Blockchain Papers

Jacopo Temperini, Marcella Corsi

No abstract is available for this record.

Junyi Hu, Anthony Lee Zhang

No abstract is available for this record.

Ivan Sedliačik, Michal Ištok

No abstract is available for this record.

H. S. Shalini, K. Ravichandran, P. V. Raveendra

No abstract is available for this record.

Mikołaj Barczentewicz, André de Gândara Gomes

Abstract The new EU Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (“MiCA”) emphasises the prevention of market abuse as one of its five main objectives. This paper critically analyzes MiCA’s provisions on market abuse (Title VI), applying the new rules to the primary categories of crypto-asset market integrity risks to provide a coherent interpretation. In doing so, we consider both the pre-existing legal framework for protecting market integrity, chiefly the Market Abuse Regulation (“MAR”), and the unique features of crypto-asset markets. We find that by largely replicating MAR, MiCA presents “new wine in old bottles” challenges, as crypto-assets introduce novel issues that the legislator attempts to address with a subset of existing tools. The extent to which “decentralized finance” (DeFi) activities will incur liability under MiCA’s anti-market abuse provisions remains unclear, particularly regarding various blockchain network participants. Furthermore, classifying MEV strategies as market abuse may prove difficult. The absence of certain safe-harbor provisions present in MAR, such as those for self-insiders and buy-back and stabilisation schemes, may create uncertainty and potentially chill legitimate market behavior under MiCA.

Anne Sibert

No abstract is available for this record.

Peter J. Phillips, Gabriela Pohl

No abstract is available for this record.

Rashad Ahmed, Iñaki Aldasoro, Chanelle Duley

No abstract is available for this record.

Nathan Pierce

No abstract is available for this record.

Olga Klein, Roman Kozhan, Ganesh Viswanath-Natraj, Junxuan Wang

No abstract is available for this record.

Douglas J. Cumming, Zachary Glatzer, Joshua R. Hendrickson, William J. Luther

No abstract is available for this record.

Basile Caparros, Amit Chaudhary, Olga Klein

Liquidity providers (LPs) on decentralized exchanges (DEXs) can protect themselves from adverse selection risk by updating their positions more frequently. However, repositioning is costly, because LPs have to pay gas fees for each update. We analyze the causal relation between repositioning and liquidity concentration around the market price, using the entry of blockchain scaling solutions, Arbitrum and Polygon, as our instruments. Lower gas fees on scaling solutions allow LPs to update more frequently than on Ethereum. Our results demonstrate that higher repositioning intensity and precision lead to greater liquidity concentration, which benefits small trades by reducing their slippage.

Jonathan Chiu, Thorsten V. Koeppl, Hanna Yu, Shengxing Zhang

No abstract is available for this record.

Luca Fantacci, Marcella Lorenzini

The application of distributed ledger technology (DLT) in the financial sector has fostered the development of new services that are frequently referred to collectively as ‘decentralized finance’, or DeFi. In the wake of these recent developments many observers and practitioners regard DLT as a major technological disruption to the financial system, possibly leading to the complete disintermediation of banks and to their substitution with a network of bilateral relations between borrowers and lenders recorded in a common ledger. Recent historiography has shown that a potentially analogous system existed in Ancien Régime societies whereby finance was provided not only by specialized intermediaries, but also by an ‘informal’ credit network where debtors and creditors entered directly into relationship through notaries. In this paper, we carry out a systematic comparison between cryptolending, an extreme form of DeFi at the technological frontier, and the early system of peer-to-peer lending represented by notarized loans in the early modern period. Our aim is to assess the true novelty of current practices and to understand if, and in what sense, the technological innovation represented by DLT can effectively produce a structural change in the functioning of the financial system.

Usman W. Chohan

No abstract is available for this record.

Tobias Berg, Jan Keil, Felix Martini, Manju Puri

No abstract is available for this record.

Paola Di Casola, Maurizio Michael Habib, David Tercero‐Lucas

No abstract is available for this record.

Julia Sinnig, Dirk Andreas Zetzsche

Abstract 157 This article discusses the regulatory definition of collective investment undertakings (CIUs) as provided for by Article 4 (1) (a) AIFMD and Article 1 (1) UCITSD in the context of traditional family offices, holding companies, and joint ventures, and distinguishes them from more recently observed digital asset pools such as digitally managed accounts, crypto lending, crypto staking, and decentralized autonomous organizations.Testing the legal definition of CIUs in the context of traditional and digital pooled investments allows not only for the delineation of the scope of AIFMD (and to a lesser extent, UCITSD), but also provides insights on the desirable content of Level 2 regulation under MiCA. While ESMA guidance based on many years of supervisory experience sets the limits on traditional use cases, the digital boundaries of collective investment schemes are largely untested and to some extent uncertain, resulting in high costs for legal advice, as demonstrated by our brief look into MiCA set out in this article. To address these matters, we argue in favor of broad default rules on pooled finance, paired with exemptive powers from individual or all rules where a disparity exists between the purpose of regulation and the regulated activities. If paired with carve-outs for applications below EUR 5 million (where retail investors are present) and EUR 100 million (sophisticated clients only), these default rules would assist supervisory authorities in setting adequate boundaries for investment fund regulation of innovative financial products. After the introduction (Pt. I), Pt. II outlines the legal definition(s) of CIUs; Pt. III discusses the regulatory limits in the context of traditional use cases; Pt. IV analyzes the limits for digitally managed accounts, decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), and decentralized finance as a whole (referred to collectively as “digital limits”); Pt. V presents our policy considerations; and Pt. VI concludes.

Yudan Zhao, Haifeng Li

The decentralized advantage of block chain technology helps to improve the credit business model of commercial banks, and also provides an idea to solve the financing difficulties of SME.This paper compares the traditional bank credit model with the credit model embedded in block chain technology from a theoretical perspective, and analyzes the impact on block chain technology on the relationship among banks, enterprises and governments.The analysis shows that the credit model embedded in block chain technology can improve the information asymmetry between banks and enterprises and alleviate the problem of bank credit rationing; The credit platform based on block chain technology effectively solves the financing difficulties faced by small and medium enterprises.

Yuliya Guseva

Non-fungible tokens (NFTs) are used in numerous markets for collectibles, art, securities, and commodities. These are different markets, and there is no regulatory framework for all NFTs. To determine a proper legal regime, it is essential to locate the market to which an NFT belongs. This task requires a deep understanding of the economic realities of the associated rights, assets, and transactions. Economic-reality-based interpretations should provide a solid footing for better regulation of NFTs in the US and other jurisdictions grappling with NFT regulation. The new cryptoasset regime in the EU already incorporates a “substance over form” approach. In the US, courts have been successfully applying the Howey test to examine transactions and schemes and establish whether securities law should apply to cryptoassets. In 2023, the SEC and a US federal district court applied the Howey test to demonstrate why and how securities law built for legacy markets where mainstream assets are fungible could apply to transactions in non-fungible assets. The decisions are an example of establishing economic realities of transactions with novel assets regardless of the underlying technologies on which the assets are built. An economic reality approach should help courts and other policy-makers ascertain to which market an NFT belongs and which corresponding legal regime should govern.

Tanmay Kadam, Sahil Shendurkar, Bhakti Sarag, Shubham Waghule · 5 authors

No abstract is available for this record.

Mansur Beştaş

Decentralized finance, powered by blockchain technology, is growing day by day. This field, which emerged a few years ago, today manages $70 billion in assets. In this study, the concept of decentralized finance is discussed and explained the differences from traditional finance. Then, compliance with the legal regulations and the requirements to ensure compliance are mentioned. An evaluation has been made about the financial services offered by the decentralized finance field and the stock market and stablecoins that it uses as a tool while providing these services. Its economic effects, security and, privacy dimensions are examined. In the study, the differences between centralized and decentralized finance, which generally covers legal, economic, security, privacy, and market manipulation, are systematically analyzed. A structured methodology is presented to distinguish between centralized and decentralized financial services.

Enrico Rossi

No abstract is available for this record.

Andrea Barbon, Jean Barthélemy, Benoît Nguyen

No abstract is available for this record.