Monies are typically categorized as commodity or fiat, depending on whether the item in question is intrinsically worthless. In the case of bitcoin, it is not so clear. I consider the superficial subjective value argument often put forward by non-monetary economists and a more sophisticated payments technology argument. After dismissing both, I argue that there are two reasonable views on the value of bitcoin. One might claim bitcoin lacks intrinsic worth, in which case its value depends on foresight and coordination. Alternatively, one might claim that bitcoin has intrinsic worth, even if no one else accepts it, because some users have peculiar preferences. In either case, the existence of bitcoin calls into question the practical relevance of the regression theorem.
Abstract Bitcoin provides its users with transaction-processing services which are similar to those of traditional payment systems. This article models the novel economic structure implied by Bitcoin’s innovative decentralized design, which allows the payment system to be reliably operated by unrelated parties called miners. We find that this decentralized design protects users from monopoly pricing. Competition among service providers within the platform and free entry imply no entity can profitably affect the level of fees paid by users. Instead, a market for transaction-processing determines the fees users pay to gain priority and avoid transaction-processing delays. The article (i) derives closed-form formulas of the fees and waiting times and studies their properties, (ii) compares pricing under the Bitcoin Payment System to that under a traditional payment system operated by a profit-maximizing firm, and (iii) suggests protocol design modifications to enhance the platform’s efficiency. The Appendix describes and explains the main attributes of Bitcoin and the underlying blockchain technology.
Sinclair Davidson, Primavera De Filippi, Jason Potts
Abstract Blockchains are a new digital technology that combines peer-to-peer network computing and cryptography to create an immutable decentralised public ledger. Where the ledger records money, a blockchain is a cryptocurrency, such as Bitcoin; but ledger entries can record any data structure, including property titles, identity and certification, contracts, and so on. We argue that the economics of blockchains extend beyond analysis of a new general purpose technology and its disruptive Schumpeterian consequences to the broader idea that blockchains are an institutional technology. We consider several examples of blockchain-based economic coordination and governance. We claim that blockchains are an instance of institutional evolution.
This paper discusses the game theory behind self-contained smart contract provably fair casinos, how they can be gamed by attackers with a large amount of money and computing power, as well as what are the necessary conditions to assure the system cannot be taken advantage of under various configurations.
Ujan Mukhopadhyay, Anthony Skjellum, Oluwakemi Hambolu, Jon Oakley · 6 authors
Cryptocurrencies have emerged as important financial software systems. They rely on a secure distributed ledger data structure; mining is an integral part of such systems. Mining adds records of past transactions to the distributed ledger known as Blockchain, allowing users to reach secure, robust consensus for each transaction. Mining also introduces wealth in the form of new units of currency. Cryptocurrencies lack a central authority to mediate transactions because they were designed as peer-to-peer systems. They rely on miners to validate transactions. Cryptocurrencies require strong, secure mining algorithms. In this paper we survey and compare and contrast current mining techniques as used by major Cryptocurrencies. We evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, and possible threats to each mining strategy. Overall, a perspective on how Cryptocurrencies mine, where they have comparable performance and assurance, and where they have unique threats and strengths are outlined.
The value of bitcoin depends upon self‐fulfilling beliefs that are hard to pin down. We demonstrate this for the case where bitcoin is the only form of money in the economy and then generalize the message to the case of multiple bitcoin clones and/or a competing fiat currency. Some aspects of the indeterminacy we describe would no longer hold if bitcoin were an interest‐bearing object. ( JEL D50, E42)
This dissertation is a compilation of three papers that investigate the role of optimal contracting in a delegated portfolio management setting. While the study of optimal contracts in classical principal-agent setup has been extensively studied, relatively few have been studied in the context of delegated portfolio management in finance. And even delegated portfolio management papers in finance, there are still several open questions and unresolved issues that are beyond the scope of a standard principal-agent problem. In Chapter 1, I study a continuous-time principal-agent problem with drift and stochastic volatility control. While the problem with drift-only control by an agent has been extensively studied recently, very few existing papers allow an agent to endogenously influence volatility. Endogenous volatility control is particularly important in delegated portfolio management settings as volatility is one of the defining aspects of modern financial portfolio management. In Chapter 2, I study a model that encompasses dynamic agency, delegated portfolio management and asset pricing. Traditionally, the fields of ``asset pricing'' and ``corporate finance'' are studied independently of each other. However, as the modern portfolio management industry blooms in size and influence, the role of the portfolio manager and the contracts that are extended to them arguably has a role in the securities that they invest in, and hence in equilibrium, the asset pricing implications of the market overall. This paper is an attempt to bridge ``asset pricing'' and ``corporate finance'' (specifically interpreted to mean delegated portfolio management contracting) into one. In Chapter 3, I study whether a principal investor is better off delegating most of his money to a single portfolio manager (centralized delegation), as opposed to multiple portfolio managers (decentralized delegation), especially when there is the possible presence of moral hazard. With the size of the hedge fund industry and growing empirical support that moral hazard is a growing risk among hedge fund managers, it becomes imperative to understand when an investor decides to delegate his money, should it be delegated in a more centralized or decentralized fashion.
Bitcoin is the most popular virtual currency yet developed. Proponents assert that bitcoin can remove frictions involved in payment and settlement systems by eliminating the need for the financial intermediaries that exist in traditional currencies. In this blog post, we show that while bitcoin transfers themselves are relatively frictionless for the user, there are significant frictions when bitcoins trade in exchange markets resulting in meaningful and persistent price differences across bitcoin exchanges. These exchange-related frictions reduce the incentive of market participants to use bitcoin as a payments alternative.
This paper provides a theory of external and internal finance where entrepreneurs finance random investment opportunities with fiat money, bank liabilities, or trade credit. Loans are distributed in an over-the-counter credit market where the terms of the loan contract, including size, rate, and down payment, are negotiated in a decentralized fashion subject to pledgeability constraints. The model has implications for the cross-sectional distribution of corporate loan rates and loan sizes, interest rate pass-through, and the transmission of monetary policy (described either as money growth or open market operations) with or without liquidity requirements.
In this paper, we analyse the workings of commercial banks in a scenario where crypto-currencies are the mainstream bills of exchange. We start by explaining the concept of cryptocurrencies (also referred to as cryptocoins in this paper). Then we discuss the concept of Regulated and Sovereign Backed Cryptocurrencies (RSBCs). Later on, we envisage a scenario where cryptocoins are the main media of exchange. The banking aspects of Paper money, Bitcoins and RSBCs are then deliberated. We analyse the interplays between Banking and various currency formats. Finally, the paper concludes as to which currency is best suited to be the mainstream bill of exchange.
The paper deals with cryptocurrencies and trading. Main goal of this article is to introduce strategy for automated trading on cryptocurrency exchange market. For this purpose we will use algorithm based of Floyd-Warshall algorithm. Article is introductory and can this method can be developed in the future. First, a general introduction to cryptocurrencies is given from the programmer's point of view, some statistics data and figure representing volatility of exchange. Then the article describes some basic strategies for automated trading. Also explained is the algorithm Floyd-Warshall and its modifications for automation arbitrage. An illustrative example is given and a trading algorithm is listed.
Can competition among privately issued fiat currencies such as Bitcoin or Ethereum work? Only sometimes. To show this, we build a model of competition among privately issued fiat currencies. We modify the current workhorse of monetary economics, the Lagos-Wright environment, by including entrepreneurs who can issue their own fiat currencies in order to maximize their utility. Otherwise, the model is standard. We show that there exists an equilibrium in which price stability is consistent with competing private monies, but also that there exists a continuum of equilibrium trajectories with the property that the value of private currencies monotonically converges to zero. These latter equilibria disappear, however, when we introduce productive capital. We also investigate the properties of hybrid monetary arrangements with private and government monies, of automata issuing money, and the role of network effects.
In this paper we propose to use the Grand Canonical Minority Game (GCMG, a highly simplified financial market model) as a model of bitcoin market to show how the lack of an income for “miners”, similar to yield earned by bond holders, could be a structural reason for high volatility of bitcoin price in a reference currency. Coherently with present analysis, the introduction of future contracts on bitcoin would have the effect of reducing the overall market volatility.
Susan Athey, Ivo Parashkevov, Vishnu Sarukkai, Jing Xia
This paper develops a model of user adoption and use of virtual currency (such as Bitcoin), and focusing on the dynamics of adoption in the presence of frictions arising from exchange rate uncertainty. The theoretical model can be used to analyze how market fundamentals determine the exchange rate of fiat currency to Bitcoin. Empirical evidence from Bitcoin prices and utilization provides mixed evidence about the ability of the model to explain prices. Further analysis of the history of all individual transactions on Bitcoin's public ledger establishes patterns of adoption and utilization across user types, transaction type, and geography. We show that as of mid-2015, active usage was not growing quickly, and that investors and infrequent users held the majority of Bitcoins. We document the extent to which the attributes of the anonymous users of Bitcoin can be inferred through their behavior, and we find that users who engage in illegal activity are more likely to try to protect their financial privacy.
We build on economic theory to discuss how blockchain technology can shape innovation and competition in digital platforms. We identify two key costs affected by the technology: the cost of verification and the cost of networking. The cost of verification relates to the ability to cheaply verify state, including information about past transactions and their attributes, and current ownership in a native digital asset. The cost of networking, instead, relates to the ability to bootstrap and operate a marketplace without assigning control to a centralized intermediary. This is achieved by combining the ability to cheaply verify state with economic incentives targeted at rewarding state transitions that are particularly valuable from a network perspective, such as the contribution of the resources needed to operate, scale, and secure a decentralized network. The resulting digital marketplaces allow participants to make joint investments in shared infrastructure and digital public utilities without assigning market power to a platform operator, and are characterized by increased competition, lower barriers to entry, and a lower privacy risk. Because of their decentralized nature, they also introduce new types of inefficiencies and governance challenges.