Larger number of confirmations are required compared to those given by Nakamoto. We also compute this probability conditional to the knowledge of the time of the confirmations. This provides a finer risk analysis than the classical one.