One of the most significant journeys in our understanding of international business has been that from an essentially centralized view of innovation in MNEs toward one that encompasses an increasing range of decentralized inputs and strategic postures. This change in perspective can then be seen as decisively embodied within comparable changes in the way in which the effects of international business on individual host countries have been analysed. Here we can see a refocusing from an FDI-based interpretation of flows of separate firm attributes (increasingly technology and other intangible assets rather than finance capital per se) toward a more MNE-strategy oriented evaluation of how firms position their operations in a specific location within wider globalized programs (Pearce, 2001, forthcoming). The aim of this chapter then is to generate a methodology for the assessment of the ways in which MNEsâ globalized strategies for innovation involve themselves with the attempts of national economies to generate and operationalize innovation competences as a source of growth and international competitiveness. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
China's WTO Entry will bring both opportunity and challenge to Chinese finance. To meet the new situation, Chinese finance must find a new way of development: relax the restrictions of financial annex, cancel the system of decentralized management progressively, give energetic support to developing and improving financial medium stups, improve the circulate funds guarantee system of medium and small enterprises, encourage new financial ideas, enhance the profit ability of banks.
From the angle of institutional analysis, the paper makes a comprehensive, systematic and profound analysis of the institutional features, incentive mechanism and supervisory mechanism of non governmental chambers of commerce in Wenzhou which have been established in the past ten years, thus revealing the inner mechanism and structural features of these spontaneous, autonomous and service organizations. It can be found from the institutional features that the institutional supply of the chambers of commerce in Wenzhou is made possible not only by governments but also by the chambers themselves. The rules and regulations, as the fundamental institution of the chambers, are established by the interplay of both the chambers and the governments. In the management practice of chambers, the internal institution based on collective spontaneity play a guiding role. But the internal institution, according to which punishment for actions in violation of the rules and regulations are enforced by the system of decentralization, spontaneous feedback from society, or by the official, organizational system, can be classified into formal and informal rules and regulations. The incentive mechanism of the chambers of commerce includes material incentive, for unity and purposes, and different selective incentives for such different level people as common members, core members and full time personnel. This has thus attracted more and more corporations to participate in the management of the chambers of commerce, whose supervisory mechanism features dual characters of institutionalization and moral driveness. On the one hand the chambers of commerce have become more and more institutionalized and standardized, and on the other hand the non governmental chambers in Wenzhou, self governing organizations which appeared not long ago after all, cannot be as highly institutionalized and standardized as the governmental organizations. That is why the working of the supervisory mechanism of thechambers depends largely on the moral driven self discipline of their leaders. And the networked organization structure provides a low cost participating network, which results in the superiority of organizational supervision. Finally, it is pointed out that after China's entry into the WTO, it is very important work for the State government and Chinese people to speed up the setting up and development of trade associations so as to adapt to the government reform and market economy. The successful experience of the said chambers and trade associations in Wenzhou provides some examples and reference for the construction and development of those in other parts of the country.
No AccessPolicy Research Working Papers21 Jun 2013Privatization and Regulation of the Seaport IndustryAuthors/Editors: Lourdes Trujillo, Gustavo NombelaLourdes Trujillo, Gustavo Nombelahttps://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-2181SectionsAboutPDF (0.3 MB) ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareFacebookTwitterLinked In Abstract:September 1999 Containerized shipping has brought profound changes to maritime transport, including a shift from labor-intensive to more capital-intensive activities. Revising the traditional organization of seaports everywhere will prepare ports for a more competitive market and less financial dependence on governments. With containerized shipping, maritime transport has changed profoundly. Among other things, it has shifted from labor-intensive to more capital-intensive activities, including larger specialized ships that require substantial investments in port infrastructure and equipment. Integrated transport chains have reduced transport costs so much that a shipper may find a distant port cheaper than a closer one. Modern ports must be competitive on times and prices for their services. Seaports must be integrated within logistical chains to serve their many functions. An efficient seaport requires infrastructure, superstructure, equipment, adequate connections to other modes of transport, a well-motivated management, and qualified employees. The public sector has been an important port organizer in the past, but private participation in port operations and infrastructure could make ports significantly more competitive. Trujillo and Nombela provide an overview of changes in maritime activity, discuss concession contracts (a key instrument of privatization), and analyze how regulatory mechanisms affect such factors as seaport tariffs, port congestion, port safety, the quality of cargo handling, and relevant indicators of performance, finances, and factor productivity. They describe how an optimal seaport system should allocate tasks between the various institutions involved, including the port authority. The degree of a seaport's decentralization, they conclude, depends on a country's size, the number of ports it has, and its legal tradition. Among several national governments in Latin America - Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela - there is an evident trend toward decentralization and greater autonomy for port authorities. This paper - a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. Gustavo Nombela may be contacted at [email protected] Previous bookNext book FiguresReferencesRecommendedDetailsCited ByPort Efficiency and the Financial Performance of Greek Public Ports Before and During the Economic CrisisMaritime Policy & Management, Vol.48, No.523 February 2021Port Performance Indicators: An Exploratory Study in the Moroccan ContextStakeholder collaboration as a pathway to climate adaptation at coastal portsMaritime Policy & Management, Vol.47, No.72 March 2020Ports's Performance: The Case of East African Ports15 July 2020Port labour, competitiveness and drivers of change in the Mediterranean Sea: a conceptual frameworkProduction Planning & Control, Vol.30, No.1311 June 2019Port competition in Latin America and the Caribbean: the role of concessions and competition policyMaritime Policy & Management, Vol.45, No.527 December 2017Tariff protection and port privatization: An import-competing approachMaritime Economics & Logistics, Vol.20, No.215 July 2016Incorporating AHP and Evidential Reasoning for Quantitative Evaluation of Inland Port Performance25 October 2017An empirical test of the balanced theory of port competitivenessThe International Journal of Logistics Management, Vol.28, No.2The drivers of port competitiveness: a critical reviewTransport Reviews, Vol.37, No.120 September 2016Maritime Policy & Management, Vol.44, No.6Port reform in Nigeria: efficiency gains and challengesGeoJournal, Vol.81, No.517 June 2015Quasi-landlord port financing in China: Features, practice and a contract theory analysisTransportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Vol.89The Balanced Theory of Port CompetitivenessTransportation Journal, Vol.55, No.2Enabling Better Port Governance in Developing Countries: The Role of Information TechnologyPort privatization in an international oligopolyTransportation Research Part B: Methodological, Vol.67Supply chain interfaces between a port utilizing organisation and port operatorSupply Chain Management: An International Journal, Vol.19, No.1Port of Havana: The Gateway of Cuba, 1850â1920A study on the efficiency of financial support for Marine economy based on DEA modelDeterminants of Port Infrastructure PricingThe Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics, Vol.29, No.2A Study of Import/Export Trade Originating from Nanjangud and Kannur to New Mangalore Port TrustSSRN Electronic JournalPort Privatization in an International OligopolySSRN Electronic JournalRegulation and price setting of pilotage services in BrazilMaritime Economics & Logistics, Vol.12, No.419 November 2010PrivateâPublic Partnerships as Strategic AlliancesTransportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, Vol.2062, No.122 May 2018Defending Dock Workers?Globalization and Labor Relations in the World's PortsIndustrial Relations, Vol.46, No.3Determinants of Competitiveness in Logistics: Implications for the ASEAN RegionMaritime Economics & Logistics, Vol.9, No.130 April 2007The Missing Point in CAFTASSRN Electronic JournalPort privatization, efficiency and competitiveness: Some empirical evidence from container ports (terminals)Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Vol.39, No.5Privatisation in Developing Countries: A Review of the Evidence and the Policy LessonsJournal of Development Studies, Vol.41, No.4Determinants of Maritime Transport CostsSSRN Electronic JournalInstitutional reform in ports of developing countries: the case of Lebanonâpart I: the planMaritime Policy & Management, Vol.28, No.43 December 2010 View Published: November 1999 Copyright & Permissions Related RegionsLatin America & CaribbeanRelated CountriesHondurasCzech RepublicPuerto RicoPeruArgentinaRelated TopicsTransportInfrastructure Economics and Finance KeywordsAIRAIR TRANSPORTALTERNATIVE TRANSPORTALTERNATIVE TRANSPORT MODESCOSTSECONOMIES OF SCALEINFRASTRUCTUREMARITIME TRANSPORTMODES OF TRANSPORTPASSENGERSPORT AUTHORITIESPORT INFRASTRUCTUREPORT SERVICESRAILWAYSROADROUTESSAFETYTRAFFICTRANS TRANSPORT SYSTEM PDF DownloadLoading ...
The case is strong for declaring an inadequacy of export finance for small business. In 1988â90, the documentation has expanded beyond that of academic research and claims by the Small Business Administration to Congressional testimony by exporters and bankers, surveys by trade associations of manufacturers and bankers, and investigations by the Government's export finance agency as well as our central bank. Nonetheless, small business is exhorted to look abroad in its marketing efforts and so to participate in reducing the U.S. trade deficit. As one means of alleviating this international marketing challenge, the ExportâImport Bank of the United States (Eximbank) has moved to convert a pilot program of 1988â89 into a fallâfledged decentralized effort to deliver export finance to qualified small firms. The intention is that carefully trained administrators in selected states will be able to match qualified exporters with financial institutions and thereby assure that the small firms receive working capital in adequate quantity to meet terms and conditions of an export contract. While Eximbank's staff is poised to support the marketing and credit analysis work of the state/local administrators, this paper examines the need for a fully cooperative effort among four parties or groups in the face of a national retrenchment by many banks in the provision of export finance for small firms.
ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol. 13, No. 2, Fall-Winter 1989, pp. 35-53 TEN YEARS OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA Richard Pomfret In the late 1970s the People's Republic of China (PRC) re versed its economic development strategy, ending three decades of economic isolation by adopting the Open Door policy. The most dramatic component of the new strategy was the June 1979 Law on Equity Joint Ventures which permitted direct foreign investment (DFI) in the PRC for the first time. Foreign capital had, of course, played a significant role in other coun tries' economic development before 1979, but the PRC decision came at a time when many developing countries were rejecting foreign investors or, if they sought foreign funds, they preferred loans, which did not pose the same perceived threat to economic independence as DFI involving foreign control. In this respect China was ahead of the times, as the post-1982 Debt Crisis revealed the dangers of loans as sources of external finance and stimulated a more favorable reassessment of DFI by capital scarce nations. China also led the way among communist coun tries in permitting DFI, and the path has been followed since by the USSR, other East European countries, and the communist nations of Indochina.1 The Chinese experience with DFI is thus of interest both in itself, as a new move by the world's largest nation, and for its lessons for developing countries and for communist states. Because DFI involves a time horizon measured in years rather than months and because the inevitable initial uncertainty slowed foreign investors' response to the 1979 Law, some time had to elapse before an assessment of the Chinese experience 1. The USSR passed a joint venture law in January 1987. Vietnam adopted a law permitting DFI in June 1988 and Laos followed in the next month. 36 Richard Pomfret with DFI could be made. Ten years is an arbitrary but reasonable length. Moreover, the tenth anniversary of the June 1979 Law was marred by the massacre in Tiananmen Square and subsequent repression, which may change the DFI situation as potential foreign investors reassess their views of the PRC as a place to do business. This paper describes and evaluates the Chinese experience with DFI between 1979 and 1989. Many features are, of course, specific to Chinaâthe lure of the billion person market, the absence of direct colonial experience, etc.âbut others are predictable consequences of China's resource endowment, level of economic development and policy choices. The paper examines the types of joint ventures (JVs) which have been formed, their characteristics in terms of size distribution, type of activity, nationality of foreign partners, determinants of success, and the role of policy in all this. The situation has changed over time as foreign investors have learned more about operating in China and as Chinese attitudes and policies have changed; the most useful distinction in this respect is between the situation before and after October 1986 when important modifications in the Joint Venture Law were announced. China's Open Door Policy Adoption of the Open Door policy represented a dramatic shift from China's previous inward-oriented development strategy. This section describes the four elements of the new strategy: trade policy, the Joint Venture Law, exchange rate and macroeco nomic policies, and the spatial dimension. Meanwhile, China was also undertaking far-reaching domestic reforms in agriculture and industry which were changing the organization of produc tion and the role of central planning. This paper is not concerned with these economic reforms, but they are important back ground events. Before 1979 China's trade policy was driven by imports and was highly centralized. Exports were determined by the amount needed to pay for imports, which were the shortfall between planned needs and domestic availability of each good. International trade was conducted by twelve foreign trade cor porations (FTCs), who insulated the domestic economy with its fixed prices from market-determined world prices. In Decern- Ten Years of Direct Foreign Investment in China 37 ber 1978 the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party rejected this approach, and by 1984 foreign trade decisions had been decentralized and controls over imports and exports...