Blockchain Papers

David M. Quinn, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kathleen Smarick, Victor Asal

International relations scholars have long focused on power relations among nations as an explanatory factor for a wide variety of state behaviors, including alliance formation, strategic interactions, and negotiation strategies. Power transition theorists have argued that war is most likely when power is equally distributed among nations or, more precisely, when the power of the challenger approaches—or begins to exceed—that of its opponent (Organski, 1968 Organski, A. F. K. 1968. World Politics, New York: Knopf. [Google Scholar]; Organski and Kugler, 1980 Organski, A. F. K. and Kugler, Jacek. 1980. The War Ledger, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; Kugler and Lemke, 1996 Kugler, Jacek and Lemke, Douglas. 1996. Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). Balance of power theorists, on the other hand, have argued that equality of power among nations diminishes the chance of war, as uncertainty about outcomes caused by approximate power parity leads actors to be more cautious (Claude, 1962 Claude, Inis. 1962. Power and International Relations, New York: Random House. [Google Scholar]; Wright, 1965 Wright, Quincy. 1965. A Study of War , 2nd, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. [Google Scholar]). The research presented here considers relative power not as a cause of conflict, as these previous studies have done, but as a factor relevant to conflict resolution efforts. In this study, we focus on crises as a specific instance of conflicts in the international system and on mediation as a specific conflict resolution measure. Building upon previous work (Wilkenfeld et al., 2003 Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, Young, Kathleen, Asal, Victor and Quinn, David. 2003. Mediating International Crises: Cross-national and Experimental Perspectives. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 47: 279–301. [CSA][CROSSREF][Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2005 Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, Young, Kathleen, Quinn, David and Asal, Victor. 2005. Mediating International Crises, London: Routledge. [Google Scholar]), we examine the way mediation styles and power relations among crisis actors interact and impact on whether the crisis ends in an agreement, and whether the crisis outcome leads to long-term, postcrisis tension reductions. This research is intended to extend understanding of the nature of crisis behavior and to inform efforts to manage crises most effectively.

Kent Eaton

In recent years, decentralization and regional autonomy measures have figured prominently in negotiations designed to end some of the world's most important conflicts, including in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan. Reforms that shift powers to subnational units deserve the attention of those who are trying to promote security via institutional design, but the risks associated with these territorial reforms are considerable. When political and economic resources are transferred to subnational governments in the attempt to create meaningful access to the political system for former combatants, the great risk is that these same resources can be used to finance a continuation of the armed struggle instead. In response to the popularity of territorial reforms in many post-conflict settings, this paper sounds a cautionary note by evaluating the negative impact of decentralization on security in Colombia, site of Latin America's longest and deadliest armed conflict. After analyzing the design decisions of reformers who hoped that decentralization would help end the conflict, I argue that decentralization in fact financed the expansion of armed clientelism by illegal groups on both the left and right. Thanks to the weakness of the police in much of the national territory, guerrillas and paramilitaries have been able to use decentralized resources to destabilize the state, limiting even further its monopoly over the use of force and creating what are in effect parallel states on the left and right.

Charles Tilly

Armed with our 21st-century democracy-finder, suppose we speed back to 17th-century Europe. In one part of Europe or another, we will find roughly 200 regimes we can reasonably call independent states: relatively autonomous, centralized, and well-bounded governments exercising priority in some regards over all other organizations operating within their territories. On four counters marked “Breadth,” “Equality,” “Consultation,” and “Protection,” we take readings for the regimes we locate in a journey throughout the continent. Where and when do we encounter vigorous vibrations of democracy? Let's say we land in the year 1650. We might think it an auspicious year for democratic initiatives: except for continuing struggle between France and Spain the major disruptions of the Thirty Years' War have just ended with the Treaties of Westphalia, great fissures have opened in the Habsburg empire, and the success of their 16th-century rebellion against Spain has finally brought the northern Netherlands international recognition as a highly decentralized independent republic. What do we find? We find plenty of revolution and war, but few signs of settled democracy. Touring the British Isles, we discover a Scotland rebelling openly against English hegemony, and a Scottish military force in northern England backing Charles Stuart's claim to succeed his father Charles I; just last year, England's contentious revolutionaries united temporarily to decapitate King Charles. In Ireland, Catholic leaders are battling not only each other, but also the English invading force of Oliver Cromwell.

Jonathan Fox

Latin America's Emerging Local Politics Jonathan Fox (bio) Does local democratization really matter for national politics? For those who value accountable government and civic participation, democracy at the local level is obviously important in and of itself. This essay makes a different point, however—that the degree of democratization of local government affects the prospects for national democratic governance. Most Latin American nations made the delicate transition from authoritarian to elected civilian regimes in the 1980s, but in the 1990s many still have not firmly consolidated their democratic gains. The wave of regime transitions in the 1980s created opportunities for experimentation with more honest and effective styles of governance, but so far most of the new regimes have failed to produce successful results at the national level. Traditional centralized, top-down approaches dominated national governance thoughout the region during the 1980s. Key characteristics included centralized and militarized police powers, appointed rather than elected mayors and governors, and extreme fiscal and bureaucratic centralization. These problems of top-down governance were compounded by systemic defects such as the lack of independent judicial authority and highly opaque, discretionary policy processes. Remarkably, most of these practices could be found across the entire political spectrum, from the moderate civilian governments of Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, and Colombia to revolutionary Nicaragua and Cuba on the left and military-dominated El Salvador, Guatemala, and pre-1989 Chile on the right. The view that policy solutions should necessarily be national is now [End Page 105] widely questioned throughout Latin America. The role of national governments is changing in two ways: international economic integration is limiting the scope for market regulation, while on the domestic front national authorities have begun to devolve major responsibilities to local governments. For example, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Colombia all began decentralization programs in the 1980s. Many of these decentralization plans were enshrined in new or recently reformed constitutions, though the actual resources and autonomy ceded to local authorities varied greatly.1 Decentralization does not necessarily involve the democratization of local government, however. In Chile, for example, General Augusto Pinochet's military dictatorship gave huge policy responsibilities to appointed mayors. Local democratization has two dimensions. First, it involves opening up territorially based subnational governments to electoral competition (mayors and governors had traditionally been chosen by the president in many Latin American countries). Second, it entails the elimination of exclusionary political practices, including fraud, unfair limits on voter registration, the lack of ballot secrecy, voter intimidation, and vote buying. These are issues of electoral freedoms, as distinct from issues of electoral fairness (e.g., media access, campaign financing, etc.). This essay focuses on exclusionary political practices in "local" politics because that is where most citizens either gain access to or find themselves excluded from the state more generally. But authoritarian local politicians—especially those challenged from below—usually need national allies to survive. Local democratization affects the prospects for national democratic governance in four interrelated respects. First, elected civilian regimes cannot be considered democratic until authoritarian enclaves are eliminated and the entire citizenry is effectively enfranchised. Second, pluralist politics must be learned, and subnational governments make a good school. Third, rising democratic leaders can most credibly challenge the corrupt old ways if they are forearmed with successful records in local government. Fourth, the widespread transition from traditionally paternalistic social policies to more efficient and targeted programs depends on balanced partnerships among national governments, local governments, and new social and civic actors. Eliminating Authoritarian Enclaves National political conditions certainly shape the possibilities for local democratization, but the reverse is true as well. If enough authoritarian enclaves persist, democracy's consolidation at the national level may be jeopardized. Longstanding exclusionary practices will not disappear because of the signing of decrees or the transfer of the presidential sash in national capitals. [End Page 106] The persistence of authoritarian enclaves under civilian rule prevents the effective extension of basic political rights to the entire population. The proliferation of seemingly small free spaces within civil society greatly helped to weaken centralized authoritarian rule in many a Latin American dictatorship. Now one encounters a mirror image of that situation—elected civilian regimes rule nationally, but the societies...