The Bitcoin payment system involves two agent types: Users that transact with the currency and pay fees and miners in charge of authorizing transactions and securing the system in return for these fees. Two of Bitcoin's challenges are (i) securing sufficient miner revenues as block rewards decrease, and (ii) alleviating the throughput limitation due to a small maximal block size cap. These issues are strongly related as increasing the maximal block size may decrease revenue due to Bitcoin's pay-your-bid approach. To decouple them, we analyze the “monopolistic auction” [8], showing: (i) its revenue does not decrease as the maximal block size increases, (ii) it is resilient to an untrusted auctioneer (the miner), and (iii) simplicity for transaction issuers (bidders), as the average gain from strategic bid shading (relative to bidding one's true maximal willingness to pay) diminishes as the number of bids increases.
Blockchain systems are designed to produce blocks at a constant average rate. The most popular systems currently employ a Proof of Work (PoW) algorithm as a means of creating these blocks. Bitcoin produces, on average, one block every 10 minutes. An unfortunate limitation of all deployed PoW blockchain systems is that the time between blocks has high variance. For example, 5% of the time, Bitcoin's inter-block time is at least 40 minutes. This variance impedes the consistent flow of validated transactions through the system. We propose an alternative process for PoW-based block discovery that results in an inter-block time with significantly lower variance. Our algorithm, called Bobtail, generalizes the current algorithm by comparing the mean of the k lowest order statistics to a target. We show that the variance of inter-block times decreases as k increases. If our approach were applied to Bitcoin, about 80% of blocks would be found within 7 to 12 minutes, and nearly every block would be found within 5 to 18 minutes; the average inter-block time would remain at 10 minutes. Further, we show that low-variance mining significantly thwarts doublespend and selfish mining attacks. For Bitcoin and Ethereum currently (k=1), an attacker with 40% of the mining power will succeed with 30% probability when the merchant sets up an embargo of 8 blocks; however, when k>=20, the probability of success falls to less than 1%. Similarly, for Bitcoin and Ethereum currently, a selfish miner with 40% of the mining power will claim about 66% of blocks; however, when k>=5, the same miner will find that selfish mining is less successful than honest mining. The cost of our approach is a larger block header.
Andrea Pinna, Roberto Tonelli, Matteo Orrù, Michele Marchesi
A Blockchain is a global shared infrastructure where cryptocurrency transactions among addresses are recorded, validated and made publicly available in a peer-to-peer network. To date, the best known and important cryptocurrency is the bitcoin. In this paper, we focus on this cryptocurrency and in particular on the modeling of the Bitcoin Blockchain by using the Petri Nets formalism. The proposed model allows us to quickly collect information about identities owning Bitcoin addresses and to recover measures and statistics on the Bitcoin network. By exploiting algebraic formalism, we reconstructed an Entities network associated to Blockchain transactions gathering together Bitcoin addresses into the single entity holding permits to manage Bitcoins held by those addresses. The model allows also to identify a set of behaviors typical of Bitcoin owners, like that of using an address only once, and to reconstruct chains for this behavior together with the rate of firing. Our model is highly flexible and can easily be adapted to include different features of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency system. By exploiting algebraic formalism, we reconstructed an Entities network associated to Blockchain transactions gathering together Bitcoin addresses into the single entity holding permits to manage Bitcoins held by those addresses. The model allows also to identify a set of behaviors typical of Bitcoin owners, like that of using an address only once, and to reconstruct chains for this behavior together with the rate of firing. Our model is highly flexible and can easily be adapted to include different features of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency system.
Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) is a flexible permissioned blockchain platform designed for business applications beyond the basic digital coin addressed by Bitcoin and other existing networks. A key property of HLF is its extensibility, and in particular the support for multiple ordering services for building the blockchain. Nonetheless, the version 1.0 was launched in early 2017 without an implementation of a Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) ordering service. To overcome this limitation, we designed, implemented, and evaluated a BFT ordering service for HLF on top of the BFT-SMaRt state machine replication/consensus library, implementing also optimizations for wide-area deployment. Our results show that HLF with our ordering service can achieve up to ten thousand transactions per second and write a transaction irrevocably in the blockchain in half a second, even with peers spread in different continents.
Stefanie Roos, Pedro Moreno-Sanchez, Aniket Kate, Ian Goldberg
Path-based transaction (PBT) networks, which settle payments from one user to another via a path of intermediaries, are a growing area of research. They overcome the scalability and privacy issues in cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum by replacing expensive and slow on-chain blockchain operations with inexpensive and fast off-chain transfers. In the form of credit networks such as Ripple and Stellar, they also enable low-price real-time gross settlements across different currencies. For example, SilentWhsipers is a recently proposed fully distributed credit network relying on path-based transactions for secure and in particular private payments without a public ledger. At the core of a decentralized PBT network is a routing algorithm that discovers transaction paths between payer and payee. During the last year, a number of routing algorithms have been proposed. However, the existing ad hoc efforts lack either efficiency or privacy. In this work, we first identify several efficiency concerns in SilentWhsipers. Armed with this knowledge, we design and evaluate SpeedyMurmurs, a novel routing algorithm for decentralized PBT networks using efficient and flexible embedding-based path discovery and on-demand efficient stabilization to handle the dynamics of a PBT network. Our simulation study, based on real-world data from the currently deployed Ripple credit network, indicates that SpeedyMurmurs reduces the overhead of stabilization by up to two orders of magnitude and the overhead of routing a transaction by more than a factor of two. Furthermore, using SpeedyMurmurs maintains at least the same success ratio as decentralized landmark routing, while providing lower delays. Finally, SpeedyMurmurs achieves key privacy goals for routing in PBT networks.
Sep 15, 2017·Lydia Y. Chen; Hans P. Reiser. Proc. of 17th IFIP Distributed Applications and Interoperable Systems, Jun 2017, Neuch{â}tel, Switzerland. Springer, 10320, pp.34-48, 2017, LNCS - Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Most online lotteries today fail to ensure the verifiability of the random process and rely on a trusted third party. This issue has received little attention since the emergence of distributed protocols like Bitcoin that demonstrated the potential of protocols with no trusted third party. We argue that the security requirements of online lotteries are similar to those of online voting, and propose a novel distributed online lottery protocol that applies techniques developed for voting applications to an existing lottery protocol. As a result, the protocol is scalable, provides efficient verification of the random process and does not rely on a trusted third party nor on assumptions of bounded computational resources. An early prototype confirms the feasibility of our approach.
Privacy risk assessments aim to analyze and quantify the privacy risks associated with new systems. As such, they are critically important in ensuring that adequate privacy protections are built in. However, current methods to quantify privacy risk rely heavily on experienced analysts picking the "correct" risk level on e.g. a five-point scale. In this paper, we argue that a more scientific quantification of privacy risk increases accuracy and reliability and can thus make it easier to build privacy-friendly systems. We discuss how the impact and likelihood of privacy violations can be decomposed and quantified, and stress the importance of meaningful metrics and units of measurement. We suggest a method of quantifying and representing privacy risk that considers a collection of factors as well as a variety of contexts and attacker models. We conclude by identifying some of the major research questions to take this approach further in a variety of application scenarios.
Harry Kalodner, Steven Goldfeder, Alishah Chator, Malte Möser · 5 authors
Analysis of blockchain data is useful for both scientific research and commercial applications. We present BlockSci, an open-source software platform for blockchain analysis. BlockSci is versatile in its support for different blockchains and analysis tasks. It incorporates an in-memory, analytical (rather than transactional) database, making it several hundred times faster than existing tools. We describe BlockSci's design and present four analyses that illustrate its capabilities. This is a working paper that accompanies the first public release of BlockSci, available at https://github.com/citp/BlockSci. We seek input from the community to further develop the software and explore other potential applications.
Yu‐Jin Kwon, Do-Hyun Kim, Yunmok Son, Eugene Y. Vasserman · 5 authors
In the Bitcoin system, participants are rewarded for solving cryptographic puzzles. In order to receive more consistent rewards over time, some participants organize mining pools and split the rewards from the pool in proportion to each participant's contribution. However, several attacks threaten the ability to participate in pools. The block withholding (BWH) attack makes the pool reward system unfair by letting malicious participants receive unearned wages while only pretending to contribute work. When two pools launch BWH attacks against each other, they encounter the miner's dilemma: in a Nash equilibrium, the revenue of both pools is diminished. In another attack called selfish mining, an attacker can unfairly earn extra rewards by deliberately generating forks. In this paper, we propose a novel attack called a fork after withholding (FAW) attack. FAW is not just another attack. The reward for an FAW attacker is always equal to or greater than that for a BWH attacker, and it is usable up to four times more often per pool than in BWH attack. When considering multiple pools - the current state of the Bitcoin network - the extra reward for an FAW attack is about 56% more than that for a BWH attack. Furthermore, when two pools execute FAW attacks on each other, the miner's dilemma may not hold: under certain circumstances, the larger pool can consistently win. More importantly, an FAW attack, while using intentional forks, does not suffer from practicality issues, unlike selfish mining. We also discuss partial countermeasures against the FAW attack, but finding a cheap and efficient countermeasure remains an open problem. As a result, we expect to see FAW attacks among mining pools.
Carlos Oliver, Alessandro Ricottone, Pericles Philippopoulos
We propose a proof-of-work algorithm that rewards blockchain miners for using computational resources to solve NP-complete puzzles. The resulting blockchain will publicly store and improve solutions to problems with real world applications while maintaining a secure and fully functional transaction ledger.
Dimitris Chatzopoulos, Sujit Gujar, Boi Faltings, Pan Hui
The popularity of digital currencies, especially cryptocurrencies, has been continuously growing since the appearance of Bitcoin. Bitcoin's security lies in a proof-of-work scheme, which requires high computational resources at the miners. Despite advances in mobile technology, existing cryptocurrencies cannot be maintained by mobile devices due to their low processing capabilities. Mobile devices can only accommodate mobile applications (wallets) that allow users to exchange credits of cryptocurrencies. In this work, we propose LocalCoin, an alternative cryptocurrency that requires minimal computational resources, produces low data traffic and works with off-the-shelf mobile devices. LocalCoin replaces the computational hardness that is at the root of Bitcoin's security with the social hardness of ensuring that all witnesses to a transaction are colluders. Localcoin features (i) a lightweight proof-of-work scheme and (ii) a distributed blockchain. We analyze LocalCoin for double spending for passive and active attacks and prove that under the assumption of sufficient number of users and properly selected tuning parameters the probability of double spending is close to zero. Extensive simulations on real mobility traces, realistic urban settings, and random geometric graphs show that the probability of success of one transaction converges to 1 and the probability of the success of a double spending attempt converges to 0.
An appealing feature of blockchain technology is smart contracts. A smart contract is executable code that runs on top of the blockchain to facilitate, execute and enforce an agreement between untrusted parties without the involvement of a trusted third party. In this paper, we conduct a systematic mapping study to collect all research that is relevant to smart contracts from a technical perspective. The aim of doing so is to identify current research topics and open challenges for future studies in smart contract research. We extract 24 papers from different scientific databases. The results show that about two thirds of the papers focus on identifying and tackling smart contract issues. Four key issues are identified, namely, codifying, security, privacy and performance issues. The rest of the papers focuses on smart contract applications or other smart contract related topics. Research gaps that need to be addressed in future studies are provided.
Since its inception, the blockchain technology has shown promising application prospects. From the initial cryptocurrency to the current smart contract, blockchain has been applied to many fields. Although there are some studies on the security and privacy issues of blockchain, there lacks a systematic examination on the security of blockchain systems. In this paper, we conduct a systematic study on the security threats to blockchain and survey the corresponding real attacks by examining popular blockchain systems. We also review the security enhancement solutions for blockchain, which could be used in the development of various blockchain systems, and suggest some future directions to stir research efforts into this area.
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Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
Paulo Matias, Pedro Barbosa, Thiago N.C. Cardoso, Diego M. Campos · 5 authors
Capture-the-flag (CTF) competitions are increasingly important for the Brazilian cybersecurity community as educational and professional tools. Unfortunately, CTF platforms may suffer from security issues, giving an unfair advantage to competitors. To mitigate this, we propose NIZKCTF, the first open-audit CTF platform based on noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs.
Bitcoin is the world's first decentralized digital currency. The rate at which bitcoins enter circulation is cut in half every 4 years, approximately. These events are considered landmarks in Bitcoin's history, and as such are widely celebrated. However, this requires placing confidence intervals on the precise timing of the halving well in advance, and the particular mechanism by which the halving time is determined makes this challenging. In this paper, we intend to help party planners by describing the problem, and highlighting several techniques to estimate the mean and variance of the halving.
Tien Tuan Anh Dinh, Rui Liu, Meihui Zhang, Gang Chen · 6 authors
Blockchain technologies are gaining massive momentum in the last few years. Blockchains are distributed ledgers that enable parties who do not fully trust each other to maintain a set of global states. The parties agree on the existence, values, and histories of the states. As the technology landscape is expanding rapidly, it is both important and challenging to have a firm grasp of what the core technologies have to offer, especially with respect to their data processing capabilities. In this paper, we first survey the state of the art, focusing on private blockchains (in which parties are authenticated). We analyze both in-production and research systems in four dimensions: distributed ledger, cryptography, consensus protocol, and smart contract. We then present BLOCKBENCH, a benchmarking framework for understanding performance of private blockchains against data processing workloads. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of three major blockchain systems based on BLOCKBENCH, namely Ethereum, Parity, and Hyperledger Fabric. The results demonstrate several trade-offs in the design space, as well as big performance gaps between blockchain and database systems. Drawing from design principles of database systems, we discuss several research directions for bringing blockchain performance closer to the realm of databases.
Steven Goldfeder, Harry Kalodner, Dillon Reisman, Arvind Narayanan
Abstract We show how third-party web trackers can deanonymize users of cryptocurrencies. We present two distinct but complementary attacks. On most shopping websites, third party trackers receive information about user purchases for purposes of advertising and analytics. We show that, if the user pays using a cryptocurrency, trackers typically possess enough information about the purchase to uniquely identify the transaction on the blockchain, link it to the user’s cookie, and further to the user’s real identity. Our second attack shows that if the tracker is able to link two purchases of the same user to the blockchain in this manner, it can identify the user’s cluster of addresses and transactions on the blockchain, even if the user employs blockchain anonymity techniques such as CoinJoin. The attacks are passive and hence can be retroactively applied to past purchases. We discuss several mitigations, but none are perfect.
A decentralized online quantum cash system, called qBitcoin, is given. We design the system which has great benefits of quantization in the following sense. Firstly, quantum teleportation technology is used for coin transaction, which prevents from the owner of the coin keeping the original coin data even after sending the coin to another. This was a main problem in a classical circuit and a blockchain was introduced to solve this issue. In qBitcoin, the double-spending problem never happens and its security is guaranteed theoretically by virtue of quantum information theory. Making a block is time consuming and the system of qBitcoin is based on a quantum chain, instead of blocks. Therefore a payment can be completed much faster than Bitcoin. Moreover we employ quantum digital signature so that it naturally inherits properties of peer-to-peer (P2P) cash system as originally proposed in Bitcoin.
Mustafa Al-Bassam, Alberto Sonnino, Shehar Bano, Dave Hrycyszyn · 5 authors
Chainspace is a decentralized infrastructure, known as a distributed ledger, that supports user defined smart contracts and executes user-supplied transactions on their objects. The correct execution of smart contract transactions is verifiable by all. The system is scalable, by sharding state and the execution of transactions, and using S-BAC, a distributed commit protocol, to guarantee consistency. Chainspace is secure against subsets of nodes trying to compromise its integrity or availability properties through Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT), and extremely high-auditability, non-repudiation and `blockchain' techniques. Even when BFT fails, auditing mechanisms are in place to trace malicious participants. We present the design, rationale, and details of Chainspace; we argue through evaluating an implementation of the system about its scaling and other features; we illustrate a number of privacy-friendly smart contracts for smart metering, polling and banking and measure their performance.
Cloud computing has become an irreversible trend. Together comes the pressing need for verifiability, to assure the client the correctness of computation outsourced to the cloud. Existing verifiable computation techniques all have a high overhead, thus if being deployed in the clouds, would render cloud computing more expensive than the on-premises counterpart. To achieve verifiability at a reasonable cost, we leverage game theory and propose a smart contract based solution. In a nutshell, a client lets two clouds compute the same task, and uses smart contracts to stimulate tension, betrayal and distrust between the clouds, so that rational clouds will not collude and cheat. In the absence of collusion, verification of correctness can be done easily by crosschecking the results from the two clouds. We provide a formal analysis of the games induced by the contracts, and prove that the contracts will be effective under certain reasonable assumptions. By resorting to game theory and smart contracts, we are able to avoid heavy cryptographic protocols. The client only needs to pay two clouds to compute in the clear, and a small transaction fee to use the smart contracts. We also conducted a feasibility study that involves implementing the contracts in Solidity and running them on the official Ethereum network.
An existing pseudo-commodity and a smart contracts framework allow the creation of a purely automatic and self-sufficient price-stable cryptocurrency, without human intervention. This new currency, we denominated Toroid or TRD, can be used more extensively for commerce than pseudo commodity cryptocurrencies due to its lower volatility. Also, is suitable for investment, as the tokens in each account multiply, return interest, when the market grows. Like the controlled fiat money of a central bank plus the benefits of an inflation-adjusted perpetuity bond. Collateral in base coin, for example BTC or ETH, can be added to bootstrap your own Toroid investment or withdrawed after a very small investment period. So, the Toroids are not created from nothing nor have a limited monetary base. The minimum investment period can be very small, for example one day, and you keep the interest but you can return the Toroids and refund your collateral. That is a one-side only peg to a deflationary crypto-commodity. The stability is guaranteed by endogenous measurements of number of transactions and wallet pro-rated rebasement of balance to reduce volatility of price. Each account has its own rebasement due to the account creation timestamp. Rebasement control mechanism is progressive during initial bootstrap period because price manipulation protection is more severe when the capital involved is smaller. Rebasement has a quick positive start to incentivize early adopters that see only big growth in their TRD account during bootstrap period. Finally, the new rebasement control makes it economically infeasible for an attacker targeting the coin with manipulated transaction volume if we set the minimum rebasement greater than profits from massive currency manipulation.
Νικόλαος Αλεξόπουλος, Jörg Daubert, Max Mühlhäuser, Sheikh Mahbub Habib
Trust Management (TM) systems for authentication are vital to the security of online interactions, which are ubiquitous in our everyday lives. Various systems, like the Web PKI (X.509) and PGP's Web of Trust are used to manage trust in this setting. In recent years, blockchain technology has been introduced as a panacea to our security problems, including that of authentication, without sufficient reasoning, as to its merits.In this work, we investigate the merits of using open distributed ledgers (ODLs), such as the one implemented by blockchain technology, for securing TM systems for authentication. We formally model such systems, and explore how blockchain can help mitigate attacks against them. After formal argumentation, we conclude that in the context of Trust Management for authentication, blockchain technology, and ODLs in general, can offer considerable advantages compared to previous approaches. Our analysis is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to formally model and argue about the security of TM systems for authentication, based on blockchain technology. To achieve this result, we first provide an abstract model for TM systems for authentication. Then, we show how this model can be conceptually encoded in a blockchain, by expressing it as a series of state transitions. As a next step, we examine five prevalent attacks on TM systems, and provide evidence that blockchain-based solutions can be beneficial to the security of such systems, by mitigating, or completely negating such attacks.
Daniel Augot, Hervé Chabanne, Olivier Clémot, William R. George
The most fundamental purpose of blockchain technology is to enable persistent, consistent, distributed storage of information. Increasingly common are authentication systems that leverage this property to allow users to carry their personal data on a device while a hash of this data is signed by a trusted authority and then put on a blockchain to be compared against. For instance, in 2015, MIT introduced a schema for the publication of their academic certificates based on this principle. In this work, we propose a way for users to obtain assured identities based on face-to-face proofing that can then be validated against a record on a blockchain. Moreover, in order to provide anonymity, instead of storing a hash, we make use of a scheme of Brands to store a commitment against which one can perform zero-knowledge proofs of identity. We also enforce the confidentiality of the underlying data by letting users control a secret of their own. We show how our schema can be implemented on Bitcoin's blockchain and how to save bandwidth by grouping commitments using Merkle trees to minimize the number of Bitcoin transactions that need to be sent. Finally, we describe a system in which users can gain access to services thanks to the identity records of our proposal.
At the heart of the Bitcoin is a blockchain protocol, a protocol for achieving consensus on a public ledger that records bitcoin transactions. To the extent that a blockchain protocol is used for applications such as contract signing and making certain transactions (such as house sales) public, we need to understand what guarantees the protocol gives us in terms of agents' knowledge. Here, we provide a complete characterization of agent's knowledge when running a blockchain protocol using a variant of common knowledge that takes into account the fact that agents can enter and leave the system, it is not known which agents are in fact following the protocol (some agents may want to deviate if they can gain by doing so), and the fact that the guarantees provided by blockchain protocols are probabilistic. We then consider some scenarios involving contracts and show that this level of knowledge suffices for some scenarios, but not others.