The problem of anomaly detection has been studied for a long time. In short, anomalies are abnormal or unlikely things. In financial networks, thieves and illegal activities are often anomalous in nature. Members of a network want to detect anomalies as soon as possible to prevent them from harming the network's community and integrity. Many Machine Learning techniques have been proposed to deal with this problem; some results appear to be quite promising but there is no obvious superior method. In this paper, we consider anomaly detection particular to the Bitcoin transaction network. Our goal is to detect which users and transactions are the most suspicious; in this case, anomalous behavior is a proxy for suspicious behavior. To this end, we use three unsupervised learning methods including k-means clustering, Mahalanobis distance, and Unsupervised Support Vector Machine (SVM) on two graphs generated by the Bitcoin transaction network: one graph has users as nodes, and the other has transactions as nodes.
George Bissias, Brian Neil Levine, A. Pinar Ozisik, Gavin Andresen
We present and validate a novel mathematical model of the blockchain mining process and use it to conduct an economic evaluation of the double-spend attack, which is fundamental to all blockchain systems. Our analysis focuses on the value of transactions that can be secured under a conventional double-spend attack, both with and without a concurrent eclipse attack. Our model quantifies the importance of several factors that determine the attack's success, including confirmation depth, attacker mining power, and any confirmation deadline set by the merchant. In general, the security of a transaction against a double-spend attack increases roughly logarithmically with the depth of the block, made easier by the increasing sum of coin turned-over (between individuals) in the blocks, but more difficult by the increasing proof of work required. In recent blockchain data, we observed a median block turnover value of 6 BTC. Based on this value, a merchant requiring a single confirmation is protected against only attackers that can increase the current mining power by 1% or less. However, similar analysis shows that a merchant that requires a much longer 72 confirmations (~12 hours) will eliminate all potential profit for any double-spend attacker adding mining power less than 40% of the current mining power.
Gina Gallegos-GarcÃa, Vincenzo Iovino, Alfredo Rial, Peter B. Roenne · 5 authors
In e-voting protocols, cryptographers must balance usability with strong security guarantees, such as privacy and verifiability. In traditional e-voting protocols, privacy is often provided by a trusted authority that learns the votes and computes the tally. Some protocols replace the trusted authority by a set of authorities, and privacy is guaranteed if less than a threshold number of authorities are corrupt. For verifiability, stronger security is demanded. Typically, corrupt authorities that try to fake the tally result must always be detected.To provide verifiability, many e-voting protocols use Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge proofs (NIZK). Thanks to their non-interactive nature, NIZK allow anybody, including third parties that do not participate in the protocol, to verify the correctness of the tally. Therefore, NIZK can be used to obtain universal verifiability. Additionally, NIZK also improve usability because they allow voters to cast a vote non-interactively.The disadvantage of NIZK is that their security is based on setup assumptions such as the common reference string (CRS) or the random oracle model. The former requires a trusted party to generate a CRS. The latter, though a popular model for secure protocol design, has been shown to be unsound.We address the design of e-voting protocols that provide verifiability without any trust assumptions. We show that Non-Interactive Witness-Indistinguishable proofs can be used for this purpose. Our e-voting protocols are private under the Decision Linear assumption, while perfect individual verifiability, i.e. a fake tally is detected with probability 1, holds unconditionally. Perfect universal verifiability requires a trusted public bulletin board. We remark that our definition of verifiability does not consider eligibility or end-to-end verifiability. First, we present a general construction that supports any tally function. Then, we show how to efficiently instantiate it for specific types of elections through Groth-Sahai proofs.
Sep 29, 2016·In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES '17). ACM, New York, NY, USA, Article 43, 2017
Distributed Hash Tables (DHT) are a common architecture for decentralized applications and, therefore, would be suited for privacy-aware applications. However, currently existing DHTs allow every peer to access any index. To build privacy-aware applications, we need to control this access. In this paper, we present k-rAC, a privacy-aware fine-grained AC for DHTs. For authentication, we present three different mechanisms based on public-key cryptography, zero-knowledge-proofs, and cryptographic hashes. For authorization, we use distributed AC lists. The security of our approach is based on k-resilience. We show that our approach introduces an acceptable overhead and discuss its suitability for different scenarios.
Motivated by the great success and adoption of Bitcoin, a number of cryptocurrencies such as Litecoin, Dogecoin, and Ethereum are becoming increasingly popular. Although existing blockchain-based cryptocurrency schemes can ensure reasonable security for transactions, they do not consider any notion of fairness. Fair exchange allows two players to exchange digital "items", such as digital signatures, over insecure networks fairly, so that either each player gets the other's item, or neither player does. Given that blockchain participants typically do not trust each other, enabling fairness in existing cryptocurrencies is an essential but insufficiently explored problem. In this paper, we explore the solution space for enabling the fair exchange of a cryptocurrency payment for a receipt. We identify the timeliness of an exchange as an important property especially when one of the parties involved in the exchange is resource-constrained. We introduce the notion of strong timeliness for a fair exchange protocol and propose two fair payment-for-receipt protocol instantiations that leverage functionality of the blockchain to achieve strong timeliness. We implement both and compare their security and efficiency.
Different versions of peer-to-peer electronic cash exist as data represented by separate blockchains. Payments between such systems cannot be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. Bitcoin provided part of the solution but its utility is limited to intra-blockchain transactions. The benefits are lost if a trusted third party is required to execute inter-blockchain transactions. We propose a solution to the inter-blockchain transaction problem using the same fundamental principles of Bitcoin. The protocol is described by the Uberledger framework, a hierarchical meta-blockchain layer that encapsulates information regarding the fidelity of peer-to-peer transaction facilitators.
There has recently been a flood of interest in potential new applications of blockchains, as well as proposals for more generic designs called public ledgers. Most of the novel proposals have been in the financial sector. However, the public ledger is an abstraction that solves several of the fundamental problems in the design of secure distributed systems: global time in the form of a strict linear order of past events, globally consistent and immutable view of the history, and enforcement of some application-specific safety properties. This paper investigates the applications of public ledgers to access control and, more specifically, to group management in distributed systems where entities are represented by their public keys and authorization is encoded into signed certificates. It is particularly difficult to handle negative information, such as revocation of certificates or group membership, in the distributed setting. The linear order of events and global consistency simplify these problems, but the enforcement of internal constraints in the ledger implementation often presents problems. We show that different types of revocation require slightly different properties from the ledger. We compare the requirements with Bitcoin, the best known blockchain, and describe an efficient ledger design for membership revocation that combines ideas from blockchains and from web-PKI monitoring. While we use certificate-based group-membership management as the case study, the same ideas can be applied more widely to rights revocation in distributed systems.
Appearance of Bitcoin raise up evolution in currency. Blockchain database also raise up possibilities to share important data between untrusted peers. In this paper, we propose Arachneum, a decentralized, distributed, and model-view-controller-based web service using blockchain and new privileges model. Therefore, we can enjoy the freedom against censorship of government or organizations, keep transparency of our web services, fork our web services, and create/read/update/delete(CRUD) all model-view-controller(MVC) components dynamically.
The Internet of Things IoT is experiencing exponential growth in research and industry, but it still suffers from privacy and security vulnerabilities. Conventional security and privacy approaches tend to be inapplicable for IoT, mainly due to its decentralized topology and the resource-constraints of the majority of its devices. BlockChain BC that underpin the crypto-currency Bitcoin have been recently used to provide security and privacy in peer-to-peer networks with similar topologies to IoT. However, BCs are computationally expensive and involve high bandwidth overhead and delays, which are not suitable for IoT devices. This position paper proposes a new secure, private, and lightweight architecture for IoT, based on BC technology that eliminates the overhead of BC while maintaining most of its security and privacy benefits. The described method is investigated on a smart home application as a representative case study for broader IoT applications. The proposed architecture is hierarchical, and consists of smart homes, an overlay network and cloud storages coordinating data transactions with BC to provide privacy and security. Our design uses different types of BCs depending on where in the network hierarchy a transaction occurs, and uses distributed trust methods to ensure a decentralized topology. Qualitative evaluation of the architecture under common threat models highlights its effectiveness in providing security and privacy for IoT applications.
Riccardo Longo, Federico Pintore, Giancarlo Rinaldo, Massimiliano Sala
In recent years certification authorities (CAs) have been the target of multiple attacks due to their sensitive role in internet security. In fact, with access to malicious certificates it is possible to mount effective large-scale man-in-the-middle attacks that may become very vicious, especially if the incident is not properly handled. Many attacks, such as the 2011 ones against DigiNotar and Comodo, also show strong hints of state sponsorship; thus, CAs have to be considered primary targets in a scenario of (possibly state-sponsored) large-scale cyber attacks. Therefore, there is a need for a PKI protocol which is more resilient and without single points of failure, such as the CAs. The BIX protocol is a blockchain-based protocol that allows distribution of certificates linking a subject with their public key, hence providing a service similar to that of a PKI but without the need for a CA. In this paper, we analyse the security of the BIX protocol in a formal way. First, we identify formal security assumptions which are well-suited to this protocol. Second, we present some attack scenarios against the BIX protocol. Third, we provide formal security proofs that these attacks are not feasible under our previously established assumptions.
Aggelos Kiayias, Ηλίας Κουτσουπιάς, Maria Kyropoulou, Yiannis Tselekounis
We study the strategic considerations of miners participating in the bitcoin's protocol. We formulate and study the stochastic game that underlies these strategic considerations. The miners collectively build a tree of blocks, and they are paid when they create a node (mine a block) which will end up in the path of the tree that is adopted by all. Since the miners can hide newly mined nodes, they play a game with incomplete information. Here we consider two simplified forms of this game in which the miners have complete information. In the simplest game the miners release every mined block immediately, but are strategic on which blocks to mine. In the second more complicated game, when a block is mined it is announced immediately, but it may not be released so that other miners cannot continue mining from it. A miner not only decides which blocks to mine, but also when to release blocks to other miners. In both games, we show that when the computational power of each miner is relatively small, their best response matches the expected behavior of the bitcoin designer. However, when the computational power of a miner is large, he deviates from the expected behavior, and other Nash equilibria arise.
A public ledger is a tamperproof sequence of data that can be read and augmented by everyone. Public ledgers have innumerable and compelling uses. They can secure, in plain sight, all kinds of transactions ---such as titles, sales, and payments--- in the exact order in which they occur. Public ledgers not only curb corruption, but also enable very sophisticated applications ---such as cryptocurrencies and smart contracts. They stand to revolutionize the way a democratic society operates. As currently implemented, however, they scale poorly and cannot achieve their potential. Algorand is a truly democratic and efficient way to implement a public ledger. Unlike prior implementations based on proof of work, it requires a negligible amount of computation, and generates a transaction history that will not "fork" with overwhelmingly high probability. Algorand is based on (a novel and super fast) message-passing Byzantine agreement. For concreteness, we shall describe Algorand only as a money platform.
Michele Amoretti, Giacomo Brambilla, Francesco Medioli, Francesco Zanichelli
Location-Based Services (LBSs) build upon geographic information to provide users with location-dependent functionalities. In such a context, it is particularly important that geographic locations claimed by users are trustworthy. Centralized verification approaches proposed in the last few years are not satisfactory, as they entail a high risk to the privacy of users. In this paper, we present and evaluate a novel decentralized, infrastructure-independent proof-of-location scheme based on blockchain technology. Our scheme guarantees both location trustworthiness and user privacy preservation.
Shayan Eskandari, Jeremy Clark, Abdelwahab Hamou-Lhadj
In this paper we discuss existing approaches for Bitcoin payments, as suitable for a small business for small-value transactions. We develop an evaluation framework utilizing security, usability, deployability criteria,, examine several existing systems, tools. Following a requirements engineering approach, we designed, implemented a new Point of Sale (PoS) system that satisfies an optimal set of criteria within our evaluation framework. Our open source system, Aunja PoS, has been deployed in a real world cafe since October 2014.
Permisionless decentralized ledgers ("blockchains") such as the one underlying the cryptocurrency Bitcoin allow anonymous participants to maintain the ledger, while avoiding control or "censorship" by any single entity. In contrast, permissioned decentralized ledgers exploit real-world trust and accountability, allowing only explicitly authorized parties to maintain the ledger. Permissioned ledgers support more flexible governance and a wider choice of consensus mechanisms. Both kinds of decentralized ledgers may be susceptible to manipulation by participants who favor some transactions over others. The real-world accountability underlying permissioned ledgers provides an opportunity to impose fairness constraints that can be enforced by penalizing violators after-the- fact. To date, however, this opportunity has not been fully exploited, unnecessarily leaving participants latitude to manipulate outcomes undetectably. This paper draws attention to this issue, and proposes design principles to make such manipulation more difficult, as well as specific mechanisms to make it easier to detect when violations occur.
Luke Anderson, Ralph Holz, Alexander Ponomarev, Paul Rimba · 5 authors
Half a decade after Bitcoin became the first widely used cryptocurrency, blockchains are receiving considerable interest from industry and the research community. Modern blockchains feature services such as name registration and smart contracts. Some employ new forms of consensus, such as proof-of-stake instead of proof-of-work. However, these blockchains are so far relatively poorly investigated, despite the fact that they move considerable assets. In this paper, we explore three representative, modern blockchains---Ethereum, Namecoin, and Peercoin. Our focus is on the features that set them apart from the pure currency use case of Bitcoin. We investigate the blockchains' activity in terms of transactions and usage patterns, identifying some curiosities in the process. For Ethereum, we are mostly interested in the smart contract functionality it offers. We also carry out a brief analysis of issues that are introduced by negligent design of smart contracts. In the case of Namecoin, our focus is how the name registration is used and has developed over time. For Peercoin, we are interested in the use of proof-of-stake, as this consensus algorithm is poorly understood yet used to move considerable value. Finally, we relate the above to the fundamental characteristics of the underlying peer-to-peer networks. We present a crawler for Ethereum and give statistics on the network size. For Peercoin and Namecoin, we identify the relatively small size of the networks and the weak bootstrapping process.
In this paper we explore several contexts where an adversary has an upper hand over the defender by using special hardware in an attack. These include password processing, hard-drive protection, cryptocurrency mining, resource sharing, code obfuscation, etc. We suggest memory-hard computing as a generic paradigm, where every task is amalgamated with a certain procedure requiring intensive access to RAM both in terms of size and (very importantly) bandwidth, so that transferring the computation to GPU, FPGA, and even ASIC brings little or no cost reduction. Cryptographic schemes that run in this framework become egalitarian in the sense that both users and attackers are equal in the price-performance ratio conditions. Based on existing schemes like {Argon2} and the recent generalized-birthday proof-of-work, we suggest a generic framework and two new schemes: MTP, a memory-hard Proof-of-Work based on the memory-hard function with fast verification and short proofs. It can be also used for memory-hard time-lock puzzles. {MHE}, the concept of memory-hard encryption, which utilizes available RAM to strengthen the encryption for the low-entropy keys (allowing to bring back 6 letter passwords).
We revisit the fundamental question of Bitcoin's security against double spending attacks. While previous work has bounded the probability that a transaction is reversed, we show that no such guarantee can be effectively given if the attacker can choose when to launch the attack. Other approaches that bound the cost of an attack have erred in considering only limited attack scenarios, and in fact it is easy to show that attacks may not cost the attacker at all. We therefore provide a different interpretation of the results presented in previous papers and correct them in several ways. We provide different notions of the security of transactions that provide guarantees to different classes of defenders: merchants who regularly receive payments, miners, and recipients of large one-time payments. We additionally consider an attack that can be launched against lightweight clients, and show that these are less secure than their full node counterparts and provide the right strategy for defenders in this case as well. Our results, overall, improve the understanding of Bitcoin's security guarantees and provide correct bounds for those wishing to safely accept transactions.
As the most successful cryptocurrency to date, Bitcoin constitutes a target of choice for attackers. While many attack vectors have already been uncovered, one important vector has been left out though: attacking the currency via the Internet routing infrastructure itself. Indeed, by manipulating routing advertisements (BGP hijacks) or by naturally intercepting traffic, Autonomous Systems (ASes) can intercept and manipulate a large fraction of Bitcoin traffic. This paper presents the first taxonomy of routing attacks and their impact on Bitcoin, considering both small-scale attacks, targeting individual nodes, and large-scale attacks, targeting the network as a whole. While challenging, we show that two key properties make routing attacks practical: (i) the efficiency of routing manipulation; and (ii) the significant centralization of Bitcoin in terms of mining and routing. Specifically, we find that any network attacker can hijack few (<100) BGP prefixes to isolate ~50% of the mining power---even when considering that mining pools are heavily multi-homed. We also show that on-path network attackers can considerably slow down block propagation by interfering with few key Bitcoin messages. We demonstrate the feasibility of each attack against the deployed Bitcoin software. We also quantify their effectiveness on the current Bitcoin topology using data collected from a Bitcoin supernode combined with BGP routing data. The potential damage to Bitcoin is worrying. By isolating parts of the network or delaying block propagation, attackers can cause a significant amount of mining power to be wasted, leading to revenue losses and enabling a wide range of exploits such as double spending. To prevent such effects in practice, we provide both short and long-term countermeasures, some of which can be deployed immediately.
Address clustering tries to construct the one-to-many mapping from entities to addresses in the Bitcoin system. Simple heuristics based on the micro-structure of transactions have proved very effective in practice. In this paper we describe the primary reasons behind this effectiveness: address reuse, avoidable merging, super-clusters with high centrality, and the incremental growth of address clusters. We quantify their impact during Bitcoin's first seven years of existence.
We examine a protocol $\pi_{\text{beacon}}$ that outputs unpredictable and publicly verifiable randomness, meaning that the output is unknown at the time that $\pi_{\text{beacon}}$ starts, yet everyone can verify that the output is close to uniform after $\pi_{\text{beacon}}$ terminates. We show that $\pi_{\text{beacon}}$ can be instantiated via Bitcoin under sensible assumptions; in particular we consider an adversary with an arbitrarily large initial budget who may not operate at a loss indefinitely. In case the adversary has an infinite budget, we provide an impossibility result that stems from the similarity between the Bitcoin model and Santha-Vazirani sources. We also give a hybrid protocol that combines trusted parties and a Bitcoin-based beacon.
Bitcoin was recently introduced as a peer-to-peer electronic currency in order to facilitate transactions outside the traditional financial system. The core of Bitcoin, the Blockchain, is the history of the transactions in the system maintained by all miners as a distributed shared register. New blocks in the Blockchain contain the last transactions in the system and are added by miners after a block mining process that consists in solving a resource consuming proof-of-work (cryptographic puzzle). The reward is a motivation for mining process but also could be an incentive for attacks such as selfish mining. In this paper we propose a solution for one of the major problems in Bitcoin : selfish mining or block-withholding attack. This attack is conducted by adversarial or selfish miners in order to either earn undue rewards or waste the computational power of honest miners. Contrary to recent solutions, our solution, ZeroBlock, prevents block-withholding using a technique free of timestamp that can be forged. Moreover, we show that our solution is compliant with nodes churn.
Bitcoin has demonstrated there are many security improvements applicable to normal currency. As the human race expands and we colonize other planets, we have to consider how we are going to extend integral parts of of society, and that includes our currency system. Information transferring does not scale well with very large distances, entirely due to physical limitations. For example, there is a maximum speed that any information can travel, and it cannot be faster than the speed of light. In this paper we take these physical limitations into account to give treatment to the following question. Can a single crypto-currency be used across the entire universe? Trivially many currencies can be used with exchange rates but we will try to avoid this as our solution. The idea of this paper was inspired by a paper titled "The Theory of Interstellar Trade" by Paul Krugman, a Nobel Economist.
The digital currency Bitcoin has had remarkable growth since it was first proposed in 2008. Its distributed nature allows currency transactions without a central authority by using cryptographic methods and a data structure called the blockchain. In this paper we use the no-cloning theorem of quantum mechanics to introduce Quantum Bitcoin, a Bitcoin-like currency that runs on a quantum computer. We show that our construction of quantum shards and two blockchains allows untrusted peers to mint quantum money without risking the integrity of the currency. The Quantum Bitcoin protocol has several advantages over classical Bitcoin, including immediate local verification of transactions. This is a major improvement since we no longer need the computationally intensive and time-consuming method Bitcoin uses to record all transactions in the blockchain. Instead, Quantum Bitcoin only records newly minted currency which drastically reduces the footprint and increases efficiency. We present formal security proofs for counterfeiting resistance and show that a quantum bitcoin can be re-used a large number of times before wearing out - just like ordinary coins and banknotes. Quantum Bitcoin is the first distributed quantum money system and we show that the lack of a paper trail implies full anonymity for the users. In addition, there are no transaction fees and the system can scale to any transaction volume.