Blockchain Papers

Péter Halmai, Viktória Vásáry, Halmai, Peter, Vasary, Viktoria

Is the Common Agricultural Policy unsustainable? Is agricultural spending a major distorting factor in the EU economy and an obstacle to the implementation of the Lisbon agenda? To answer these complex questions, detailed analysis is required along the following lines of thought: 1. Exploration of factors justifying Community level intervention. – Is the ’theory of decentralization’ applicable to budgetary issues and the common agricultural policy? Our hypothesis suggests that it is. 2. Assessing CAP as it currently exists, including its ability to generate public goods at the level of the Community (multifunctional elements which are indeed cross-border externalities) and its ability to create added value at the level of the Community. 3. Making an attempt to redefine the Community’s agricultural policy by identifying goals which can be achieved more effectively at the supranational level rather than by involving secondary levels of decision making. – Making an attempt to outline a Common Rural Policy, a new policy intended to promote the creation of public goods required by the society by means of targeted and decoupled economic policy measures. The concept of the new policy – a new policy requiring both national and Community funding – is in line with the requirements of sustainable development, i.e. sustainable agricultural activities such as sustainable land use, food and feed production, biofuels, forestry and fishing. Additionally, the new policy we outlined may also be an effective approach to meeting challenges arising from globalisation, trade liberalization, climate change and structural reform issues. ----------------------------------------- Fenntarthatatlan a Közös Agrárpolitika? Torzítják a mezőgazdasági kiadások az EU gazdaságá¬nak fejlődését, gátolják a Lisszaboni stratégia végrehajtását? Ezekre a bonyolult kérdésekre a követ¬kező pontok részletes elemzésével adhatjuk meg a választ: 1. A közösségi szintű beavatkozást igazoló tényezők feltárása, rendszerezése. – Alkalmazható a „decentralizációs elmélet” a költségvetési kérdések, illetve a közös agrárpolitika vonatkozásában? Hipotézisünk szerint: igen. 2. A KAP értékelése – figyelembe véve az EU-szintű közjavak (a multifunkcionális elemek va-lóban határokon átnyúló externalitások) és EU-szintű hozzáadott érték előállítására vonatkozó képességet. 3. Kísérlet az EU agrárpolitikájának átalakítására annak segítségével, hogy felmérjük, mely cél-kitűzések valósíthatóak meg eredményesebben szupranacionális szinten, és nem pedig másodla¬gos döntési szintek bevonásával. – Kísérlet a Közös Vidékpolitika körvonalazására, amely új poli¬tika célzott és szétválasztott szakpolitikai intézkedések segítségével járul hozzá a társadalom által megkívánt közjavak előállításához. Az új politika koncepciója – annak az új politikának a koncepciója, amely mind nemzeti mind Kö¬zösségi szintű finanszírozást is igényel – összhangban van a fenntartható fejlődés – azaz a fenntart¬ható mezőgazdasági tevékenységek: fenntartható földhasználat, élelmiszer- és takarmány-előál¬lítás, bioüzemanyag, erdészet és halászat – követelményeivel. Továbbá az általunk felvázolt új po¬litika megfelelően kezelheti a globalizációval, kereskedelem-liberalizációval, klímaváltozással és strukturális reformmal kapcsolatos kihívásokat.

Judit Kálmán

Observation of the first and second generation of literature on fiscal decentralization together with further branches of political economy, e.g. specifically on the political economy of intergovernmental grants and the widening literature on political business cycles leads to a puzzle: decentralization is a continuing policy trend however in reality there are downsides, institutional, political and other factors that do interfere with decision-making and can increase the chances for inefficient policy outcomes. Infrastructure investment finances at all levels of government are especially prone to election cycles and corruption. Driven from the above context the basic research question guiding my work is: whether local infrastructure policies in Hungary are really designed according to efficiency considerations? What politico-economic factors might affect central and local governments’ allocations on infrastructure investment? To complete this goal, a closer look at municipal capital investment financing in Hungary takes place. Related to the main research question several themes emerge and hypotheses are checked on the effects of the revenue base, local need and socioeconomic indicators on local investment strategies and financing constructions or grant allocations. Does grant financing mean a less careful financial planning? What is the importance of lobbying through different channels? I also search for - and in fact do find evidence of electoral cycle effects and partisan considerations (effect of similarities in political color of central and local governments) in intergovernmental grant distribution and in municipal investment activities. These issues to be researched call for a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. Some of my hypothesis are tested on limited data from a 2004 survey of city mayors in Hungary. Hypotheses on cycles, determinants of investment outlays of local governments and grant recipiency are tested with linear and Probit panel regressions respectively on a panel dataset comprehensive for all Hungarian local government budgets from 1993-2003, a period bridging three election cycles, linked with some demographic,socioeconomic data and local election data. Findings can add to the discussion on reforming local government finance system overall, on the agenda in Hungary for quite a while, but perhaps also to the new literature on the political economy of failures, delays in socially beneficial reforms. What this dissertation certainly does contribute to is the fairly small pool of international empirical evidences available on political budget cycles, especially at the sub-national level and the emerging literature on the political economy of intergovernmental grants providing the case of one transition country that irrespective of the fact of by now being an EU member sometimes shows certain similarities to the developing ones.

György Jenei, Ákos Szalai

Compared to the national level, the local government level in Hungary is more responsive to reform efforts. The Hungarian experience indicates that decentralization is a key programme of the transition process for the emerging democracies of eastern Europe. These experiences also show that the decentralization process will be efficient and effective only if three key requirements are met. These are: (1) a stable and democratic constitutional, legal background; (2) an efficient municipal finance system; and (3) a well-functioning local administration.

Jacob Naor

Hungry has since 1968 been in the vanguard of reform movements unfolding in the east-bloc countries. With the exception of reform measures in Yugoslavia, the measures introduced in Hungary in 1968 represent the most radical central system changes of any of the countries belonging to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). These changes firmly establish the foundations for what can be characterized as a socialist market economy in Hungary. The purpose of this article is to report on a most recent and bold development in Hungarian reform: the creation, as of January 1, 1982, of radically new forms of small business organizations. The available experience with those new organizations as of early 1983 are also presented, based on descriptions by Hungarian sources. Finally, Hungarian economists' and planners' suggestions for future changes and improvements in Hungarian organizations are discussed and evaluated. The success or failure of the measures currently being implemented in Hungary will undoubtedly affect the direction of reforms in other east-bloc countries. It is clearly important, therefore, to assess the meaning of these reforms as well as the thinking of Hungarian reformers on future directions for change. DECENTRALIZATION MEASURES OF 1968 The principal feature of the 1968 reform measures in Hungary was decentralization of the mechanism, a move which significantly extended the decision-making power of enterprises to areas previously reserved for higher administrative levels, such as that of ministries and central bodies. Enterprises were thus freed of the previously obligatory plan assignments and could develop autonomous production and distribution plans. The role of ministries was reduced to coordination and provision of assistance and guidance for the preparation of such plans. Centralized materials allocation was abolished as well. Ministries henceforth exercised influence over enterprise management through the provision of appropriate financial incentives or disincentives, involving such economic levers as tax rates, interest rates, and loans. Indicative planning largely replaced command planning, and the influence of market forces grew considerably. Prices, for example, were partially freed from central control and in many cases were allowed to fluctuate freely in response to demand and supply. Thus, while in 1968, 86 percent of food and consumer articles had an official price, in 1980 only 72 percent of such articles belonged to this category. Similarly, in the metal-technical sector, only 13 percent of products were freely priced in 1968, but by 1980 that percentage had increased to more than two thirds. Market socialism seems an apt characterization of a system that increasingly attempted to blend central guidance with local enterprise autonomy and freely functioning market forces towards the achievement of national development objectives. EMERGING PROBLEMS REQUIRING NEW MESURES The 1968 measures were generally given high marks for success, but by the late 1970s new problems had emerged that appeared to require additional regulatory steps. Severe external shocks buffeted the Hungarian economy, particularly the worsening terms of trade with both the East and the West, marketing crises in some major export markets in the West, and the halt in growth in much-needed supplies of raw materials and energy from the CMEA bloc. These negative developments provided the backdrop for additional reform measures begun in 1979-1980, which led to the 1982 small business reforms. By the late 1970s it became necessary to mobilize hitherto unused human and material resources in order to avoid stagnation. Hungarian planners attempted to apply to the industrial sector the principles which led to the successful experience with household plots and small-scale farming, which and resulted in high productivity gains in agriculture. …

Tore Modeen

Aspects of the finnish administration. After a short historical introduction (before and after independence), the author describes the organization of central administration and decentralized units and presents some services : Finance, Education, National Defense. Reforms are under way or in the blueprint : they concern the administration of justice, deconcentration of some services, democratization of administrative life, departmental autonomy.