Андреас Каппелер, Albert Solé‐Ollé, Andreas Stephan, Timo Välilä
Spending on productive infrastructure is seen as an important contributor to long term economic growth. Several authors have documented a downward trend in public investment during the last three decades and warned about its possible detrimental effects on the economy. A not well-realized fact is that productive infrastructure investment is mostly provided by sub-national governments. The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of revenue decentralization on the provision of infrastructure at the sub-national level. We estimate the effects of revenue decentralization and earmarked grant financing on the level of sub-national infrastructure investment in 20 European countries over the period 1990-2009. The findings are compared to those obtained when using sub-national investment in redistribution, for which the theory predictions are different. To account for the high auto-correlation in the dependent variable, we apply a dynamic panel data approach. In particular, we use a Corrected Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDVC) estimator with the lagged dependent variable included to account for the dynamic character of the dependent variable. The empirical analysis shows that decentralisation in terms of tax shares increases public investment in infrastructure; public investment in redistribution is not significantly affected by decentralisation. The positive link between total regional investment and decentralisation suggests that decentralisation on regional infrastructure investment is additional and does not go hand in hand with a considerable reduction in other types of regional investment, such as health, education or safety. As to investment grants, they have a positive impact on both types of regional investment. The negative interaction between investment grants and decentralisation for regional infrastructure investment suggest that the impact of tax decentralisation on regional infrastructure investment declines with increasing receipts of investment grants by regional governments. This result is intuitive. As the significance of the tax-decentralisation parameter suggests, higher regional decision autonomy leads to more investment in infrastructure. Attempts to undermine the power of regions through the backdoor - e.g. by introducing conditional transfers - will at least partly offset the positive effect of decentralisation.
Gover Baja Daza, Sergio Villarroel Böhrt, David Zavaleta Castellón
The second generation fiscal federalism (SGFF) approach is used as a reference to analyze the political and fiscal institutional design of Bolivia’s decentralization model and its evolution. Subnational public finance data up to 2008 is used to verify that decentralization of expenditure was higher than that of revenue, establishing a context of vertical fiscal imbalance that increased due to growing fiscal transfers during the positive external shock (boom) period. Consequently, the subnational fiscal surplus was not a result of internal efficiency but of excess revenues from such transfers. Panel models were estimated to identify and assess the implicit incentives embedded in fiscal institutions of the decentralization model. Findings at the municipal level are: i) misalignment of local spending with local interests due to dominance of transfers over own revenue (dominance of central government development policies); ii) incentive to spend transfers faster than own revenue (flypaper effect); iii) greater marginal contribution of own revenue to positive fiscal balances compared to transfers, thus introducing the seed for a soft budget constraint but hidden by the fiscal surplus; iv) disincentive to generate own revenue (tax and non-tax) due to the size and growth of transfers (disincentive to the culture of contributing to own revenue). Findings at the prefectural level are: i) misalignment with regional interests given the dominance of transfers over own revenue due to absolute lack of tax powers (until 2009); ii) high tendency to a soft budget constraint and, eventually, also fiscal bail-out, hidden by the fiscal surplus; iii) in only two departments collection of national-level taxes were higher, compared to transfers received in the same departments; iv) disincentive to pay the VAT (national-level tax) due to higher royalty transfers received, an effect not extended to other national-level taxes; v) high dependence from hydrocarbon-based transfers, and fiscal risk when this natural resource declines (both in volume and prices) due to volatility of international oil prices. Also, as a result of the decentralization model a positive and significant impact was found on education-coverage indicators, an important development objective of the national government.
Núria Vergés Bosch, Mateu Espasa, Albert Solé Ollé
Contents: Preface 1. Inter-regional Fiscal Flows: Introduction to the Issues, Nuria Bosch, Marta Espasa Queralt and Albert Sole Olle PART I: COUNTING MONIES: MEASUREMENT AND PRACTICE OF INTER-REGIONAL FISCAL FLOWS 2. Regional Fiscal Flows: Measurement Tools, Giuseppe C. Ruggeri 3. Regional Fiscal Flows: Determinants, Measurements and Meanings, Francois Vaillancourt Comment by Nuria Bosch and Antoni Zabalza 4. Constitutional Reforms, Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Fiscal Flows in Italy, Maria Flavia Ambrosanio, Massimo Bordignon and Floriana Cerniglia 5. Measurement and Practice of Fiscal Flows: The Case of Belgium, Paul Von Rompuy 6. Balance Sheet Federalism: Canada, Giuseppe C. Ruggeri Comment by Francois Vaillancourt 7. Balance Sheet Federalism: Methodologies, Results and their Determinant Factors for Spain, Marta Espasa Queralt and Nuria Bosch Comment by Guillem Lopez Casasnovas and Ramon Barberan PART II: BEYOND THE DATA: WHY SOME REGIONS GET MORE MONEY? 8. Federalism and Inter-regional Redistribution, Jonathan Rodden Comment by Carles Boix 9. Decentralization by Politicians: Creation of Grants-financed Local Jurisdictions, Stuti Kehmani 10. The Political Rationale of Regional Financing in Spain, Sandra Leon Comment by Santiago Lago 11. The Determinants of Regional Transport Investment Across Europe, Achim Kemmerling and Andreas Stephan 12. The Determinants of the Regional Allocation of Infrastructure Investment in Spain, Albert Sole-Olle Comment by Germa Bel PART III: IN OR OUT? REGIONAL REDISTRIBUTION AND THE STABILITY OF FEDERATIONS 13. Federalism, Regional Redistribution and Country Stability, Enrico Spolaore Comment by Massimo Bordignon 14. The Costs and Benefits of Constitutional Options for Quebec and Canada, Francois Vaillancourt 15. Staying Together? Scotland and the Rest of the United Kingdom, David Bell 16. The Costs and Benefits of Staying Together: The Catalan Case in Spain, Elisenda Paluzie Index
This dissertation examines local governments’ efforts to promote economic development in Latin America. The research uses a mixed method to explore how cities make decisions to innovate, develop, and finance economic development programs. First, this study provides a comparative analysis of decentralization policies in Argentina and Mexico as a means to gain a better understanding of the degree of autonomy exercised by local governments. Then, it analyzes three local governments each within the province of Santa Fe, Argentina and the State of Guanajuato, Mexico. The principal hypothesis of this dissertation is that if local governments collect more own-source tax revenue, they are more likely to promote economic development and thus, in turn, promote growth for their region. By examining six cities, three of which are in Santa Fe—Rosario, Santa Fe (capital) and Rafaela—and three in Guanajuato—Leon, Guanajuato (capital) and San Miguel de Allende, this dissertation provides a better understanding of public finances and tax collection efforts of local governments in Latin America. Specific attention is paid to each city’s budget authority to raise new revenue and efforts to promote economic development. The research also includes a large statistical dataset of Mexico’s 2,454 municipalities and a regression analysis that evaluates local tax efforts on economic growth, controlling for population, territorial size, and the professional development. In order to generalize these results, the research tests these discoveries by using statistical data gathered from a survey administered to Latin American municipal officials. The dissertation demonstrates that cities, which experience greater fiscal autonomy measured by the collection of more own-source revenue, are better able to stimulate effective economic development programs, and ultimately, create jobs within their communities. The results are bolstered by a large number of interviews, which were conducted with over 100 finance specialists, municipal presidents, and local authorities. The dissertation also includes an in-depth literature review on fiscal federalism, decentralization, debt financing and local development. It concludes with a discussion of the findings of the study and applications for the practice of public administration.
Financing of local authorities is currently at the Centre of the political discourse is a daily concern. Romania faces, usually with an attempt to offset the need for control and reduction of public spending with greater financial autonomy of local authorities. At the time, it was searched and searches for a path, a means to achieve a fair distribution of financial resources between the various levels of administration, budget reductions to all of them. If strengthening democracy means to strengthen local autonomy, then it means you have created a system for financing local authorities to be efficient, fair and pointing towards the economic needs of States. In other words, decentralization and local financing and the principle of subsidiarity are mutually dependent. Rightly, the decentralisation of financial management is considered to be the "backbone" of the administrative system of decentralisation, the financial resources being those which are operational link between the needs of local communities and the rules necessary to satisfy them. Thus, the lack of financial resources of the local self-government can result in failure to meet the needs of its members, which at the same time failure of administrative decentralization. The decentralisation of financial management can also be seen as the Government of some specific functions on the line of management authority and the tax revenue to the local public authorities.
The aim of this paper is to present a frozen image of the current Spanish system of fiscal federalism, in light of the tensions that the economic situation, has brought about. With this purpose, I will first broadly offer an outline of how decentralized Spain actually works, and how the decentralization process was brought about. Then I will focus on how the financing system works for most Autonomous Communities. Finally, I will attempt a preliminary analysis of the recent constitutional reform. A main conclusion of this paper is that fiscal federalism in Spain is, in fact, a work in progress. This paper has been previously published at the eJournal of Tax Research, (Australia); Volume 10, N. 1/2012.
Following the gradual deepening of China’s decentralization reforms since reform and opening up in 1978, local governments have played an ever more prominent role in the entire vertical structure o...
This thesis is entitled ’Fiscal policy and economic growth in the presence of intergenerational transfers’. It is composed of four self-contained chapters and focusses on the growth and welfare effects of taxation and public spending. The common denominator of all four chapters is that they incorporate an endogenous growth process in an overlapping generations model to evaluate long-term policy implications when different generations are affected in different ways by fiscal policy. In the first and second chapter the implications of capital income taxation for the growth process are discussed. The analysis emphasizes the role of public and private intergenerational transfers in form of public pensions and bequests as well as intergenerational redistribution induced by public policies. Among other results, it turns out that the presence or absence of such transfers critically determines whether an increase of capital income taxes with additional revenue being devoted to cut wage taxes may enhance economic growth. In the third chapter, the focus of the analysis is on social security funding and its implications for economic growth. Whereas a pay-as-you-go pension scheme, as considered in chapter one, naturally includes intergenerational transfers from the current working generation to retirees, a fully funded social security system does not. Still, the presence of such transfers within the economy in form of private educational spending and bequests turns out to play a key role in deter- mining the impact of funded social security on economic growth. More specif- ically, it is shown that a funded pension scheme may harm growth if there are operative bequests within the family, and parents thus face a trade-off between educating their children and leaving bequests. By contrast, when bequests are inoperative, the Ricardian equivalence holds and an increase in forced savings is exactly offset by a reduction in private savings leaving capital accumulation and educational spending unchanged. Chapter four discusses the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth in the context of education funding. While the traditional theoretical literature on fiscal decentralization focusses mainly on efficiency issues, empirical evidence for a positive relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth turns out to be mixed. Some studies can confirm the positive impact of higher degrees of decentralization on economic growth, whereas others face difficulties in establishing a positive relationship and, in fact, obtain either no dependency or a negative one. The aim of the fourth chapter is therefore to further evaluate the theoretical linkage and, at the same time, to give an ex- planation for the discrepancy between the empirical literature. The analysis reveals that there exists a growth maximizing degree of fiscal decentralization. Furthermore, it is shown that some degree of fiscal decentralization is always superior (in terms of long-run growth and welfare) to a system where either local or central governments exclusively finance educational investments.
From an analitycal historical perspective, this paper deals with the important public finance issue of decentralizing the government’s economic activities and functions into distinct branches, respectively devoted to collecting taxes and to allocating a given budget to different public goods. We start with the so-called Italian tradition in public finance and go on to the crucial contributions from James Pigou, Paul Samuelson and Richard Musgrave, up till the modern second best and optimal taxation approaches. Starting from the Italian tradition is meaningful as this stream of literature has given important pioneristic contributions to this topic, namely by Maffeo Pantaleoni and Enrico Barone. However, it is in developing the relationships of these contributions with the modern second best optimal taxation approach that we may find rigorous solutions to the main emerging problems of the issue.
One important aspect of fiscal decentralization policy is delegation of authority and responsibility of management of public finance to regional governments, especially those of municipalities/districts. After more than ten years of implementation, it is now the right time to evaluate the policy questioning how effective its impacts on regional economic development. The study intends to find on how effective the performance of regional public finance is in providing basic infrastructures and how effective the provision of basic infrastructures reduces the poverty rates. By using panel data methods, this study confirms the positive relationship between performance of regional finance management and provision of basic infrastructures (especially those of road and electricity, but not that of drinking water). On the other hand, the relationship between the provision of basic infrastructures and poverty rates, as expected, is negative. This finding strengthens the belief that it is necessary to further enhance the basic infrastructures development to reduce poverty rates.
Our country's financial decentralization of authority belongs to the scope of decentralization authorization.There are some tax preference margins in the local finance,but it has no pivotal decision-making power and independent taxation power.Based on the data collected from 28 provincial administrative regions in our country between 2003 and 2009,this paper,in view of the special situation of the present social system and economic development,made a specific analysis of the mechanism of action in the local government financial behaviors and proposed some suggestions that the central government need to make further adjustment about assessment criterion for officials' performance and regional economy evaluation index,and properly pilot the local government financial behaviors.
This paper reexamines the Barro growth model taking into account status-seeking behavior. Agents care about both consumption and social status, which is determined by their relative consumption in society. Public capital as production input is financed by income tax or lumpsum tax. We discuss different measures to reach the optimal growth and optimal welfare in a decentralized economy and find that under some parameter conditions, there are some government sizes for which the decentralized growth is optimal, and this result does not require corrective taxation policy. We also find the superiority of income tax versus lump-sum tax from the point of view of optimal growth in a decentralized economy and of social welfare. Besides, we propose corrective tax programs with constant capital tax or subsidy and time-varying consumption tax that enable an economy to reach the first-best optimal growth. The extension to a congestion model modifies somewhat the results. We discuss conditions under which the first-best or the secondbest optimal growth is attained in a decentralized economy.
Built on the theories about talent competition between rent-seeking and entrepreneurship, and the theories about constitutional environment and rent-seeking, this dissertation explores empirically the effects of a country's constitutional settings on entrepreneurship, in terms of the quantity of entrepreneurs and the quality of their performance. Both the de facto and de jure constitutional environments are studied. In particular, with respect to the de facto constitutional environment, I considered the property rights protection, decentralization, and the factors suggested by the "selectorate theory". In relation to the de jure constitutional environment, I focused on six aspects including electoral rules, form of government, federalism, property rights protection, judicial independence and antidiscrimination provisions. Three indexes were constructed to measure the de jure property rights protection, judicial independence and antidiscrimination provisions, using the data set provided by the Comparative Constitution Project.The empirical study first shows that the quantity of entrepreneurs is inversely correlated with the quality of entrepreneurship in a country. If entrepreneurship does serve as the engine of economic growth, it is perhaps the quality, rather than quantity, that matters. This study then demonstrates that the de facto property rights protection is associated negatively with the quantity of entrepreneurs, but positively with the quality of entrepreneurship. The effects of the two key factors of the selectorate theory, the size of the winning coalition and the ratio of this size to the size of the selectorate, also appear to be compatible with what the theory is to predict. On the other hand, neither fiscal nor political decentralization is found to significantly affect entrepreneurship. Among the de jure constitutional features, two have significant influence on entrepreneurship. First, the constitutional design of judicial independence has a negative effect on the quantity of entrepreneurs, but a positive one on the quality of their performance. Second, majoritarian electoral rules, compared with non-majoritarian rules, have a negative effect on the quality of entrepreneurship. In contrast, the presumed effects of the other three formal constitutional attributes, federalism, presidentialism and property rights protection, cannot be ascertained.Apart from the cross-country study, I also conducted a detailed research on China. Entrepreneurship in China is a case of entrepreneurial development in an authoritarian state lack of secure property rights and the rule of law, hence afflicted with profuse rent-seeking activities. Under these circumstances, entrepreneurship hinges on both the rent-seeking and the entrepreneurial abilities. Drawing on the private enterprise surveys, I found that, in China, the politically connected were systematically advantaged in terms of bank finance, entry to regulated industries and judicial treatment, when they plunged into the business world. The Chinese case also indicates that, when entrepreneurs cannot trust the commitment made by the state in the constitution, they will be eager to scoop profits as soon as possible and exit swiftly with accumulated wealth.Finally, this dissertation concludes by suggesting that a healthy development of entrepreneurship should be sustainable rather than aiming merely at quick money and instant success. It should allow all talented people to reach their full potentials, rather than keep the politically disconnected away from resources needed to make the best use of their potentials. Above all, it wants a constitutional environment with reliable property rights and equal access to opportunities, neither of which is seen in today's China.
Based on the phenomenon that serious inflation and local investment overheated coexist now,we establish one empirical model in order to investigates into the impact of local government investment impact on inflation under fiscal decentralization system.The study indicates that the local government’s investment in China form a positive factor in inflation,local government investment windens the needs of the community through the multiplier effect of stimulating.At the same time,the increased investment strengthen the dependence on the land finance,the two together promotes a rise in inflation.
Decentralisation and Reform in Latin America analyses the process of intergovernmental reform in Latin America in the last two decades and presents a number of emerging issues. These include the impacts of decentralization and the response of countries in the region to challenge such as social cohesion, interregional and interpersonal disparities, the assignment of social and infrastructure expenditure, macrofinancial shocks, fiscal rules and the sharing of natural resources revenue. The main aim of the book is to assess the effective working of decentralized arrangements and institutions, with a view of suggesting corrections and reforms where the system is not working according to expectations.
We address the issue of emission tax harmonization in a model featuring two representative firms located in two countries. Firms are subject to an international emissions trading system and to domestic emissions taxation; the latter generates public revenue but also implies implementation costs. Decentralized tax setting causes a spillover across countries via the permits price. Nonetheless, harmonization might imply a lower aggregate social welfare. This happens when uniform taxation prevents the exploitation of significant differences across countries in terms of costs and benefits of taxation. Finally, we identify cases where harmonization implies larger aggregate social welfare but lacks unanimous consent . [JEL numbers: Q58, H23].
A perfect arrangement of fiscal decentralization has two characteristics: one is the symmetry between financial power and administrative right,and the other is the effectiveness of enforcement mechanism.When financial power and administrative right are asymmetric and the responsibility of local government becomes larger and larder,the local government will resort to land revenues besides taxation.At the same time,when there is a lack of an effective mechanism to guarantee the enforcement of responsibility,the local government will spend more and more land revenues in the field benefiting individuals.For this reason,land finance tends to have two-edged effects on economic growth.On the one hand,it provides the foundation for the expansion of government spending,which facilitates rapid economic growth.On the other hand,it also provides the possibility for the government's wrong investment,which results in a kind of misspent economic growth.The misspent economic growth is typically embodied in the aspects such as visual projects,short-lived project,repeated construction,error investment and job consumption and so on,which is also the major cause of social corruption.