Blockchain Papers

James Grimmelmann

No abstract is available for this record.

Elena Letiagina, Yuriy Trifonov, Alexander N. Vizgunov, Roman S. Tanchuk · 5 authors

No abstract is available for this record.

Edward Lee

No abstract is available for this record.

Randy Priem

No abstract is available for this record.

Chen Zhu, Kazuyuki Motohashi

No abstract is available for this record.

Yu. V. Malkova, A.V. Tichkonova

No abstract is available for this record.

Agnessa O. Inshakova, Tatiana V. Deryugina, Evgeny Y. Malikov

No abstract is available for this record.

Pēteris Zilgalvis

No abstract is available for this record.

Marcus O’Dair, Robyn Owen

Abstract Blockchain technology represents an emerging source of venture capital crowdfunding for creative ventures, specifically in the music industry. Although music streaming is often portrayed as a success story, the internet has in fact been something of a false dawn for the recorded music industry—particularly for emerging musicians. New music ventures might obtain alternative entrepreneurial finance through token sales or Initial Coin Offerings. Policymakers can play a role in developing this form of seed finance for the creative industries and beyond.

Ignacio De León, Ravi Gupta

Analogous to the emergence of the internet, the introduction of blockchain technology augurs disruptive change to the music industry. Though in its infancy, the technology presents interesting policy issues related to registering and monetizing intellectual property, policing piracy, and creating and executing more flexible contracts between and among members in the music supply chain, among others. This paper assesses the ability of the distributed ledger technology to steer the industry toward a distributed model and its potential to drastically alter the entire music supply chain. It initiates a conversation about policy implications and how policymakers might address the issues related to adopting blockchain technology, including designing policies that support an environment that enables the well-deserved compensation of artists.

Sebastian John

A brief idea

Malin Lindberg


 
 
 This article examines whether hitherto marginalized actors, industries and innovations – such as women, services industries and service innovations – could be acknowledged by the use of a bottom-up approach in innovation research in a way that helps make public innovation support more inclusive. It is scrutinized whether the relation between context, organization and outcomes in publically financed innovation networks such as clusters and innovation systems serves to highlight how more inclusive innovation support could be designed. Four regional innovation networks promoting women’s entrepreneurship and innovation in Sweden are analyzed by a bottom-up approach, since while emphasizing decentralization and inclusion in theory, most innovation theories and policies are in practice characterized by a top-down approach, ascribing superiority to certain actors, industries and innovations while marginalizing others in a distinct – often gendered – pattern. The bottom-up approach makes it possible to expose that being a marginalized actor in public innovation support is related to the organization of entrepreneurial types of innovation systems, based on contacts established ad hoc and resources gathered from scratch, making a wider range of actors, industries and innovations relevant than in institutional types of innovation systems favored in prevalent public innovation support. By acknowledging both types of innovation systems, more inclusive innovation policies could be designed and more nuanced innovation theories could be developed.
 
 

Dimitris Manolopoulos

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore the link between R&D internationalization and finance decisions by providing survey evidence on the funding sources of R&D in light of recent perceptions of MNEs' decentralized knowledge-related competitiveness. Design/methodology/approach – The study draws upon a survey of 83 decentralized R&D units located in countries outside the EU core of mature economies. Funding sources are classified as MNE-internal and external. Using simulation-based models, six ordered probit regression models were run with each funding source forming the dependent variable. Findings – There are three significant findings. First, decentralized R&D funding relies mainly on MNE-internal sources. Second, decentralized R&D funding patterns reflect on the interdependencies within an overall MNE R&D strategy that is articulated through varied laboratory roles. Third, while the strategy-finance interaction is confirmed, the prevalence of parent funding is challenged. Instead, evidence recorded here suggests support for the decentralized, “subsidiary-focused” perspective that has recently regained a considerable momentum in the literature. Research limitations/implications – Notwithstanding that this study reinforces the interaction between strategic decisions and funding patterns, more work is required to identify the effects of other aspects of strategy on the funding sources of decentralized R&D activity. However, it is seemingly the first study that investigates MNEs' R&D financial decisions in economies outside the EU core, incorporating also a wide array of external funding sources. Practical implications – Funding choices for decentralized R&D labs should be contingent upon their unique contribution to the competitive evolution of the MNE group. Further, R&D activity seems to leverage the autonomy of subsidiary managers. Originality/value – This research is one of the very few empirical studies providing evidence on the funding sources of decentralized R&D laboratories, and suggests possible predictors that have not been put forward hitherto.

Dieter Zinnbauer

No abstract is available for this record.

Kjeld Møller Pedersen, Terkel Christiansen, Mickael Bech

The Danish health care system has undergone gradual changes, but not radical reforms, from 1970 until 2004. Theoretically, the development can be viewed from the perspective of fiscal federalism, decentralization, and incentives embodied in reimbursement systems. Furthermore, path dependence and incrementalism have characterized the system. The Danish health care system is decentralized politically, financially, and operationally. The counties are responsible for health care, and finance it out of county income and property taxes along with block grants from the state. Hospitals are publicly owned while general practitioners are private entrepreneurs working on contract with the counties. Hospital services and GP and specialist services are free, while there are co-payments for drugs, adult dental care, physiotherapy and the like. Co-payments make up close to 19% of total health expenditures. The system has been characterized by expenditure control, reasonable positive development in productivity, and a high degree of patient and citizen satisfaction despite waiting lists. Free choice of hospital was introduced more than 10 years ago. It has recently been expanded so that after waiting 2 months for treatments like elective surgery at public hospitals, citizens can choose either private hospitals or go abroad with full payment from public funds. The thinking behind decentralization gradually has been eroded for a number of reasons. This has led to a reform that will be effective as of January 2007. The number of counties will be reduced, but the new regions retain responsibility for health care. A national earmarked health tax will be introduced so that the regions will receive revenues from state block grants and municipal co-payment, for instance an amount per hospitalization.

Jonathan Putnam

No abstract is available for this record.

Kalevi Lauslahti, Risto P. Roine, Virpi Semberg, Martti Kekomäki · 6 authors

Finland has a long tradition of supporting social programs that promote equality and the welfare state. The healthcare system is financed mainly by taxation. Everyone is insured against illness. Each of Finland's five provinces is run by a provincial government that monitors the provision of social welfare and health care. However, the municipalities actually provide the services and regulate medical equipment and regionalization of services. During the early 1990s, gross domestic product (GDP) fell dramatically, and healthcare expenditure rose to 9.4% of GDP. Due to the economy's rapid recovery, the share of healthcare expenditure has again decreased and now matches the average level of OECD countries of approximately 7.7%. The former Finnish method of central planning and norm setting has guaranteed a fairly uniform development of necessary services throughout the country and free or low-cost access. Tight central planning did not, however, create incentives to contain costs. Therefore, in the beginning of the 1990s, decision-making power was largely decentralized to the municipalities, and the principles of state subsidies were reformed. In 1995, the Finnish Office for Health Care Technology Assessment (FinOHTA) was set up as a new unit of the National Research and Development Centre for Welfare and Health (STAKES). FinOHTA is intended to function as a national central body for advancing HTA-related work in Finland, with the ultimate goal of promoting the effectiveness and efficiency of Finnish health care. At present, the importance of HTA is widely recognized in Finland, especially in the face of rising healthcare costs.

George France

Italy has a national health service (SSN) dating to 1978. Italy's system of government is characterized by a rather high degree of decentralization of power, and the health system is likewise decentralized. Most of the responsibilities for health care have been ceded to the regions. The state retains only limited coordinating and supervisory powers. The state has a financial responsibility for the national health service, but state contributions are limited and expenditures in excess of this made by the region must be financed from other sources. Health reforms of 1992-93 aimed at making the regions more sensitive to the need to control aggregate expenditure and to monitor measures to promote efficiency, quality, and citizen-patient satisfaction. The diffusion of individual health technologies has been relatively uncontrolled in many regions in Italy, although tight central constraints on capital spending have contained diffusion of new technology. Regulation of placement of services is a planning function and is the responsibility of both the Ministry of Health and the regions. Health technology assessment (HTA) activities have been expanding since the early 1990s, but these activities tend to be untargeted, uncoordinated, and without priorities. Nonetheless, the principal actors in the SSN at national, regional, and local levels are becoming more sensitive to the need to apply criteria of clinical and cost-effectiveness and to be more rigorous in deciding what services to guarantee. There are reasons to be guardedly optimistic about the future of HTA in Italy.

Wallace E. Huffman, Richard E. Just, Huffman, Wallace E., Just, Richard E.

This paper reviews agricultural research structural and organizational changes in western developed countries, examines new financing prospects for agricultural research, and provides some tentative conclusions about which organizations are best positioned to provide services for the twenty-first century. Given that these countries face many similar economic, political, scientific, and agroclimatic factors and fiscal issues, we can expect a set of similar new developments that have potentially important and widespread long-run implications. After three common developments are outlined, principles of impure public good financing are applied leading to the following agricultural science policy recommendations: (i) new political jurisdictions should be formed to finance research, e.g. new alliances across countries and subregions within large countries; (ii) intellectual property rights should be strengthened to increase the total amount and share of total (public and private) agricultural research that is privately financed and conducted, i.e. the private sector should find it profitable to undertake a large share of applied research but not be expected to finance public-sector agricultural research; and (iii) the public sector should redirect its research efforts increasingly to areas that are socially worthwhile, but not privately undertaken, e.g. in the basic and pretechnology areas, on environmental, resources, food safety and human nutrition, and policy. Finally, large countries that have developed a system of shared public and private financing and performance and decentralized public support of agricultural research seem best positioned for meeting the needs of the twenty-first century.© 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Richard Graham Halliday, A.L. Drasdo, Cynthia E. Lumley, Stuart Walker

A survey of 45 leading pharmaceutical companies has been used to investigate aspects of their Research and Development (R&D) strategies, the allocation of resources including the financing and staffing of R&D functions, and the numbers of New Chemical Entities (NCEs) in the development process. The companies included the top ten by R&D expenditure in 1992 (top 10 companies). The study identified characteristics of leading companies and provided comparative data. The principal findings are that: top ten companies had the highest R&D to sales ratios, progressed more NCEs after the drug candidate selection stage in 1992 and had achieved a greater geographical decentralization of staff than any other company. Japanese companies differed in some respects from western companies, even those of a similar size. They operated with smaller clinical and regulatory affairs functions and made detailed plans for R&D expenditure further ahead than western companies, on average, more than 5 years compared with 3 years. an increase in aggregated R&D staffing had occurred between 1990 and 1992 in 33 companies for which data for both years were available and staff numbers had decreased in only five of those companies. top ten companies differed from others in their apparent productivity measured in terms of staff or R&D expenditure per NCE after the drug candidate selection stage, utilizing more staff and having greater R&D expenditure per NCE. The results also appear to indicate early signs of a change in the structure of the industry according to R&D expenditure, which has since become more apparent. There was a distinct polarization by R&D budget size among the respondent companies: five companies were spending $900m or more on R&D in 1992 while the majority of the rest were spending less than a third of that amount.

Chien‐Fu Chou, Oz Shy

Economists and policy makers have always argued that the patent system is necessary for a growing economy despite the fact that temporary monopoly rights to innovators imply a distortion of the price system. However, economists have not yet come up with a unified theory to determine the optimal duration of patents. In this paper, we develop a simple dynamic model which identifies two important welfare effects of the patent system, the effect on the incentive to innovate and that of the price distortion caused by the monopoly rights of patent holders. Using this framework, we analyze the factors which determine the optimal duration of patents awarded to new product developers. We argue that the possibility of a finite optimal patent life does not arise in the literature on product development since it considers only a constant returns to scale technology for developing new products. We first confirm the optimality of an infinite patent life for this technology and then show that if the cost of developing new products is increasing with the rate of instantaneous product development then the optimal patent life for economies with a population growth rate less than the interest rate is finite. In addition, we show that for economies with population growth rate exceeding the interest rate, the optimal patent life may also be finite provided that the degree of product substitution is sufficiently high. The patent system can be viewed as a method of assigning property rights to innovators in order to encourage research and development. Theoretically, the optimal R&D level can be tackled using a standard public goods analysis (such as the problem of financing a new bridge) yielding a result that optimal allocations can be achieved at the cost of a significant amount of government intervention. Perhaps for this reason most decentralized societies have chosen a different way to motivate people to engage in R&D, and this is done by assigning temporary monopoly rights to innovators.

Brian D. Wright

Though public intervention in the market for research is virtually universal, economists have paid surprisingly little attention to the choice of the form of research incentive in a given market structure. Many studies concentrate on patents, but any assumption of their superiority over other incentives has been founded on intuition rather than on formal analysis. In this paper I analyze the choice between three of the most alternative means of public intervention in the research market, namely, patents, prizes, and direct contracting for research services. I show why, and under what conditions, any one of the three may be preferred by a social welfare-maximizing administrator in a competitive economy, using a model that, for the first time, pays explicit attention to differences in the informational roles of each of these alternatives. In the extensive literature on the economics of patents (see Arnold Plant, 1934; Fritz Machlup, 1958; Charles Taylor and Z. A. Silberston, 1973; Morton Kamien and Nancy Schwartz, 1975; and F. M. Scherer, 1977, for valuable surveys), formal analysis weighs the benefits of patents as a solution to the market failure associated with the inappropriability of knowledge against the welfare cost due to the restriction on the use of the knowledge generated, and this tradeoff is optimized by patent life adjustment in William Nordhaus (1969). Scant analytical attention is paid to alternative incentive mechanisms. (An exception is Ben Yu, 1981, who considers the role of prior contracting for inventions.) But as many writers (for example, Dan Usher, 1964; Yoram Barzel, 1968; Joseph Stiglitz, 1969; Carole Kitti, 1973; Glenn Loury, 1979; Partha Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980a) have pointed out in various contexts, the incentive offered by an unlimited patent to competitive researchers may be excessive, due to the common pool problem discussed further in Section I below. If the patent administrator and researchers share the same information, as implicitly assumed in previous models, then the patent life limitation can be adjusted to provide the optimal patent incentive, given the pool problem. But in all such models, patents would not be chosen in a fully optimized fiscal system. Researchers and the administrator are assumed to have identical information about the shadow price of potential inventions; a patent is just a means of turning this shadow price into a monetary reward. But monetary compensation can instead be offered directly to researchers by the state. Assuming that patent revenues incur a higher deadweight loss than an equivalent amount of public funds financed by less distortionary means (for example, a minimally efficient tax system), appropriate prizes or government contracts are socially preferable to patents with optimal lives. If the patent is ever to be the optimal incentive mechanism for research, it must possess advantages not captured in existing models. Informal discussions of patents emphasize their informational role. To include the latter as a justification for decentralized invention incentives, I incorporate an ex ante imbalance of information about costs and benefits of research in the model presented in Section II. But this alone is not quite enough. It is further necessary to specify that the terms of the award must be fixed before *Department of Economics, Economic Growth Center, Box 1987 Yale Station, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520. I thank, with the usual caveat, Marguerite Alejandro-Wright, Cindy Arfken, Martin Baily, Nuong Brennan, Steven Englander, Robert Evenson, Richard Levin, Richard Nelson, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Denis Wright, and two referees for assistance of various kinds.