We present a cryptographic framework to achieve access control, privacy of social relations, secrecy of resources, and anonymity of users in social networks. The main idea is to use pseudonyms to hide user identities, signatures on pseudonyms to establish social relations, and zero-knowledge proofs on these signatures to demonstrate the existence of the corresponding social relations without sacrificing user anonymity. Our framework is generally applicable and, in particular, constitutes an ideal plug-in for decentralized social networks.
This paper presents a distributed anonymous authentication scheme for MANET based on the technique of group signature, secret share and zero-knowledge proof. The scheme takes advantage of the distributed certificate management to solve the authentication and key management problems of MANET which is lack of fixed infrastructure. Meanwhile, the scheme adopts the efficient group signature presented by Camenisch and Stadler, achieved the anonymity in the process of authentication and public key transmission. In the case of a later dispute, the group manager can reveal the identity of node by opening its signature. Besides anonymity and traceability, the scheme also has the property of unforgeability and robustness.
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) offer an excellent opportunity to monitor environments, and have a lot of interesting applications, some of which are quite sensitive in nature and require full proof secured environment. The security mechanisms used for wired networks cannot be directly used in sensor networks as there is no user-controlling of each individual node, wireless environment, and more importantly, scarce energy resources. In this paper, we address some of the special security threats and attacks in WSNs. We propose a scheme for detection of distributed sensor cloning attack and use of zero knowledge protocol (ZKP) for verifying the authenticity of the sender sensor nodes. The cloning attack is addressed by attaching a unique fingerprint to each node, that depends on the set of neighboring nodes and itself. The fingerprint is attached with every message a sensor node sends. The ZKP is used to ensure non transmission of crucial cryptographic information in the wireless network in order to avoid man-in-the middle (MITM) attack and replay attack. The paper presents a detailed analysis for various scenarios and also analyzes the performance and cryptographic strength.
Recent work in the corporate governance literature stresses the need to provide boards of directors (BoDs) with explicit incentives to safeguard shareholder welfare (Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker 2002; Bebchuk and Fried 2004). Jensen (1993) observes that “encouraging outside board members to hold substantial equity interests would provide better incentives.” In a similar spirit, the National Association of Corporate Directors (National Association of Corporate Directors 1995) proposed that “boards should pay directors solely in the form of stock and cash — with equity representing a substantial portion of the total up to 100 percent.” Indeed, equity-based BoD compensation has been on the rise in recent years (Bhagat and Black 2002; Conference Board 2006; Pearl Meyer & Partners 2007).1 The underlying premise is that equity awards help align BoD incentives with shareholder interests and enhance long-term firm value (Byrne 1996; Gabrielle 2001). However, to the extent that directors hold both vested and unvested (restricted) equity-based instruments, their actions are likely influenced by a combination of short-term and long-term incentives. The literature has focused mainly on the beneficial long-term incentive effects of equity awards. However, the effects of accompanying short-term incentives are not clear. Are they non–value adding, or do they in fact affect BoD behavior in a way that benefits shareholders? We address these questions in this paper. In particular, our purpose is to jointly examine the short-term and long-term incentive effects of equity-based BoD compensation on the BoD’s corporate governance (contracting and monitoring) and advisory (consulting) roles.2 The boards’ corporate governance role has been examined extensively.3 However, directors are typically individuals with considerable management experience and expertise and serve as a natural resource for top management in making crucial strategic and operational decisions.4,5 In fact, surveys have indicated that most directors view advising as their primary role (Mace 1972; Demb and Neubauer 1992; Adams 2009). Nevertheless, the BoD’s advisory role has received relatively little attention in the literature. Adams and Ferreira (2007), for example, examine the BoD’s monitoring and advisory role and show that a less independent BoD is sometimes optimal because it is less likely to monitor management, which, in turn, induces management to share information with the BoD, and receive better advice leading to greater investment efficiency.6 If this advisory role is indeed value-enhancing for shareholders, it cannot be ignored when examining the short-term and long-term incentive effects of BoD compensation. We use a simple agency model in which the BoD performs three roles: contracting, monitoring and consulting. The BoD contracts with the manager to supply some productive input that results in firm output. A performance evaluation system that produces an informative signal about firm output, and consequently about managerial effort, is used to contract with the manager. By monitoring, the BoD improves the precision of this information signal. By serving as a consultant, the BoD makes the manager more productive, that in turn means higher expected firm output. The BoD and the manager’s inputs are unobservable and personally costly.7 We assume that board members are themselves rational and self-serving, and must be motivated to provide consulting and monitoring inputs. Consequently, there are two agency problems in our model. The first is between the BoD and the manager, and the second is between the BoD and the shareholders. Both the agency problems arise because the BoD and manager’s respective inputs are unobservable and personally costly. In this respect, our paper adds to the growing literature that models shareholder-manager conflict as arising from a two-tier agency relationship. In our context, a single-tier model that examines shareholder-manager agency conflict stemming from the separation of ownership and control does not permit a role for the BoD. Therefore, by examining a multi-tier agency relationship our paper helps us better understand organizations (Bolton and Scharfstein 1998). In related work, Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2008) examine the BoD’s corporate governance role using a double agency model. They focus on the impact of the lack of BoD independence from management on corporate governance, and characterize optimal equity awards to the BoD to create the right BoD incentives. Harris and Raviv (2008) present a model where control of the board can be given to either insiders (the non-independent board) or outsiders (the independent board) — both insiders and outsiders have private payoff-related information. They show that it is sometimes beneficial to give board control to insiders in order to better exploit their information. We begin our analysis by examining a benchmark setting in which the BoD’s inputs are commonly observable. In this benchmark case, it suffices to compensate the BoD for the personal cost of providing consulting and monitoring inputs. When the BoD’s inputs are not observable, explicit BoD incentives become necessary. We show that long-term incentives (i.e., incentives tied to firm output) make the BoD explicitly care about the firm’s output and thereby motivate the BoD to play an active consulting role. Thus, compensating the BoD with restricted stock awards (equity) motivates the BoD to supply consulting input. However, we identify conditions under which long-term incentives alone do not suffice in motivating the BoD’s monitoring input. The is that the BoD’s monitoring input improves the of the performance evaluation system used to managerial and has on firm output. The BoD, does not have incentive to supply monitoring input. the need for short-term incentives. We show that incentives tied to the short-term used to are in this because they provide incentives for the BoD to in We are not of work that has the role of short-term BoD incentives in this short-term BoD a that the manager can these in for private the BoD or We address this by a setting where the manager can the firm’s short-term and show in the use of short-term induces the BoD to monitoring In our results that both long-term and short-term incentives are to that the BoD both corporate governance and consulting equity awards are in the with to equity awards are in motivating In we are to of BoD compensation to BoD The paper as In we the model. In we the BoD’s consulting and monitoring inputs. In we the effects of providing short-term long-term incentives to the BoD. In we the where the manager can firm We provide a and some in where is the of is the manager’s is the manager’s productive effort, and is the cost of productive to the manager. The manager’s productive input is unobservable to the BoD. we assume it is where actions that are in the interests of the shareholders. of we assume that productive is personally to the The output of the by is a from the with The BoD has the expertise to as a to the manager. from simple advice to the manager to providing on and the firm’s and We assume that the manager’s Thus, the BoD’s expertise and the manager a We do not on the of and for the that the BoD’s consulting input can have a more impact on the manager’s when the manager either or productive We assume that the firm’s expected output on productive effort, of the BoD’s consulting is that the productive that We assume that the firm’s output, is not the short-term of the manager. Therefore, the manager cannot be a that a of this output. the manager to be on an and short-term which we by by a performance system in performance can of two where We can of as a short-term of the output. we assume that the manager does not have the to this we this The that the manager cannot be a contract on the long-term output some the manager’s contract can be on long-term the optimal compensation contract would be a of is a of there is that in short-term performance play a role in managerial is literature on managerial or that can be to the to short-term and Bebchuk and (1993) show that focus on short-term performance in model this by the manager’s that a contract on short-term performance is of our model is that the BoD’s consulting and monitoring inputs are unobservable to the manager, as is the manager’s to the BoD. Both the BoD and the manager must be motivated to supply their respective inputs. in the the BoD is with restricted and We assume that restricted equity awards have a that the firm’s output or value observable. Thus, the value of restricted equity awards on the of of compensation we use the restricted equity awards to to BoD compensation on the firm’s output of compensation for of the the value of equity awards on the firm’s short-term which is by awards be as a short-term incentive when there are on as a we use the equity awards to to BoD compensation on The manager’s compensation is on short-term performance — the of the performance the contract to the by the BoD. The BoD’s on the can be on both short-term and long-term and We use to the contract to the BoD by the shareholders. We are in that directors have an that has example, that directors their a of the of the fact that the is for both and that a of their between the of and outside in their is to the Board the of directors on boards is years of directors have for more the is The of is as the BoD a compensation contract to the manager. If the manager the or productive the BoD monitoring and consulting inputs. performance is and are as of that by monitoring input the BoD makes the short-term performance a less signal about the firm’s output Consequently, by monitoring the BoD improves the of about the manager’s productive input and can the manager productive a expected compensation The BoD’s consulting on the the manager’s and firm output, it can for the BoD’s monitoring role. The BoD’s consulting input the of the short-term performance a on it the of consulting can or the of about the manager’s productive on consulting input is more informative on consulting input the is a of the in the can a or a in the manager. an where the BoD’s consulting the manager’s it the that on productive by the manager, making about the manager’s makes it more likely that the manager is for Thus, consulting in this the role of and thereby results in expected compensation the where means that the signal more likely with consulting when the manager productive making about the manager’s more more for the manager. a higher compensation is to the manager to supply productive In the of and which of these two effects and the BoD’s consulting input improves or the of the short-term performance about the manager’s productive input We can the has a on the manager’s performance evaluation by the of the short-term performance about the manager’s productive to consulting and in the of has a on the manager’s performance evaluation by the of the short-term performance about the manager’s productive to consulting and in the of If the of consulting on the of the short-term performance about the manager’s productive to consulting and in the of is is to that we are the of on consulting and consulting input. Thus, consulting the role of monitoring in our model. the consulting has an on the of with to the manager’s productive input. The BoD’s consulting input the manager’s the adds some to the performance evaluation that conditions and are conditions and it is that of In the impact of the BoD’s consulting input on the of and on the manager’s performance is for or effects of BoD consulting makes the model more the that the role the short-term performance and the long-term value play in motivating the BoD the become to We to the effects of the BoD’s consulting and monitoring inputs using the by and in the effects of and in the of and consulting the of about the manager’s productive and the of to which the manager is in Consequently, we can identify a of for which the manager’s by the to the is not us to the effects of consulting and The focus of is on the manager’s expected compensation and on However, in the of or are on the manager’s Therefore, on the us to identify a of that for of monitoring, consulting does not affect the of the of the we focus on the of for which the BoD’s consulting does not affect the of with to the managerial productive input. We begin our analysis by examining a where the BoD’s monitoring and consulting inputs are commonly and the manager productive input (the manager’s productive input is not setting a benchmark which we the benefits from providing short-term and long-term incentives to the BoD when the BoD’s inputs are not observable. In this benchmark explicit incentives are to motivate the BoD to provide these it suffices to compensate the BoD for the of these inputs. Thus, the that the BoD monitoring input the from monitoring — expected compensation cost — the BoD’s cost of the the BoD consulting input they a If consulting has a on the manager’s performance the consulting input from the BoD the from and expected managerial compensation the BoD’s cost of consulting. If on the consulting has a the consulting input from the BoD the from the in expected managerial compensation and the BoD’s cost of consulting. We this in the In the benchmark the the BoD consulting monitoring inputs in the benefits from these inputs the BoD’s cost of monitoring and consulting. We a setting in which these inputs are unobservable to the manager and to outside shareholders. setting us to examine the role of short-term and long-term BoD In BoD compensation vested stock and equity the value of these is by short-term is to examine the role of short-term BoD incentives in motivating their consulting and monitoring we first characterize the BoD’s optimal compensation contract on and on and We examine the optimal contract can the form of a to the BoD on short-term performance and restricted equity stock tied to long-term and the BoD’s and of we to and assume the monitoring and consulting by the BoD. In the benchmark the BoD’s monitoring input the of the short-term performance about the manager’s productive a monitoring the BoD to that in the manager productive a expected compensation However, a BoD contract on long-term performance does not the BoD’s compensation to or the manager’s compensation — monitoring improves the precision of about to is not to compensate the BoD on long-term performance and that it monitoring input in can that the BoD consulting input in The is to the firm’s expected output of the BoD’s and manager’s compensation. The the BoD and the that the BoD consulting input. the that BoD are The to that the BoD monitoring and consulting inputs in using a contract on to the need to compensate the BoD on both short-term and long-term that the BoD’s cost of monitoring input does not affect the BoD’s compensation the cost of monitoring to the cost of consulting is that the firm the BoD consulting input in by the BoD when this the BoD monitoring input. that both monitoring and consulting affect the In this case, that the BoD consulting input does not monitoring input. The BoD has to be explicitly for the cost of monitoring, in to the cost of to supply monitoring and consulting inputs in contract the that are more likely when the BoD monitoring input. monitoring is that the firm must provide incentive for the BoD to supply monitoring input in and which are the two that become more likely when the BoD monitoring input — by monitoring improves the precision of about by the that is when the firm’s long-term performance is that the BoD optimal of the cost of monitoring to the cost of consulting is a of both short-term and long-term Thus, the BoD’s compensation to both short-term and long-term and is to that the BoD consulting and monitoring inputs in We this in the does not a BoD contract on long-term performance that the BoD monitoring input. A BoD contract that is on both long-term and short-term and is to that the BoD consulting and monitoring inputs in The BoD optimal the BoD for of short-term and long-term and we to examine the optimal BoD contract can be a that is on short-term performance and a that is on long-term it the optimal BoD contract can be short-term and long-term We can the which conditions under which the optimal BoD contract can the form of a on the short-term performance and restricted equity stock value is tied to the output The can that the BoD monitoring and consulting input in by the BoD a contract of the form If If We focus on with in which to a of BoD compensation short-term and long-term is to that does not the incentive effects of BoD equity awards. In particular, equity awards and long-term performance incentives as are not because the BoD with equity makes a of the firm’s output — firm output compensation — of Nevertheless, we a more in our analysis and our attention to contracts of the form where a share of the firm given to the BoD, and a a us to to the role of equity awards in the BoD compensation is similar to that in the benchmark for the incentive that the BoD’s monitoring and consulting inputs. equity as in share the BoD to care about the firm’s expected long-term that given a equity the BoD would in the However, as we in restricted equity awards are not in motivating monitoring input. the BoD that the manager has productive effort, it does not by to the of the performance about the manager’s productive has incentive to monitoring that given the the BoD’s consulting input the of about the manager’s productive restricted equity awards provide incentive to the BoD to that the manager productive the as the BoD a portion of that incentive to the BoD to not monitoring If the BoD that the manager has productive effort, it not supply monitoring input to the that and thereby the manager’s expected compensation as is to that the BoD’s incentive to not supply monitoring input does not solely on to the manager’s expected compensation. Therefore, we identify the equity to motivate the consulting the the BoD’s consulting input results in higher expected firm output that the BoD some equity their The must the benefits and with the BoD’s consulting input in and equity to to the BoD. equity is for shareholders, it does not make to have the BoD provide consulting input in The BoD’s incentive to not supply monitoring input some In our it is rational for the BoD to not supply monitoring input there that this example, directors have personal with the manager of the If we to the effects of the BoD’s personal cost of monitoring suffices to that restricted equity awards cannot motivate the BoD to supply monitoring input in The of this is as The is that is of the BoD’s and the We can the The can be by to the that consulting long-term firm value and monitoring has short-term in turn that the BoD’s compensation has to be tied to both short-term and long-term Indeed, that restricted equity awards are to that the BoD consulting and that equity awards are to that the BoD monitoring role. the BoD’s compensation to the long-term performance of the firm — restricted equity awards — is the BoD’s compensation to the firm’s short-term performance does not to be that as we have the BoD, the manager, must be for short-term The If a performance is to it is for setting BoD incentives as The use of short-term performance in setting BoD incentives is with an in that it the BoD to performance by for management — on which there is little — is that is a performance and have the incentive to in a way that on by using their it is the of the to that the and the performance of a firm in a the BoD has a to shareholder Thus, it would that in setting BoD the use of performance that are to managerial incentives does not help this this it is more likely that when the firm’s output is of managerial the analysis we assume that does not a personal cost to the manager does it affect or If it the manager would in or expected from is greater the this cost an it does not affect our analysis is to show that in the manager indeed to productive the BoD has to short-term that is the manager in to or expected BoD monitoring the effects of does not the manager’s incentive to the BoD this behavior by the manager and that or is to or However, results in higher expected compensation because the performance evaluation system is less because it is more for the BoD to the manager’s productive input. The manager the firm’s short-term performance in results in higher expected compensation We examine the BoD’s compensation incentives to monitor the manager in the of performance We first the role of long-term BoD incentives. 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In this we examine the effects of short-term and long-term incentives on the corporate governance (contracting and monitoring) and management advisory (consulting) of the BoD using a two-tier agency primary is that long-term incentives not suffice and that short-term BoD incentives can play a role in shareholder as restricted equity provide the BoD with the incentive to supply consulting by not motivate the BoD to monitor when monitoring is personally to the BoD. By short-term incentives BoD as or a on short-term can the BoD contracting, and monitoring more short-term serve an incentive role in the of long-term incentives. of our model some we have on a simple to these In particular, the that are be as there is considerable in the agency literature in this If we this and it is that the not the manager to the and not the BoD to the monitoring However, the underlying incentive is the as in our model. in the results of the we the effects of the BoD’s consulting and monitoring inputs on the of the short-term about the manager’s In particular, we conditions that the BoD’s consulting input has or with to the of the short-term when helps the it is not necessary. results and hold when we for of the BoD’s consulting input. We that managerial is a primary BoD Recent corporate governance as the of shareholder and shareholder to directors have this In our monitoring is not a for is because the way can in our model is the manager to supply productive when is expected to supply productive there is in — the manager productive In in our managerial is and monitoring can be as the cost of in where we performance we do not view monitoring as a way to the improves the precision of the performance and the effects of it does not the BoD to If the BoD with some managerial a would that the manager does not in The role of short-term BoD incentives in a setting where the primary is is not clear. be an for is to that shareholder and BoD interests be for can create incentives for directors to provide consulting and monitoring inputs the for directors of is is that directors some benefits personal or have for when be as directors for short-term In this the of boards that directors can serve as and shareholder and not be in the our analysis makes a for providing explicit incentives to align interests and of the BoD, a recent by to a a in the by making corporate boards more and to have been in to recent the of stock by some address this the cost of incentive that we have in this paper. 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Background Over the past two decades the quest for safe blood supply has led to tremendous growth in the content and scope of the science and practice of Transfusion Medicine (TM). The desire by the various stakeholders in the blood establishment for zero‐risk blood transfusion has not only stretched the level of quality expected of the Transfusion Medicine Service to apical height, but has also resulted in the demand by these stakeholders for concrete proofs that expected degrees of quality have been met or preferably exceeded. Quality indicators (QIs) are a Quality Management System (QMS) tool that are instituted in an organization with intent on not just providing this much needed proof of the level of quality performance tenable in the organization, but they are also intent on utilizing the information gained to seek improving the quality of performance in the organization. In the last decade, huge efforts have been exerted by government and non‐government hospital‐based blood banks, national and international organizations to collate, select, establish and analyze quality QIs for several dimensions of healthcare quality. Notable contributions have been made by such eminent bodies as the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the College of American Pathologists (CAP). Unfortunately these efforts have only sparsely addressed quality indicators for TM. A year ago, the International Society of Blood Transfusion (ISBT) instituted its Working Party on Quality Management (WPQM). Quality indicators for TM are of priority to the WPQM which presumably is intent on redressing this imbalance and providing robust and valid quality indicators to monitor quality performances in key processes and outcomes in TM practice, globally. Objective This paper therefore highlights some basic essentials for successful monitoring of quality of transfusion medicine service through appropriate selection and implementation of quality indicator projects. It is hoped the information shared through this medium might be of value to Transfusion Medicine practitioners as well as to the ISBT WPQM as they thinker with quality indicators for Transfusion Medicine. Material and Method Considerable review of published literature in the form of journal articles, books and online publications on quality management and quality indicators in Healthcare/Transfusion Medicine was performed with the view to extract essentials elements that could be considered building blocks for the selection, implementation, analysis and utilization of quality indicators in Transfusion Medicine. Result Elements deemed as essential building blocks that were appraised included, but were not limited to: understanding Transfusion Medicine terrain; concept of quality and quality indicators selection criteria; choice of improvement model, data analysis and manner of communication of findings as well as the role of effective education and leadership. Conclusion Quality indicators are indispensible tools which various stakeholders in the Blood Transfusion establishment now demand to adjudge and improve on quality performance. Practitioners as well as policy makers in Transfusion Medicine need to ensure that the quality indicators they institute are appropriately selected and analyzed to be effective and efficient monitors of quality. Knowledge of basic building blocks discussed here is therefore a fundamental prerequisite.
A public watermark detection scheme based on secure multiparty computation is proposed. It removes the expensive zero-knowledge interactive proofs and replaces the traditional trusted third party with a group of proxies. Then, the proposed scheme is robust against "single point failure", and efficient in terms of computation cost, the number of rounds and bandwidth required in the communications. Because of using integer comparison technique, the scheme achieves the provable security against sensitivity attacks without leaking any information about the secret watermark.
Cryptography and Data Security
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
Market research surveys report that 75% of hacks occur at the application layer. Of the multiple vulnerabilities that exist in Web application software, proper authentication of the client and the server to each other is fundamental to the security of the system. In the current scenario, we manage this with the adoption of password-based client authentication and PKI-based server authentication. There exist unresolved vulnerabilities in this system due to the misuse of the client's passwords (impersonation) by those managing the servers. The clients' trust of the server based on the certificates issued by an increasing number of certification authorities is questionable in terms of validity and freshness. For proper authentication in Web applications, we need to verify two conditions: 1) the binding of the identity of the entity with the publicly known name or key and 2) the entity does possess the corresponding private key for the identified public key. In this paper, we use the elliptic curve discrete log problem-based version of classical zero knowledge protocol for proving number 2 and modifications of the existing schemes for proving number 1. We have done a prototype implementation of the solution and security analysis required to satisfy the security objectives.
A public watermark detection scheme using verifiable secret sharing is proposed. It removes the expensive zero-knowledge interactive proofs and replaces the traditional trusted third party with a group of proxies. Moreover, the scheme is secure against sensitivity attacks and very efficient in terms of computation cost, the number of rounds and bandwidth required in the communications.
Open access
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
Zero-knowledge proof is an important part of the field of cryptography. In this paper, we obtain two zero-knowledge proof schemes based on the conic curve group being studied. The two schemes are interactive proof systems that one party claims to have some kind of information to the other who yields nothing beyond the validity of the assertion.
A new watermark embedding and detection method in Microsoft Word 2007-2010 files which use Office Open XML (OOXML) format is proposed in this paper. Watermark information can be imperceptibly embedded into OOXML documents by replacing or adding the values of Revision Identifiers (RIs), which are specific attributes in the main document body of the OOXML document. In the detection process, a secure watermark detection scheme based on zero-knowledge proof is proposed without revealing any watermarking-related information to improve the security of watermarking detection. Experiments show that 4.43 bit is embedded into each word and 0.07 bit is embedded into each bit of the document on average, which is higher than contemporary linguistic watermarking approaches. The method can resist “Format”, “Impersonation”, “Save As”, “Copy” and other active attacks and all these changes will not be shown on the MS Office screen display. Therefore, the proposed method can apply to the field of security protection for OOXML format documents.
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
L'interpretazione astratta è una teoria che formalizza l'approssimazione conservativa della semantica di sistemi informatici hardware e software, focalizzandosi su alcune proprietà, che espresse mediante opportune strutture algebriche (domini astratti) possono essere calcolate in modo corretto (anche se non completo). Una grande varietà di domini astratti può essere elaborata, a aseconda dei contesti di applicazione, e con scelta dei domini astratti è possibile modulare in modi diversi precisione e complessità computazionale. Questa tesi considera l'applicazione di tecniche di Interpretazione Astratta in tre diversi scenari: Program slicing; Watermarking di database relazionali; Watermarking del codice sorgente di programmi. Relativamente al Program slicing, viene proposto un raffinamento delle tecniche tradizionali già presenti in letteratura. Molto spesso, siamo interessati a una specifica proprietà delle variabili in un criterio di slicing, piuttosto che ai suoi effettivi valori. Questo è il caso, ad esempio, quando si analizza la non-interferenza in language-based security, dove le astrazioni entrano in gioco per modellare il potere osservativo degli attaccanti. In questo scenario, lo slicing tiene in considerazione le proprietà astratte delle variabili e le dipendenze astratte. Questo approccio allo slicing, non è solo la generalizzazione della tecnica tradizionale, ma offre nuovi spunti nelle relazioni tra diverse aree di ricerca dell'informatica. Un secondo scenario di applicazione delle tecniche di Interpretazione Astratta è la progettazione di watermarking di database relazionali, la cui rilevanza è legata al fatto che in Internet è molto importante preservare i diritti di proprietà nei database relazionali mantenuti in outsourcing. In tale ambito, viene proposta una tecnica di watermarking senza distorsione, che migliora la verifica dell'integrità dei database relazionali utilizzando un meccanismo di autenticazione pubblica. L'ultimo scenario considerato è quello del Watermarking del codice sorgente di programmi: all'aumentare della quantità di codice sorgente distribuito sul web, la protezione e il rilevamento delle proprietà del software è diventata una questione importante. Nella tesi, viene presentato uno schema di watermarking software a chiave pubblica (watermarking asimmetrico), basato su tecniche di trasformazione che preservano la semantica, e che è simile nello spirito alle zero-knowledge proofs. L'approccio proposto si pone come un'alternativa alla cifratura e l'autenticazione software piuttosto che come uno strumento per la protezione del copyright.
Dr. Welch: is a fellow with Intermountain Institute for Health Care Delivery Research, an emergency physician with Utah Emergency Physicians, and a member of the board of the Emergency Department Benchmarking Alliance. Dr. Taylor is a physician executive for Microsoft Corporation's Health Solutions Group and the principle promoter of the national Emergency Department of the Future project. Dr. Cheung is a Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award Examiner, former faculty of the Johns Hopkins Center for Innovation in Quality Patient Care and the Quality and Safety Research Group, and a member of ACEP's Quality and Performance Committee.Should board certified emergency physicians be required to earn certain “merit badge” credentials for hospital privileges? Should such certifications be required for activities like EMS base station medical control or specialty center designation? Hospitals, state EMS authorities, and specialty center designation bodies are increasingly turning to “merit badges” (see table) as proxies for competency in various specialty areas within emergency medicine. Does this make any sense? And where will this end? Will emergency physicians ultimately be required to hold certificates or earn CME hours in geriatric medicine, psychiatry, ethics, and ingrown toenail removal? An Internet search for “merit badge medicine” results in web sites for the Boy Scouts. Has it come to this? Should we wear merit badge sashes during our shifts? It's time to insert a bit of common sense into this madness. In the early days of the specialty, there were few training programs, and the first certifying examination in emergency medicine did not occur until 1980. As a result, most early emergency physicians gained on-the-job experience, and those who became board certified did so through the practice pathway. Since that time, training programs have expanded dramatically, and the only recognized path to board certification is now through emergency medicine residency training and the American Board of Medical Specialties' certifying bodies. Ironically, despite 30 years of formal emergency medicine board certification, “merit badge” requirements have re-emerged as a phenomenon. Are these efforts unwarranted, unnecessary, or even counterproductive? And what is driving this trend? The American College of Emergency Medicine and the American Academy of Emergency Medicine are clear on the use of “merit badges,” and these positions can be used as support exemption from merit badge requirements: The AAEM membership card notes that a fellow is board certified in emergency medicine and therefore has advanced resuscitation expertise in pediatric, trauma and cardiac care. The 1999 ACEP policy, “Use of Short Courses in Emergency Medicine as Criteria for Privileging or Employment,” strongly discourages the use of certificates in subareas of emergency medicine as requirements for privileges or employment. (http://bit.ly/ShortCourse.) Nevertheless, the growing list of merit badges required for hospital credentialing and privileging has become cumbersome. Resources for continuing medical education for physicians can be a zero-sum game. The time and cost for merit badge achievement will inevitably result in other, perhaps more important, educational areas being ignored. Most states and specialty societies require CME for maintenance of licensure and membership. On average, this requirement is 20 to 50 credit hours a year, and can often require up to two weeks away from work (worth $10,000 to $20,000) and $5000 to $8,000 for tuition and travel expenses. While making a financial argument against merit badges can be risky (i.e., “doctors make lots of money”), it can be done successfully. Arizona ACEP avoided state-mandated merit badges by pointing out the total annual cost for particular requirements. An effort to require PALS by all ED staff (including nurses) was defeated when it was suggested it should be funded as a state-mandated program at an annual cost of more than $8 million. This idea quietly went away. As a relatively young specialty, emergency medicine may suffer from a lack of understanding by the community, hospital administrators, and regulators on the breadth of expertise and training of board certified emergency physicians. Even among emergency physicians, considerable confusion exists over the Emergency Medicine Continuous Certification program requirements. These requirements, built on residency training and certification, are perhaps the best argument against merit badges. With the significant investment in initial training and the ongoing and increasing Maintenance of Certification requirements, merit badges are simply unnecessary. There is no evidence that any of these individual credentials correlate with improved clinical care. In contrast, one study demonstrated a quality correlation between board certification and quality measures. (Arch Intern Med 2010;170[16]:1442.) In addition, the “credentials equal quality” mental model is founded on a false premise, that putting more knowledge in the head of the practitioner will improve care. In the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality whitepaper, “Mistake Proofing the Design of Health Care Processes” (www.ahrq.gov), the authors note that one of the biggest failed mental models in health care has been to assume that if we could put more into the practitioner's memory, we could avoid mistakes and provide better care. The premise is faulty because the human memory is fallible. The passage of time erases these efforts from memory if not used regularly. An example is pediatric resuscitation credentialing where pediatric critical care occurs only once every 30,000 to 40,000 ED visits. So the average PALS certified practitioner in a community hospital will go years or even decades before using the information, which is unlikely to be retrievable when actually needed. No other specialty requires physicians to jump through as many hoops to put on a white coat and practice medicine. Five arguments can be used against merit badge requirements for board certified emergency physicians: ACEP and AAEM have strong policy statements against merit badge requirements. Maintaining these credentials is growing more burdensome, expensive, and crowding out more important CME activities. The new ABMS Maintenance of Certification requirements supersede the need for merit badges. There is no proven quality correlation with merit badge requirements. The mental model of “knowledge in the head” is a false premise. Comments about this article? Write to EMN at[email protected]. Click and Connect!Access the links in this article by reading it onwww.EM-News.com. Typical Merit Badges Basic Life Support (BLS) Advanced Cardiac Life Support (ACLS) Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS) Advanced Pediatric Life Support (APLS) Pediatric Advanced Life Support (PALS) Advanced Airway Courses Procedural Sedation Courses Ultrasound Training and Credentialing Hazardous Materials Training (HAZMAT) The Joint Commission's Ongoing Practice Performance Evaluation (OPPE) 16 hours a year of trauma CME (for physicians practicing in American College of Surgeon Certified Trauma Centers) Various state-specific requirements (pain management, geriatric medicine, end-of-life care, infectious disease, risk management, sexual assault, domestic violence, cultural competence, appropriate prescribing, medical jurisprudence, ethics in medicine) CME Requirements Read a state-by-state listing of CME requirements at http://bit.ly/CMErequirements.
In this paper, we study methods for improving the utility and privacy of\nreputation scores for online auctions, such as used in eBay, so as to reduce\nthe effectiveness of feedback extortion. The main ideas behind our techniques\nare to use randomization and various schemes to escrow reputations scores until\nappropriate external events occur. Depending on the degree of utility and\nprivacy needed, these external techniques could depend on the number and type\nof reputation scores collected. Moreover, if additional privacy protection is\nneeded, then random sampling can be used with respect reputation scores in such\na way that reputation aggregates remain useful, but individual reputation\nscores are probabilistically hidden from users. Finally, we show that if\nprivacy is also desired with respect to the the reputation aggregator, then we\ncan use zero-knowledge proofs for reputation comparisons.\n
We study the Glauber dynamics for the zero-temperature Ising model in dimension d=4 with "plus" boundary condition.Let T+ be the time needed for an hypercube of size L entirely filled with "minus" spins to become entirely "plus". We prove that T+ is O(L^2(log L)^c) for some constant c, not depending on the dimension. This brings further rigorous justification for the so-called "Lifshitz law" T+ = O(L^2) [5, 3] conjectured on heuristic grounds. The key point of our proof is to use the detail knowledge that we have on the three-dimensional problem: results for fluctuation of monotone interfaces at equilibrium and mixing time for monotone interfaces dynamics extracted from [2], to get the result in higher dimension.
We study the Glauber dynamics for the zero-temperature Ising model in\ndimension d=4 with "plus" boundary condition.Let T+ be the time needed for an\nhypercube of size L entirely filled with "minus" spins to become entirely\n"plus". We prove that T+ is O(L^2(log L)^c) for some constant c, not depending\non the dimension. This brings further rigorous justification for the so-called\n"Lifshitz law" T+ = O(L^2) [5, 3] conjectured on heuristic grounds. The key\npoint of our proof is to use the detail knowledge that we have on the\nthree-dimensional problem: results for fluctuation of monotone interfaces at\nequilibrium and mixing time for monotone interfaces dynamics extracted from\n[2], to get the result in higher dimension.\n
In this paper, we study methods for improving the utility and privacy of reputation scores for online auctions, such as used in eBay, so as to reduce the effectiveness of feedback extortion. The main ideas behind our techniques are to use randomization and various schemes to escrow reputations scores until appropriate external events occur. Depending on the degree of utility and privacy needed, these external techniques could depend on the number and type of reputation scores collected. Moreover, if additional privacy protection is needed, then random sampling can be used with respect reputation scores in such a way that reputation aggregates remain useful, but individual reputation scores are probabilistically hidden from users. Finally, we show that if privacy is also desired with respect to the the reputation aggregator, then we can use zero-knowledge proofs for reputation comparisons.
We present a cryptographic framework to achieve access control, privacy of social relations, secrecy of resources, and anonymity of users in social networks. We illustrate our technique on a core API for social networking, which includes methods for establishing social relations and for sharing resources. The cryptographic protocols implementing these methods use pseudonyms to hide user identities, signatures on these pseudonyms to establish social relations, and zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of such signatures to demonstrate the existence of social relations without sacrificing user anonymity. As we do not put any constraints on the underlying social network, our framework is generally applicable and, in particular, constitutes an ideal plug-in for decentralized social networks. We analyzed the security of our protocols by developing formal definitions of the aforementioned security properties and by verifying them using ProVerif, an automated theorem prover for cryptographic protocols. Finally, we built a prototypical implementation and conducted an experimental evaluation to demonstrate the efficiency and the scalability of our framework.
As costly and spectacular art museums have proliferated since the opening of Frank Gehry's Bilbao Guggenheim, some critics have complained that “flash and bravura win out over contemplation…and architecture triumphs over art.”1 Hal Foster has even declared that museums like Gehry's Bilbao “inflate the contemporary museum into a gigantic spectacle‐space that can swallow any art, let alone any viewer, whole.”2 The problem is not that bold exteriors outshine the art, but that strange curves, odd angles, or enormous heights inside may generate a “spectacle‐space” that interferes with our attention to the art.3 For example, a number of the acutely angled gallery walls of Daniel Libeskind's 2006 Denver Art Museum addition slant inward or outward in ways that many people have found intrusive. But other critics have been willing to overlook functional defects in favor of audacious formal qualities, even if not all would go as far as Phillip Johnson's “if the architecture is as good as in Bilbao, fuck the art!”4 These conflicting responses to dramatic art museum architecture seem to reflect two deeper intuitions about architecture in general: it seems only natural to expect aesthetics and function to complement each other in architecture, yet it also seems natural to overlook functional defects when aesthetic qualities are outstanding. In this article, I will suggest a way to reconcile these two intuitions by outlining a perspective I call “moderate functionalism.” Moderate functionalism tries to avoid the faults of two polar positions on aesthetics and function in contemporary philosophy of architecture. One position, going back to Roger Scruton's Aesthetics of Architecture and recently updated by Edward Winters, accepts the necessity of function in general but denies the aesthetic relevance of particular functions, a position that would justify those who give priority to formal audacity in art museum architecture.5 At the opposite pole, Glenn Parsons and Allen Carlson's “functional beauty” proposal would make aesthetic appreciation directly depend on a building satisfying its “proper” function, a position that would support those who champion the priority of a museum's exhibition functions.6 In what follows, I criticize both the separatist and functional beauty approaches and then show how a moderate functionalist position can unite the intuition of a desirable concord between aesthetics and function and the intuition that spectacular aesthetic achievements may override functional faults. Before beginning a critique of the separatist and functionalist beauty positions, I need to outline some preliminary assumptions. The first is that the aesthetic experience of architecture is not only about the contemplation of visual form, but is also multisensory and immersive, involving the volumes, textures, and sounds that determine how a building feels as we move through it.7 Of course, we do experience many buildings only visually from the outside. In fact, the “spectacle” art museum controversy has arisen partly from the desire of some museum boards to have an iconic building whose external appearance will draw paying crowds. The importance of such issues as iconicity and symbolism suggests that our concept of aesthetic experience also needs to include a cognitive dimension. The cognitive aspect of aesthetic judgment seems especially appropriate to contemporary art museum architecture, which includes not only sculptural designs (Gehry, Zaha Hadid, Libeskind) but also works influenced by conceptual art (Elizabeth Diller and Ricardo Scofidio) or deconstruction (Peter Eisenman), whose formal and sensory satisfactions may be less important than the way they embody certain ideas. Like the concept of the aesthetic, the concept of function is not only unsettled but is also inflected by its application to architecture.8 Early modernists sometimes interpreted Louis Sullivan's “form follows function” to refer to “structural” function (form should reflect construction), at other times to refer to “practical” function (form should reflect human needs). But architecture theorists have also written of many other architectural functions: urban, environmental, social, ethical, symbolic, even aesthetic.9 The fact that there are many kinds of functions means that aesthetic and practical functions are almost always found intertwined with other functions, among which the symbolic and social are especially important for art museum architecture. Symbolic functions obviously concern architectural meanings, whether understood in terms of “exemplification,”“allusion,” or in some other way.10 Historically, one of the most important symbolic aims of art museum architecture has been to express the value of art itself. In the nineteenth century, this concern gave us those familiar classical temple forms with their grand stairways, spacious reception halls, and sumptuous materials, whereas today's “spectacle” museums try to send similar messages by means of radical shapes, dramatic massing, acres of glass, and unusual materials. Social functions in architecture concern the way buildings affect such things as our sense of well‐being, our sense of place, or the quality of human interactions within them. Arthur Danto has called attention to the way Steven Holl recently designed a stairwell in a faculty office building at New York University to invite chance meetings, thus creating “a remarkable aesthetic experience while solving a sociological problem.”11 When these kinds of social concerns inform specific practical functions in the design of schools, hospitals, or museums, spaces for teaching, healing, or exhibition can be transformed into something far richer than a neutral means to an end.12 This blending of social and practical functions also calls attention to their normative dimension, which has been so effectively described in different ways by Karsten Harries and Yuriko Saito.13 The normative dimension of functions is what makes us ready to criticize an otherwise aesthetically and symbolically exciting building for failing its practical or social purposes or, to criticize an otherwise functionally efficient building, for its sterility and lack of aesthetic vitality. With these general considerations in mind, we are in a better position to examine the separatist view that aesthetic and practical functions should be treated as simply parallel to each other. Roger Scruton and Edward Winters, reacting to extreme versions of “functionalism,” have claimed that a building's specific functions are irrelevant to its aesthetic appreciation.14 Scruton goes so far as to declare that the very idea of function is “fundamentally, and perhaps irremediably, obscure,” so that “all we can say … is that buildings have uses.”15 Moreover, both he and Winters believe that even if we could somehow get a clearer concept of function, it would not make any difference since a building's functions are liable to change with time.16 What remains most important for Scruton is “to find meaning in appearance itself,” so that “aesthetic considerations … must take precedence over all other factors.”17 But the separatist approach cannot do justice to the fact that most architects’ aesthetic choices take into consideration practical and other kinds of functions in the process of design, so that a particular set of functional concerns becomes embodied in architectural form. Major encyclopedic art museums, for example, are likely to have specialized spaces for a variety of practical functions, such as reception (entry halls), exhibition (galleries), or halls), whose architectural forms will have also been for social, symbolic, and aesthetic The specific practical functions of and for example, are dramatic such as for the or for the Art whose architectural forms not only aesthetic responses but also at the a of from the even as they symbolic similar of aesthetic qualities with social, and symbolic functions in the museum gallery the between the and as we move from the and architectural has to the less dramatic forms and spaces may be to a for a for art not that the architecture as in with design for the in New architectural forms should be aesthetically in ways that complement the art even as those forms a for and aesthetic I believe at this of the social, and aesthetic of gallery design when he neutral works of art as as spaces that make the building into a of In for example, one through its dramatic the of the for seem like an Libeskind's radical in Denver sometimes with the art for our go to the other extreme and an aesthetically less for than for The between the aesthetic and practical functions for gallery architecture can be to what has about the halls, such as in or Frank Gehry's in their designs to of an experience architecture by means of the as the are for the quality of their so the gallery designs make of natural to the experience of for example, Louis for the for the Steven walls for the Museum or for the museum in that give it a and In what to be an to this of aesthetic and practical concerns in gallery design, the Frank who so to the function of to in has as the idea that museum architecture should be and not with the the Bilbao museum's than a with a by and be a “spectacle‐space” to swallow almost in this is not the at also designed a number of for and and sculptural for contemporary and of the at Bilbao are are most of intrusive. In the design of the Bilbao Guggenheim, practical and social concerns in aesthetic and symbolic even if he not always a that I believe the of the functional in museum the of separatist and approaches that particular functions in aesthetic practical and other functional aims may as external to a have into their design, they to the to the way the external of a becomes of the of the would be as to the of a of architecture to the of practical and social functions in its forms as it would be to an extreme functionalist that in a should be by its The separatist position, the moderate functionalist approach I have been aesthetic judgment by the aesthetic function of forms from their practical and social Of course, a separatist to the idea of embodied functions, beginning with Scruton's and that since a building's practical functions may change with we are better them. from the that there is some “aesthetic that can be from a building, this the fact that through or the formal and sensory of many buildings may also change over so that involving practical functions are in this than formal a separatist that we may not be to whether the concord between the aesthetic and practical functions of a museum's art is to the design or to choices the of how to and so it is that a may make of an architectural designed for art or a designed for art, in most it is not to out the architectural choices from the One of the Denver for example, Libeskind's that the a of of the function as as they their When the Denver museum first in for example, by from the walls and to be from their on the walls by of on the When I the museum two these been by on the walls to to and on the to at a if one accepts these there remains a to the idea of embodied practical functions: the fact that many important art museums have been in and in which it would be to that we something about the of practical and aesthetic functions from the way the buildings the of many buildings for as art museums have been to make to But even in have been as at or even if one to a building into a museum at our judgment of the aesthetic qualities of the building in its would be by how the aesthetic and practical have been Of course, our attention in such would from the choices of the to the architectural choices of those for a museum in this particular At this a separatist or the by that aesthetic simply are about formal and sensory and the to make is the to responses to aesthetic from responses to like or to like and some be willing to the moderate functionalist that we can make the way practical functions have architectural but they would that these cognitive only concern and are irrelevant to aesthetic would that if we are to justify the of embodied functions in aesthetic we must make aesthetic only one of an judgment or the of aesthetic judgment in a way that these the of aesthetic responses only one of an judgment would aesthetic and practical functions they what we to is whether practical achievements or defects in a of architectural art can into the process of aesthetic itself. recently versions of to this by on our to than to works of art, and both in idea of I will on the position of Glenn Parsons and Allen since they not only make architecture a concern but also to Scruton's the concept of function by as the of can our to a building or an be by of its and the of can we the “proper” function of a building or an to the of on idea of of to that in the of how function us to different aesthetic qualities in of approach seems to show some for with architectural since spaces for and art have been for a so that one idea of forms to the of iconic art museums like Gehry's Bilbao or Libeskind's Denver addition and say that their or may be as an aesthetically or an aesthetically when it to the appearance of such it would seem to determine which forms are for an art museum for many other building so that are of value in at an aesthetic Parsons and Carlson's to Scruton's that the concept of function is also since they to be to determine a building's function” by to a concept on the function of an is some in the that it to a need in the in its In addition to some with the of it seems for architectural designs like art One is that Parsons and seem to architectural works as if they could have only a For example, in the controversy over the in as an but for its lack of formal in the as if the must be in that its “proper” function is to or the architecture critics must be in its “proper” function is to make a bold Parsons and that it may be so to the function in many that it will the of and social and even then it is what the of may But in the of building like art museums, we can to of the art that there is in fact function that has been by The functions of art museums have been since their in the of with and in the of art, and a for aesthetic Moreover, over priority among these functions has been going on since the beginning and of the for any one function as the function of an art museum seem some functions are obviously than for example, functions like or contemplation all depend on the functions of and architectural works like art museums a than like function” can the of both the separatist and functional beauty we are with an of how aesthetic art museums can include social, and symbolic functions and we need to show in what way a practical or can an aesthetic or in an architectural that I will first to idea of of a judgment of beauty for is a to the of the as in a of the and a judgment of beauty a concept of the that what the is to One of of a judgment of beauty concerns architecture, our to a that would be to our intuition could be to a building, “if only it not to be a When that such of beauty are not aesthetic some have how they could be aesthetic at the he on the of and But seems in this to of a that in a judgment of the concept of a not but the of the to of a the of a as a of which architectural forms can us but it not determine in any particular that would the needs of have interpreted of a or as external and that we first take of an as an of its found it to its we then it as have interpreted of beauty as an of a judgment on in the of to a judgment on a in of these that a building is of a certain us to expect that it will the functions of that if it we may go on to its formal But when a building its functions we may find our in its to the building's the and the of of beauty do make function to aesthetic by a both to the separatist position we are to What we need is an of of beauty that can show how function can be a of the process of aesthetic Of the of idea of beauty that for a I find most that of in on and For aesthetic judgment in general attention to all the of an as these are in the of and In a judgment of this of our experience is on the form, but in a judgment of such as aesthetic or the are into an … of the on we an as a the that make it a of its are to be aesthetically aesthetic In of an practical purposes do not judgment from the or get with in an way but also are an of a process of are the appropriate of what I have to as embodied as must practical and other functions with their aesthetic so those who the building must to and other or, in to the aesthetic function” of the Of course, by of or into the of and such are and can to But the of a concept such as beauty is to make for a of aesthetic judgment that the of like social, and symbolic are aesthetic in the sense that they are of are they that directly a general can be into a aesthetic judgment of architecture so as function is in to be in with the other it seems to is what when we take in the way the inward walls of Steven for addition to the Museum are at one and the forms and of natural who is otherwise to concept of that to the specific functions of building into aesthetic may find I believe is the problem of the of seems for any approach to aesthetic judgment that a cognitive Moreover, the of a to the is than for by the of a of beauty that as to take into than those that an simply “a good of its I would that we should not the of aesthetic, and other functions of a particular museum in a way that it as an of the general building art but always move to the appropriate of The kinds of architectural forms that would the function of a museum like the in with its of are likely to be different from the forms appropriate to the New Museum of Art in New York or to a museum such as the Museum in The need to take into the of functions appropriate to different kinds of art museums means that the of beauty I to be by the that “all are preliminary on an of beauty is a there may be in the way people in the aesthetic judgment of a of architecture, one they cannot they cannot give the specific practical functions of a building in an aesthetic This to may seem a especially since at the very of of seems to the out from not only an view of practical functions in aesthetic judgment but even from the and that a through of an or by from such a as if it is to out that when we are of a building's we are when we a strange or are likely to to a of architecture as form. But other that even when we what the function is we may from while also seems to with the idea of could be as the of aesthetic and practical functions, a to the social, and symbolic functions of a of architecture whereas I have that the idea of beauty that a cannot such functions have ways to as with idea of I in the way it a of the other intuition about works of architecture that I at the beginning of this and to which we must our I there that our intuition that aesthetic qualities and practical functions should be in architecture, we seem to have an natural intuition that some buildings are aesthetically so that we may their appearance their practical One way of this other intuition is by to the between architecture and building, by the art is a is architecture. architecture only to buildings designed with a view to aesthetic a similar in some of on architecture, that as of the human is not “a so functional is not on the he designed for in he that in of its satisfying and practical it what he called In these seems to the architecture building to an even than “aesthetic the has interpreted the building architecture as one between and architecture, for which he the of the and the of one of the we have the a and to … at at the other we have the which and us with buildings or are by who as with their to a of practical and aesthetic on the other are designed by who as the of who are us the most spectacular of The problem with the is that most have at some aesthetic and most or works of have some so that the to be an as a the of architecture and building may have some for or to it as for practical functions in the aesthetic judgment of works would simply make practical functions irrelevant by Gehry's or Libeskind's Denver Museum addition may so us by their and that we may be to some of their practical faults. But that is very different from that their specific function of art is irrelevant to in the of “spectacle” or architecture, we need to the that “all are when we a of aesthetic, symbolic, social, and practical as for aesthetic of course, the of works like the the or which we as of architectural art that can be simply as of even they may be for some even their I believe it will us how a functional in a of architecture can to an aesthetic judgment and how a similar functional in a different may not in an judgment by the problem of the between defects and aesthetic For many like functional have been irrelevant or at to from aesthetic At the other pole, the position sometimes called that a in a of art is always an aesthetic and should to a aesthetic What calls “moderate both that an may in certain an aesthetic In a for example, a may try to the that a with a but the is something with the of the has not been designed on its As this of aesthetic to a of art is the of an of many of the not simply the of a or But as it is to at an aesthetic in some it is also to at an in other in which a when all things are defects that are by its other such as formal approach to and aesthetics the of of beauty that I to a similar of practical and formal in an aesthetic is I have called perspective on architecture “moderate “moderate The moderate functionalist not the in aesthetic and practical functions as but the moderate functionalist “functional beauty” in that the aesthetic of an must be in terms of how they a “proper” a moderate functionalist a judgment about a of architecture that is aesthetically exciting but it will be the to embody its practical functions the of its formal and other aesthetic the moderate functionalist is also ready to that a of architecture to all things are defects that are by its other such as formal architecture, of course, will into the of what called the but buildings are less important or of for their aesthetic in aesthetic with practical and other functions than is the spectacular building that so us with that we what it to as a in a or remains a the aesthetic so a practical and social in a of architecture remains a practical and social even when we that it is by aesthetic In I to to the two of spectacular art museum architecture with which I The sculptural and the of its are not only aesthetically but also the symbolic function of important for our the aesthetically of the of its for art are appropriate to the kinds of art each is to In the Bilbao museum's aesthetic and symbolic could be as for the practical of a of its gallery In the of Libeskind's Denver on the other a that is aesthetically and symbolically as a the walls of of its with their exhibition function in ways that have many aesthetic judgment of the there are a the museum's and walls complement particular contemporary in many other the architecture on the art in Libeskind's Museum in and symbolic that give meaning to its aesthetic and for its functional as an exhibition the Denver symbolic and aesthetic not seem to for its practical As these aesthetic of the “moderate will not only kinds of functions into the process of aesthetic but there will also be in the that may be to each the of such not into but to about how a museum's functions have been in the In can an appropriate aesthetic judgment practical functions as irrelevant in the museum's aesthetic as the separatist approach would on the other can one that there is a “proper” function that should be the in the aesthetic judgment of a museum In this I one can both our intuition of a desirable concord between the aesthetic and practical of works of architecture and our intuition that some works are aesthetically so that we may their practical faults.
Abstract : Zero-knowledge proof systems have many characteristics that are desirable for determining trustworthy parties in an airborne networking environment. One approach is to base zero-knowledge proof systems on the instances and solutions of NP-complete problem. This report investigates this approach with a focus on the graph theory problems within the NP-complete and NP-hard classes.