Blockchain Papers

Enrico Petracca, Shaun Gallagher

Abstract The stated aim of cryptocurrencies is to free the monetary system from the need to trust financial intermediaries, by relying on incentive design and technology. Many descriptive studies, however, have questioned cryptocurrencies’ delivery on the promise of trustlessness. This paper promotes a normative analysis of trust in cryptocurrencies by discussing (i) whether trust is in principle eliminable, and (ii) whether trustlessness is in itself a desirable goal. These issues are closely related, we argue, to the further issue of what kind of institutions cryptocurrencies represent. We discuss the cognitive functions played by cryptocurrencies through the lens of the “extended mind” hypothesis in the philosophy of mind and hence conceive of cryptocurrencies as mind-extending institutions. As the models of institutional mind extension differ in the fiduciary bond they assume exists between individuals and institutional resources, we compare the reliance-based model of “scaffolding institutions” with the trust-based model of “cognitive institutions,” showing that the ineliminability and desirability of trust lead to seeing cryptocurrencies as instances of the latter. In the end, our discussion suggests that trust is a necessary component of cryptocurrencies’ cognitive functions and its promotion helps to perform such cognitive functions more effectively and sustainably

Claudia Westermann, Tanu Gupta

The editorial introduces issue 21.1 of Technoetic Arts via a critical reflection on the artificial intelligence hype (AI hype) that emerged in 2022 and gives an overview of each of the issue’s ten articles. The first four articles engage with new technologies from different positions in art and architecture. These articles include an exploration of the indexical function of images as a means for revealing cultural premises governing public space during the pandemic in Hong Kong, a neuroarchitectural perspective on immersive architectural environments, and an investigation of the link between the popularity of immersive art installations and the emotions these installations generate. The ‘Cryptoart’ section features an ethnographic study of the DADA digital art collective, shedding light on the role of non-fungible tokens (NFTs) in community building. Guest-edited by Professor Tanu Gupta, the Special Section ‘Perspectives from Chandigarh’ constitutes the second part of the journal issue. Based on contributions to the national conference on Contemporary Perspectives in English Language, Literature, and Cultural Studies held on 15–16 July 2022, at Chandigarh University in Punjab, India, the six articles reflect a search for meaningful existence within colonial, patriarchal and biopolitical structures that frame everyday practices of exclusion and oppression. Discussing works of literature and cinema from the European, Japanese and the US American canon, the articles contribute a distinctive perspective to the critical analysis of contemporary societies that are shaped by the idea that progress is technological invention.

Jan Westerhoff

I was intrigued to see that there was surprisingly little overlap in the responses by the three critics. It therefore seemed most sensible to treat each critic’s points separately, which is what I have done below. I hope I have managed to say something substantial on each of the points they brought up. While I harbour no illusions about my comments resolving all of the concerns raised to each critic’s satisfaction, I hope that the response helps to elucidate unclarities in the earlier exposition of my ideas and may, perhaps, provide resources for the further philosophical exploration of the views discussed. In relation to my discussion of Hohwy’s prediction-error minimization framework, Das rightly points out that nothing in this approach entails that our representations cannot carry information and hence yield knowledge about the external world. Indeed, some interpreters see this approach as a way of discovering the ‘hidden causes’ of whatever it is that brings about the changes in the outer nodes of our Markov blanket, arguing that the generative model ‘recapitulates’ the causal-probabilistic structure of the external environment that impinges on the organism’s sensory apparatus. It constantly generates, in a top-down manner, a flow of virtual or mock sensory signals that predicts the unfolding of sensory signals by external causes. 1 Similarly, some forms of Bayesianism see it as a way of discovering the true probabilities out there in the world (the ‘Lord’s prior’). What I am trying to argue is that neither appealing to the existence of some external item represented nor appealing to the accuracy of our representation (both the prediction-error minimizer and the Bayesian are likely to say that there are some structural features of the ‘hidden causes’ or the ‘true probabilities’ that our beliefs will capture) is necessary for the prediction-error minimization theory; in fact, that the theory would be in better shape if it dispensed with this idea. Considerations of parsimony aside, it is hard to make sense of the kind of connection supposed to exist between things inside and outside of the Markov blanket. On the one hand such a relation should be inside the Markov blanket for us to be able to think about it. Yet it also needs to reach beyond it to link up with the ‘hidden causes’. But if we can conceptualize a relationship and one relatum, the status of the other relatum does not appear to be quite as inaccessible as the idea of the explanatory-evidentiary boundary makes out. As such, the notion of a ‘connection’ with something outside of the Markov blanket is something we should do without.2 Das notes that ‘if the form of intentionalism sketched above is right, nothing in Hoffman’s account rules out the possibility that we can perceptually represent mind-independent properties of objects in our environment’. According to Das’s intentionalism, we represent a certain property in our environment if we are in an internal state that ‘has the biological function of indicating that property’. Certain internal states of an organism might have the function of indicating the presence of water. Does that mean that our internal state represents the mind-independent property of there being water in our environment? Not according to Hoffman’s account. What Hoffman sets out to show is that our perceptual capacities are not geared towards indicating properties the environment has no matter what, but that they have been shaped by evolution to indicate instances of fitness arising from an organism in an environment. An organism’s internal states do not have the function of indicating properties of the environment, but properties of the environment refracted through the lens of the organism’s specific interests and needs, i.e. instances of fitness. In these instances of fitness, properties of the organism and properties of the environment are so much bound up with one another that it is impossible to separate them. A realist critic might point out here that there must still be mind-independent properties of the environment, whether or not we can disentangle them from our representations or not. This move, however, pushes these properties into an epistemically inaccessible noumenal realm, and it becomes then unclear why the resulting position has any advantage over a more parsimonious rival that simply treats the mind-independent world as another part of the representational interface. In addition, an argument involving self-information entailed by non-self-locating claims is presented by Das, suggesting as an example that being in the British Library entails the existence of the British Library. I don’t think Hoffman would disagree with this, any more than he would disagree with saying that the claim that there is a blue folder on my desktop entails that there is something that is blue. However, this does not yet get us to ‘properties of mind-independent particulars’, but only to properties (and individuals) in the interface. Hoffman’s interface theory of perception does not rule out ‘the possibility of there being self-locating truths or of self-locating truths entailing non-self-locating truths’, but claims that any such truths are strictly truths about what goes on within the representational interface. In addition, Das points out that ‘as long as we accept a sufficiently externalist conception of knowledge … we can still be in a position to know that we are not in those sceptical scenarios’ irrealism raises. Externalism about mental states here means that such states ‘depend on extrinsic properties of an agent, not just intrinsic ones’. As an extrinsic property of me is one that essentially involves entities other than myself, externalism about knowledge clearly avoids the irrealist predicament. But anybody inclined towards irrealism is unlikely to assume that cognitive states essentially involve entities beyond the cognitive interface. The regarding impasse is then prone to reduce to a debate about where the burden of proof should lie: does the irrealist have to show that the existence of a mind-independent world is incompatible with the epistemic situation we find ourselves in (as Das seems to think), or does the realist have to show that the assumption of such a world presents an explanatory advantage that the irrealist’s representation-only view cannot match? It seems that one of the reasons why the debate between the realist and his opponent is so difficult to resolve is that the two have different ideas of what such a resolution would look like. The realist demands that his opponent ‘rules out’ the possibility of a mind-independent external world, while the opponent wants to see evidence of a unique feature of the realist conception of the world that cannot be replicated by ‘realism in the image’, that is by the idea that the mind-independent world is part of the representational interface. The irrealist regards the realist’s demand as excessive, as no amount of epistemic insulation would rule out the possibility of it just happening to be case that there is the realist’s kind of world behind the representational interface (much like some events in the real world might just happen to correspond to events in some video game). The realist regards the irrealist’s offer of ‘exact replication’ of his external world as insufficient, since his epistemic default is always the existence of something behind the representation. As long as we don’t have proof that there cannot be such a thing we are justified in assuming that there is. I agree with Das that if we accept that perceptual do not represent the world as it is of this does not that these cannot be ‘true or The world behind might be with our by the of the it might out that the structure of the just to be that of But on such a is more than on the of the the of the are presents a argument that the for a substantial structural between representation and represented are is as a theory as it to I that there must be a argument to it than the claim to the the world might just out to entities with the structure as our perceptual an in Das’s It is the claim that ‘if things appear to us to be a certain in the of those we should that things are that In the philosophical this claim was by the and by so we have another here where the between the irrealist and his some philosophical But are we to the of in a point that unclear to me is much the the of is supposed to be able to I look the world from an position it to and to most that there are real out there in the world, that the structure of is that all of my to me with that it is an whether two events happen or don’t happen the that my has the resolution and so Yet some to cognitive of perception and that these do not the things are that of all of these can of be into our but that we appear to have much of what was appealing to the claim that the world see is more or the world all things the world as it and the world as our it are what is trying to the of the theory of or cognitive are any it as if the we the to the structure of the world ‘as it is in to the to which we this on a is different from the way things appear or not this is a matter we not but it seems to be that needs to be up by some kind of It is not a we can accept some further idea of what might it. concerns the that of parsimony not While it is than as irrealism only one kind of two and has the advantage of the of from the whether are as a to things are the most than simply as in our of parsimony are not the only idea that in is the point that what we mean by ‘the is with like and so on of which essentially on to such an that it is unclear much sense we can make of a world beyond these This is of a for Das, to the claim that and so on are all in the world, and more or by our But those not to the that of the our idea of ‘the is might be no more than by the will not only that a theory that with the noumenal might be more parsimonious but are likely to be such an of properties to to our cognitive be what the we in is the most As a we the existence of any substantial structural between our representations and the mind-independent world and are to accept an noumenal as the of all the world behind the representational as part of the representational seems to the most sensible An Das’s argument on is the assumption that in the of we can simply assume the existence of an external world. do not to any evidence for While this point the argument can into the I am of the that if there is no evidence the existence of we are to the existence of for is that it would us to the existence of beyond the In this my philosophical is the of the one by any has to in explanatory entities that do not the idea of a noumenal world we cannot with in any the response should not be there are of blue behind the or there but explanatory do not have but no Das the that the irrealist’s to accept beyond the interface might be by the irrealist’s According to the irrealist cannot say what he is out to The is that the irrealist cannot the the as to something beyond the since for there is no such As such any this would be or he the as for something within the such as the representation of something beyond the interface. But the irrealist and his opponent to be about different the opponent about things beyond the he means mind-independent things with in some As such nothing the irrealist can say about such according to his disagree with what his opponent is resolve this it is to be that if irrealism is any theory that essentially on things beyond the interface needs to be this we cannot make such a theory part of our trying to between and Das is in that for the irrealist it is to an point outside of that representational but that does not that the of irrealism on such an The we to irrealism out to be is it according to the irrealist’s The to this to be a for the irrealist has the resources to that specific are not can that there are no and so he can that the beyond the representational is not Das the that if we make the assumption that on with entities the irrealist seems to be to to entities like and since he has with them. about the such a is since it our in with the entities The between the irrealist and his opponent is here not about the as such, but about to to It is that Das of in his of the he this to to real to a relation that us and our representational states with entities however, is an assumption that will appear to the we are that there is one relation that as a between the representational inside and the outside of the the irrealist’s claim that all our resources only to on to something within the representational is Yet there is nothing the irrealist from the as long as we it to about The of as to something within the representational interface than beyond it is an It is simply a of more in the debate about the cannot in on the of our theory by in since the of like and the like is by the other The is a that within the of the not a of the interface with entities that are not part of the interface. notes that that irrealism is not a but an about the external This might appear to The that I irrealism from is in the of truths it cannot be an that there is as would have it. The of irrealism with is on the idea that we can have an towards the external world there is such a world, or an is no such does not claim that we information to this but that on the of to us the more position is to the existence of an external world. or is a view of the world is the and irrealism is not. This is where the between irrealism and concerns the the irrealist into we accept a account of perception according to which the world we in is a that us will be on the The still on such as the two which will in on the they all the way to whatever the will on the since in the world us therefore have a of in which no is up the is a then nothing is real the sense of being have that that is and it if to an it is however, we simply up in a position to where we from inside the to the outside world of the our find ourselves inside the might also be that irrealism the and the theory about The a there is no behind the can we still make sense of the between the The an there is no true can we argue that are about the way things In response to the that the only in the interface. is nothing beyond the interface that the still be a the that is and we are epistemically with I it there are no the is and we are epistemically with like are are still The irrealist is hence not his and it since there are no in of he is not saying that there are no and that it the of so would by his point is that an we might up with a this however, that so that we will it. This is not if to get but by the for better than while we might to the of as this should not be as an theory that the of As the of is to point some position does not of the In this we should also point that something behind the of the that about mental the I to argue that no sense is to be of a behind the of can I still to the idea of of there being cognitive we since they are I do not that the of our cognitive that are inaccessible to us form a for the claim that all is The is for example by things that are to or of as by the of the and the of can about such and they can in our they to us in the way and them in to things that do and we inaccessible mental to of the mental we can As for the it is that out that we are about the way things cannot be the of outside of the of in to have an look the world. any must be from within the interface. we that certain as a world behind do not make sense we have this, we have not an true view of the world, an our view is better than the not in of approach to but in to the of The discussion in the by to the raised in the the whether it still a theory any true This is an which is in an of the debate between two different of the and The between these two is a matter of but one point is that is as some philosophical while is to be a with the any position of also the with a to the whether is to that the claims an irrealist be as might be part of a true a theory that does not to or but that of whatever there and is the point of our This point is simply ‘the that our with an this is not a about the world, but a about our we carry them out according to the rules that form part of the in which we we find that we reach the that might have like has another it. I don’t think there is here a would disagree but I also find it hard to see that this is an approach according to which is to are part of and about are by to that are also part of should this about by true means be to be an The I is that for there are two different sets of epistemic the of a of and is to truths about the world is the of water and so and the is to such truths as have no however, should we accept this of our epistemic it not the kind of epistemic that we to all of truths we might them in different I would to that we whether or not the on the is real water or a we the we trying to whether or some things are are with the epistemic we and have to all with some of these is no that us to the by it from those by epistemic outside of this about the whether the irrealist any It seems as if the irrealist’s can all be as claims about the of the with his the are to a to a no claim to or to such a claim can be to be have no for an can be to be in the world all the way or and The only other is are of a virtual world. we assume is we up with a the two of a theory of whatever there and of a point of our also be in of between the and his is the of all the claims by the true say that of whatever there is simply means that for the opponent up with the can show that the existence of to a Similarly, any entities to in an with can be further to an with The between this and the is that the is about the world, and to any entities still truths about the world, truths that are supposed to no matter what, or of there The to what is and is not in It is on by as the of and that certain entities cannot be in a theory of the world. It does however, a of the world that might why this is the these are then the is no whether or not the has a that of whatever there is and the point of our I that makes a case in of an But this in does not a that of whatever there is is to be Does this mean a about the world, or is it a about the we for the This it seems to the of the relation between irrealism and is as the position that I am while all other and things are a of my mental it is that the are irrealism is incompatible with the existence of any real However, we might also as the position that other are not of any about the of It is this form of that is in the discussion about the of other mental we for example in the of the two and it is also the one that we should have in in the we like we a representational or are different interface up as in a video or I the only one or are there other that do so as we about what is happening beyond our representational interface. such or is since it something the interface theory we cannot a view from outside of our interface into as it is in in to whether or not there are other we see from the The position that there are no other beyond our interface is as as the position that there is nothing beyond the since it the kind of true theory the in out to show to be The only response to the of the irrealist can is to say that from the within the interface which is the only we can there are other this does not provide us with any information about the of the irrealism and In one sense the is our view of the world the existence of other one then are they also real from the As long as an to this more than information within the interface it cannot be a from the can only be by us through our and if the interface our as a the existence of a in the the cannot be that my argument for irrealism on the of the world to the representational or as regarding it as a noumenal something behind the to which our This he such as or of the view of perception that forms the to much of the discussion in arguing that we should an account of According to such an are not representational about the they are and with the What this means on what we mean by ‘the the world is an of and things in a mind-independent in a mind-independent a realist is into this of the view of This makes it of in a discussion where the of such a view of perception is being On the other the world also be with the representational interface. As for the irrealist our clearly are and with the representational the the position is clearly true from an irrealist the does not reduce to no more than in the to since the and the realist accept the existence of an true theory of the structure of the world, while the irrealist does not. on is the irrealist would to see an argument for the about the external world by or he the as from within the representational Similarly, to argue that a account of perception us … with the objects or not be as being in with the irrealist’s It is that the here cannot be real entities out in a we would not be with a but with a realist view of But if the status of these objects is that they out to be of the representational or if they are simply with whatever our perceptual relation is to us to the irrealist’s of the representational there is no for the irrealist to to this account of While me in of a between an position and an beyond our epistemic reach I am about the the between the two of the might be to In some the can be as a to a world in it into a kind of hard to from the irrealist position in all but But of we cannot have it and must be that our response does not from one to the other to the of any is that the irrealist model be as it to account for the our appear to it seems to me that irrealism has resources to account for such for example no why of the should not be something that can within the representational nor would the claim that all perception within the of the interface that we cannot between or some according to the irrealist the and it does not link us up with entities of different in one a in the in we are to of our representational interface. But these are to other in different and it is this in structure that us to one from the in of us is likely to the of being be able to to in it will not this to the of our cognitive in a way that is quite different from the way our and this is what makes them as different of this is to point out that water cannot our but it does not from this that of water are and with the while of water are not. the are to cognitive states of one kind while the are to cognitive states of another kind The existence of these different us to and but it does not on that only the are with the also notes that we are of some features of the perceptual that are suggesting that the irrealist account for this by these features within the representational but that this would explanatory with and Yet this seems to that there is no more for such features than there is to example to in for the a with of of In the way in which the does not have to the ‘as if by an external of the of the features not be within the perceptual interface. a would the of the interface beyond It is only the features to that the perceptual interface has to from something like the features to something more

Sanneke de Haan

Two Enactive Approaches to Psychiatry: Two Contrasting Views on What it Means to Be Human Sanneke de Haan (bio) Shared Sources and Different Aims The relevance and potential value of insights from enactivism for the field of psychiatry have been recognized for some time now. Recently, two overarching frameworks have been proposed, one by Nielsen (Nielsen, 2020; Nielsen & Ward, 2018, 2020), and one by me (De Haan 2017; 2020a; 2020b; 2020c).1 As mentioned by Nielsen (2021), we developed our approaches largely in parallel: I was not aware of Nielsen’s work, and he only became aware of my work in the last phase of his PhD. Nielsen (2021) compares our approaches and concludes that our frameworks are ‘largely compatible, do different work to one another, and are best understood as complimentary’ (p. 175). I think, however, that the differences between our positions run much deeper, so that they are, in fact, incompatible. These differences result from fundamentally opposed views on what it means to be human. But before I get into our differences, let me acknowledge what we share. Nielsen and I are attracted to enactivism2 for similar reasons. We are both critical of neuroreductionist views that depict psychiatric disorders as internal problems in individual brains, and instead stress the relevance of taking the individual’s whole body and larger (sociocultural) context into account. In enactivism, we find a framework that spells out how the mind is fundamentally tied to the body and to interactions with the environment (Thompson, 2007; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). More specifically, ‘mind’ refers to the sense-making activities of an organism interacting with its environment, which it depends on for its survival. Enactivism, furthermore, argues that the organism in its environment is best described as a complex, dynamical system. Applied to psychiatry, enactivism offers a) an integrative perspective on the relation between body, mind, and world;, and b) a complex systems approach which acknowledges causal complexity without ascribing a priory primacy to any of the processes involved. Our aims—what we use enactivism for—are different though. My aim is to solve psychiatry’s integration problem, that is, the problem of how to relate the heterogeneous factors that are at stake in the development and persistence of psychiatric [End Page 191] disorders. Even though many people would be willing to embrace the (potential) influence of biological, psychological and social factors, the proof of the pudding will be in providing a proper explanation of how these factors work together and how (causal) interaction between them works. Enactivism provides an excellent basis for explaining such interactions, without resorting to either reductionism or dualism (de Haan, 2020a). As such it can offer an extended and improved version of Engel’s (1977, 1980) biopsychosocial model (de Haan, 2020c). My enactive approach to psychiatry is thus clearly not a ‘first person or phenomenological approach,’ as Nielsen (2021) calls it. Personal experiences are indeed vital when trying to understand and explain psychiatric disorders—but so are (neuro) physiological processes, sociocultural influences, and existential considerations. The purpose of my account is precisely to relate personal experiences to these other processes and explain how these four heterogeneous dimensions affect one another. Enactivism’s thesis about the continuity of life and mind and its concept of sense-making are useful to explicate how ‘matters of the mind’ are necessarily also matters of the body and matters of the world too (de Haan, 2020a, 2020b). Nielsen, in contrast, is primarily interested in solving the demarcation problem between mental health and mental illness, or: ‘why some behaviors should be considered disordered’ (Nielsen & Ward, 2018, p. 801). This should in turn help to carve out psychiatry’s ‘diagnostic entities’ (Idem, p. 813) and classify mental disorders accordingly. Nielsen mainly draws on enactive ideas to ‘naturalize normativity’ (Nielsen & Ward, 2020, p. 121) as he calls it. Because mere statistical rarity is not enough to establish a phenomenon as ‘disordered’, we need to adopt some norms to distinguish between ‘dysfunction and functionality’ (Nielsen & Ward, 2018, p. 811). Nielsen appeals to the enactive idea of organismic self-maintenance to establish such norms. Being alive is a precarious condition that requires constant, adaptive interaction...

Gabriel Axel Montes, Ben Goertzel

The accelerating pace of development in artificial intelligence invokes fundamental questions regarding what constitutes a mind. Considering that AI has sprung from the cognitive enterprise of humanity and that there is the likely prospect of constructing some form of 'global brain', examining such questions may help to refine the conversation around AI and understand what might constitute a global brain. We draw on recent work in philosophy of mind and cognition—viewing mind as being representational and/or enactive in nature and function—, and hone in on insights that practices and accounts of non-ordinary consciousness (NOC) lend to this discussion. We discuss the concept of a "mindplex", which is comprised of individual constituents (humans and/or AI's) and an encompassing collective global brain that both concurrently possess cohesive 'theatres of consciousness'. We posit that these theatres of an AGI global brain have correspondences with key aspects of the inherent nature of consciousness and reality (as understood outside the AI context) as gleaned through NOC. We propose that these considerations are poised to strongly contribute to the construction of mindplexes by reflecting in their functional architecture the nature of mind and engineering mindplexes in tandem with ethical and value-alignment considerations. Furthermore, we propose the adoption and implementation of AI on distributed ledger technology (DLT), such as blockchain, which would provide support for the evolution of a global brain mindplex.

Jorge N. Ferrer

HOW DO WE creatively participate in the mystery of spirituality? The participatory approach holds that human spirituality emerges from human co-creative participation in an undetermined mystery, generative power of life, the cosmos, or reality. My understanding of the mystery is aligned with Rabbi Michael Lerner’s account (in his book Spirit Matters) of Spirit as the “energizing Force” behind the Big Bang and the ongoing evolutionary process.Spiritual participatory events can engage the entire range of human epistemic faculties (e.g., rational, imaginal, somatic, vital, aesthetic) with both the creative unfolding of the mystery and the subtle entities or energies in the enactment — or “bringing forth” — of ontologically rich religious worlds. In other words, the participatory approach presents an enactive understanding of the sacred that conceives spiritual phenomena, experiences, and insights as co-created events. The emergence of spiritual knowing can be located amidst the connections of human multidimensional cognition, cultural context, subtle worlds, and the deep generativity of life or the cosmos. Importantly, this account avoids both the secular postmodernist reduction of religion to cultural-linguistic artifact and, as discussed below, the dogmatic privileging of a single religious tradition as superior or paradigmatic.The rest of this essay introduces nine distinctive features of the participatory approach: spiritual cocreation, creative spirituality, spiritual individuation, participatory pluralism, relaxed spiritual universalism, participatory epistemology, the integral bodhisattva vow, participatory spiritual practice, and social engagement.Spiritual co-creation has three interrelated dimensions — intrapersonal, interpersonal, and transpersonal. These dimensions respectively establish participatory spirituality as embodied (spirit within), relational (spirit in-between), and enactive (spirit beyond).Intrapersonal co-creation consists of the collaborative participation of all human attributes — body, vital energy, heart, mind, and consciousness — in the enactment of spiritual phenomena. This dimension is grounded in the equi-primacy principle, according to which no human attribute is intrinsically superior or more evolved than any other. To be sure, the mind-centered character of Western culture hinders the maturation of non-mental attributes, normally making it necessary to engage in intentional practices to bring these attributes up to the same developmental level the mind achieves through mainstream education. In principle, however, all human attributes can participate as equal partners in the creative unfolding of the spiritual path, are equally capable of sharing freely in the life of the mystery here on Earth, and can also be equally alienated from it. The main challenges to intrapersonal co-creation are cognicentrism, lopsided development, mental pride, and disembodied attitudes to spiritual growth. Possible antidotes to those challenges are the integral bodhisattva vow (discussed below), integral practices, the cultivation of mental humility, and embodied approaches to spiritual growth. Intrapersonal co-creation affirms the importance of being rooted in spirit within (i.e., the immanent dimension of the mystery) and renders participatory spirituality essentially embodied and integrative.Interpersonal co-creation emerges from cooperative relationships among human beings growing as peers in the spirit of solidarity, mutual respect, and constructive confrontation. It is grounded in the equipotentiality principle, according to which “we are all teachers and students” insofar as we are superior and inferior to others in different regards. This principle does not entail that there is no value in working with spiritual teachers or mentors; it simply means that human beings cannot be ranked in their totality or according to a single developmental criterion, such as brainpower, emotional intelligence, or contemplative realization. Although peer-to-peer human relationships are vital for spiritual growth, interpersonal co-creation can include contact with perceived nonhuman intelligences, such as subtle entities, natural powers, or archetypal forces that might be embedded in psyche, nature, or the cosmos. The main challenges to interpersonal co-creation are spiritual pride, psychospiritual inflation, circumstantial or self-imposed isolation, and adherence to rigidly hierarchical spiritualities. Remedies to those challenges include collaborative spiritual practice and inquiry, intellectual and spiritual humility, deep dialogue, and relational and pluralistic approaches to spiritual growth. Interpersonal co-creation affirms the importance of communion with spirit in-between (i.e., the situational dimension of the mystery) and makes participatory spirituality intrinsically relational and eco-socio-politically engaged.Transpersonal co-creation refers to dynamic interaction between embodied human beings and the mystery in the bringing forth of spiritual insights, practices, states, and worlds. This dimension is grounded in the equiplurality principle, according to which there can potentially be multiple spiritual enactions that are nonetheless equally holistic and emancipatory. For example, a fully embodied liberation could be equally achieved through Christian incarnation or Yogic integration of purusa (consciousness) and prakriti (nature); likewise, freedom from self-centeredness at the service of others can be attained through the cultivation of Mahayana Buddhist karuna (compassion) or Christian agape (selfless love) in the context of radically different ontologies. This principle frees participatory spirituality from allegiance to any single spiritual system and paves the way for a genuine, ontologically and pragmatically grounded, spiritual pluralism. The main challenges to transpersonal co-creation are spiritual disempowerment, indoctrination, spiritual narcissism, and adherence to naive objectivist or universalist spiritualities. Antidotes include: the development of one’s inner spiritual authority and the affirmation of the right to inquire, heretical courage, and enactive and creative spiritualities. Transpersonal co-creation affirms the importance of being open to spirit beyond (i.e., the subtle dimensions of the mystery) and makes participatory spirituality fundamentally inquiry-driven and enactive.Although all three dimensions interact in multifaceted ways in the enactment of spiritual events, the creative link between intrapersonal and transpersonal co-creation deserves special mention. Whereas the mind and consciousness arguably serve as a natural bridge to subtle spiritual forms already enacted in history that display more fixed forms and dynamics such as cosmological motifs, archetypal configurations, and mystical visions and states, greater access to the more generative power of life or the mystery can be found through attention to the body and its vital energies. From this approach, it follows, the greater the participation of embodied dimensions in religious inquiry, the more creative one’s spiritual life may become and a larger number of creative spiritual developments may emerge.In the infancy of participatory spirituality in the 1990s, spiritual inquiry operated within certain constraints arguably inherited from traditional religion. As the historian of religion, Mircea Eliade famously argued, many established religious practices and rituals are “re-enactive” in their attempt to replicate cosmogonic actions and events. Expanding this account, I have suggested that most religious traditions can be seen as “reproductive” insofar as their practices aim to not only ritually reenact mythical motives, but also replicate the enlightenment of their founder or attain the state of salvation or freedom described in allegedly revealed scriptures. Although disagreements about the exact nature of such states and the most effective methods to attain them abound in the historical development of religious ideas and practices — naturally leading to rich creative developments within the traditions — spiritual inquiry was regulated (and arguably constrained) by such pre-given unequivocal goals.Participatory enaction entails a model of spiritual engagement that does not simply reproduce certain tropes according to a given historical a priori, but rather embarks upon the adventure of openness to the novelty and creativity of life or the mystery. Grounded on current moral intuitions and cognitive competences, for instance, participatory spiritual inquiry can not only undertake the critical revision and actualization of prior religious forms, but also the co-creation of novel spiritual understandings, practices, and even expanded states of freedom.This emphasis in creativity is central to spiritual individuation, that is, the process through which a person gradually develops and embodies her or his unique spiritual identity and wholeness. Religious traditions tend to promote the homogenization of central features of the inner and outer lives of their practitioners, for example, encouraging them to seek the same spiritual states and liberation, to become like Christ or the Buddha, or to wear the same clothes (in the case of monks). These aspirations may have been historically legitimate, but after the emergence of the modern self, our current predicament (at least in the West) arguably calls for an integration of spiritual maturation and psychological individuation that will likely lead to a richer diversity of spiritual expressions. In other words, the participatory approach aims at the emergence of a human community formed by spiritually differentiated individuals.It is important to sharply distinguish between the modern hyper-individualistic mental ego and the participatory selfhood forged in the sacred fire of spiritual individuation. Whereas the disembodied modern self is plagued by alienation, dissociation, and narcissism, a spiritually individuated person has an embodied, integrated, connected, and permeable identity whose high degree of differentiation, far from being isolating, actually allows him or her to enter into a deeply conscious communion with others, nature, and the multidimensional cosmos. A key difference between modern individualism and spiritual individuation is thus the integration of radical relatedness in the latter.The participatory approach embraces a pluralistic vision of spirituality that accepts the formative role of cultural and linguistic factors in religious phenomena. This simultaneously recognizes the importance of nonlinguistic variables (e.g., somatic, imaginal, energetic, subtle, archetypal) in shaping religious experiences and meanings while also affirming the ontological value and creative impact of spiritual worlds.Participatory pluralism allows the conception of a multiplicity of not only spiritual paths, but also spiritual liberations, worlds, and even ultimates. On the one hand, besides affirming the historical existence of multiple spiritual goals, the increased embodied openness to immanent spiritual life and the spirit-in-between fostered by the participatory approach may naturally engender a number of novel holistic spiritual realizations that cannot be reduced to traditional states of enlightenment or liberation. If human beings were regarded as unique embodiments of the mystery or the cosmos, would it not be plausible to consider that as they spiritually individuate, their spiritual realizations might also be distinct even if potentially overlapping and aligned with each other?On the other hand, participatory pluralism proposes that different spiritual ultimates can be enacted through intentional or spontaneous participation in an undetermined mystery, spiritual power, or generative force of life or reality. Whereas I take these enactions to be ultimate in their respective spiritual universes, this consideration in no way relativizes the various traditions’ ultimates — nor does it posit a supra-ultimate spiritual referent beyond them. In contrast, I hold that participatory enaction allows one to not only move away from representational and objectivist accounts of spiritual cognition, but also avoid the problematic dualism of the mystery and its enactions. Building on both the enactive paradigm’s account of cognition as embodied action, I maintain that in the same way an individual is her actions (whether perceptual, cognitive, emotional, or subtle), the mystery is its enactions. In this understanding, emptiness (sunyata), the Tao, and God (in their many inflexions) can be seen as creative gestures of the mystery enacted through participating human (and perhaps nonhuman) individuals and collectives.Hence, the participatory perspective does not contend that there are two, three, or any limited quantity of pre-given spiritual ultimates, but rather that the radical openness, interrelatedness, and creativity of the mystery or the cosmos allows for the participatory co-creation of an indefinite number of ultimate self-disclosures of reality and corresponding religious worlds. Participatory approaches seek to enact with body, mind, heart, and consciousness a creative spirituality that lets a thousand spiritual flowers bloom. Although this may at first sound like a rather “anything goes” approach to religious claims, I hold to the contrary: namely, that recognizing a diversity of co-created religious worlds in fact asks both scholars and practitioners to be more perspicuous in discerning their differences and merits. Because such worlds are not simply given but involve human beings as agents and co-creators, individuals are not off the ethical hook where religion is concerned but instead inevitably make cosmo-political and moral choices in all their religious actions. As discussed below, ethical considerations are crucial, especially in light of the demonstrably pernicious ecological, political, and social impact many religions historically had — and continue to have today.The pluralistic spirit of the participatory approach should not eclipse its “more relaxed” spiritual universalism — although eschewing dubious equations among spiritual ultimates (e.g., the Tao is God or Buddhist emptiness is structurally equivalent to the Hindu Brahman), the participatory approach affirms an underlying undetermined mystery or creative spiritual power as the generative source of all spiritual enactions. This shared spiritual dynamism should be distinguished from any Kantian-like noumenon or “thing-in-itself” endowed with inscrutable qualities and from which all spiritual ultimates are always derived as incomplete, culturally conditioned, or cognitively constrained phenomenal manifestations. In contrast, the enactive epistemology of the participatory approach does away with the Kantian two-worlds dualism by refusing to conceive of the mystery as having objectifiable pre-given attributes (such as personal, impersonal, dual, or nondual) and by affirming the radical identity of the manifold spiritual ultimates and the mystery, even if the former do not exhaust the ontological possibilities of the latter. Put simply, the mystery co-creatively unfolds in multiple ontological directions.Moreover, the relationship between pluralism and universalism cannot be consistently characterized in a hierarchical fashion. Whereas there surely are “lower” and “higher” forms of both universalism and pluralism (e.g., more or the between universalism and pluralism, between the and the it may be the dynamics of the of the mystery. The affirmation of a between the and the in spiritual unfolding renders any or hierarchical between universalism and pluralism cannot be that participatory pluralism does not entail the or of or religious or forms of Put the participatory of an objectifiable pre-given spiritual ultimate referent does not in spiritual To be sure, like of traditions cannot be ranked according to their in or this account does not cannot be more or the participatory renders the of among traditions according to a or a of spiritual insights, these can be in a of (e.g., cognitive, emotional, I have suggested the which the to which spiritual and practices practitioners from and subtle forms of and and the which the to which the same the of all dimensions of the the many and in the of religion, it may be to an which the to which spiritual social and religious and and and other human light of these differences among traditions can be and this is important — from both and In a for example, traditions may have contemplative more than the same could be about emotional intelligence, social or and practices a relationship with In a traditions may be more than others to dissociation, and religious and or among The fact that different traditions have different human is of makes and arguably for the development of more integral spiritual and important be spiritual and may be more for different psychological and cultural as for the same individual at distinct developmental but this does not make them superior or The of action, and to mind in this as do other spiritual that can be found in other the participatory emphasis on and although arguably central to most spiritual may not be shared by more most religious traditions would likely not in of the or the For example, or subtle forms of or of the human body and its energies are the in most and contemplative one could and participation of the body in spiritual many religions have had a demonstrably and about of human even they have also vital to them. the and of the participatory is for the development of a participatory critical of these the of a which the of a fully is open to can as a principle The of is thus capable of for critical in spiritual that is, in spiritual might be From this principle, or to spiritual choices and practices can be In to self and one might consider the of such as the In the of other may the degree of integration of spiritual states, for of with of body and in this it will no be a practitioners a or account of the mystery, or their of spiritual cultivation is social conscious or communion with The spiritual in contrast, will be the degree to which each spiritual both an of self-centeredness and a fully embodied integration to make individuals not only more to the of others, nature, and the but also more effective agents of cultural and in their unique the conscious mind is the of most of an liberation of consciousness can be insofar as one can that one is fully in dimensions of the self are or in — as the of modern spiritual teachers Participatory spirituality to the engagement of all human attributes in the spiritual or his the spiritual of and the vital the was that the liberation of consciousness cannot be to an integral the spiritual of all human this in mind, I have an integral bodhisattva vow in which the conscious mind its liberation the body, the heart, and the can be as from that them from sharing freely in the unfolding life of the mystery here on to to an integral bodhisattva vow is not a to the spiritual aspirations of it entails a to the integral liberation of all rather than only of their conscious or of as the of the bodhisattva does not a to Buddhist accounts of liberation as of and and from the of vow is arguably to the of many religious such as Michael and for or and These and many others spiritual and of their traditions that seek not only to and but also to human dimensions that had been or even such as the of and body and or relationships and to many spiritual and of or participatory spiritual practice the embodied, and enactive (i.e., and dimensions of spiritual growth. This emphasis can be found in traditional practices, many of traditional practices, and a number of spiritual Whereas traditional practices (e.g., are participatory in many The Participatory in their modern one can more and of participatory I for example, Michael Lerner’s and and embodied of Buddhist and account of modern and Western approaches to and Christian of the body and in Christian among many the have the emergence of a of novel participatory spiritual practices, such as and embodied cooperative spiritual inquiry, and of embodied spiritual of practice with important participatory include and spirituality modern forms of integral relational approaches to spirituality, and modern of as spiritual path, among a are our relationships with both the human and nonhuman This is inevitably with a to social To be sure, this can take many different forms, from more social or in the (e.g., social spiritually grounded to more subtle of social or discussed by in his there is to about the of subtle embodied spirituality cannot be from a to political, and — this may arguably calls for the of a This however, cannot of moral religious and even mystical but to be in the of religious on human and cooperative spiritual In other words, it is likely that any will be grounded not only in human spiritual but also in the critical on such a history in the context of moral intuitions (e.g., about the of religious narcissism, and its for and the of — for with — to of the most of the such as the of and the of rich and the to cultural and and in although participatory spirituality arguably for critical in spiritual it is to consider the participatory or any participatory approach, a spiritual tradition that could be all In contrast, participatory spirituality might be as a spiritual (i.e., and creative that can be found in various within many that is in the ongoing of and that may also to spiritual and the emergence of novel religious or spiritual I that the participatory should be seen more as a of sharing a about the nature of spiritual the of and multidimensional cognition, or the of religious pluralism than as a of or through traditional The pluralistic character of a can greater diversity than a of which achieves its identity through to or a is not only with the pluralistic of the participatory but also in the of not a constraints to or the to into a the nature of a is with the of hierarchical and in and religion by many participatory as as with for peer-to-peer of and and of is an important of such might seek to not only sharing of but also to promote a of for and the and of a participatory approach the spiritual of not in any spiritual or but in the shared of communion with the generative dimension of the mystery. In other words, the spiritual of may not be found in the (i.e., in or even mystical but deep into the (i.e., in the embodied with our creative As the to and are among the for only in the The of such creative may to by in creative a of deep communion a may also engender a of to a spiritual to the spiritual individuation of its and the eco-socio-politically of the an to both scholars and practitioners to their and to the and to participatory in and into I with the that the participatory approach and to a more individuals in the embodied co-creation of their spiritual perhaps most participate more fully in the mystery of which

Norihiko Egi

It is not so difficult to design a fully automatic control system for the chemical plant, if control engineers and instrumentation engineers understand the static and dynamic characteristics of that plant. However the behavior of those plants specially so-called bio-plants is not easily measured and understood. If a plant in an organization does not perform a vital role or dose not require very accurate control, a relatively simple control system, i.e. only to maintain the plant at its current state or prevent it from moving into abnormal states, may be sufficient from point of view of reducing the operative personnel. The aim of this study is to establish the effectiveness of the autonomous control system for such a situation.

Norihiko Egi

No abstract is available for this record.