Hasan Akgul, Mari Eplik, Javier Rojas, Aina Binti Abdullah · 5 authors
ZK-SenseLM is a secure and auditable wireless sensing framework that pairs a large-model encoder for Wi-Fi channel state information (and optionally mmWave radar or RFID) with a policy-grounded decision layer and end-to-end zero-knowledge proofs of inference. The encoder uses masked spectral pretraining with phase-consistency regularization, plus a light cross-modal alignment that ties RF features to compact, human-interpretable policy tokens. To reduce unsafe actions under distribution shift, we add a calibrated selective-abstention head; the chosen risk-coverage operating point is registered and bound into the proof. We implement a four-stage proving pipeline: (C1) feature sanity and commitment, (C2) threshold and version binding, (C3) time-window binding, and (C4) PLONK-style proofs that the quantized network, given the committed window, produced the logged action and confidence. Micro-batched proving amortizes cost across adjacent windows, and a gateway option offloads proofs from low-power devices. The system integrates with differentially private federated learning and on-device personalization without weakening verifiability: model hashes and the registered threshold are part of each public statement. Across activity, presence or intrusion, respiratory proxy, and RF fingerprinting tasks, ZK-SenseLM improves macro-F1 and calibration, yields favorable coverage-risk curves under perturbations, and rejects tamper and replay with compact proofs and fast verification.
Blockchain systems rely on decentralized ledgers and strong security guarantees. A key requirement is non-repudiation, which prevents denial of transaction authorship and supports integrity of recorded data. This work surveys digital signature schemes used in blockchain platforms and analyzes how they deliver non-repudiation and contribute to overall system security. We examine representative scheme families and their cryptographic foundations, security assumptions, and properties relevant to deployment, including unforgeability, resistance to malleability, support for aggregation and multisignature or threshold settings, key and signature sizes, and verification cost. Using these criteria, we compare the suitability of different designs for consensus protocols, smart contract constraints, and resource limits. We highlight practical tradeoffs that affect throughput, storage, scalability, and attack surfaces, and summarize benefits and limitations of each scheme in blockchain contexts. The study underscores that carefully chosen digital signatures are central to achieving non-repudiation and preserving information integrity, and it outlines implementation considerations and open directions such as interoperability and post-quantum readiness.
We formalize a cross-domain "ZK coprocessor bridge" that lets Solana programs request private execution on Aztec L2 (via Ethereum) using Wormhole Verifiable Action Approvals (VAAs) as authenticated transport. The system comprises: (i) a Solana program that posts messages to Wormhole Core with explicit finality; (ii) an EVM Portal that verifies VAAs, enforces a replay lock, parses a bound payload secretHash||m from the attested VAA, derives a domain-separated field commitment, and enqueues an L1->L2 message into the Aztec Inbox (our reference implementation v0.1.0 currently uses consumeWithSecret(vaa, secretHash); we provide migration guidance to the payload-bound interface); (iii) a minimal Aztec contract that consumes the message privately; and (iv) an off-chain relayer that ferries VAAs and can record receipts on Solana. We present state machines, message formats, and proof sketches for replay-safety, origin authenticity, finality alignment, parameter binding (no relayer front-running of Aztec parameters), privacy, idempotence, and liveness. Finally, we include a concise Reproducibility note with pinned versions and artifacts to replicate a public testnet run.
Smart contract vulnerabilities cost billions of dollars annually, yet existing automated analysis tools fail to generate deployable defenses. We present FLAMES, a novel automated approach that synthesizes executable runtime guards as Solidity "require" statements to harden smart contracts against exploits. Unlike prior work that relies on vulnerability labels, symbolic analysis, or natural language specifications, FLAMES employs domain-adapted large language models trained through fill-in-the-middle supervised fine-tuning on real-world invariants extracted from 514,506 verified contracts. Our extensive evaluation across three dimensions demonstrates FLAMES's effectiveness: (1) Compilation: FLAMES achieves 96.7% compilability for synthesized invariant (2) Semantic Quality: on a curated test set of 5,000 challenging invariants, FLAMES produces exact or semantically equivalent matches to ground truth in 44.5% of cases; (3) Exploit Mitigation: FLAMES prevents 22 out of 108 real exploits (20.4%) while preserving contract functionality, and (4) FLAMES successfully blocks the real-world APEMAGA incident by synthesizing a pre-condition that mitigates the attack. FLAMES establishes that domain-adapted LLMs can automatically generate production-ready security defenses for smart contracts without requiring vulnerability detection, formal specifications, or human intervention. We release our code, model weights, datasets, and evaluation infrastructure to enable reproducible research in this critical domain.
Blockchain-based Attribute-Based Access Control (BC-ABAC) offers a decentralized paradigm for secure data governance but faces two inherent challenges: the transparency of blockchain ledgers threatens user privacy by enabling reidentification attacks through attribute analysis, while the computational complexity of policy matching clashes with blockchain's performance constraints. Existing solutions, such as those employing Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs), often incur high overhead and lack measurable anonymity guarantees, while efficiency optimizations frequently ignore privacy implications. To address these dual challenges, this paper proposes QAEBAC (Quantifiable Anonymity and Efficiency in Blockchain-Based Access Control with Attribute). QAE-BAC introduces a formal (r, t)-anonymity model to dynamically quantify the re-identification risk of users based on their access attributes and history. Furthermore, it features an Entropy-Weighted Path Tree (EWPT) that optimizes policy structure based on realtime anonymity metrics, drastically reducing policy matching complexity. Implemented and evaluated on Hyperledger Fabric, QAE-BAC demonstrates a superior balance between privacy and performance. Experimental results show that it effectively mitigates re-identification risks and outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, achieving up to an 11x improvement in throughput and an 87% reduction in latency, proving its practicality for privacy-sensitive decentralized applications.
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) smart contracts manage billions of dollars, making them a prime target for exploits. Price manipulation vulnerabilities, often via flash loans, are a devastating class of attacks causing significant financial losses. Existing detection methods are limited. Reactive approaches analyze attacks only after they occur, while proactive static analysis tools rely on rigid, predefined heuristics, limiting adaptability. Both depend on known attack patterns, failing to identify novel variants or comprehend complex economic logic. We propose PMDetector, a hybrid framework combining static analysis with Large Language Model (LLM)-based reasoning to proactively detect price manipulation vulnerabilities. Our approach uses a formal attack model and a three-stage pipeline. First, static taint analysis identifies potentially vulnerable code paths. Second, a two-stage LLM process filters paths by analyzing defenses and then simulates attacks to evaluate exploitability. Finally, a static analysis checker validates LLM results, retaining only high-risk paths and generating comprehensive vulnerability reports. To evaluate its effectiveness, we built a dataset of 73 real-world vulnerable and 288 benign DeFi protocols. Results show PMDetector achieves 88% precision and 90% recall with Gemini 2.5-flash, significantly outperforming state-of-the-art static analysis and LLM-based approaches. Auditing a vulnerability with PMDetector costs just $0.03 and takes 4.0 seconds with GPT-4.1, offering an efficient and cost-effective alternative to manual audits.
Despite the popularity of Hashed Time-Locked Contracts (HTLCs) because of their use in wide areas of applications such as payment channels, atomic swaps, etc, their use in exchange is still questionable. This is because of its incentive incompatibility and susceptibility to bribery attacks. State-of-the-art solutions such as MAD-HTLC (Oakland'21) and He-HTLC (NDSS'23) address this by leveraging miners' profit-driven behaviour to mitigate such attacks. The former is the mitigation against passive miners; however, the latter works against both active and passive miners. However, they consider only two bribing scenarios where either of the parties involved in the transfer collude with the miner. In this paper, we expose vulnerabilities in state-of-the-art solutions by presenting a miner-collusion bribery attack with implementation and game-theoretic analysis. Additionally, we propose a stronger attack on MAD-HTLC than He-HTLC, allowing the attacker to earn profits equivalent to attacking naive HTLC. Leveraging our insights, we propose \prot, a game-theoretically secure HTLC protocol resistant to all bribery scenarios. \prot\ employs a two-phase approach, preventing unauthorized token confiscation by third parties, such as miners. In Phase 1, parties commit to the transfer; in Phase 2, the transfer is executed without manipulation. We demonstrate \prot's efficiency in transaction cost and latency via implementations on Bitcoin and Ethereum.
Problem Space: AI Vulnerabilities and Quantum Threats Generative AI vulnerabilities: model inversion, data poisoning, adversarial inputs. Quantum threats Shor Algorithm breaking RSA ECC encryption. Challenge Secure generative AI models against classical and quantum cyberattacks. Proposed Solution Collaborative Penetration Testing Suite Five Integrated Components: DAST SAST OWASP ZAP, Burp Suite, SonarQube, Fortify. IAST Contrast Assess integrated with CI CD pipeline. Blockchain Logging Hyperledger Fabric for tamper-proof logs. Quantum Cryptography Lattice based RLWE protocols. AI Red Team Simulations Adversarial ML & Quantum-assisted attacks. Integration Layer: Unified workflow for AI, cybersecurity, and quantum experts. Key Results 300+ vulnerabilities identified across test environments. 70% reduction in high-severity issues within 2 weeks. 90% resolution efficiency for blockchain-logged vulnerabilities. Quantum-resistant cryptography maintained 100% integrity in tests. Outcome: Quantum AI Security Protocol integrating Blockchain Quantum Cryptography AI Red Teaming.
Digital transactions currently exceed trillions of dollars annually, yet traditional paper-based agreements remain a bottleneck for automation, enforceability, and dispute resolution. Natural language contracts introduce ambiguity, require manual processing, and lack computational verifiability, all of which hinder efficient digital commerce. Computable legal contracts, expressed in machine-readable formats, offer a potential solution by enabling automated execution and verification. Blockchain-based smart contracts further strengthen enforceability and accelerate dispute resolution; however, current implementations risk exposing sensitive agreement terms on public ledgers, raising serious privacy and competitive intelligence concerns that limit enterprise adoption. We introduce zk-agreements, a protocol designed to transition from paper-based trust to cryptographic trust while preserving confidentiality. Our design combines zero-knowledge proofs to protect private agreement terms, secure two-party computation to enable private compliance evaluation, and smart contracts to guarantee automated enforcement. Together, these components achieve both privacy preservation and computational enforceability, resolving the fundamental tension between transparency and confidentiality in blockchain-based agreements.
Phishing attacks in Web3 ecosystems are increasingly sophisticated, exploiting deceptive contract logic, malicious frontend scripts, and token approval patterns. We present DeepTx, a real-time transaction analysis system that detects such threats before user confirmation. DeepTx simulates pending transactions, extracts behavior, context, and UI features, and uses multiple large language models (LLMs) to reason about transaction intent. A consensus mechanism with self-reflection ensures robust and explainable decisions. Evaluated on our phishing dataset, DeepTx achieves high precision and recall (demo video: https://youtu.be/4OfK9KCEXUM).
Eranga Bandara, Sachin Shetty, Ravi Mukkamala, Ross Gore · 12 authors
In recent years, blockchain has experienced widespread adoption across various industries, becoming integral to numerous enterprise applications. Concurrently, the rise of generative AI and LLMs has transformed human-computer interactions, offering advanced capabilities in understanding and generating human-like text. The introduction of the MCP has further enhanced AI integration by standardizing communication between AI systems and external data sources. Despite these advancements, there is still no standardized method for seamlessly integrating LLM applications and blockchain. To address this concern, we propose "MCC: Model Context Contracts" a novel framework that enables LLMs to interact directly with blockchain smart contracts through MCP-like protocol. This integration allows AI agents to invoke blockchain smart contracts, facilitating more dynamic and context-aware interactions between users and blockchain networks. Essentially, it empowers users to interact with blockchain systems and perform transactions using queries in natural language. Within this proposed architecture, blockchain smart contracts can function as intelligent agents capable of recognizing user input in natural language and executing the corresponding transactions. To ensure that the LLM accurately interprets natural language inputs and maps them to the appropriate MCP functions, the LLM was fine-tuned using a custom dataset comprising user inputs paired with their corresponding MCP server functions. This fine-tuning process significantly improved the platform's performance and accuracy. To validate the effectiveness of MCC, we have developed an end-to-end prototype implemented on the Rahasak blockchain with the fine-tuned Llama-4 LLM. To the best of our knowledge, this research represents the first approach to using the concept of Model Context Protocol to integrate LLMs with blockchain.
Hadis Rezaei, Ahmed Afif Monrat, Karl Andersson, Francesco Palmieri
The deterministic nature of blockchain technology creates fundamental difficulties in producing secure random numbers within smart contracts, a limitation that exposes vulnerabilities in applications such as decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols and blockchain-based gaming platforms. From our observations, the current state-of-the-art detection tools suffer from inadequate precision while dealing with random number vulnerabilities. To address this problem, we propose TaintSentinel, a novel path-sensitive vulnerability detection system designed to analyze smart contracts at the execution path level and gradually analyze taint with domain-specific rules. This paper discusses a solution that incorporates a multifaceted approach, integrating rule-based taint analysis to track data flow, a dual-stream neural network to identify complex vulnerability signatures, and evidence-based parameter initialization to minimize false positives. The two-phase operation of the system involves the construction of semantic graphs and the analysis of taint propagation, followed by pattern recognition using PathGNN and global structural analysis via GlobalGCN. Our experiments on 4,844 contracts demonstrate the superior performance of TaintSentinel relative to existing tools, yielding an F1-score of 0.892, an AUC-ROC of 0.94, and a PRA accuracy of 97%.
Wan Ki Wong, Sahel Torkamani, Michele Ciampi, Rik Sarkar
Evaluating the usefulness of data before purchase is essential when obtaining data for high-quality machine learning models, yet both model builders and data providers are often unwilling to reveal their proprietary assets. We present PrivaDE, a privacy-preserving protocol that allows a model owner and a data owner to jointly compute a utility score for a candidate dataset without fully exposing model parameters, raw features, or labels. PrivaDE provides strong security against malicious behavior and can be integrated into blockchain-based marketplaces, where smart contracts enforce fair execution and payment. To make the protocol practical, we propose optimizations to enable efficient secure model inference, and a model-agnostic scoring method that uses only a small, representative subset of the data while still reflecting its impact on downstream training. Evaluation shows that PrivaDE performs data evaluation effectively, achieving online runtimes within 15 minutes even for models with millions of parameters. Our work lays the foundation for fair and automated data marketplaces in decentralized machine learning ecosystems.
Jiri Gavenda, Petr Svenda, Stanislav Bobon, Vladimir Sedlacek
A coinjoin protocol aims to increase transactional privacy for Bitcoin and Bitcoin-like blockchains via collaborative transactions, by violating assumptions behind common analysis heuristics. Estimating the resulting privacy gain is a crucial yet unsolved problem due to a range of influencing factors and large computational complexity. We adapt the BlockSci on-chain analysis software to coinjoin transactions, demonstrating a significant (10-50%) average post-mix anonymity set size decrease for all three major designs with a central coordinator: Whirlpool, Wasabi 1.x, and Wasabi 2.x. The decrease is highest during the first day and negligible after one year from a coinjoin creation. Moreover, we design a precise, parallelizable privacy estimation method, which takes into account coinjoin fees, implementation-specific limitations and users' post-mix behavior. We evaluate our method in detail on a set of emulated and real-world Wasabi 2.x coinjoins and extrapolate to its largest real-world coinjoins with hundreds of inputs and outputs. We conclude that despite the users' undesirable post-mix behavior, correctly attributing the coins to their owners is still very difficult, even with our improved analysis algorithm.
Smart contracts play a significant role in automating blockchain services. Nevertheless, vulnerabilities in smart contracts pose serious threats to blockchain security. Currently, traditional detection methods primarily rely on static analysis and formal verification, which can result in high false-positive rates and poor scalability. Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently made significant progress in smart contract vulnerability detection. However, they still face challenges such as high inference costs and substantial computational overhead. In this paper, we propose ParaVul, a parallel LLM and retrieval-augmented framework to improve the reliability and accuracy of smart contract vulnerability detection. Specifically, we first develop Sparse Low-Rank Adaptation (SLoRA) for LLM fine-tuning. SLoRA introduces sparsification by incorporating a sparse matrix into quantized LoRA-based LLMs, thereby reducing computational overhead and resource requirements while enhancing their ability to understand vulnerability-related issues. We then construct a vulnerability contract dataset and develop a hybrid Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) system that integrates dense retrieval with Best Matching 25 (BM25), assisting in verifying the results generated by the LLM. Furthermore, we propose a meta-learning model to fuse the outputs of the RAG system and the LLM, thereby generating the final detection results. After completing vulnerability detection, we design chain-of-thought prompts to guide LLMs to generate comprehensive vulnerability detection reports. Simulation results demonstrate the superiority of ParaVul, especially in terms of F1 scores, achieving 0.9398 for single-label detection and 0.9330 for multi-label detection.
Hasan Akgul, Daniel Borg, Arta Berisha, Amina Rahimova · 6 authors
Large language models are often adapted through parameter efficient fine tuning, but current release practices provide weak assurances about what data were used and how updates were computed. We present Verifiable Fine Tuning, a protocol and system that produces succinct zero knowledge proofs that a released model was obtained from a public initialization under a declared training program and an auditable dataset commitment. The approach combines five elements. First, commitments that bind data sources, preprocessing, licenses, and per epoch quota counters to a manifest. Second, a verifiable sampler that supports public replayable and private index hiding batch selection. Third, update circuits restricted to parameter efficient fine tuning that enforce AdamW style optimizer semantics and proof friendly approximations with explicit error budgets. Fourth, recursive aggregation that folds per step proofs into per epoch and end to end certificates with millisecond verification. Fifth, provenance binding and optional trusted execution property cards that attest code identity and constants. On English and bilingual instruction mixtures, the method maintains utility within tight budgets while achieving practical proof performance. Policy quotas are enforced with zero violations, and private sampling windows show no measurable index leakage. Federated experiments demonstrate that the system composes with probabilistic audits and bandwidth constraints. These results indicate that end to end verifiable fine tuning is feasible today for real parameter efficient pipelines, closing a critical trust gap for regulated and decentralized deployments.
This paper presents DESTinE Block, a blockchain-based data storage framework designed for power systems and optimized for resource-constrained environments, including grid-edge devices such as single-board computers. The proposed architecture leverages the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) for storing large files while maintaining secure and traceable metadata on a custom blockchain named DESTinE Block. The metadata, comprising the IPFS Content Identifier (CID), uploader identity, administrator verification, and timestamp; is immutably recorded on-chain to ensure authenticity and integrity. DESTinE Block adopts a dual-blockchain abstraction, where the blockchain remains unaware of the IPFS storage layer to enhance security and limit the exposure of sensitive file data. The consensus mechanism is based on Proof of Authority (PoA), where both an administrator and an uploader with distinct cryptographic key pairs are required to create a block collaboratively. Each block contains verified signatures of both parties and is designed to be computationally efficient, enabling deployment on devices like the Raspberry Pi 5. The framework was tested on both an x86-based device and an ARM64-based Raspberry Pi, demonstrating its potential for secure, decentralized logging and measurement storage in smart grid applications. Moreover, DESTinE Block is compared with a similar framework based on Multichain. The results indicate that DESTinE Block provides a promising solution for tamper-evident data retention in distributed power system infrastructure while maintaining minimal hardware requirements.
FibRace, jointly developed by KKRT Labs and Hyli, was the first large-scale experiment to test client-side proof generation on smartphones using Cairo M. Presented as a mobile game in which players proved Fibonacci numbers and climbed a leaderboard, FibRace served a dual purpose: to engage the public and to provide empirical benchmarking. Over a three-week campaign (September 11-30, 2025), 6,047 players across 99 countries generated 2,195,488 proofs on 1,420 unique device models. The results show that most modern smartphones can complete a proof in under 5 seconds, confirming that *mobile devices are now capable of producing zero-knowledge proofs reliably*, without the need for remote provers or specialized hardware. Performance was correlated primarily with RAM capacity and SoC (System on Chip) performance: devices with at least 3 GB of RAM proved stably, when Apple's A19 Pro and M-series chips achieved the fastest proving times. Hyli's blockchain natively verified every proof onchain without congestion. FibRace provides the most comprehensive dataset to date on mobile proving performance, establishing a practical baseline for future research in lightweight provers, proof-powered infrastructure, and privacy-preserving mobile applications.
Son, Do Hai, Hieu, Le Vu, Khoa, Tran Viet, Alem, Yibeltal F. · 8 authors
Blockchain technology has experienced rapid growth and has been widely adopted across various sectors, including healthcare, finance, and energy. However, blockchain platforms remain vulnerable to a broad range of cyberattacks, particularly those aimed at exploiting transactions and smart contracts (SCs) to steal digital assets or compromise system integrity. To address this issue, we propose a novel and effective framework for detecting cyberattacks within blockchain systems. Our framework begins with a preprocessing tool that uses Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques to transform key features of blockchain transactions into image representations. These images are then analyzed through vision-based analysis using Vision Transformers (ViT), a recent advancement in computer vision known for its superior ability to capture complex patterns and semantic relationships. By integrating NLP-based preprocessing with vision-based learning, our framework can detect a wide variety of attack types. Experimental evaluations on benchmark datasets demonstrate that our approach significantly outperforms existing state-of-the-art methods in terms of both accuracy (achieving 99.5%) and robustness in cyberattack detection for blockchain transactions and SCs.
New technologies, such as blockchain, are designed to address various system weaknesses, particularly those related to security. Blockchain can enhance numerous aspects of traditional banking systems by transforming them into digital, immutable, secure, and anonymous ledger. This paper proposes a new banking application ALBank, which is based on blockchain and smart contract technologies. Its functionality relies on invoking functions within smart contracts deployed on the Ethereum blockchain. This approach enables decentralization and enhances both security and trust. In this context, the paper first presents a critical analysis of existing research on blockchain and traditional banking systems, with a focus on their respective challenges. It then examines the Know Your Customer (KYC) process and its various models. Finally, it introduces the design and development of ALBank, a decentralized banking application built on the Ethereum blockchain using smart contracts. The results show that the integration of blockchain and smart contracts effectively addresses key issues in traditional banking systems, including centralization, inefficiency, and security vulnerabilities by storing critical data on a decentralized, immutable ledger, managing processes autonomously, and making transactions transparent to all users.
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) refers to a class of attacks to decentralized applications where the adversary profits by manipulating the ordering, inclusion, or exclusion of transactions in a blockchain. Decentralized Finance (DeFi) protocols are a primary target of these attacks, as their logic depends critically on transaction sequencing. To date, MEV attacks have already extracted billions of dollars in value, underscoring their systemic impact on blockchain security. Verifying the absence of MEV attacks requires determining suitable upper bounds, i.e. proving that no adversarial strategy can extract more value (if any) than expected by protocol designers. This problem is notoriously difficult: the space of adversarial strategies is extremely vast, making empirical studies and pen-and-paper reasoning insufficiently rigorous. In this paper, we present the first mechanized formalization of MEV in the Lean theorem prover. We introduce a methodology to construct machine-checked proofs of MEV bounds, providing correctness guarantees beyond what is possible with existing techniques. To demonstrate the generality of our approach, we model and analyse the MEV of two paradigmatic DeFi protocols. Notably, we develop the first machine-checked proof of the optimality of sandwich attacks in Automated Market Makers, a fundamental DeFi primitive.
Neural networks increasingly run on hardware outside the user's control (cloud GPUs, inference marketplaces). Yet ML-as-a-Service reveals little about what actually ran or whether returned outputs faithfully reflect the intended inputs. Users lack recourse against service downgrades (model swaps, quantization, graph rewrites, or discrepancies like altered ad embeddings). Verifying outputs is hard because floating-point(FP) execution on heterogeneous accelerators is inherently nondeterministic. Existing approaches are either impractical for real FP neural networks or reintroduce vendor trust. We present TAO: a Tolerance Aware Optimistic verification protocol that accepts outputs within principled operator-level acceptance regions rather than requiring bitwise equality. TAO combines two error models: (i) sound per-operator IEEE-754 worst-case bounds and (ii) tight empirical percentile profiles calibrated across hardware. Discrepancies trigger a Merkle-anchored, threshold-guided dispute game that recursively partitions the computation graph until one operator remains, where adjudication reduces to a lightweight theoretical-bound check or a small honest-majority vote against empirical thresholds. Unchallenged results finalize after a challenge window, without requiring trusted hardware or deterministic kernels. We implement TAO as a PyTorch-compatible runtime and a contract layer currently deployed on Ethereum Holesky testnet. The runtime instruments graphs, computes per-operator bounds, and runs unmodified vendor kernels in FP32 with negligible overhead (0.3% on Qwen3-8B). Across CNNs, Transformers and diffusion models on A100, H100, RTX6000, RTX4090, empirical thresholds are $10^2-10^3$ times tighter than theoretical bounds, and bound-aware adversarial attacks achieve 0% success. Together, TAO reconciles scalability with verifiability for real-world heterogeneous ML compute.
Fernando Castillo, Eduardo Brito, Sebastian Werner, Pille Pullonen · 5 authors
Service Level Agreement (SLA) monitoring in service-oriented environments suffers from inherent trust conflicts when providers self-report metrics, creating incentives to underreport violations. We introduce a framework for generating verifiable SLA violation claims through trusted hardware monitors and zero-knowledge proofs, establishing cryptographic foundations for genuine trustworthiness in service ecosystems. Our approach starts with machine-readable SLA clauses converted into verifiable predicates and monitored within Trusted Execution Environments. These monitors collect timestamped telemetry, organize measurements into Merkle trees, and produce signed attestations. Zero-knowledge proofs aggregate Service-Level Indicators to evaluate compliance, generating cryptographic proofs verifiable by stakeholders, arbitrators, or insurers in disputes, without accessing underlying data. This ensures three security properties: integrity, authenticity, and validity. Our prototype demonstrates linear scaling up to over 1 million events per hour for measurements with near constant-time proof generation and verification for single violation claims, enabling trustless SLA enforcement through cryptographic guarantees for automated compliance verification in service monitoring.
Rapid advancement in generative AI and large language models (LLMs) has enabled the generation of highly realistic and contextually relevant digital content. LLMs such as ChatGPT with DALL-E integration and Stable Diffusion techniques can produce images that are often indistinguishable from those created by humans, which poses challenges for digital content authentication. Verifying the integrity and origin of digital data to ensure it remains unaltered and genuine is crucial to maintaining trust and legality in digital media. In this paper, we propose an embedding-based AI image detection framework that utilizes image embeddings and a vector similarity to distinguish AI-generated images from real (human-created) ones. Our methodology is built on the hypothesis that AI-generated images demonstrate closer embedding proximity to other AI-generated content, while human-created images cluster similarly within their domain. To validate this hypothesis, we developed a system that processes a diverse dataset of AI and human-generated images through five benchmark embedding models. Extensive experimentation demonstrates the robustness of our approach, and our results confirm that moderate to high perturbations minimally impact the embedding signatures, with perturbed images maintaining close similarity matches to their original versions. Our solution provides a generalizable framework for AI-generated image detection that balances accuracy with computational efficiency.