Current cryptocurrencies, starting with Bitcoin, build a decentralized blockchain-based transaction ledger, maintained through proofs-of-work that also serve to generate a monetary supply. Such decentralization has benefits, such as independence from national political control, but also significant limitations in terms of computational costs and scalability. We introduce RSCoin, a cryptocurrency framework in which central banks maintain complete control over the monetary supply, but rely on a distributed set of authorities, or mintettes, to prevent double-spending. While monetary policy is centralized, RSCoin still provides strong transparency and auditability guarantees. We demonstrate, both theoretically and experimentally, the benefits of a modest degree of centralization, such as the elimination of wasteful hashing and a scalable system for avoiding doublespending attacks.
Johannes Göbel, Paul Keeler, A. E. Krzesinski, Peter Taylor
In the context of the `selfish-mine' strategy proposed by Eyal and Sirer, we study the effect of propagation delay on the evolution of the Bitcoin blockchain. First, we use a simplified Markov model that tracks the contrasting states of belief about the blockchain of a small pool of miners and the `rest of the community' to establish that the use of block-hiding strategies, such as selfish-mine, causes the rate of production of orphan blocks to increase. Then we use a spatial Poisson process model to study values of Eyal and Sirer's parameter $γ$, which denotes the proportion of the honest community that mine on a previously-secret block released by the pool in response to the mining of a block by the honest community. Finally, we use discrete-event simulation to study the behaviour of a network of Bitcoin miners, a proportion of which is colluding in using the selfish-mine strategy, under the assumption that there is a propagation delay in the communication of information between miners.
Trusted timestamping is a process for proving that certain information existed at a given point in time. This paper presents a trusted timestamping concept and its implementation in form of a web-based service that uses the decentralized Bitcoin block chain to store anonymous, tamper-proof timestamps for digital content. The service allows users to hash files, such as text, photos or videos, and store the created hashes in the Bitcoin block chain. Users can then retrieve and verify the timestamps that have been committed to the block chain. The non-commercial service enables anyone, e.g., researchers, authors, journalists, students, or artists, to prove that they were in possession of certain information at a given point in time. Common use cases include proving that a contract has been signed, a photo taken, a video recorded, or a task completed prior to a certain date. All procedures maintain complete privacy of the user's data.
Open access
2 source records
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
The ability to assess the reputation of a member in a web community is a need addressed in many different ways according to the many different stages in which the nature of communities has evolved over time. In the case of reputation of goods/services suppliers, the solutions available to prevent the feedback abuse are generally reliable but centralized under the control of few big Internet companies. In this paper we show how a decentralized and distributed feedback management system can be built on top of the Bitcoin blockchain
Bitcoins have recently become an increasingly popular cryptocurrency through which users trade electronically and more anonymously than via traditional electronic transfers. Bitcoin's design keeps all transactions in a public ledger. The sender and receiver for each transaction are identified only by cryptographic public-key ids. This leads to a common misconception that it inherently provides anonymous use. While Bitcoin's presumed anonymity offers new avenues for commerce, several recent studies raise user-privacy concerns. We explore the level of anonymity in the Bitcoin system. Our approach is two-fold: (i) We annotate the public transaction graph by linking bitcoin public keys to "real" people - either definitively or statistically. (ii) We run the annotated graph through our graph-analysis framework to find and summarize activity of both known and unknown users.
Sidecoin is a mechanism that allows a snapshot to be taken of Bitcoin's blockchain. We compile a list of Bitcoin's unspent transaction outputs, then use these outputs and their corresponding balances to bootstrap a new blockchain. This allows the preservation of Bitcoin's economic state in the context of a new blockchain, which may provide new features and technical innovations.
ECDSA has become a popular choice as lightweight alternative to RSA and classic DL based signature algorithms in recent years. As standardized, the signature produced by ECDSA for a pair of a message and a key is not deterministic. This work shows how this non-deterministic choice can be exploited by an attacker to leak private information through the signature without any side channels, an attack first discovered by Young and Yung for classic DL-based cryptosystems in 1997, and how this attack affects the application of ECDSA in the Bitcoin protocol.
Kourosh Davarpanah, Dan Kaufman, Ophelie Pubellier
NeuCoin is a decentralized peer-to-peer cryptocurrency derived from Sunny\nKing's Peercoin, which itself was derived from Satoshi Nakamoto's Bitcoin. As\nwith Peercoin, proof-of-stake replaces proof-of-work as NeuCoin's security\nmodel, effectively replacing the operating costs of Bitcoin miners\n(electricity, computers) with the capital costs of holding the currency.\nProof-of-stake also avoids proof-of-work's inherent tendency towards\ncentralization resulting from competition for coinbase rewards among miners\nbased on lowest cost electricity and hash power.\n NeuCoin increases security relative to Peercoin and other existing\nproof-of-stake currencies in numerous ways, including: (1) incentivizing nodes\nto continuously stake coins over time through substantially higher mining\nrewards and lower minimum stake age; (2) abandoning the use of coin age in the\nmining formula; (3) causing the stake modifier parameter to change over time\nfor each stake; and (4) utilizing a client that punishes nodes that attempt to\nmine on multiple branches with duplicate stakes.\n This paper demonstrates how NeuCoin's proof-of-stake implementation addresses\nall commonly raised "nothing at stake" objections to generic proof-of-stake\nsystems. It also reviews many of the flaws of proof-of-work designs to\nhighlight the potential for an alternate cryptocurrency that solves these\nflaws.\n
Gareth W. Peters, Efstathios Panayi, Ariane Chapelle
The internet era has generated a requirement for low cost, anonymous and rapidly verifiable transactions to be used for online barter, and fast settling money have emerged as a consequence. For the most part, e-money has fulfilled this role, but the last few years have seen two new types of money emerge. Centralised virtual currencies, usually for the purpose of transacting in social and gaming economies, and crypto-currencies, which aim to eliminate the need for financial intermediaries by offering direct peer-to-peer online payments. We describe the historical context which led to the development of these currencies and some modern and recent trends in their uptake, in terms of both usage in the real economy and as investment products. As these currencies are purely digital constructs, with no government or local authority backing, we then discuss them in the context of monetary theory, in order to determine how they may be have value under each. Finally, we provide an overview of the state of regulatory readiness in terms of dealing with transactions in these currencies in various regions of the world.
PGP is built upon a Distributed Web of Trust in which the trustworthiness of a user is established by others who can vouch through a digital signature for that particular identity. Preventing its wholesale adoption are a number of inherent weaknesses to include (but not limited to) the following: 1) Trust Relationships are built on a subjective honor system, 2) Only first degree relationships can be fully trusted, 3) Levels of trust are difficult to quantify with actual values, and 4) Issues with the Web of Trust itself (Certification and Endorsement). Although the security that PGP provides is proven to be reliable, it has largely failed to garner large scale adoption. In this paper, we propose several novel contributions to address the aforementioned issues with PGP and associated Web of Trust. To address the subjectivity of the Web of Trust, we provide a new certificate format based on Bitcoin which allows a user to verify a PGP certificate using Bitcoin identity-verification transactions - forming first degree trust relationships that are tied to actual values (i.e., number of Bitcoins transferred during transaction). Secondly, we present the design of a novel Distributed PGP key server that leverages the Bitcoin transaction blockchain to store and retrieve Bitcoin-Based PGP certificates. Lastly, we provide a web prototype application that demonstrates several of these capabilities in an actual environment.
Shayan Eskandari, David Barrera, Elizabeth Stobert, Jeremy Clark
Bitcoin users are directly or indirectly forced to deal with public key cryptography, which has a number of security and usability challenges that differ from the password-based authentication underlying most online banking services. Users must ensure that keys are simultaneously accessible, resistant to digital theft and resilient to loss. In this paper, we contribute an evaluation framework for comparing Bitcoin key management approaches, and conduct a broad usability evaluation of six representative Bitcoin clients. We find that Bitcoin shares many of the fundamental challenges of key management known from other domains, but that Bitcoin may present a unique opportunity to rethink key management for end users.
Open access
3 source records
User Authentication and Security Systems
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
In this chapter we provide an overview of the concept of blockchain technology and its potential to disrupt the world of banking through facilitating global money remittance, smart contracts, automated banking ledgers and digital assets. In this regard, we first provide a brief overview of the core aspects of this technology, as well as the second-generation contract-based developments. From there we discuss key issues that must be considered in developing such ledger based technologies in a banking context.
Christian Decker, Jochen Seidel, Roger Wattenhofer
The Bitcoin system only provides eventual consistency. For everyday life, the time to confirm a Bitcoin transaction is prohibitively slow. In this paper we propose a new system, built on the Bitcoin blockchain, which enables strong consistency. Our system, PeerCensus, acts as a certification authority, manages peer identities in a peer-to-peer network, and ultimately enhances Bitcoin and similar systems with strong consistency. Our extensive analysis shows that PeerCensus is in a secure state with high probability. We also show how Discoin, a Bitcoin variant that decouples block creation and transaction confirmation, can be built on top of PeerCensus, enabling real-time payments. Unlike Bitcoin, once transactions in Discoin are committed, they stay committed.
An open distributed system can be secured by requiring participants to present proof of work and rewarding them for participation. The Bitcoin digital currency introduced this mechanism, which is adopted by almost all contemporary digital currencies and related services. A natural process leads participants of such systems to form pools, where members aggregate their power and share the rewards. Experience with Bitcoin shows that the largest pools are often open, allowing anyone to join. It has long been known that a member can sabotage an open pool by seemingly joining it but never sharing its proofs of work. The pool shares its revenue with the attacker, and so each of its participants earns less. We define and analyze a game where pools use some of their participants to infiltrate other pools and perform such an attack. With any number of pools, no-pool-attacks is not a Nash equilibrium. With two pools, or any number of identical pools, there exists an equilibrium that constitutes a tragedy of the commons where the pools attack one another and all earn less than they would have if none had attacked. For two pools, the decision whether or not to attack is the miner's dilemma, an instance of the iterative prisoner's dilemma. The game is played daily by the active Bitcoin pools, which apparently choose not to attack. If this balance breaks, the revenue of open pools might diminish, making them unattractive to participants.
Marc Solanas, Julio Hernandez-Castro, Debojyoti Dutta
More users and companies make use of cloud services every day. They all expect a perfect performance and any issue to remain transparent to them. This last statement is very challenging to perform. A user's activities in our cloud can affect the overall performance of our servers, having an impact on other resources. We can consider these kind of activities as fraudulent. They can be either illegal activities, such as launching a DDoS attack or just activities which are undesired by the cloud provider, such as Bitcoin mining, which uses substantial power, reduces the life of the hardware and can possibly slow down other user's activities. This article discusses a method to detect such activities by using non-intrusive, privacy-friendly data: billing data. We use OpenStack as an example with data provided by Telemetry, the component in charge of measuring resource usage for billing purposes. Results will be shown proving the efficiency of this method and ways to improve it will be provided as well as its advantages and disadvantages.
Decrits is a cryptocurrency in development that makes use of a novel consensus algorithm that does not require proof-of-work. This paper describes how the Decrits Consensus Algorithm (DCA) is as trustless as a proof-of-work algorithm while offering superior transaction security at virtually no cost.
Bitcoin is a decentralized P2P digital currency in which coins are generated by a distributed set of miners and transaction are broadcasted via a peer-to-peer network. While Bitcoin provides some level of anonymity (or rather pseudonymity) by encouraging the users to have any number of random-looking Bitcoin addresses, recent research shows that this level of anonymity is rather low. This encourages users to connect to the Bitcoin network through anonymizers like Tor and motivates development of default Tor functionality for popular mobile SPV clients. In this paper we show that combining Tor and Bitcoin creates an attack vector for the deterministic and stealthy man-in-the-middle attacks. A low-resource attacker can gain full control of information flows between all users who chose to use Bitcoin over Tor. In particular the attacker can link together user's transactions regardless of pseudonyms used, control which Bitcoin blocks and transactions are relayed to the user and can \ delay or discard user's transactions and blocks. In collusion with a powerful miner double-spending attacks become possible and a totally virtual Bitcoin reality can be created for such set of users. Moreover, we show how an attacker can fingerprint users and then recognize them and learn their IP address when they decide to connect to the Bitcoin network directly.
A soft control of the network activity through varying reward in a proof-of-work (PoW) cryptocurrency is reported. Rewards are the necessity to incent the contributors activities (i.e., mining) in order to maintain the PoW network. Contrary to constant rewarding in a certain period implemented in most of cryptocurrency, such as bitcoin, we propose a network-dependent rewarding model system, primarily including two phases: 1) activities encouraging phase in which higher rewards are issued at higher network activities; and 2) discouraging further increase of activities by reducing rewards. The advantages of this system include 1) fair distribution of rewards among a variety of contributors, and 2) enforcing a limit to the network activity and hence the cost of maintaining the PoW network. This mechanism requires network contributors to show their participation in order to earn maximum rewards, i.e., proof-of-mining.
Off-Chain transactions allow for the immediate transfer of Cryptocurrency between two parties, without delays or unavoidable transaction fees. Such capabilities are critical for mainstream Cryptocurrency adaption. They allow for the "Coffee-Coin Criteria"; under which a customer orders a coffee and pays for that coffee in bitcoins. This is not possible with On-Chain transactions today. Unfortunately, all existing Off-Chain transaction protocols are notoriously unreliable The current generation of third-party facilitators are vulnerable to hacker-based attacks. As Mt. Gox tragically demonstrated, centralized-transaction institutions are easy targets for Cryptocurrency thieves. The slightest security flaw in a third-party system will pounced on by hackers, who will proceed to devour it like ants devouring a crab. Under such circumstances, it no wonder that the Public treats most Cryptocurrency services with a constant shadow of suspicion. For Bitcoin to flourish, its anti-hierarchy principles must be applied to safe Off-Chain transactions. First and foremost, we need a new hacker-proof protocol that can easily be executed by any experienced developer. Preferably, the protocol will be open-sourced for full reliability and transparency. This paper presents one such procedure, which allows for he safe transmission of Bitcoin private key control by way of Cryptocubic transactions.
In this paper we present a new primitive for a key exchange protocol based on multivariate non-commutative polynomial rings, analogous to the classic Diffie-Hellman method. Our technique extends the proposed scheme of Boucher et al. from 2010. Their method was broken by Dubois and Kammerer in 2011, who exploited the Euclidean domain structure of the chosen ring. However, our proposal is immune against such attacks, without losing the advantages of non-commutative polynomial rings as outlined by Boucher et al. Moreover, our extension is not restricted to any particular ring, but is designed to allow users to readily choose from a large class of rings when applying the protocol. Our primitive can also be applied to other cryptographic paradigms. In particular, we develop a three-pass protocol, a public key cryptosystem, a digital signature scheme and a zero-knowledge proof protocol.
We study decentralized cryptocurrency protocols in which the participants do not deplete physical scarce resources. Such protocols commonly rely on Proof of Stake, i.e., on mechanisms that extend voting power to the stakeholders of the system. We offer analysis of existing protocols that have a substantial amount of popularity. We then present our novel pure Proof of Stake protocols, and argue that they help in mitigating problems that the existing protocols exhibit.
On February 2014, $650.000.000 worth of Bitcoins disappeared. Currently it is unclear whether hackers or MtGox, the largest Bitcoin exchange, are to be blamed. In either case, the anonymous and unregulated nature of the Bitcoin system makes it practically impossible for innocent victims to get their money back. We have investigated the technical possibilities, solutions and implications of introducing a regulatory framework based on redlisting Bitcoin accounts. Despite numerous proposals, the Bitcoin community has voiced a strong opinion against any form of regulation. However, most of the discussions were based on speculations rather than facts. We strive to contribute a scientific foundation to these discussions and illuminate the path to crypto-justice.
Alex Biryukov, Dmitry Khovratovich, Ivan Pustogarov
Bitcoin is a digital currency which relies on a distributed set of miners to mint coins and on a peer-to-peer network to broadcast transactions. The identities of Bitcoin users are hidden behind pseudonyms (public keys) which are recommended to be changed frequently in order to increase transaction unlinkability. We present an efficient method to deanonymize Bitcoin users, which allows to link user pseudonyms to the IP addresses where the transactions are generated. Our techniques work for the most common and the most challenging scenario when users are behind NATs or firewalls of their ISPs. They allow to link transactions of a user behind a NAT and to distinguish connections and transactions of different users behind the same NAT. We also show that a natural countermeasure of using Tor or other anonymity services can be cut-off by abusing anti-DoS countermeasures of the bitcoin network. Our attacks require only a few machines and have been experimentally verified. We propose several countermeasures to mitigate these new attacks.
Open access
4 source records
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
In this paper we revisit some major orthodoxies which lie at the heart of the bitcoin crypto currency and its numerous clones. In particular we look at The Longest Chain Rule, the monetary supply policies and the exact mechanisms which implement them. We claim that these built-in properties are not as brilliant as they are sometimes claimed. A closer examination reveals that they are closer to being... engineering mistakes which other crypto currencies have copied rather blindly. More precisely we show that the capacity of current crypto currencies to resist double spending attacks is poor and most current crypto currencies are highly vulnerable. Satoshi did not implement a timestamp for bitcoin transactions and the bitcoin software does not attempt to monitor double spending events. As a result major attacks involving hundreds of millions of dollars can occur and would not even be recorded. Hundreds of millions have been invested to pay for ASIC hashing infrastructure yet insufficient attention was paid to network neutrality and to insure that the protection layer it promises is effective and cannot be abused. In this paper we develop a theory of Programmed Self-Destruction of crypto currencies. We observe that most crypto currencies have mandated abrupt and sudden transitions. These affect their hash rate and therefore their protection against double spending attacks which we do not limit the to the notion of 51% attacks which is highly misleading. In addition we show that smaller bitcoin competitors are substantially more vulnerable. In addition to small hash rate, many bitcoin competitors mandate incredibly important adjustments in miner reward. We exhibit examples of 'alt-coins' which validate our theory and for which the process of programmed decline and rapid self-destruction has clearly already started.