Blockchain Papers

Mónica García-Salmones Rovira

International legal positivism in some of its radical forms in the 21st century operates as theological voluntarism. It is the ambition to translate an overwhelmingly practical art into a general theory of law that has squeezed these theories into a theological structure of thought. If such a thing could ever exist, a general theory of law ought to reveal the role played by morality in the normative pronouncements about law. However, a general theory can only emerge at the expense of taking the existential decision about identifying law with morality or severing law from morality.2 Hans Kelsen writes that ‘law is an order of human behaviours’.3 But is this order founded upon morality or not? This very question articulates a fragmented view of reality falling between fact (morality) and value (law) that we have learned to take for granted.4 Practitioners know that the correct professional approach is to be interested in the legal aspects of a case and not in its moral aspects. Moreover, both in theory and practice, one can often limit oneself to act as a morally responsible person.5 There are, however, several sensitive areas in which even minimal theoretical work calls for the adoption of a moral-normative standpoint.6 However, the ‘general theory’ type of thinking urges the theological question7 – will the law punish my immorality or not?8 The theoretician devising a general theory will lay out the question of morality and law in absolute terms. Independently of the answer, articulating this question involves the assumption that the lawyer should take a theological approach, which is also reflected in the non-neutral outcome of the following two absolutist approaches.9 If law is to prescribe what is moral, every legal judgment is a moral judgment about good and evil. Law is endowed with power in order to apply a moral code, and secular law becomes superfluous. The second approach, based on the separability of law and morality, denies that the normativity of law makes claims connected with morality. What is at stake is not whether law ignores or refrains from expressing whether a particular behaviour is moral or not but, rather, the assertion of the idea that no violation of the law is a moral evil and no legal judgment is a moral condemnation. Morality is irrelevant to this approach. Both types of general theory work in the realm of the ideal with an a priori type of human being. The sinner belongs to the first category; the god to the second.10 In both cases, the theologian-theoretician devising a general theory employs law that works in history in order to model behaviour in practice. In the first case, the human being becomes absolutely dependent on the ideal type to which she has to conform, the supreme legislator (presumably representing God) being in charge of its implementation. As if in parallel, in the second choice, the morality of human beings is considered to be autonomous from that of the supreme legislator (embodied by the people, the consent of the state and so on). A theory of law that demarcates strictly legal norms declares that moral normativity in its varied forms, including reason, nature, justice, politics, the real world or humanity, never comes into contact with legal judgments.11 A human being’s behaviour ought to be examined through law without this type of considerations. Law as ideality is, as it were, enclosed – it is disconnected from any claim to substantive moral content, but, more importantly, it is also disconnected from the sphere of practical action in which the legal actor takes a moral decision when necessary. The troubled history of natural law theories proves that the first option described above has never been attempted, let alone implemented.12 Moreover, there is no moral code that can produce a complete system of (international) law – not even Sharia does that.13 Equally, the few alleged attempts made in the realm of theory to produce any form of neutral normativity, independent from morality, have failed with similar regularity. The (healthy) inconsistency of the formulations attempted to this end has been laid bare by the fact that their authors have introduced rational considerations of morality and justice when this was felt to be necessary or unavoidable.14 The condition of voluntarism concerns a classical position of Western theology that differentiates between the absolute power of God to adopt any possible course of action without contradiction and the divine ordained power by which God is committed to act in a certain manner. While we are moving within the realm of strict theology, the voluntarist element appears when emphasis is placed on all of the logical possibilities open to God to create different worlds. Everything from the beginning is considered to be contingent (‘it could have been otherwise’) and therefore no rationality can bind the will of God.15 Instead of observing the reality around him, the 14th-century voluntarist theologian felt compelled to focus his epistemological view on the normative character of God’s command. He accordingly focused on the idea that God’s command was binding even though he considered it to be, logically speaking, deprived of inherent rationality, morality and so on – or in modern formalistic terms, empty and neutral.16 In his book, Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen sketches a similar type of theological voluntarism with some wit: From the point of view of a theory of positive law, there is no fact that by itself – that is, regardless of a consequence stipulated by the legal order – is a delict. There are no mala in se, but only mala prohibita. This is only the consequence of the principle, generally recognized in criminal law: nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena singe lege; and this principle which is valid not only for criminal law, not only for criminal but for all delicts, not only for punishments but for all sanctions, is merely a consequence of legal positivism.17 Kelsen continues by explaining that it was self-evident that certain behaviour was criminalized when the legal authority regarded it as ‘harmful to society’. However, ‘from the point of view of an analysis of the immanent meaning of the legal order, this circumstance is irrelevant for the concept of delict’.18 The invocation of the positivist principle nullum crimen sine lege makes Kelsen’s thought look voluntarist it a of the nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege that in to limit the power of the and the of the crimen sine lege a from all that is morally The idea was to the of a as a criminal only on the of what has been as law. Kelsen made his claim to that there was no that this principle to that there are no that are not or only have been by law. it does not as that when one human behaviour from a positive law one a the principle of nullum crimen sine lege the lawyer to to positive law, if there is In the principle to law in criminal law of any but it is not its to morality from a legal point of in his to Kelsen articulates his theory with all the in law of a voluntarist in law is not by any particular rationality or Law could have The two in International A and and the of International A Theory of the of in the epistemological of theological voluntarism. The legal theoretical ambition of the two appears to be to one should of an law that state consent at the that morality be placed law. In a similar to century legal the existential by these is by not by Moreover, the two authors to apply the radical of a positivist general theory of law to this theory but, rather, it – Kelsen’s this both the by their legal theoretician the of in Kelsen’s normativity of law. In the and theoretical first by of normativity by to without about its However, it is no that several of to legal In the of and this theory appears to a of power to the law to which have an of in which legal are being the of of law, one with and of the between the of law and and of the of law to some of the in this law is connected to such a theory the of in of from the of law. However, the theory type of normativity of in International Law and and the of International Law an ideal for law, it to its The of its politics, not to its morality, makes the – the theological type of thinking as Kelsen law is and ought not to be with of morality. as was the case with this type of theory to with to the What are the of the of law the can legal to that and all of the of the to an ideal of law and morality has never of the theoretical of law, and of such as or one to whether be the to take such a However, this is not to that the not and and that in some the modern The International in a a of around the general of positivism and legal theory by and is by a different theoretical In the of the of the two which is that the authors are the of this the a positivist and a and with the of and – and the also in their of the the power of the for law or attempts to the between natural and positivist law. In this the of the of both expressing the in law – which is, in their positivist – and the of positivism in The forms a of with the which this for its to through the the in upon this Moreover, not only is the an independent but of the also form of their that that one can with is that are about law. the theological of positivism are in the the of the in the the adoption of a moral point of view in law, with the of substantive by which the of law can be In morality is with what the of the century has to their in radical positivism in their and have in or even Kelsen’s and – does as with a minimal of natural of the adopt the with to the of However, one the in the on this particular the that the to the several of the in to theological voluntarism are In the one does not that is about the to be a in to the theories of that made claims The of legal is but are with the of with a world in which is to be in of legal In this the legal of the century works in with what is in reality and is not on of of legal theory or – the as on the through This about is with to Pure Theory is to legal theory in in International A In the is often with the legal theory of to a decision of the authority is as as a legal In the have Kelsen’s Pure Theory as both of more to of Kelsen’s work and articulating the of and the law to Kelsen with the create Kelsen this idea Moreover, the of to Kelsen’s legal thinking is not to the emphasis on the of in law. In Kelsen’s was the very question that ought to in the of law. on the of was to whether the to and Kelsen that it was that the itself its to be that the of could be when the felt to be open the question of – the state or the itself was also and Kelsen The question of be by no decision necessary. But such a does not in law. There are no in only by the The is the can never be only two of Kelsen’s one his in to and his in the of the law to be by the are in order to that is not a particular from the of the of the legal the of is and is in the 21st a when several of legal Kelsen have legal and have to and in of It is only natural that the is to be no a in the of law. While there is in law, the century have law itself as the to the state of in In the of law as a to the fact that it was considered to be the when thinking in of book, however, with type of This is one to and to epistemological as Kelsen’s theory within the of theological as of the theory of the is founded on the from no from an of the Pure Theory does not that law is an legal order or that is not by It is in this that in International Law with the of that and of the in of to the that has to and as as the of in International Law is about to itself as both an and a about the of valid law without the of morality and state the of at thought that in he on in the as we as being that which is of have both and aspects take the in the be by the described the of an act of as being on the He that is to the to with so that the act of is from all the of the which are about the or the This in which is about thinking with and about thinking with is in of the idea of voluntarism as an epistemological in in International A as to the Pure Theory will that and are in in International The to a Pure Theory to law calls for to a priori the between and to the The to this in the in which he his work on legal theory to in the very in the to the made the book, in which the Pure Theory is as both and does in theoretical or a of what in the 21st in to law. Moreover, very in the the that is and a in the classical – a to one will not be he to and of when the adoption of the Pure Theory is as an act of one a as to the thought it a on that particular this at the end of the is an of existential to and is Kelsen’s also be as through an act of in the Pure However, he never attempted a of the Pure Theory to of law. This is from of International Law, which is a of the law of his It be the case that he not to to the law of his – which from the – or he felt the was not for that through he his in of law, as to the of the between and law the that in the of the Pure Theory is a in a as as refrains from any of Kelsen’s to of the of a theory of law that was to be to above in of of from the and the regarded that as the only to However, in his theory of law, Kelsen the There is to that his that as a of principle it was a to moral and judgment in law. In the of the of the committed by the Kelsen made no about the and and to the morality of the However, we can only with on the the of his What is is that Kelsen’s theory of law in of Pure from The of to through Law and of International Law the real of of International A is that it what Kelsen never In this its is at the very of The a very to the thought of and the few to work on his and moral However, the and analysis of Kelsen’s – the of The of taking Kelsen’s work and as a that Kelsen in these and of Kelsen’s legal theory on the of the two the only The the Pure Theory to law in International Law is a and from which any interested in legal theory will Moreover, in of the substantive it with – law and and of – the a of thinking that through the of legal the of the Pure as a for the of in its to the of the law, its in the of law, and its to the of and in the case of to the approach of radical This approach, to to with the Pure and that is a valid and through to the of is the of is as the between and to legal makes possible the of norms as is in the as the to every theoretical and even are to for to that In one a with This is in the which are more with legal of the normative to be the of the to apply and law as it is in the of the However, the in no that this to the to what the to the Pure should not act with in of This is for from the of the law of of the in The with a on the different of within the and law legal the for to have to such as or that positive law. on that are open to to in the of the of of the of law to in the of in It is not so an inherent of that the but an of to the for the of both theoretical and practical on the on the of or of laid in of the which in to by in this case to the in the the from which an in of the general of the The idea is to to what the law and the of But law on the of be but as and the of for or for have their and that the of can be also This look However, what is of is that he the – to and through law. on the of normativity was an in the of the century by legal In so the of the of to that a has law. The in legal theory is in the in which this is is the between Kelsen law as and the in at a when law was and could not have been to the and to He was thinking of the when the of law which was the of the and the by the of It is for to know or this to be so in the history of legal However, was in a that the of of law that – that of with the of the about law being law and a in which the an in the normativity of law. and the of International Law belongs to this of the to the of is, one of the one from the appears more to a epistemological for (international) law. This works in with the that the to a in his all the to but, to the between a and a of the of that law is what the makes the of However, it is on the He to in – that is, the idea that have of their – as principle of of The by and the that it – by as and – is what the to on the of in that law be he on the of and the the to this type of theory of of which was a makes more the that the at the As the the of natural law and of the will of the state the to the of law. The on a of natural law and state will the the as being As an natural law can be and – from of natural to the of the or the of law, the of law and the the or will of the state – that – also when as a of of is the of a normativity in of the in the book, Kelsen’s theory is all in the very of and the of International Law in of the by and that their meaning through a in the that in the of the of a theory of law, as the of legal is the makes the question of of the legal order as a and his theory to the and Kelsen the of through the of law is the of the theory in the However, even though the claims that he is not in devising a general theory of law this does not that the does not one – to a of the particular theory introduced in this is Kelsen’s even – it is The of and the of International Law does not merely to a theoretical of but also to produce a theory of in the of the of of Moreover, one can on the of one the of theories that could the work that has the fact that the several and a legal the of theory and is by the of the of theory in the This that the of can be by of such a formalistic However, this is the general of radical and the of International Law is at and to The is to know more about the of this theory in practice, and the at the end of the about only on the of the that in calls for the and of his never at the of to idea idea in such a that we at but legal Moreover, their work about legal and this in their of the works of and and What is in this is the fact that the authors generally adopt to the with to The are and for a and point of In are with the in which law the real world and The the that the the of positivism is to a by the fact of and by the that can into the power to apply law. In this the the classical of law between and are more to the are with the The of the between positivism and in the of the system of law is reflected in the of the to a this is with legal The that for the radical positivist position a good of its more in a Kelsen’s as the assumption of the and the of the he that is at a – this is what when a as a on his a more role in his in the and on the of legal and the of the of the lawyer the of In an the of a at the that be as act of in the of a morality, could the lawyer whether she or he has a responsible In a different that the of law should of professional that the in its form of This and such as on legal analysis of legal on a for positivist legal thinking and on the of positivism and through its as the general of the is the of such legal thinking is by about the of a of authors in legal thinking for their of the power of the has to it is to that he appears to be to an of the the This was by the but is in the several authors and on and to this it have been a good idea to have it in the In the a of natural law. As as this is to of his an question open at the end of the What be the in as which is the of the natural law he law with a theology in the at the beginning of this or is it an of the human necessary to in the more the of the positivist of and for his the classical legal in in his state consent several legal The that more with the with the as to the to which morality is with law. the of of a fragmented view of human beings based on different of ideal normativity with no – morality As it is a that the theological of a theory of law is in its to the between morality and law. This is not to that the authors a the the involves an of the of But of the both at the that work in the legal sphere is with a of morality. is at to the of the positivist principle nullum crimen sine However, his that what is at stake in the of this principle in the case of criminal law is that the by which the or of an is is and does not in a about human but, rather, human are in by positive law. He that human are the of divine a but a of some for which the consent of is therefore the beginning and the the of law when norms to normative considerations and any to be in violation of the the she the of law to forms of law in a general manner. However, analysis also moral-normative considerations as a of course in the of law. The by and is on the law to the of and is the on the of when and moral are at In one could the with in several of the in this without of The following is a good of what have in is by no that positivist to legal should be an when the to a different In this case as by is to upon a or a or a or a such as this the at the beginning about the of the of a general theory of law in to a practical art such as law. the general of the in this on positivism in a world a for responsible by and in different to that the of of If there be to be it be and not very to the to claim that was the There is no that this is However, this position does not to be the in this The from some of only two of the are an fact that one for thought. one can about with some the of in a on an analysis of the of a with law is this of what is a of the in this has to what is are and and one should the for a not only of law but also of some of the from which it with legal or for that with law will from the with to the of and and in law and will from to it from to have in this that theological about morality and law to the that ought to be autonomous or that ought to history and and from the from legal history at two about the between morality and law. both in the in the legal the in with one at the normative of the first of what makes a good or of the of what makes good law and the of we are thinking in of practical it is in that practical law has its in a and The of International in International Law of International Hans Kelsen in International in International Kelsen and on International and Law International and International and International and to International Law International Law International law in and from a International Law International Law and of

Carol Lasser

This study of Elizabeth Patterson Bonaparte recovers the life of an impressive woman who successfully challenged the gender, political, and cultural conventions of the early American republic to reinvent herself as a European lady of taste and refinement. Born in 1785, the Baltimore beauty rebelled against the democratic world of her homeland. Achieving personal independence through, ironically, her unsuccessful marriage in 1805 to Jerome Bonaparte, younger brother of the French emperor, she found her land of opportunity in the Old World, where she styled herself an aristocrat, attaining transatlantic celebrity. While most Americans prized democratic equality, she found a comfortable niche toward the top of a well-defined social hierarchy. When many in the new nation feared the corrupting influence of aristocratic luxury, she embraced lavish display as proof of superior culture. And even as most American men and women found themselves moving in increasingly “separate spheres,” with women building domestic virtue while men staked out their places in public, Elizabeth Patterson Bonaparte enjoyed “mixed-gender sociability” (p. 158). Rejecting domesticity, she asserted that “Marrying is almost a crime” (p. 205); moreover, her manipulative motherhood focused more on social positioning than moral training.

Blessing E.N. Thom-Otuya

Nigeria’s federalism has been distorted from its original vision and structure. This situation presents the concept of federalism as a weak form of government that needs to be transformed for effective performance. The British colonial masters, and our foremost patriotic nationalists, adopted federalism as the best form of government for a country that is glaringly diversified in geographic, ethnic, language and religious constitution.  At its initial practice in Nigeria, the regions were autonomous in governance, finance and duties. The military incursion into governance and politics, distorted the practice of decentralization for centralization. Noting that Federalism has propelled countries like USA, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Australia, etc.  to an enviable political administration and economy, there is need for Nigeria to re appraise her practice of federalism in order for her to transform the practice of democracy and her economy and impact positively on her national development and foreign policy. This paper attempts to examine Nigeria’s federalism, sieve the strength in the philosophy of federalism, determine where Nigeria’s dilemma in the practice is anchored and suggest ways forward. The purpose of this paper is to expose the strength in the philosophy of federalism and to strengthen its practice in Nigeria. Key Words: Federalism, Exploration, Dilemma

Susan Dunston

In “Experience” Emerson announces his readiness “to die out of nature, and be born again into this new yet unapproachable America I have found in the West” (CW 3:41). Whatever personal manifest destiny the passage expresses, it arises from Emerson's deep affinity for Eastern philosophy. The inscription in Emerson's notebook “Orientalist” is “Ex oriente lux,” or “Light out of the east” (1993, 39), and, as Ronald Bosco notes in his introduction to the notebook, Emerson believed that the light of the East “has the power both to nourish otherwise impoverished individuals and nations and to transmute … the crime of materialism into wisdom” (1993, 14). His west is far to the east in “the sunbright Mecca of the desert,” not Huckleberry Finn's territory, the pioneer's prairie, or the miner's rocky west, and unlike miners, settlers, land speculators, governments, and most Western philosophers, he does “not make” or stake a claim; he “arrive[s] there, and behold[s] what was there already” (CW 3:41). Emerson's approach to the west entails the death or disappearance of “all mean egotism” (CW 1:10) and the open flexibility of a Zen practitioner's mind. The grand sense of entitlement and the mission of proliferation that sent most European Americans west are quite foreign to Emerson's acknowledgment and receptivity. All a miner knows is by penetration into the earth; all Emerson knows “is reception” (CW 3:48). “I am and I have,” he writes, “but I do not get, and when I have fancied I had gotten anything,” as countless westward-bound adventurers have fancied, “I found I did not” (CW 3:48).The attentive, appreciative reception Emerson practices is the strategy used by the Taoist sage, the Sufi mystic, and the Zen meditator, and the delight he consequently experiences, clapping his “hands in infantine joy” and filled “with the love of the new beauty” (CW 3:41), is the good humor of Chuang Tzu, the ecstasy of Attar and Rumi, the satori of the Zen practitioner. The reception and delight are not complacent, unproductive spectatorship, nor do they signal an erasure of the subject/self. They are the condition and result of the creative work that constitutes the unfolding of human experience and insight. As Emerson knew all too well by the time of “Experience,” we must be receptive to what is rather than to what we would prefer, what would be convenient, what we assume, or the fraction of reality that our selective attention happens to register. The “life of truth is cold, and … mournful,” he writes in “Experience” (CW 3:46), because truth is experienced (received) rather than chosen (begotten). Living in the light of truth requires acknowledging the world's indelible inscription rather than forcibly inscribing or scarring the earth with our ambitions. The world's inscription comes as a “series of surprises” (CW 2:189) unforeseen and sometimes very painful. Remaining “fearlessly available to experience whatever life presents” (Klein 1995, 202) is the challenge Emerson meets in “Experience.” Holding to this cold and mournful life of truth, just as ninth-century Chinese poet-hermit Han Shan (who also believed that crass materialism is criminal) kept to Cold Mountain, underwrites the only creative expansion Emerson finds sustainable and ethical, both individually and nationally. For Emerson “expansions” must be “organic” and mutual because “the mind does not create what it perceives, any more than the eye creates the rose” (CW 4:46); seer and seen arise mutually.In the light of the East, Emerson developed a distinctly American version of creative and ethical self-expansion that is both predictive of and a precursor to contemporary American interest in Eastern philosophy. Though clearly attracted to the Eastern philosophical ideas he encountered, he kept to his “own orbit” and wrote his “own books” (CW 1:56). His insights about self, subjectivity, and creativity arose in the context of his personal experience and the American behaviors and commitments that deeply troubled him. His response is a theory-practice of creative expansion born of the silence, stillness, and mindfulness necessary to cultivate wisdom and to transmute consumerism into thoughtful, respectful exchanges. It is a highly relevant part of our philosophical inheritance that we have yet to put into practice fully. In his well-known work on Emerson's “Experience,” Stanley Cavell challenges us to put philosophical insight (what Emerson calls “genius”) “into practice” and bring it “to earth,” saying that “America has deprived us of the reasons” not to and that “the very promise of it drives you mad, as with the death of a child” (1989, 95).Many Eastern philosophies, particularly Buddhism, have long described self as relational, interdependent, and contiguous with all; nothing is inherently separate or autonomous. Distinctions such as those between self and other, and their correlative parallels such as mind and body, are common in Western thinking but understood in Eastern traditions as distinctions in name only. At the beginning of Nature, Emerson distinguishes between the “Soul” and “the NOT ME,” relegating even his “own body” to the not-me (CW 1:8), but he sees the trap in taking name as actuality. In “Self-Reliance,” he warns against preferring “names” to “realities” or “customs” to “creators” (CW 2:29). The problem with customary names is our propensity to settle for them. We limit ourselves to the horizons they define, thus blinding ourselves to both reality and possibility. Emerson is not the only person who has fallen under the spell of the originary, seductive name “I” to the peculiar extent of including his own body in the “not-me.” As Alan Watts notes, customarily in the West “we do not regard I, myself as identical with our whole physical organism. We regard it as something inside it” (1980, 2) and accord “I” the power to survive the death of the body.“Truth” is a similarly seductive name. In contrast to I's autonomous interiority is Truth's autonomous exteriority. In the West, we take “Truth,” reified, capitalized, and impersonal, to denote something “out there” on which multiple investigations converge. Even though contemporary Western science increasingly acknowledges that distinctions between, for example, mind and body, self and other, or observer and observed are convenient concepts rather than actual realities, it largely avoids the ethical ramifications of this insight in the name of an objectivity grounded in a dualistic ontology that distinguishes subject/mind from object/body. The tension between the insight of interrelatedness and the attachment to separateness also gives rise to the language of problems that we use in Western philosophy: the “mind/body problem,” the “problem of other minds.”The “problem” of self/other or mind/body differences disappears in Eastern monistic accounts of ontology, not by eliding difference but by resisting the urge to view it as an inherent problem of ontological significance, reconsidering difference instead as a set of experienced appearances that we imbue with nominal or conceptual significance. Watts writes, “It is completely absurd to say we came into this world” as some alien, separate novelty when “we came out of it” (1980, 6). Though we typically experience ourselves as having appeared precipitously on the scene, “all our scientific knowledge about living organisms shows us that we grow out of this world, that each of us might be called a symptom of the state of the universe as a whole” (Watts 1980, 6). Watts agrees with the “biologists [who] show us very clearly that there is no way of definitively separating a human organism from its external environment. The two are a single field of behavior” (1980, 38), but these findings have not yet transformed how we think about ourselves in relation to our environment, history, and others. Though the anchorage is loosening, Western science nor Western has the that would us from customary commitments to mind self other, and creative in of and ontological “has the mutual or of and the of each on the other, and the that does not in any way or out the Emerson's for relation to the (CW has all of these The passage a of and and out the or the Emerson on and new (CW and he that is quite … but is in the whole” (CW in a monistic universe of and In he writes that the that the universe is in of its that each part all the of and that is of (CW At the of he the to to the which that all is of that and and and and are of (CW is with the of and to its in (CW the between and to be the creativity in the of and (CW two and all all the the is the other, is the other, the other, the other, the other, the other, the other, the other, the other, the other, the other, and, we these a and name the of we might that the of the is from and the of the other is the or use of (CW of is each a of the a set of a … (CW I Emerson on a of creativity as in from to the (CW rather than as of a separate self who an or a Nature, Emerson is but as a of and rather than as entitlement or as is an and … he is in the of a that that a of relation from other to (CW We understood these nor these us (CW Alan Watts a about the of each with single it that is to say is what the whole is (1980, The is not to we are by our to the whole Watts Emerson's as a are all which the universe is (1980, Emerson's to from a state with a that … his … his as the of (1980, for is also “the of because in its is the of and in a is the of the (1980, a that Emerson also in his and (CW self the is an and his or are a to the rather than significance. The this very the for identical in myself and is about in 1995, was born into a Western of the self as and to and in of or calls this “the of the Western Emerson kept into that are … in than and that by response is in an America by commitments to the on a against a even eye as as to (CW any are he to by his own is from who be from but who only to to “the of found in because that truth is the only that bring us out (CW that the West is to be in to autonomous but Emerson in this single passage in the by to the truth of both and in a practice to the in insight is that the is and a of the of multiple The is that to the of self and other and that even difference rather than or Emerson's relation to the universe calls for the other with and rather than of it as a way to our own or The and (CW of all are Emerson finds a between and (CW the does not the Cavell notes that by the world, we are or the of our our to the world” (1989, the entails to calls for to as and (Klein 1995, is in the of their and knowledge that be rather than in the of their and Emerson this In “Self-Reliance,” he that “the the is the (CW in “the in the world, of the (CW 1:56). The is what to not the having accounts of the self on and instead of or The of in its (Klein 1995, is a for an such as Emerson (CW is in because this a is the condition of self-expansion and Emerson's to the of the is inherent is (Klein 1995, in this sense is is a necessary condition of is in the West as an to be as as Even of by Emerson's we to to in the to to that “the of the is to and practice” (Klein 1995, to as an of is a Emerson does not or does to or the and (CW As Watts you are in in the way that you into a you own and you the of with the of (1980, experience the self, of any inherent Emerson's Eastern and an and to an and of we ourselves … the of that silence, and science we to our or (CW and experience of we the of self that is a in Sufi Attar writes, in of and the the and to requires and It time and for both our own and those of (CW to to their in of Eastern Watts must our our and be to the actual … it is as as (1980, but how we have to be to and (Watts 1980, and as Watts mind to be would be to in with an and only when mind and only when to it and it which is the Emerson finds the to which is (CW Nature, Emerson a strategy for the (CW he on the which is quite to practice and which Emerson well even in the of and by by the time he wrote that the truth about relation to the world” would be by of the by a and by (CW that by to “to the actual (Watts 1980, or any other of in the body even as it the by an Emerson that “we are for two having two of the and the (CW His to the personal and is from the In of Emerson's writes that he insight and in the and from nature, (1989, the American for in “the of the the of for in “the in the the of the the of the the and the of the body” (CW As Emerson the of the otherwise to be is the of to (CW in physical is to Eastern with for all that we its of and is what Emerson to including in the for the and are not two of a but two of into the in which they you far it you to the as Sufi and “the cold and the that has all the of the physical the of is experience of mind and body as only a of is a of the (Klein 1995, only his death but also Emerson's own of a of (CW into the with between us and the we and (CW As not his the truth of to Emerson and the challenges and the on which we are “not but a of a of and (CW Emerson than to any (CW for even the of are as other (CW of inherent with Emerson's of with to which has far more with Eastern than with only to be just as and but it has a all the (CW and are by but Western and Eastern accounts of personal In the West, personal is the to to something a way to the and them. set of from this philosophical The or of personal difference is to that a the of of the and Western the that is into the world, has his own and the in his own to with The is from to from what to be to the to and our to the physical is to to as to The of the is that we are The is a in Western and are The is our about We are too and, ourselves into of in the to to to be the that he has had with to the of (CW 3:48). In he has to that the I with … is not the I and to that even when he did not its and (CW 3:48). a Taoist approach of rather than the approach of Western His approach is not a to or nor is he an and (CW the or the ideas about of those of a and of the it is a are from an Eastern The for example, finds a in the Western I of is with are no In the context of the of is is as “the that all experience the of their own good and an that not only with their own “but also with a that the of living in a they and that is and … sometimes even (Klein 1995, Emerson's world, is with multiple and each (CW that we are not to there are new new (CW Watts with Emerson we say that and all of us might be called a symptom of the state of the universe as a part or of a of Cavell has set on Emerson's to of language and to and the … by and and (CW Emerson the of the knowledge the practice of and and personal Emerson's sense that truth is the of that what is for you in is for all is is in a in of all from to Emerson to be (CW that has to a monistic of self and any to an objectivity that experience and possibility. have long that with cultivate as a by which “the mind … be experienced as a of or (Klein 1995, The as and use of and mindfulness to deeply into the of a chosen and it with the that science that experience of … has a of and “is but that it to “the reality of our a that is to but with the Emerson “I I is the of to mind to its or and to be of mind as or We our in of is not nor is it separate from It is also and (Klein 1995, is an in and ideas as they and to into of that of and difference between an and thinking it is but notes it is the difference between practice and Emerson that no of for “life is not or but (CW our in the interest of a objectivity our of reality as well as our for It also our into and objectivity as a that his for an relation with the universe and with The wisdom is to Emerson and a about to conceptual of reality the of with for is its own for (CW is The difference between our own for and thinking of or for our is and do I … (1993, Emerson also experience and the of the insights it is but the of own (CW in Emerson's view to as a state of and as a to cultivate its of and with and than to from reality in the name of creative is on our of what is the not on a Nature, that “we have … yet a approach to an of Emerson that … be its own and be “the most (CW creative must be and and and the for is “to new and creativity to to Emerson his on creativity from nature, a (CW and finds for his own as an (CW and for the of His own way in his to the (CW is to from any of and a new (CW just as way in to is to way to the world, is to create the world” (CW are All of all are (CW In truth they be otherwise “we are in in a just on the of and only to be by and (CW ethical creativity and self-expansion are in his deep to between self and others. Emerson what as “the urge to or otherwise his own and also the egotism” (CW 1:10) that would the of others. The … is a very of which does not by but by the and what it by the or of (CW be and what sees requires to the and living with is also a for for example, is as by “the of which with I must as is to As a and a the ethical about creative expansion that Emerson in or I what is to experience and with experience is and in creative power arises from his Eastern of self and as and of autonomous finds and in the experience of and (CW and “the of (CW that his and and is creative and … in to that the mind not be as a that filled but be experienced as an open something more take (Klein 1995, of that is for something (Klein 1995, is for creative In his of in life and in light of Eastern philosophy. His is to Emerson's creative sees as a to and it requires to to the … entails to what Watts calls “the actual (1980, who writes that are only of a new … by to the of (CW finds reception to creativity and that to we have to we have to in our own to our own “the use of … very Emerson's way of and the of to creative power and of to and from that of I be and to Emerson and is not a of novelty in the of of out of own Holding the mind to … (CW open to the truth as by an other, is not a to but is as to it as out of own In Emerson writes that has such by is I a of two The seen from seen from the of two in and our the approach and the of a the experience of which is not found in nor yet in but in from to the other, which must be to as as (CW well own and between and between self and (Klein 1995, is to the of (CW arises in between as and receptive to each other as not in to and For creativity is the of that America in It is not an of to be only when the work of the is the the the is not a for but of our because the of the light which we our and and into into into more Emerson's of as (CW is not just a calls for a as American not just in American In is as that the of those the creative and to to Emerson's calls for we (CW for to on our own … work with our own … our own (CW and for to be rather than Though in a and Emerson writes that “America is a in our its the and it not long for (CW he more finds America to a of its creative (CW and As Cavell writes, the promise of it drives you is that in the West, instead of difference we with and that “the of all this in our is the (1980, the a it is and all the way It the of the and all the but by the have a good would a to the does the not such an it is because the does not that the external is his own It (Watts 1980, Though the world” might to be part of the attention to the of what we otherwise take to be a of for All we have is The of on for a that our relation to the land from to an ethical that more the reality that and the and are of of The problem with a relation to the land is that we ourselves as the who … just what the and just what and who is and what and who is the is in his that he and this is his good would to the and with a creative of two born of an to the the American the out that more than Watts a passage from Emerson's to under do not about they are than or be than is the it with human of the which are on to a and they do not how to completely and (1980, Emerson the because is and it nature, in all (CW the Emerson's take a approach to on is in what we It is a to we and it in an to the Emerson do we (CW no way to (1993, on eye a a person to what is the and In that between what is and what is the of a and our and the of actual with and ideas with the of us would rather have than We are in our that we have our (Watts 1995, into for an of an a a our and to “to and in the (CW The of creative … is to and not to (CW is to that on all and into orbit” (CW Emerson's about a new America in the west, or are and to the to get, and in a by whatever too the our the more we in the that rather than that power the to take rather than that knowledge in separating ideas from rather than their and that creativity entails rather than In American Emerson writes that the of as they the when the is and the their to the which by their to our to the East the (CW but Eastern insights into ontological and a light for Emerson on of creativity and

Arthur T. Downey

Reviewed by: Fugitive Justice: Runaways, Rescuers, and Slavery on Trial, and: Fugitive Slave on Trial: The Anthony Burns Case and Abolitionist Outrage Arthur T. Downey (bio) Fugitive Justice: Runaways, Rescuers, and Slavery on Trial. By Steven Lubet. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010. Pp. 367. Cloth, $29.95.) Fugitive Slave on Trial: The Anthony Burns Case and Abolitionist Outrage. By Earl M. Maltz. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010. Pp. 174. Cloth, $34.95; paper, $17.95.) Four days after adopting its Ordinance of Secession, the same South Carolina Convention issued its Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union. The underlying principle was "the law of compact," according to which, if one party to a contract "fails to perform a material part of the agreement," the aggrieved party is released from its obligation. The "proof " that fourteen northern states failed to meet their obligations under Article IV of the Constitution—requiring the rendition of fugitive slaves—was laid out [End Page 90] in the declaration's longest section. Because of this failure regarding fugitive slaves, the compact was "deliberately broken" and South Carolina was released from its obligations. In his first inaugural, lawyer Lincoln destroyed South Carolina's "law of compact" argument—all the parties to the contract, he said, had to agree to its rescission. Then, he jumped headlong into the fugitive slave issue, about which, he acknowledged, there was "much controversy." He urged his northern listeners to abide by the fugitive slave law, rather than hope it might be found unconstitutional. Lincoln reminded the South that, if the sections separated, the North would no longer surrender fugitive slaves as it did, however imperfectly. There was much at stake in how the Fugitive Slave Act was interpreted, not only in southern statehouses and at the White House but in courtrooms throughout the North. The two works under review here bring new attention to the topic. Steven Lubet's Fugitive Justice is essential to exploring the issues surrounding the implementation of the Fugitive Slave Act. Of the 191 known proceedings under that act, the author selected three fugitive slave trials: the 1851 "Christiana slave riot" trial in Pennsylvania (the largest treason trial in U.S. history); the dramatic 1854 Boston trial of the escaped slave Anthony Burns; and, finally, the 1858-59 trials in Ohio of thirty-seven Oberlin rescuers of a Kentucky fugitive. Lubet, who directs the Bartlit Center for Trial Strategy at Northwestern University Law School, carefully traces the changing nature of defense counsels' strategy, as it evolved from an acceptance of the legitimacy of the Fugitive Slave Act (Christiana), to acceptance of resistance (Burns), to flat-out disobedience based on a "higher law" (Oberlin). The enactment of the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 influenced this change, for if the slave-owning South was no longer barred from westward expansion, why should abolitionists feel bound by the fugitive slave law that had been the key part of the Compromise of 1850? Along the way, Lubet explains how antebellum trial practice differs from today's, in that judges enjoyed great latitude in their jury charges, defendants were disqualified from testifying on their own behalf, and defense lawyers had no opportunity to obtain witness statements in advance. He puts the reader in the position of a juror, a prosecutor, a judge, and defense counsel, and succeeds in making the issues human and real. Readers might have found it useful had he included the text of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, and the author might have spent more time on the March 1859 case Ableman v. Booth, which exposed all the issues with fugitive slave rendition, but these are minor quibbles. [End Page 91] Earl M. Maltz focuses exclusively on the Boston trial of Anthony Burns in Fugitive Slave on Trial. The book is a departure for Maltz, a constitutional scholar at Rutgers Law School, and scholarly readers will miss the footnotes. The author brings his talents to bear in presenting the broad context of the Burns case. While he covers the same ground as Lubet, Maltz digs deeper into the fate of the federal commissioner...

Michael Javen Fortner

No abstract is available for this record.

Michael Javen Fortner

No abstract is available for this record.

Andrew S. Moore

In October 1976, political scientist Seymour Martin Lipset studied recent polls and predicted that “if present trends continue,” the upcoming presidential election would be the first “in which Catholics have not been considerably more supportive of the Democratic nominee than Protestants.” Just a few weeks earlier, former governor of Georgia Jimmy Carter had enjoyed a comfortable lead over Republican President Gerald Ford in national public opinion surveys. But several different polls now revealed that no longer was the case. Lipset blamed the “Catholic defection” from Democratic ranks that he believed had come, at least in part, because of Carter's perceived shift to the left on a variety of issues; he appeared to many voters to be more liberal than he had been during the primary campaign. In addition, Carter's “cultural and religious style,” combined with a media fixation on abortion and his relationship with Catholics, had undermined his support among the nation's largest Christian denomination.1 This came at an inopportune time for Democrats, whose identity and relationship to the nation's religious people were in flux. As William Prendergast has written about the post–civil rights period: “Lost to the Democratic Party were millions of Catholics who would have enlisted under its banner in earlier times. Most had not become Republicans. They were adrift in a state of independence awaiting a candidate, a cause, a party more congenial to their values than the party of their fathers had become by the dawn of the decade of the seventies.”2 There were those who believed that Carter could have been that candidate. It was not to be. In short, Carter had what observers at the time labeled a “Catholic problem.” As it turned out, he also had a Protestant problem, as he represented the ways that the Democratic Party coalition was unraveling along religious lines. Both Catholic and Protestant problems resulted from the convergence of several interrelated forces. First, the civil rights movement that peaked in the mid-1960s had drawn its moral energy from a particular religious vision for America. The black freedom struggle legitimated religious activism to achieve a desirable liberal political end.3 After much internal struggle, Catholics and many Protestants accepted that vision—at least rhetorically—and reaffirmed America's Christian heritage. Protestants had long marginalized Catholics and neglected their place in that heritage. Now, however, Catholics demanded acceptance on their own terms. Carter's Catholic problem, then, came at a time when the nation's largest Christian denomination believed that they had finally been embraced as part of the nation's Christian heritage. At the same time, however, other events of the 1960s accelerated trends toward secularization. For some people, Carter—the most openly devout presidential candidate since William Jennings Bryan—represented the possibility to reclaim a moral and religious vision for America and to encourage Protestant and Catholic cooperation to achieve that vision. He symbolized a postracial, more inclusive South, the antithesis of a nation that had become increasingly secular. His religious vision for the nation, however, and his ideas about the separation of church and state meant that his candidacy threatened the avenue through which Catholics had participated in public life since the nineteenth century. In a bit of historic irony, the nation's perceived secularization had roots in Carter's Southern Baptist theology and ideas about church and state and religious liberty. In a sense, of course, Carter's Catholic problem was not new. Catholics and Protestants had long viewed each other with at least suspicion, if not outright hostility. What was different now was that Catholics' position in public life had changed since the 1960s. For the first time, Catholics qua Catholics were part of the public debate. That is, in 1960, John F. Kennedy had been elected president only after assuring American Protestants that he could govern in a secular manner, that his being Catholic in effect would not matter.4 Now, however, the civil rights movement had changed the nation's political and religious landscape and created new opportunities for religion in public life. At its best, the civil rights movement reflected Catholic inclusion and they now expected to be a part of the new religious and political dialogue. Despite Catholic misgivings, the fact that Carter was a man of faith encouraged them that a shared religious vision for America could give them common ground. Carter's problem with Catholics—or their problem with him, to be more accurate—revolved around several issues. In one way or another, all the issues touched on Carter's stance on the separation of church and state. The potentially most explosive issue was abortion and where the candidate stood on the need for a Human Life Amendment to the Constitution. Second was the possibility of state support for parochial schools. Finally, Carter's being an outspoken and active Southern Baptist layman aroused general suspicion among the nation's voting Catholics. In the 1970s, these were interwoven, a complex web of issues that were difficult to separate from each other. Together they pointed to the paradox of Catholic involvement in politics. On the one hand, Catholics now expected to be taken seriously on their own terms in public life. On the other hand, they continued to suffer (at least in their own minds) marginalization. One unnamed Milwaukee, Wisconsin, priest summed up the problem succinctly. He wrote Congressman Clement J. Zablocki about the “very real danger that Catholics are being alienated by the seeming indifference of these Democratic Leaders to the problems of American Catholics.” His parishioners were no longer solidly Democratic and were skeptical of Carter. “They seem to think that [Carter] and the Party is [sic] not concerned about a deterioration of respect for life, eg. [sic] abortion, about the deterioration of the cities, about those constitutional aids to parochial education.” Indeed, “Mr. Carter seems to favor secularization of all education.” This priest recalled “the anti-Catholic attitudes of the Baptists in Bay View,” and his and his parishioners' allegiance to the Democratic Party was shaken.5 For him and others, abortion, the separation of church and state, and secularization of society all were of a piece. Sociologist, Catholic priest, and Carter supporter Andrew Greeley was one of the most public observers of Carter's Catholic problem. The worst part of it for Greeley was that the problem was one that Carter could have addressed and alleviated, with only a little effort. In fact, “it took a lot of effort on his part to get into trouble on a number of ‘Catholic’ issues.” On abortion, according to Greeley, Carter's personal position resembled that of Catholics. Carter should have simply said nothing; however, he, was “under pressure from feminist militants who wanted another symbolic victory over Catholics.” Feminists would not suddenly favor Ford over Carter, Greeley reasoned, but Catholics might.6 The 1976 Democratic plank amounted to two sentences in a lengthy document that covered the full range of issues expected to face a president—from taxes and health care to foreign policy. Democrats acknowledged “the religious and ethical nature of the concerns which many Americans have on the subject of abortion.” Nevertheless, a constitutional amendment was “undesirable.” Roe v. Wade should be allowed to stand.7 Blaming Carter for the platform was not entirely fair, since the platform did not meet all of the standard bearer's demands. To be sure, his would not have many Catholics His would have neglected to it would have simply to health care and with their own In to abortion, and former and first pointed to Catholic in the Baptist a that had since the 1960s but was perceived Carter and its for for Catholic about Carter's President Ford an to Catholic that the Carter to the Catholic to the of but to the and of by Catholics.” Carter should his personal to abortion and the fact that he had with Catholics, to his by the to the of on the Catholic John F. Kennedy for Catholics Protestants for their and it was time to the the of religious and Jimmy Carter as a a Southern and to as as a former candidate for the Carter that the problem was not the of or Greeley or Jimmy Indeed, it was and it would Carter on election Catholics were in and most of them were For they could not be or taken for For a to he Catholics to as a when they would be more to Catholics would not a way Americans would a with and on of the would they would for in a voting and give it to the The problem could be but not by with or of Catholic it first that Carter the nature of the problem and the to which Catholics the American and the Democratic the were two Democratic one of William Jennings and the other of The former is the was Catholic two had been at since the nineteenth but each to the party that did one The party of its roots to and was for most of the of American The with and was for most of the of as and of and As and other observers Catholics had been Democratic since the nineteenth century. At the same time, as a coalition of the Democratic Party Protestants as much of the liberal or Protestant to support for the time of Carter's however, that had to liberal Protestant support for and many of them their support to Democratic That liberal Protestant toward the Democrats to be the most of the political party in the of the to Carter could not the in his own party in the same way that he the and roots of the relationship and in the The the two Catholics and their of and the those Catholic “They were the most of people, as than his was Catholic of in the and political to were This parochial symbolic what the parochial if not that they were in to public that openly for the Protestant and for and all its and There were that Carter The first and problem was the 1976 Democratic Carter the with the support of and black with no active Catholic It was of to the of American Carter had Martin to on the platform at the But it was a not a Catholic to the for what be the first time in Carter's Democratic coalition be than and black Protestants a few In to a general it Catholics. What was that Catholics believed that Carter in to liberal on after the be to get was not a of Catholics. Indeed, in his of the problem, at they as of than with the political Nevertheless, the problem was more than one of perceived and It was real for many more for it had political Catholic revealed the of in the Democratic Party in the 1960s. As liberal and had taken of the party from and the of those Catholics. that by the 1960s Catholics had enjoyed opportunities that and movement up the In fact, were than the whose was the of during Nevertheless, they the of that and the and real of of and their the of by Greeley and that They marginalized and Greeley with that Martin a of the and to on the platform with Carter. of a of the an at left from a of anti-Catholic and Catholic of their place in the public Carter's acceptance the of a who have and had to for or to suffer from the public are or by their to For Greeley, that was a that “the fact that most of those who to Catholic are who are not Catholic but a for their that Carter people who were is, who had or This would be more than It would Carter who could problems and the candidate into and from of anti-Catholic The most of what could came with Carter's of the issue of to parochial the Catholic is its to What Carter did not seem to was that of church and state is an anti-Catholic It is to to parochial because it is the of all the and Protestant that to to to parochial and to their over To to would be political to parochial was one of two issues that as abortion other was that Carter could about a that would the first to in to with to be a to the of the This would parochial which were and to Catholics that Carter had their in they did not in Carter's not as as would have the had to Catholic One revealed the difficult position Carter was as he to these political with Democratic secular to his own personal That concerned the relationship church and state in It Carter's position as being one of a in the for the separation of church and state. a position reflected the “in that religious freedom be threatened by a from in the “the public to parochial The candidate continued to however, to to public schools. to religious at the of America's and it is also a the has Nevertheless, that a some to some from public could in the of that was to all and and of the they had as a public than a to The did an of “the of to freedom of at the same time, the public or to a After the is one way Americans achieve desirable the of and in 1976, the Carter a to the Catholic The Carter's a and for for to whose It that a parochial had a long and a and in the of What was at however, was “the of millions of and Americans to a religious for their This at the of America's and It is a not by Carter a on a Georgia that would give to and schools. In Carter that as be to that the freedom of and that parochial have in the in the Carter's in the separation of church and state was in his ideas about personal and should be from to his own and about moral issues on that to and moral to were the state should The American Protestant was that Catholics, who their allegiance to the in were not to their own is no that Carter shared the that threatened religious he did his about the of to the issue of This to the that was a Catholic As Catholic and political observers it threatened the political on the of the who had long up their In October 1976, a presidential among its President Gerald Ford of the Carter with by revealed abortion as according to a was no that those to the of the the more issue was the Democratic Party which a constitutional amendment Roe v. Carter's own position on abortion was He his personal to the but was to support to Roe v. long he had been to the is He the governor of Georgia after v. was in state and he had been governor for a of when it was with Roe v. the Carter's and that Carter to the in That is not in the but was a in that that to abortion What was Carter wrote the to a in by and an of and a of all of which for the need for of and The would be the of of In his Carter his in with him now the of each and to many they would to have and when they would to have them as an for and as an for and Carter was that it was now to these issues more it was the of each to what he or to the of to wanted into on a Carter's to in a problem for him in the but that after the appeared Carter's on abortion a bit and he his to This came in to in a public and to the of As a by the time he was a presidential candidate, Carter to a personal to abortion, but an to effort that would Roe v. He did the Carter as he would support a to national and that Carter had acknowledged that “under he would support a constitutional amendment on a Georgia state Despite the fact that of Carter's position on a constitutional amendment from in and appeared on to the that was to Catholic support for Carter over the only Catholic candidate in the After the Carter that the took his of and was in fact, a of his to a constitutional After he the he and his did to up his Catholic At the of on a in he with Catholic of of of the of Catholic John of John J. of and of were of the of the Catholic The Catholic were that Carter in his support of Roe v. but they were encouraged that he, according to a with not an effort to a constitutional to to Carter, he his own it that Catholics, or have a to an would to an At least one of people, Catholics for a that Carter was on the of his position on abortion in to Catholic on the Catholics for a had in a with Carter, a fact that to the was in of recent with the of Catholic Catholics for a was that Carter continued to a constitutional amendment and the to which most Catholic were to Indeed, the that that a of Catholics that abortion should be a a and in a of the in was At least one priest, his that the Carter and the Catholic would to President Ford and Catholic support for Jimmy The wrote in The was that on abortion threatened to the to a In fact, he the Democrats had long been more in with the of the church on issues than the stance of the Republicans. Both Democrats and Catholics are by a common for the of and the people of society and Catholics to the abortion issue to become a in the from Wisconsin, where the of Catholic believed that their own could be to the Carter campaign. The had for in wanted Democrats to a Catholic on life from abortion to to As to the life issues on the with if Life is the only one that the to would have a problem To that Carter could be to a constitutional “the Catholic and the political be to to a of the problem. Democratic Catholics are to a to In his that Carter should not his own position on abortion, which was as it and be in in the What was Carter should not be concerned about the in since the are more to than to lead Carter should that the movement at the and those have their own Carter should to and he did be all was that was the and who did not in to all that the or them to But abortion was to Catholics. It could not be as as to a of in fact, as out, the were in effort. in the revealed that abortion was the issue on which was of among The same could not be said for the nation's Indeed, if was on abortion it was that it was a Catholic issue that threatened to of religious liberty. In Protestant Catholics were to the separation church and state. This was the opinion of the of the Southern Baptist Christian Life was a of the of a in the in an effort to amendment that would have Roe v. The acknowledged among the nation's religious people about The issue for them was religious which “the freedom to abortion in of his or own and religious and in with Most Southern Baptists had the issue much in 1976, and Carter's position was with most of those who Nevertheless, as a political issue was After Roe v. Wade abortion a national voters who were their own of those Carter They that abortion would not most of Carter not to on the It was more that he his position and and former candidate for the Democratic presidential a Carter that is being up by the in the on abortion.” Nevertheless, Carter's position was the that fact, the what the Carter political should be. to Carter's was to to on the abortion than two left in the and with Ford that was of the has to be on to those Carter should the of the of to to to them only a of voters who were more concerned about Carter's to with the political Democratic William the of abortion as an issue that could In he a election when his him with the issue in the of their campaign. first Carter, not Carter's personal to abortion and to the as as his that should to encourage were general and become and a of voters in an effort to an few Carter and those for him on the on the the position on position should be as of political of about the of Carter should also Ford and personal about they would for abortion in their position no more than The to Carter's was to the The that Carter's Catholic problem did not him in In fact, he of the Catholic to along with of the Protestant That of the Catholic was considerably than the that had in it also was than Carter would in when he of the Catholic in he did little to his Catholic He did to the of to for This an among his and those who had him during the campaign. In a of Carter's in the of the the to the president for public the outspoken and addressed the president in a to be for and and over Carter's about for concerned among that Carter would position and support the of for when in the of the They also that Carter's to and and in a in an Carter's of that his position potentially of of the the an most these Carter the his would in he had much on state would have in his he that his was to during campaign. is more liberal than Despite pressure from his own Carter stood his that his own stance on the relationship church and state his in he to Southern Baptist and but with other In fact, the problem had the the of the polls that Carter to have the election all but he to a of with in an to up his The was that Carter's religious faith would lead him to a new state that would the of his In a on in the face of own however, Carter that he had on a lot of with have in many of was for a Southern Baptist Carter, and particular was a of on the But it came in the at the time for Carter. were by his of the and by the fact that his came the of a of and In a sense, Carter's to his and to to his was with his The support for separation of church and state was in the that and personal would This was most in an in which most people were with the of a that was at least in In the was not and Carter was not a But events of the 1960s had drawn the into the nation and the nation into the South, a that had to its by the Carter continued to that personal and but his to new religious revealed the to which position in national society had He a relationship with several of the Southern Baptist the Jimmy president of the from to As Carter encouraged the of a by the and Baptist to the for what appeared to be The of the Georgia Baptist The Christian his in a through the Carter's with Baptist in some The president should be for a with those religious the same as he would be with that the to the into the and to of and for the President to which become in and Southern Baptists to some Carter's of what Baptists that John F. Kennedy would have he their at in during the campaign. to for other Georgia Baptist In his to Carter by the personal and The as his and he with during his Carter had from but a As governor of Georgia and as president of the Carter had and to religious of all in the separation of church and state and would not to in at Carter's of a was from where Baptists believed their primary Nevertheless, Carter and he to be in the be that Baptists have no to be concerned about Carter's relationship with other religious the that expected from the in his Carter an effort to to religious then, however, it was In fact, his own denomination in The that of the denomination that with Carter on the nature of religious and the of the in a particular moral vision on the The new of the denomination was more concerned with they believed that Carter's of religious had encouraged the nation's secularization. This the for abortion to become a political issue for Southern Baptists in the and for them and Catholics to a shared religious vision of America that had in the of the civil rights Carter's had drawn into the political if Carter turned not to be their candidate. Carter had to from to his faith for political not an active a vision that to Carter's Southern As a most Southern Baptists their way into the Republican Carter's ideas about religious and about the separation of church and state. in the they the need to abortion as a moral and religious issue than a Catholic It an issue in the nation's religious heritage. One Baptist the to abortion a Catholic issue was a which the of the millions of who are not changed and in the a of Southern Baptists for Life acknowledged that Southern Baptists have the to to the of They to and they with over the the Christian Life should abortion in the They that but only after in Most Catholics and came to on Nevertheless, many Catholics continued to however, they now did the of a party that Carter's on the of religious The among many observers was that the Democrats had become the secular the one to religious In fact, Carter's position would be the one by Catholic Democratic in the a position that them at with of the

Amy Dru Stanley

In the fateful year before peace came at Appomattox—as slaves pursued their exodus from bondage and the Civil War dragged on—a counterpoint arose between two antislavery decrees under debate in the United States Congress. That counterpoint illuminates conceptions of universal human rights forged at an epic moment in the downfall of New World slavery. One decree became the Thirteenth Amendment; all but forgotten is the other, a congressional act to “encourage Enlistments” in the Union Army. The amendment provided for abolishing slavery everywhere in the United States and its territories. The enlistment measure freed soldiers' wives and children owned by masters in the loyal border states exempt from the 1863 Emancipation Proclamation. As destroying slavery became inseparable from vanquishing the South, bondsmen refused to go to war unless, in exchange, they won their families' freedom as well as their own. “It is a burning shame to this country,” affirmed congressional abolitionists, “to hold the wives and the children in slavery of men who are periling their lives before the rebel legions.” A month before the war's end, on the very day of Abraham Lincoln's second inaugural, March 4, 1865, the measure took effect. As the Thirteenth Amendment awaited ratification and as the president spoke of malice toward none, upwards of 50,000 slave wives and children went free.1 In a world in flux, where constitutional change flowed from the tides of war, the abolition of slavery fused with freedom endowed by marriage, thereby tethering a new birth of human rights to enduring domestic bonds. That counterpoint casts new light on the making of abolition—a problem of enduring historical and constitutional significance. It reveals not simply how Congress asserted its sovereignty to nullify chattel relations and secure human rights, but also what counted as slavery and freedom as the advance of the Union Army overthrew old ways of life. Simply put, it manifests what abolition was meant to overturn and to create. For both the Thirteenth Amendment and the enlistment measure were acts of abolition. Both split asunder the relation of master and slave, destroying constitutionally protected property in human beings without compensating owners. Both turned chattel into free persons. Arising together amid the crisis of the Civil War, they belonged to a tradition of declaring rights and invalidating unjust forms of sovereignty that had emerged throughout the Atlantic world in the Age of Revolution, a tradition that wedded emancipation to marriage bonds among ex-slaves—from Haiti to Jamaica to the American South to Brazil.2 Their juxtaposition, however, has never been systematically studied; indeed, the enlistment measure barely appears in landmark scholarship on abolition or constitutional transformation.3 Overshadowed by the antislavery amendment, the wartime of freedom has the for a from the of to the of 1865, Congress the decrees month as never before that the Atlantic the rights of The abolition amendment was a and of the enlistment measure was an act of abolition—a on slave marriage bonds. it an of congressional the domestic of the slave loyal masters of the wives and children of bondsmen turned Union the for the emancipation on slave not in a to the of the the measure what slavery the of chattel to and a In the amendment and the measure the of abolishing slavery as a domestic by property in human for in the of the slavery and marriage to together as relations of domestic the master of a to the and of both and in and the in the of the the of all the of chattel bondage to In Thirteenth Amendment not what abolition but what freedom as to as slavery. the counterpoint between the abolition decrees is the of an amendment in in It to light a the of in for abolition but their from Thirteenth Amendment the of the antislavery by the of human rights by chattel slavery. under the abolition amendment, slavery has to a of and the of slavery in abolition never in Thirteenth Amendment It is as and the of Congress had never universal emancipation by of In the of the Thirteenth Amendment illuminates a of the American human rights of rights in the of Congress to in of the and as slavery by the a of landmark and of and the Thirteenth Amendment has never been a of rights the of to the in under the Congress in the slave but never to the of slavery or the domestic slave has to hold is at Amendment of and it is the that the Congress has in from and to of and rights, as the not to or are not as human rights but from exchange, by congressional constitutional from that the of the emerged not with slave emancipation but from it the of antislavery to where the Thirteenth Amendment as a of universal human The of that rights to abolition and to the counterpoint between the Thirteenth Amendment and the enlistment In that counterpoint a of the of slavery and freedom at the moment of abolition and the of and sovereignty to that on both the of the of slavery abolition and a rights tradition with the of the of the two abolition decrees reveals that the of the Thirteenth Amendment in the slave where the master both and to new into the Thirteenth its and its to its The is to as to advance antislavery and of human rights at the or the second is a what the but what meant by on the as they the to slavery and affirmed freedom as to The is what the of slavery had to with the Thirteenth and what the Thirteenth Amendment had to with antislavery of human the of the of the of the chattel relations by the a all the the freedom that a owned by a loyal master to in a of As the abolition amendment and enlistment measure in president It is to to go to on the are and what to for this or as as and The Congress as the debate abolition of human beings with freedom and the to slavery as a constitutional amendment or by a act as the of chattel slavery and the of Congress to that the enlistment measure abolition by For both decrees Lincoln's that slave property to masters loyal to the Union by the Civil debate on the amendment, as in the of Congress the of slave wives and it is to this of slavery and a at the of A year as Union a “It is for the and that of with and abolishing the slavery by the and and the two abolition decrees and in the in amendment to the the enlistment measure from on and the a year they were both of In Congress the the enlistment measure into the war dragged on and the states with the The counterpoint between was to all in Congress. it is a measure to “It is a very and It simply for the and the of the with its It of constitutional with all that the slave property of loyal the of the the freed soldiers' owned by rebel the Emancipation rebel and the of the as a for for the The was to the amendment and the measure in two to end, As the is to slavery it for a constitutional amendment but how it to that both of to it to its by the of the of the men the measure as to but not that it is for the of to the United the are that the amendment not by the and are to all and in to to this in advance of the Thirteenth Amendment or as a the at slave wives and children owned by masters loyal to the property by the the bonds of marriage between the enlistment measure slavery. the amendment was universal in its by all in Congress that the amendment and meant to free slave wives and it was all the that the on the amendment, on came to on its for but all The the of the Thirteenth but to light the of constitutional abolition and the rights at of two for the amendment before the were the by the and from the of slavery as a for the been the United or to their Congress to this by were the by who on of the of are before the that hold as a and the Congress to all and to this into everywhere in the United was the amendment had in was for the of the enlistment in the on the of the to the 1865, and of A in the constitutional of slavery was that the amendment spoke amendment spoke persons. The amendment the everywhere and slavery in the amendment a of universal human rights, all as the not it provided a for for a moment to to the rights of and in the of Both of the abolition amendment universal the the of the by that of freedom to as of human rights is in of a as was of and Congress that as as a new and into it to in the is at won by emancipation of the has been to the As by amendment the before the that was a the was to all as by free or by before the by a of to the of it was was the the as the American not from the not with historical of who had in the amendment, that to but not to all to or and go to the old by For the of chattel slavery. the Thirteenth Amendment not universal the freedom of all not For a in the of arose the that the abolition amendment been the of a that of all as free and before the also of in the Civil and the in the of the the rights arose to to the was or the relation between men and is to the or before the in a the of all men before the a to a a as free as a A to and as free as before the the was meant to the amendment, not in the who is slavery not to in its a of the who that very day had amendment to a in the by that the marriage from the of relations as in and and been for a abolition. a freedom went as the the amendment, not the and the of a universal of human a before it was to the of the in that had to marriage with bondage in from of constitutional abolition by human rights that the on the of slavery was but It was the enlistment measure that to the of the freedom by the debate on the Thirteenth both to the Union Army and to at the slave Congress on the and masters in the loyal states in slave and children and their the from slave property as it never the as for Congress to the For that an antislavery of property in human beings and as the for the new of in congressional abolition turned on of war, marriage, and the the for Union Congress the of the enlistment it constitutional abolition as a war to the of human bondage to the property rights by the the measure both the Emancipation and the it rebel or loyal masters for the of their it property rights in as well as in human and to the measure to the to its It was a debate at as as that the Thirteenth and it went on indeed, the for the had been in it a of from to of but were to at it the in of or of in Union and freedom to as well as and in a that spoke in universal of into making war for the United States and simply that and children were as of or marriage was or was not or by the Congress the for their the of slave marriage, the of and the of of the counterpoint between the measure and the in March The of the congressional and the constitutional at as the debate into the was not human rights the and the the of Congress to war a slaves in loyal on slave marriage bonds at the turned Union and not how and to in and and to bondage that the and it that by the constitutional to of the slave master and to human a and rights by the and of Congress It has been and that the is the Congress has the to the and the is in that spoke of war, and congressional spoke of and constitutional both on and was Congress the to loyal masters of slave to what of the on Congress the to a that Congress has the to the that it has to the That was the to also a tradition to of a at war for In for the of arose the of as the Civil War was for the not for the the tradition had never the to slave and In making constitutional with the of of Union and with an to on of congressional abolition. of both and of from of the rights of with spoke war and The in its that secure the of the and in its and spoke of and to its to an but also in and the of to the emancipation to as as to the and the this from the of the and to an in freedom on slave marriage, the of Congress on both and It was an that the of the with for the Thirteenth was in the for a at this moment is master of the of slavery everywhere in the United without constitutional It it all of to this of congressional the between slave and the between master and slave, the of the abolition an was with of the for Amendment property rights were the antislavery of and property and its for without to the wartime of the constitutional that amendment has been the enlistment measure as slavery as as and as as all the that in the Congress to the to rights of were bondsmen to for the border states had of to the were slave wives and children of as they not into the war for the the measure as well as the of in the a is the of the is to slave of their it is to the it is to it is to the and to slave It was and In the to loyal masters as with a of property rights and with a to the of chattel slavery. to the of and in for slave wives and a of emancipation by the of the had been by abolition in the of and slave the measure to at as well as slave property by all an in in or making or by or by of for the the of the to this they are and for to their spoke of abolitionists, also spoke of toward slaves protected by masters the of As slavery affirmed its a of abolition with a of that freedom was to a of and the Union for slave wives and children free by Congress. the relation between the and children and their not without As spoke of to a and of both the that a and the that the is Congress to the and the the is the to a in the of in the the antislavery of the enlistment measure in abolition before the day of the Thirteenth but the was that the measure as As act to the of its as in a and the rights constitutional and As in this the of loyal masters to slave wives and children to the of the of war, and the bonds of slave marriage as for Congress to abolition. In the of the enlistment amid the of the South and the Congress turned to the and the of slavery and It was not that simply as a to the of the Thirteenth Amendment in of human rights free it was the very of the of the debate abolition. by as well as by the of Union Army Congress to for the Thirteenth Amendment or with the enlistment measure or the the of abolition the slave but also of and a of slave antislavery Congress came to the of slavery. under the enlistment freedom in bonds of marriage that the bonds of as as under the as were a of as a slave as a freed was to rights simply by of the antislavery on the enlistment as the men in Congress. it the of the of the it as and as and that the was slavery by antislavery The as that had the on the both antislavery and was the of the slave to both a loyal master and a the In was the of a turned as slaves had marriage rights by was the Union for in light of the counterpoint between the abolition free a measure with constitutional of for the not and but also men of and men the the debate became a on the of slavery. the of the war and the the of rights, and the of property in to from slave wives and the on their was a slave That was the to and to For the measure on the that the bonds of slave marriage were as to the bonds of chattel slavery. is the of a the antislavery of as the in as was March to the that men a the and the and the As of this and it very to who has a or how wives to the of the slave was for it not the between and but also the of of as well as the of the slave as into the of that was marriage relation in between chattel had rights of on in for slave to as has a the for the of the is to in or where has a and to the of the the enlistment measure simply took slave marriage for border however, who to in a was a in the of slaves were and but chattel to are to a in has a in and that the to with to is not marriage was a of Congress “to as marriage that is not marriage, the of a of slave all freedom by the and to it by the the are at very in a that but an is to the to abolitionists, the the of the not how slave marriage bonds free a from the bonds of slavery. As the of the measure was its of freedom not the of a slave is the of a the war freed the of and but not as a that the relation of and is not with and this relation is of as a measure of who the of the that the measure for the to with new of slave marriage, or a year of the measure that slaves or or enlistment day counted as of marriage, with children to freedom the marriage had the of the Thirteenth is this to the in is a who was not a of a The was freedom by slave marriage bonds that the of both and The was that and it was and or the of a slave this who the Thirteenth affirmed that slave marriage and as and a to the of the slave who the slave to and the to to human not property to not to their marriage the of the slave as was the of how the slave was and under the were not in the a slave without how loyal a the who had the abolition amendment but congressional abolition had to by the the slave of a loyal and for the of the slave and the with a new in March that loyal masters to by and came to debate the with Congress on the of a slave as the of of this chattel in the or or a or a the and they it to the war's the in slave not it very to for the master that by the In a slave at this in the of also a slave very on the slave as on a antislavery were in the loyal slave and for a of freedom the Union the the slave for of simply it for the Union to into the to slaves the is a antislavery men of as of in or at is to are a in the of the was that to the slave however, Congress that the of a slave was For it the of property in human for abolitionists, who it to the both property in and the in they antislavery to not this to the of of to the are in the of the United States in the that to for property for it is that the that slaves are property and by the Congress of the United that the a by a was from the enlistment an act that a slave counted as property under the for a Congress from a loyal master and to a what was the in and The was that had That the not for the Thirteenth all the of the enlistment the of slave marriage by the of with abolition the Congress the counterpoint between the measure and the It was a between antislavery and that had emerged with in the and in wartime with the of Congress free the slave or for an abolition in as was to its March to the in Congress to their the the enlistment measure a to the act the of this by and by and that the the to to the of the and the of the that on the of the and the in the new the amendment had been in both of were and the was to act at all on the enlistment that amendment slavery is throughout the United a this measure the the or for of a slave from the to the and of That free the slave the amendment slavery Congress for a was not simply by but also by the who that the enlistment measure was but in the amendment in they to the and as to who A year with the amendment in the had that this constitutional amendment and this not the to not to free slave in the were to the of to free human where to the hold by of a to freedom to for the counterpoint between the measure and the amendment old between abolition and to the It to to a of the antislavery to the Civil War as an a between and human As Congress abolition or for the amendment that a and the antislavery in the of both and The the of a constitutional amendment the of the to the of the who for their for in the of the not that the men who the the of the by the as it is change it in a constitutional had the on the Thirteenth the of the was for congressional abolition. It was the of the slave that this by the The of abolition by on at the loyal In the of a slave and and refused that not to for the Thirteenth of the of Congress. as never in the a to of before all to a had in in the of was all to a was all to was and the who had been a Union that had of and as the the slave freedom to of their loyal masters were the wives and children of making of their and and it as for their into Army. this by with a year that Congress was the slave was all of to from and on the came that was of the for slave were on a in the border were in in with and all of that the soldiers' wives and are and by wives were or to were from slave wives to at As by was by a master to of was and and and of to and as the loyal the to to their by slave wives and but to for For a the of slaves and and in the congressional debate abolition. was the from of the country,” a a to in how is not to and children to a that were to the enlistment measure that their was by the of the The crisis was by the of a and slave who was a from a and this was and It a from to the the but the emancipation of for the of to the an provided at from the the of the slave for congressional from the border states to the Congress on the of slavery. to free the slave that slaves between loyal masters and and were freedom on marriage with the of antislavery in their that the the a on the as well as to for the Thirteenth Amendment that a what of men to act and and slave wives and the amendment, an from the to a slave to and however, they the of by to and wives and children or a the For a antislavery throughout the Atlantic world had been with of in Congress. and slave all the of the of and marriage all the the the of a the of to and as of of the Atlantic slave to the of antislavery as crisis into In the the and that as a free in the that debate on had of slavery is that it the marriage the of the debate on the Thirteenth it was for to in by of that the of the is the of and who in the of The of the not simply slave emancipation but also of freedom as an The of the universal of human as the of chattel relations of and to is it is to the of the American at its in the of the to the of from the of its from the or of the slave the of freedom as for its the American the for and and this that but on a The and the a That is was an by the slave bondsmen to their had all slaves wives from and before In the of are in and the of a who simply to a slave it to the relation of master and in the of the that it a of slavery. to the old with in with all of and and the from an of the American for and of The enlistment measure to the of also its For the American not the of Congress to slavery its slave states in to the that the and the sovereignty of to on the of the slavery that under the has to with of the slave into the loyal border the enlistment measure that antislavery the Thirteenth the measure a of in the measure the of For in freedom on marriage it congressional to antislavery that the very bonds property in and a free of an The by abolition was has a to the antislavery the slave is not the but the to with the from property into a abolition also of slave marriage bonds and the of the slave As the an antislavery that a slave to slave who but never to the of as the the rights, chattel slavery became the for A free was chattel a that is the slave turned the slave from loyal master to a Union antislavery as well as the of marriage as a to freedom but of slavery. The of the was the sovereignty that the slave the of of as The the among free or the sovereignty as the of In it was the that to in the loyal slave in the bonds of slavery marriage the the slave freedom but the to an freedom to a of the relation between the Union and the had the of slavery in the and affirmed marriage the enlistment measure slave marriage the very of American abolition. spoke of to the slave but to and of to the for the to as a but to the as a for for the a of go to a and to to the of that the moment is turned and children to Simply the of from the of the the that the debate the Thirteenth at slavery marriage, by of their as property relations of the thereby slaves and wives into For the marriage bonds as the very of abolition. the enlistment spoke of the rights of but without rights to slave of antislavery men that of slave wives beings and was the of Congress to and the of Union to the toward their wives and children that men as as and where is the who in the Army of the United States and and children to the the and of a and of In the the antislavery belonged to who the enlistment measure in the it belonged to the who the abolition of in slave for the as by not the slave freedom was simply of under the to the and of to that a of and is to men who are all for and for the of this For a Congress the slave what was and to how and to for the Thirteenth the of to never For all the of and the of not to a of rights of the to a of but as a not master of in 1865, as the enlistment measure Congress. the Thirteenth Amendment had been by the states in the and slavery had been by

William J. Novak

The American present is at odds with representations of the American past. The American present witnesses the steady aggrandizement of executive, administrative, emergency, penal, military, and war powers as contemporary commentators such as Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, and Giorgio Agamben contemplate the contours of American hegemony and superpower in a new era of empire.1 The global impact of present American politics, political economy, and foreign policy is obvious to any casual observer of current affairs. The story of the American past, on the other hand, continues to be told in narratives that seem to be heading off somewhere else. In place of the growth of power, the history that America most frequently tells itself highlights a story of relative powerlessness—a usually benign tale of legal-political self-abnegation, emphasizing constitutional restraints such as federalism, checks and balances, the separation of powers, limited government, the rule of law, and laissez-faire. When presented more positively, American history is usually framed as a quest for freedom—the struggle for political liberty, emancipation from bondage, the rise of civil, economic, and social rights. Property, contract, and freedom of speech, press, and association form the constitutional backbone of a free market, a vigorous civil society, and a democratic polity—hallmarks of a free people. Oddly, key elements of this tale are kept alive in both older political histories of the liberal tradition in America and newer histories highlighting the rights and agency of particular cultural communities. Coming to terms with the historical rise of the mechanisms of legal, political, economic, corporate, and technological power that currently shape so much of the globe is thus a more difficult task than it should be. A true philosophical and political history of the American present continues to elude historians.2 This disjunction between historical perception and political reality is not an entirely new phenomenon in the United States. As early as 1887, in a penetrating essay titled “The American State and the American Man,” Albert Shaw chided Americans for their laissez-faire fantasy: “The average American has an unequaled capacity for the entertainment of legal fictions and kindred delusions. He lives in one world of theory and in another world of practice … Never for a moment relinquishing their theory [of laissez-faire], the people of the United States have assiduously pursued and cherished a practical policy utterly inconsistent with that theory, and have not perceived the discrepancy.” Surveying thousands of regulatory laws passed by state legislatures in the late nineteenth century, Shaw concluded that “the one common and striking characteristic of this huge collection of new statutes is its utter disregard of the laissez-faire principle … They deal with the citizen in every conceivable relation. They seem to have left nothing for future Legislatures to regulate.” One hundred years later, in the middle of Ronald Reagan's America, Senator Ernest “Fritz” Hollings (D-SC) similarly observed the powerful role of government in the construction of modern life and its renunciation in the American historical self-conception. Seeking the 1984 Democratic nomination for president, Hollings delivered a stump speech deploying several different versions of a story about “a guy who came home from the Korean War, went to college on a form of the GI Bill, opened a business with a Small Business Administration loan, made sure his parents' farm was adequately wired through Rural Electrification and irrigated with assistance from the Army Corps of Engineers, saw his kids get subsidized school lunches at a school that received lab equipment from a National Science Foundation grant, got his mortgage from the FHA and hurricane disaster relief from FEMA, and one day, took AMTRAK to Washington to complain to his congressman about getting big government off people's backs.” Like many Americans, “the guy” never saw the role of collective power in the creation of his individual declaration of independence.3 Shaw and Hollings reveal a disconnect at the heart of the American experience—a tension between the story that Americans themselves like to tell themselves about individualism, self-reliance, voluntarism, associationalism, free labor, and the free market and the actual history of the “concrete national institutions,” as Shaw put it, that have been capable of wielding such broad interventionist, coercive, and regulatory power at home as well as abroad. Samuel Huntington once dubbed this yawning gap between facts and norms “cognitive dissonance”—an almost pathological tendency to confuse a fictional American ideal with historical political reality. From Thomas Jefferson's elision of slavery in the Declaration of Independence to Ronald Reagan's anachronistic invocation of John Winthrop's shining “city upon a hill,” examples are obvious and legion and not always merely rhetorical. At the turn of the last century, Roscoe Pound surveyed the damage done when the United States Supreme Court took a “long step into the past” and imposed the fallacy of “liberty of contract” on modern industrial labor relations, as if the parties were still individual “farmers haggling over the sale of a horse.” As Pound's example suggests, the problem is one not so much of psychology as of political economy. Shaw and Hollings foreground a particular American version of the tension at the center of social and political thought—the between and power, freedom and and and and A of this American the power, and of the American much of modern history with the of powerful and the of their and of the American state one of the more in in a different and a The “the American is as of an in a of and When at the American version of a state is as not to the that modern and tendency to the American state its history as continues to a with American power in the The and of this historical of the American The of the American state is to the history of American the is to American constitutional and laissez-faire is to American political economy. Like the of and the of a American state is the of a tendency to American history as the history of the of a the historical and of is of the of America as a place of American from a state of As John with almost in the the was The the of individualism, civil society, free labor, and a free in American it the more historical and role of collective law, government, and in American In this the state itself is as of a that never a place in a and The of a American state in and on individualism, associationalism, and to the power of the state in many of democratic and have his American state was in “the government of the United States is to get by it from its of it the of the tradition of in the American state not on perceived to be an from the United States was a at “The of the of this State is not and and the for a not for a State and a a of has the of the late nineteenth and were of commentators to the to is in the United in an American political a characteristic the for the of the of the American state was the the heart of In the of with American to between American and the a of on an national historical American in liberty, voluntarism, and a market, the role of the state in social and In political such as to a a and national that as the of a for over individual over collective and and over and state this the history of the American state its and almost and regulatory in the of national cultural of was the American it was a the of an to new for the of the of and free the most to the of the of the American state is the to this has been by with and an social in the and the state to the of American by historical such as and political such as the of the American state The tendency to the American state as of a to of a continues the of of American political As American has not been by it has on a new new form has a of that the as to and American state power with and for another and The modern American state is still as and the of historical and by social in the of the 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powerful in world that American history of the construction of American state power from the of the to the past. for has the history of the American the creation of a that “the true of the American was not to to more power, to and an entirely new power was a state in the United it have been the of government in a most of has similarly the of a powerful and national to the of the the historical that a national and regulatory the of the John has almost of the of government in the nineteenth through his of the role of the state in the and of from the to the and has government power at the center of the new history of and and As the of a of social and cultural and and of and were not the of laissez-faire a to on the powers of the state a for people The of the state is over The powerful role of the American state in labor has been the of a of on “the state and the has on the role of in the creation of a national in the United States. power was present in the social from such as to more in 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social one should not to a historical of liberal and legal elements with “The liberal state has always been as as the political and social and the of has and with the of it has its with the of it has and its with the of the it has and … has upon and law, upon and This of the American liberal both and law, and and new of historical In a of a of historical and political to the of “the of social theory and their in about the social and political of and the almost of American social theory and is more when of modern state The problem historical of the American state is the tendency to American into a the of modern more than a In the ideal of and are of modern a and legal and to a of business with to an of the power to rule and and the its and the to and the as by the and have the of modern from this to be as of to the of the the In the from the American state is almost to for state is an of state a of at the American state than from other of the and of American government to other that for the power of the American of more for the American The historical in this of and the American in the of new to the of an American of state are a of the of a to the problem of a of the of in American a of the power of the American rule of and a of the as was a when it made to the and of and as of state and the of political In the early century, such the world and the future to be by social different from the of the early and state than a of the political by and of and the and social of the century, the state of social theory more like a of the than a of the the to and have and when to their and American that and not well the a of have the of the United in the the of to be and the of the and the of the when about a state as about the of the of people At the an of the of should the state usually into a of the of The Michael a with his between different of state power and power, to the capacity of state to rule by other of power by civil power, in to the capacity of the state to civil and 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the of a American as legal and legal have been for American has as more than a constitutional on state has been an and of political and power, a than role in the creation of the modern American has been the of such a and of power, that in place of a of to power should be as “the of upon histories the of in state from the of contract, and to market in the nineteenth century, to the of the power and and regulatory in the One to for the rise of a modern state in the United States in and and labor and and and and the of and laws and American state power is a of legal of and The of as state be into a of state through law, and other legal the power of the American state such as John and have been as an of American state is to be as another American for state through of the most policy in American and and the Americans with on as a of the and relative of such should the that law, and are of state the such examples the power of to a citizen into civil and the to the the of the When to this to its of have an of American state power and The a in an American of state the The to American state power the of civil is in the in it and the This the American state has the to The of through law, the and and is one The of the powers of to the of a national through the of powers such as to and is of the American and the American to a role in social and and collective into the than power, and policy in the of a the American state and powers through the its its and its in the the history of government and other of power to the is well the other of the role of the American state in the creation of the From the role of state in the of and to the role of in the of the the market, and cultural the powers of the state were to the and of American civil As observed about the market, history that the of national was in the of the and emancipation of the from the the market has been the of a and on the of social and cultural have been a about the construction of and The most of American power have always to the problem a the people the the state the the and to American state the of and of and in to this is the that American power has been a of and not as for of the of the American the American the American the American the the the American the American the the and the National The power at the of is of the of and in the United States. emphasizing the of the legal-political and the the the of in more and power, and and The of such a is by the of American such as and The of was on the of rights contract, and the market to to the of In a of and the role of and the state in and and rights. the of the hand, the state in the legal-political of the In the and the of and power that “the of as power and He of that the ideal of has never in been In through of the powers and He that the the role of the state in the that so much of the of and power in American on the of and power in the actual of the American state has it to the of state the to of the power over the of the to the of such of As and the of in the United States be as the of market that market was itself the of and political are difficult to from the of by the of contract, and in and politics, the the of to the of power in a democratic When are about the as well as the as well as be more As be as to that the of never be by as it be to that the of political power never be In his essay the of on the role of fictions and in the of power, as well as more to who with a philosophical the with the many are by the and the with their and to of their When by this is as is always on the of the the have nothing to From the of to to the of a government of laws than national and historical of and have kept the of from into the and of modern The of the American state is such a of both and In an era by both and state theory, the story of an and version of that state in the United States was the in politics, and global the last the of the American state as is should be The aggrandizement of power the American and historical as as well as new of and of state theory the of not be the for the new of power that in global political economy. is an In the early century, a of and and American social of at power in its economic, political, and to by of American that with and the and of American power is From and John to and John to and early American a of a and of American and the and of power in a United States. the problem of power in America as and not as it the of state and civil than the of the of the on of power in in the and that American than the of power to the of political theory the political of social a more of as is to are political and legal never the of and the that from American political the of the of legal and political They never the that state so at the of his and the that legal and political place a of and The of American state power are In a democratic should always be on the of the the history of that power has never been more

Jessica M. Lepler

Reviewed by: Slave Agriculture and Financial Markets: The Bank of the United States in Mississippi, 1831–1852 Jessica Lepler (bio) Slave Agriculture and Financial Markets: The Bank of the United States in Mississippi, 1831–1852. By Richard Holcombe Kilbourne, Jr. (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2006. Pp. 202. Cloth, $99.00.) In Slave Agriculture and Financial Markets: The Bank of the United States in Mississippi, 1831–1852, Richard Holcombe Kilbourne, Jr., aims to rekindle interest in the "bank war" of the 1830s. Once the fodder of arguments between giants like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Bray Hammond, the story of the demise of the Second Bank of the United States (BUS) starred in the narrative of antebellum America until the new social history removed the spotlight from powerful, dead, white men like President Andrew Jackson and BUS President Nicholas Biddle. Although many historians lost interest in the bank war after the 1960s, economic historians performed econometrical analyses of the available statistics to locate the financial cause of one of the worst depressions Americans had ever experienced. In 1969, Peter Temin's The Jacksonian Economy (New York, 1969) supplied quantitative evidence of macroeconomic forces stretching from England to China that replaced the contest between Whig and Democratic fiscal policy as the explanation for America's hard [End Page 134] times. Written almost four decades later, Kilbourne's monograph is an attempt to refute Temin's theory and return to an interpretation of the bank war that relies on American domestic fiscal policy. Despite the mention of slavery in the title, Slave Agriculture and Financial Markets does not try to spark new interest in the bank war by linking recent social, political, and cultural studies of the early-nineteenth-century market revolution with quantitative economic history. Rather, this is a purely financial and legal history of an ignored sector of the 1830s economy that makes some astounding discoveries and specialized historiographical arguments. Whereas previous economic historians have examined Jacksonian era banking from the perspective of either the federally chartered BUS or the decentralized state-chartered banks, Kilbourne scrutinizes the intersection between national and state institutions by focusing on the Natchez branch of the BUS before, during, and after the expiration of the federal charter. Employing the surprisingly complete financial records of this institution and other Mississippi banks in conjunction with familiar documents relating to the Philadelphia-based BUS, Kilbourne has crafted a case study of the rise and fall of the Natchez branch of the BUS. Each of Kilbourne's four chapters targets a different historiographical literature on the bank war. In the first chapter, he dismisses studies that blame the financial crisis on inflated bank paper by analyzing the competition among Mississippi banks for the more lucrative trade in commercial paper. He shows that in the early 1830s, the BUS opened branches in Natchez and elsewhere to control local banks and profit from the intra-national circulation of commercial bills of exchange and other financial instruments. Kilbourne finds that during these prosperous years, the investments of the branches of the BUS supplied the central bank with the majority of its profits. After Andrew Jackson's refusal to renew the BUS's charter, the financial flow from periphery to center reversed direction. As Kilbourne argues in his next section, after 1836, the branches drained Biddle's Philadelphia institution of its liquidity and, eventually, forced banks throughout the United States to suspend specie payments. Kilbourne blames the Panic of 1837 and the subsequent depression on the events following the expiration of the BUS's federal charter and its recharter in Pennsylvania. Although Kilbourne argues for domestic causation, his sources document strong connections between financiers in Mississippi and London that reaffirm Temin's international thesis. Thus, Kilbourne's reconsideration of the financial causes of the Panic of 1837 [End Page 135] should inspire new scholarship that synthesizes national and global perspectives. Switching from the terms of finance to the letter of the law (subjects that explain but do not excuse jargon-laden chapters), Kilbourne next considers the BUS's attempts to recover losses in Mississippi through both state and federal court systems. Countering a historiography that posits that commercial law responded to economic development, he finds that...

Gina Vega, Patrick Primeaux

The Congregation of the Blessed Virgin Mary (CBVM), a Catholic order founded in the early 1800s, was faced with a series of strategic concerns, including an aging clerical population, a changing laity, reduced finances, very limited vocations, and an evolving mission. Some of these concerns faced the Catholic Church in America as a whole (including sexual abuse, not discussed in this case) and several of these issues were also facing the Catholic Church worldwide. The serious matters facing them were threatening the continued viability of the order in America, and the guidance they were receiving from Rome - instruction to decide which of three suggested models for restructuring they would adopt - seemed to back them into a corner, requiring selection from among several strategies not devised by their membership and commitment to the selected strategy going forward. Change was necessary, but one of the major concerns of the order was that it remain consistent with its stated mission while adapting to a new environment and “operating system.” Their decisions were driven by Rome, but the decisions were not made by Rome; the CBVM was as autonomous in its decision-making as any decentralized international organization.

Andreas Büsch

“Front-loading” primaries and caucuses - the movement of state delegate selection contests to the beginning of the nomination calendar - is problematic for the integrity of the presidential nominating system. Because it results from decentralized decision making by self-interested states, front-loading also poses a problem for federalism. Indeed, most proposed remedies for front-loading would impinge on federalism in some manner. In analyzing those remedies, one must assess their interaction with federalism both procedurally and substantively. For example, a federally imposed national primary would be harmful to federalism on both dimensions; regional primaries negotiated among states would be best for federalism procedurally but are of dubious efficacy; the national parties have an ambiguous relationship to federalism; and a change in federal campaign finance rules would seek to combine a centralized process with a decentralized result. The best solution might be to use available central levers to try to change campaign dynamics and thus the incentives for states to schedule their primaries early.

James Epstein

V. S. Naipaul's bookA Way in the World (1994) is perhaps most strikingly about obsession—about historical figures obsessed by an idea: dreams of new worlds, the fulfillment of large schemes, and the universal failure of such visions. In his long chapter “In the Gulf of Desolation: An Unwritten Story,” Naipaul imagines the wasted year that the Venezuelan revolutionary Francisco Miranda spent on the island of Trinidad in 1806, marooned after an abortive insurrection across the gulf on the mainland. Nine years before Miranda's arrival in Port of Spain, Trinidad was part of the Spanish empire, but now it is British. The island is dominated by plantations: “no place for a metropolitan man like Miranda,” writes Naipaul.1 And yet his work turns on the often hidden or forgotten exchanges between metropolitan spaces of empire and subjugated spaces of colonization. At Port of Spain, Miranda is met by General Thomas Hislop, the British governor. “Hislop is a man of jangled nerves,” Naipaul tells readers. And for good reason. The brutal repression of incipient slave revolt—“the hangings and the mutilations”—has raised legal questions back in London. Much of the chapter centers on imagined conversations between Miranda and Hislop. Hislop is deeply troubled by uncertainties, by the shaky foundations of Britain's Trinidad regime and his responsibility for actions, inhumane and possibly illegal, taken to maintain order. Most particularly, he is anxious about the investigation of General Thomas Picton, the island's first British governor, and by Picton's conviction in the court of King's Bench. “Strange,” Hislop observes, “that all the bigger charges of hanging and theft should have been thrown out, and this case of petty theft should have brought Picton down. Signing the order that the very respectable magistrate brought him for the torture of the young mulatto girl.”2 In fact, this glancing reference to an anonymous “young mulatto girl” marks a return, a reworking of themes and characters that Naipaul introduced twenty-five years earlier in The Loss of El Dorado: A History (1969). As he notes, his earlier book “is made up of two forgotten stories,” two moments when his native Trinidad “was touched by ‘history’” or was brought within European historical consciousness.3 The first story marks the final chapter in the search for El Dorado with Sir Walter Raleigh's return to Trinidad in 1617; the second is that of Louisa Calderon, the young mulatto girl whose torture brought Governor Picton to trial and whose case became a cause célèbre. Calderon now appears at the fringes of British history, given a walk-on part in histories of Trinidad.4 Picton is generally remembered not as a colonial governor but for his role in the Peninsular Campaign and as the highest-ranking officer killed at the Battle of Waterloo; his portrait hangs in the National Portrait Gallery, and his heroic death is commemorated by a statue erected in St. Paul's Cathedral.5 In his Nobel Prize lecture for 2001, Naipaul describes growing up without a sense of his own family's historical past: “All children, I suppose, come into the world like that, not knowing who they are. But for the French child, say, that knowledge is waiting. That knowledge will be all around them … In Trinidad, bright boy though I was, I was surrounded by areas of darkness.” Those “areas of darkness … became my subjects,” writes Naipaul, and that darkness sent him “to the documents in the British Museum and elsewhere, to get the true feel of the history of the colony.”6 The “postcolonial” moment has been one of recovery, as well as one for redrawing boundaries and identities. The blurring of cultural and spatial boundaries has led historians, as well as novelists and other writers, to rethink our own work, sending us back to the archives to get “the true feel,” or at least a new sense, of history. As Antoinette Burton explains, “the imperial turn” “is not a turn toward empire so as a return to the between and and the and the of the on to the case of Picton and the cause of Calderon, with new historical questions and of us who work on British have Picton's case legal that an of In my own A Way in the World and it to a to the to the trial the and the the But as historians, our or the documents after the of the and with other and to the story deeply on And Britain's historical is of the of that history, the by Picton's trial In or British about empire, it is on the of empire as a in empire in on the of colonial to the between a of and the of colonial As cause but one in the long and history of colonial one of The and us of the of empire and of the of exchanges between and this the of British in the and metropolitan about the of that by Picton's trial for Louisa Calderon colonial for a the of as observes, metropolitan was on of colonial the of often the between and and the of on was to The Picton's most the of cultural of and that the and of of to be the of and to and The of was The dominated British an of all British in this that the was an and of and not the the of British and French they the most A of in in all the British and of and a was by and the French of with of of and as the Trinidad was of a The island's and the of very with who French the of of and the island to a Spanish Trinidad became an and the slave to was a large of of who The British Trinidad in but after the of was it to the British Trinidad and it the of with the Spanish British in the and French Trinidad a for the of In the of the General Picton in of Trinidad with a he was governor in and to the of Picton and his within the of a thrown into by and the of the the the of or legal to in a by British his of Picton was by a with long that the of the in the of the him or of Picton this to it in of his was the he was brought to after the of on 1806, Picton's case before and a in the court of King's Bench. Picton was for a the to be Calderon, a in The case first before King's two years in but been sent on to Port of for the case has a the trial was a of a one in a legal The case the as it of death brought a to for or the In Picton been taken into in order to charges before the case was the charges of and was brought to King's for other that Picton was of and of the and of the by Picton around the that Calderon was Most at least for the was the that he without a young of and a of the case in on to when Picton was all charges and his of Picton's case was, in fact, part of a the of British colonial in the A colonial the In the of Picton as governor of Trinidad and him with a by with Picton as second and as and Picton of colonial and Picton was a of his own in and to a In this he was of with British for for and the who was to in to the as an of of imperial responsibility been at an earlier moment of imperial he as a the as an of and a of Picton was a who his at was a of the his at he as to the British in at he and as a of the of and he on in and in The between Picton and and a with a of in that documents at into The of the and to the imperial us to King's the of the the court was to have been a of the to after The trial was for Picton was brought to court on the the trial as the for him to the of the case to As in the the case Picton was of the most to our and has for a of Picton was he was the of the case was by the role of a for his who led the The was brought and by the the the case raised questions about Spanish or British the British of And Spanish was the legal and the case questions about of and the of colonial was the case by his that Picton, in his role as of our and governor of one of our colonial and to his … has the to he was been by the of the of that after the British Spanish to be but to the to his Picton's of British introduced the of Louisa At the of or been by “to with him as his to the court that such to us in this … yet in that the of is it is for them to at the of at that they or into a of with Calderon “was in an with one to him to of a of and Calderon taken into to in the and at the of the or Picton the the torture was first brought to the of and two or who to the on a of and a British governor for the first torture into a British as a for and and as a of a this Calderon in at the was The of torture was The was by one to a other was to and was by of a a the of on The for to by to this was that but was of a that the torture not be for an Calderon but was up but not to the was The the torture was for Louisa Calderon on the The of Governor Picton for the on Louisa Calderon was a British but that it be a the to the torture on Calderon by the the should be “that it be by the most by it be and be as a to such the of British and history. on the of the of was Picton's that it was to have the of the of this new a conviction of the they of the they the and of British to that of to of a to to the of Picton's to the now around was the In a the that was and was that of a and that was in with a on in the of the was and two one for Spanish and one for “the the of the was to in or to with that was to the years in this and the of was that not who taken “the was to his the at who the and who the and two to an of by in the so was by the to the with to and the in … in with the and his the of the that it was an to that he his have him to “the of the of the at the to of this before the it to be with the of the the that that should be made by the Calderon the court that on the was to to in and and a was in in a between for without a to be before arrival and his of the inhumane At the of the marks of torture in the of or on two Port of Spain, or and to British the to the of of torture and the of the by that the case was not and but of the to Picton and the at In Picton's the the between and the was a whose been “the of by and the a and in a to that of Louisa was as as a in the of and in a of with in a with the court that to the and of this have met on the … a a to a of this … the is to and the is by an The not in Picton introduced the to to the to and two years to the to torture he that Picton to the order after all other been As it was that Spanish was to be British Picton's case on that Spanish and that in this he without the between and well that two of be the of our and that of the the that a who for years on the island of St. to and was taken into on charges brought by a who in court and with his and his and that his been by the as for his a was him to be for his that of the been not and the of his that a of death been a man for his a and man who this But when the to the in St. that a slave who a was to the death the an is the of Spain, but the of an and was in that a to his at At was the Spanish as it was to be in a British court was to Spanish legal the island as a of that it a for of and other Picton was “no a man of he been with order colonial As for the of torture to the of inhumane and of this The of on Calderon was as in of and the this of is for the of the of the is it who and in the and for the of was for of of Spanish the was a The was to the of Spanish to torture in the to the that Picton's torture been in A for the was was to a of as it became that he about Spanish he his to Spanish without the of a The was by who was in A in who the Spanish he that he of that The case to a the Spanish torture in the that the that Picton with As in his Picton should have not be a but was an and governor of a British who should have or him in this his for the to as to who by the of the British have and will the in the of has the of his his to for his before a court of The a of but this was the of the for a new A case that with torture in that first in King's in when it was sent on to Port of and that to King's in 1806, was two years in a it torture to be legal in Trinidad at the of the island to and Picton not to have been by Calderon of the of the as on British But the case to come to as legal on the the of In the court the the case was Picton was on the the him this of cause was Louisa At one Picton's case and the his regime in Trinidad of within a a for colonial at other the case the of a between metropolitan and colonial of between of and cause with of British own this of was legal was to be the of a British The case raised British was in to other European as well as to of the world for colonial such with Picton's torture of it about in the of a British governor the Spanish brought torture to of the of Picton's was that the and Trinidad, Trinidad to In order to of Picton's the of torture and to the death that and have in for the In was or about was a to British of to Picton's actions, the of the of Britain's own and the St. of the man with his and as a colonial British slave generally of or The trial of the of of British in the Louisa was not a but was a of to been into In to this Picton and his by of Calderon as an of Picton that a been made to the of the in of a of the and most who with a or introduced into the of “to his and him of his between two was around the of a of to the of colonial In the role of or of became a of of the of the In the in Trinidad and the of a of torture to the British of the of colonial the of or was to a for As a into own in the but as a of a long one to colonial to of as with the of of and the of the was the in Louisa to the the of the imagined of and was perhaps to the As has the of torture is In at trial and the of trial the to the of the of Louisa and when the of the torture of torture and by to the the was given the was As Louisa to the The of and to Picton's In fact, of the to the was the most of the it is to the about the of given that and British legal The that own the was in the that was by a that the in was and in a for the that in have been by the of the in and of King's Bench. Picton to in to in the and in the as “the Governor of the case to the the by the of the and the The most of the the that in The this a of in of that it not be the and the of this the this trial is to be of Picton's that he his own to the British into in order to the by the in of the of Louisa that and the and of the part of the the and and has been to such and by the of the and the of torture the been in in and in all at to and in the the and with the the on his was so so so so of all to and that he have to and taken a lecture him to to the of his and of and us to the In the of Picton and his a be about as well as for cause was of of to the to this was was with the of with the by the of by the as and As the “was not so a and as an of themes and be taken and in or The of as the of the and the first of the a for the by the of and that be to the and of The of as on on new of and a of Louisa and story in and between and often with between the and the the it was a or story was by of to and trial to the of the was the was not to be and in when the was to a of it with a of the most the As to and Louisa appears in in of the torture appears The Picton Picton the of the the of the is a of very about years of and was in The was it to the of on the first of The the is as the of a is in the of this man … was of a the of a and As the governor of a Spanish island by Spanish Picton into the of the so in The was an a of was The of Port of Spain, with and on a of darkness and to a place by an in Trinidad and the of Picton's to the first him to the of Picton's within a of he to the about “the of that In a of and was on first a of was taken the so that on and in order to to was so young at the that not the is but by years was for without trial on Picton's with of work to The colonial was by Louisa Calderon other figures in a of with slave of and the of by was and for like the for of was the and the part of the charges brought Picton to of was by the of the to with the of on large “the of was before the and as a was and … the into the it the when the in the of the and a it to of it was on the a was one of the or so who on Picton's the the of to be the least of Picton's so on the brutal of a colonial regime of to a of metropolitan the of the and the was to the of the of the … The as the of repression in slave by of out, with As of and of “to a “the to into the of such not be but to metropolitan as well as colonial At the of the in a of to the in this with the And as the of and with the in “the of The was In the case of Louisa Calderon, was a with and case on a with the of colonial As have European on be without reference to a As a mulatto Louisa was a of for mulatto a of and they often in European as by and to work, and to the of British the of not the of European but “the of and for and slave and of about boundaries of the in the of on for European and Calderon an imagined between and was a of but was an of for to be taken into as his In metropolitan of Picton's trial with of torture in order to The of one of the by is of as it Calderon with in the to to in the the torture and the around the of the the is and a of of revolutionary The on of the to the perhaps on of of a for of a the of an that became part of the In the of is the as they be by But the slave is is a of on a a to the Louisa torture of Thomas Picton … Governor of the of Trinidad for Louisa Calderon by of The of the torture of a of a the of by of The The of story was that it brought the of the colonial to the between and in of and by the of colonial in such they an the on the of own into a by it at a the by the for to the and to the with to be about as it was him that cause touched on that of as a man of and on the fringes of metropolitan in the of such as he his own he at a young to the of the before at the slave he to have arrival at Port of in with A he Picton him of as a in not long for to get into at Port of Spain, cause with British for Picton him and the book in Trinidad, his return to was the most of Picton's As a of Picton's he the of a The the book as an given that the of the French of of and the the a for for as the of imperial and the a of for a such as that the by the to the and In a of other on the he the first was to a his he for in the for a in … this of his in all … the of all he is at into the of the of not Picton was of Picton brought and to Picton up with a mulatto his he to and “to Picton the for the and the this to all the in the to the of … Those who or on his became the of his of to of of and the British of the British Thomas the of on the island “is by the or of a of the has to Picton across an it was not for a colonial to a of as his or to such a was was in the in about the of and of the of as was a the of the of his was a to back the on to to the court of was an of The of figures to was a man on the he was a after his own he been to Picton's with Calderon as a of he was at Picton's trial to he have as a or at least as a British the of The of of the trial Louisa Calderon as of the of or in the of of colonial British British to the the in the of the the the slave the of The of Governor Picton General The and The is not As was in a British who not in to be as In the of the of questions with in the colonial slave in and for in in the British raised the of for in and questions about the legal and to such in Trinidad, part of the to British and an colonial about the of of and to be with revolutionary who colonial And about the an of to and to slave and other British troubled by in the as and the of in of the of as and by a of come within the of a in cultural history toward he As with work in this one the of historical it is not by of this but that and cultural As the story of torture the colonial the trial and it up cultural in of and The was to as well as to The story not in of but and it and on colonial and Calderon the of of as the case Picton the of colonial of and brought to be metropolitan The the metropolitan to colonial and the historical in a between it us to it to the as a an as of a of across made and the Britain's imperial and and about of the of imperial and the of colonial The of empire as a the of by to as the the of colonial to of to the of of the on and the as a of In fact, in the and brought before by in an to a of and to Picton's But the the place at they of and to the governor to the the of colonial in the of one the of colonial an of and the of imperial In Trinidad, Picton's as a to General Hislop, his whose regime Britain's to the a or to British legal and to The characters Picton's was in when the governor to the at of good Picton for the Peninsular Campaign on the of Miranda's the Calderon case At the Picton was an to a in part of the of the in that for the case Picton, in his to in a that the of his in the Picton a of As for Picton's him the of the of the between and and he became deeply in the most as for the of who was of before his death in A and a to the of And about Louisa is like to about at the in a Trinidad, in a my when I was that, with with his a the and about with them in they as the who was the of Picton's that the was introduced by to in be to that his young has a of by an to all his In before King's at Picton's new The St. to be and in knowledge of with and a in the that be a to return to be the as the in the of the of the in Port of as given in to an this be the of the to by A in History of Trinidad, in that Louisa Calderon of in on to Louisa As a colonial was the of became an of metropolitan and as well as in and a young of and as an within the boundaries to a of Most the world of cultural a of and perhaps Naipaul has that he one a to the the other the world that one In Louisa the of the our to or to story to a sense of that has to turn the historical to the in an to the of

Celeste-Marie Bernier

Material proofs or Imaginary Property? Complex intellectual, historical and cultural relationships have always existed between the experimentation with rhetoric and the spectacle of the slave body in abolitionist literature. This article debates the challenges the eighteenth and nineteenth century writers offered to the widespread representation of the slave body within mainstream North American, British and Caribbean abolitionist discourse. The commitment of writers such as Robert Wedderburn, Phillis Wheatley, David Walker and Jupiter Hammon to experimental language and subject-matter testifies to the existence of a radical literary tradition much earlier than the popularly examined mid-nineteenth century authors, including Frederick Douglass and Harriet Jacobs. These earlier figures were intent, not only upon extending the permissible boundaries of abolitionist representation, but also in staking a claim for the politically liberating potential of the literary imagination in a fight for the right to aesthetic experimentation.

Lenore T. Ealy, Steven D. Ealy

Progressivism and Philanthropy Lenore T. Ealy (bio) and Steven D. Ealy (bio) Toward the end of the nineteenth century America faced unfamiliar circumstances that seemed to make its traditional social institutions obsolete and threatened the hope for social stability. Steady immigration swelled the ranks and diversity of the urban poor, and headlong industrialization radically changed the ways in which people worked and lived. The growing complexity of social and economic affairs contributed to a widespread belief that a new social and political order must be created. The response of many social critics and scholars, today known broadly as "Progressives," was to forge an approach to social and institutional change rooted in evolutionary philosophy, enamored with scientific objectivism, and often infused with German ideological statism. Traditional Anglo-American common sense and the rule of common law were increasingly suspect as the new "social sciences" emerged with hopes of rationalizing social control. In the decades that followed, most American institutions were organized or re-organized according to the Progressive prescription. The flow of social responsibility was away from more primary, local, and voluntary institutions to those more centralized, professionalized, and tax-supported. This transformation was financed in part by the fledgling philanthropic foundations of Carnegie, Rockefeller, Sage and others who subscribed to some version of the new corporate liberalism. The hierarchical, corporate organization of business entities created a work force with middle-class means and proletarian status, and many of the society's major responsibilities were newly assumed by remote national organizations or assigned to some level of government. By mid-century, in the wake of the New Deal, America's institutions and practices of mutual aid were widely displaced by specialized professionals. Those in need of assistance became clients or "cases." Today, at the turn of another century, new circumstances are rendering the Progressive prescriptions largely obsolete. American society is outgrowing the institutions the Progressives designed for it. The practical virtue and utility of classical liberal principles have triumphed over the ideologies of socialism and statism. Government administration has been shown to suffer from and to reinforce significant knowledge problems. The electronic revolution has suggested and enabled a more horizontal corporate organization in which more and more working people are self-managed. In short, the centralizing thrust of the 20th century seems to be giving way to a decentralizing tendency in the 21st. The purpose of this paper is to foster better understanding of the origins and rationale of the Progressive "old order" and of its continuing impact on American philanthropy. Drawing upon dozens of readings from Progressive-era journals and popular magazines, we seek to uncover the intellectual foundations of Progressivism and to identify its strengths and vulnerabilities. Part of our exploration is also intended to understand how we might best articulate a new rationale for philanthropic enterprises that are today working to return social responsibility to local communities and to support the emergence of new forms of mutual aid and voluntary action. A more robust understanding of the promise of decentralized voluntary action is needed to facilitate the reclamation of responsibility from the outdated, bureaucratic institutions born in the Progressive era. Philanthropists who are today glimpsing the opening of new paths for human action and who wish to encourage the present transformations must understand the challenges in proceeding. A better understanding of the "old order" as well as the entrenchment of contemporary institutions in Progressive assumptions can help promote more effective action in the present. Only when we understand the old assumptions and their compelling hold on the present can we begin fruitfully to challenge these assumptions with a new vision for the future. I. What's Wrong With Charity? A hallmark of the Progressive movement was its effort to reform politics and government administration, to reclaim them from the corrupt patronage system of the party bosses and to apply new, more professional means to accomplishing the ends of government. In the name of reform the Progressives viewed the legitimate ends of the national government as more expansive and substantive than in previous eras. Ever present in the minds of many reformers was the fear of popular revolution, and "the labor question" was of central importance. In the years...

George R. Esenwein

The outbreak of civil war in July 1936 did more than just divide the country into two mutually opposing camps: it dramatically and permanently reshaped the whole of Spain’s political landscape. On the Republican side, the rebellion produced a crisis of authority that led directly to the near-collapse of national and local government institutions. Above all, these events produced a significant realignment of political power on the left. The first and most significant casualties of this crisis were the middle-class Republican factions. The inability of either Martínez Barrio or José Giral to form a viable administration in the immediate aftermath of the uprising demonstrated beyond a doubt that the liberal politicians of the prewar Republic were in no position to play a leadership role. The fracturing of the Republic’s political framework instead produced a new constellation of forces. One source of power radiated from the far-left organizations which had responded to the breakdown of traditional authority by launching a sweeping revolutionary movement. As we have seen, their control over a variety of economic and social institutions as well as over their own militias enabled them to rise to a commanding position in the Republican camp. The separatist Republican parties in Catalonia and portions of the Basque country also sought to fill the vacuum created by the dissolution of central government institutions by pressing hard to achieve their longstanding claims for greater regional autonomy. At least for a brief period, the creation of semi-autonomous regional governments within the boundaries of the wartime Republic represented yet another hub of power in the anti-Nationalist zone. The moderate socialists of the PSOE and Communists of the PCE constituted a third Republican force that vied for power during the war. Though they were divided over a number of fundamental ideological issues, these two factions were united over their opposition to the revolution as well as to the decentralizing efforts of the regionalists. Both groups also shared a common belief that the war against the Nationalists would not be won unless political and military unity prevailed on the Republican side. From 1937 on, an alliance between these two groups became the core of the ‘Popular Front’ coalition that ruled the Republic until the end of the war.

William E. Thro

In America free public education is a constitutional value. Yet, although free public education for all is a constitutional value, America's public schools remain ravaged by savage inequalities, many of which are the direct result of significant financial disparities. Given the obvious conflict between the constitutional value of free public education for all and the funding parities created by the States' school finance systems, it is not surprising that the courts have been asked to intervene and vindicate the constitutional value of free public education for all by declaring that the current system of financing the schools is unconstitutional. However, a judicial solution to the problem has proved as elusive as a legislative or executive solution. Paradoxically, a major reason for the States' failure to adequately finance the achievement - the constitutional value of quality education for all - is the existence of other constitutional values. In other words, there are values within the American constitutional system that make it extremely difficult to achieve another constitutional value. This article explains how two American constitutional values - judicial restraint and decentralization - work together to prevent adequate funding of another constitutional value - a quality education for all.

Konstantin Sonin, Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)

In a federal state, political leaders of constituent units might protect their enterprises from the federal center (e.g., allowing them not to pay federal taxes). The effectiveness of such protection depends crucially on the ability of local authorities to extract rents from enterprises. They can easily do so, if there are a small number of enterprises with large employment, and local monopolies can be effectively sustained. They cannot do it so easily if regional industry is competitive, political opposition is strong, and the federal center has enough means to enforce payment of taxes. We build a simple model to argue that it is the industrial structure of constituent units that determines political relations between them and the federal centre. The theory is supported by the recent experience of Russia, China, and Argentina.

Paul Frymer, Albert Yoon

Almost fifty years ago, Herbert Wechsler famously argued that congressional legislation requiring individual states to fulfill federal mandates should be given great deference by the Supreme Court because state interests were better by the legislative process.' All federal laws, Wechsler noted, had to gain the approval of the Senate, which by design represents states rather than individuals; the House, which is composed of districts drawn by state legislators; and the President, who is elected by the Electoral College, an institution also designed to protect in part the interests of states. Because the Constitution ensured that state interests were represented in the two elected branches of the federal government, Wechsler argued, it obviated the need for the Court to subject congressional legislation to judicial review on behalf of the states. In 1980, Jesse Choper extended Wechsler's emphasizing the importance of congressional committees and party leadership in the Senate and House of Representatives, as well as the emergence of state lobbies that formed in the nation's capital to combat federal power during the Great Society.2 Five years later, a majority of the Supreme Court adopted this line of argument, which has come to be called the safeguards thesis, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: Me are convinced that the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the as is one of process rather than result. Any substantive restraint on the exercise of the Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible IMAGE FORMULA4 failings in the national political process rather than dictate a sacred province of state autonomy.'3 In recent years, however, the Court has largely abandoned the political safeguards thesis,4 aggressively overturning federal legislation on the grounds that it infringes upon the constitutional interests of individual states.' The Court has argued that Congress and other national political institutions have not-and perhaps cannot-protect the interests of states, particularly state officials. There is, the Court has claimed, a fundamental conflict between national and state institutions: to avert blame for the difficult choices they face, congressional members attempt to accomplish national goals while deflecting the responsibility of policy enforcement, implementation, and financing onto the states through the passage of unfunded mandates.6 Many law professors agree with the Court, arguing that Congress cannot be trusted with the representation of state actors and that there is little legal precedent for providing the national legislative branches with the opportunity to tread on state government terrain in the absence of IMAGE FORMULA7 judicial review.7 Even one of Wechsler's sympathizers, Mark Tushnet, has recently written, It seems fair to say that no one today believes that Wechsler's arguments retain much force.118 Through recent decisions, the Court has made emphatically clear that it believes it more effectively protects and advances state interests than does Congress or other national political institutions? In the face of these Court decisions and supporting legal scholarship, Larry Kramer has attempted to revive the Wechsler but with a twist.10 States are by the legislative process, claims Krameralthough not by constitutionally created institutions like the Senate or the Electoral College. Instead, he argues, the party system has protected the states by making national officials politically dependent upon state and local party organizations. Kramer asserts that because American parties are highly decentralized and responsive to voter interests, they do an excellent job of channeling the concerns of state and local voters and officials into national party platforms and agendas. …

David F. Labaree

We have increasingly held the view that education is a private good, which should serve the individual interests of educational consumers, rather than a public good, which should serve the broader public interest in producing competent citizens and productive workers, Mr. Labaree points out. And the last thing we think we need is a standards effort that equalizes educational achievement. THE MATTER OF setting standards for American education is certainly quite visible these days, but much of what we hear about it is not very enlightening. The talk is frequently filled with ideological heat rather than with critical light, and the tone of the discussion is more often nostalgic than realistic. In addition, the pitch in favor of standards is currently so strong that it may well leave a number of listeners wondering why such an obviously needed and beneficial reform wasn't undertaken a long time ago. But the fact is that the effort to establish educational standards has always been an uphill fight in this country. In light of these circumstances, it is useful to examine why Americans have so vigorously resisted educational standards over the years. The history of such resistance suggests that there are three factors in particular that have made standards such a hard sell: a commitment to local control of schools, a commitment to expansion of educational opportunity, and a commitment to form over substance in the way we think about educational accomplishment. All three of these factors, which I treat below, can be traced in large part to our preference for one particular purpose of education: we have increasingly held the view that education is a private good, which should serve the individual interests of educational consumers, rather than a public good, which should serve the broader public interest in producing competent citizens and productive workers. Preserving Local Control First, consider our traditional commitment to preserving local control. The core issue here is the wide and deep strain of libertarian sentiment that lies at the heart of the American psyche. The urge to preserve individual liberty is a key to understanding American society, and it is what defines our distinctive approach to politics, economics, and education. Don't tell me what to do? has long been our national slogan. By it we have meant in particular that government should keep off our backs - especially government that is far removed from our local community. All you need to do is remember that this nation was born of an uprising against a colonial government that tried to impose modest taxes on it from afar. In education, this sentiment came to be expressed as a staunch defense of local control of our schools. During most of the 19th century, the local school was the primary unit of educational governance for most Americans. An individual community built a school, hired a teacher, raised money through local taxes and fees, and implemented education on its own terms. Outside help was neither offered nor welcomed. This was the ultimate in local control. Even in large cities, control of education tended to rest at the ward level. Consider some numbers that suggest the radical degree of decentralization that has long characterized American education. It was not until 1937 that we started recording information about the number of individual school systems in the country. In that year, which was some 40 years after the start of a massive effort by reformers to consolidate districts into larger administrative units, there were about 120,000 individual school districts in the U.S. This meant that on average there were only two schools per district. Now, that is really local control. Even now, after consolidation has continued for another 60 years, we still have about 15,000 separate school districts - each with primary control over financing, staffing, and setting curriculum standards for our schools. …

Lex Renda

Richard P. McCormick and The Second American Party System Lex Renda (bio) In his American history survey lectures at Rutgers University, Richard P. McCormick often placed politicians at the center of history while irreverently poking fun at their inability to control long-term events. On the one hand, he argued that partisanship in the Jacksonian era originated in the contest for the presidency and politicians’ manipulation of the electoral system, not in doctrinal disputes or social cleavages. On the other hand, politicians were at the mercy of fate. Neither the Whigs’ issueless, hoopla-dominated campaigns, replete with military hero candidates and absent of party platforms, nor the Democrats’ “Jacksonian Strategy” of laissez-faire government could withstand the sectional tensions that eventually sundered the parties as well as American society as a whole. The incredulity of Whigs toward one delegate at their 1840 national convention who daringly proposed a platform, the explosion on the U.S.S. Princeton, which took the life of John Tyler’s secretary of state and permitted his replacement, John C. Calhoun, to breach the hitherto stifled Texas annexation issue, the insulting rant of Michigan’s Charles Stuart at the 1860 Democratic convention, which precipitated the bolt of southern delegates and the subsequent break-up of the Democratic party — all figured prominently in McCormick’s humorous anecdotes about antebellum politics. Leaders created events, yet when structural changes and transcendent sectional animosities are factored in, their influence appears enigmatic, akin to that of the broker in a stock market that ultimately crashes. This role is most visible in McCormick’s The Second American Party System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era (1966), 1 a book which remains equally enigmatic in its seminal importance and ambiguous legacy. McCormick received his graduate training at the University of Pennsylvania under the tutelage of Roy F. Nichols, the preeminent “politician’s political historian” of his day. Nichols’s account of the disruption of the Democratic party in the late 1850s provided an organizational interpretation of political history that challenged the “irrepressible conflict” school of Civil [End Page 378] War causation. 2 Although McCormick would implicitly reject Civil War revisionism, Nichols’s assumptions about the impact of politicians, especially their ability to exploit voter impulses, would permeate The Second American Party System. Nichols fostered in McCormick an enduring appreciation of the autonomous nature of political parties and the propensity of politicians to act with personal goals in mind. The genesis of McCormick’s interest in the development of the second party system lay in his own earlier study of voting patterns in New Jersey, as well as in his reading of Maurice Duverger’s comparative analysis of the world’s party systems. 3 Duverger concluded that the American political system deviated markedly from every model. American political parties were, in essence, electoral machines — institutions more adept at electing candidates than in articulating convictions, educating voters, or fulfilling policy goals. For McCormick, the proximate cause of American exceptionalism in this regard was structural. The decentralized system of government and the various constitutional provisions which by design frustrated majority rule ensured the creation of parties more capable of winning elections than of governing. Americans’ persistent ambivalence toward both, power and the legitimacy of political parties, undergirded these structural impediments. Of all the party systems in American history, the second was most clearly an electoral machine system, McCormick implied, for not only did its component parties abdicate their responsibility to govern, but they had to exist in defiance of the most divisive issue in American history: black slavery. 4 The complexity of the federal system of politics led McCormick to write The Second Party System in an unconventional manner. His account of political development was based on neither national nor local events exclusively. Instead, he traced party development in every state which entered the Union prior to 1824, excluding only South Carolina, where no state-wide elections were held before the Civil War. This comparative approach allowed McCormick to ask the same analytic questions and to deduce with reasonable accuracy the timing of party formation everywhere. 5 Indeed, the timing of party development was McCormick’s principal concern, and that too distinguished his book from others...

Mark E. Steiner

Abraham Lincoln, as most antebellum lawyers, believed that lawyers should serve as peacemakers. His slander cases show that he often took advantage of opportunities for mediation and compromise. Lincoln was able to resolve many cases by repairing the damage to the plaintiffs' reputation. In several cases, the defendant attested to the good reputation of the slandered plaintiff, which settled the case. In some cases, the defendant consented to a large judgment, which the plaintiff then agreed to reduce to a much smaller sum. In others, the plaintiff, after a jury had awarded damages, agreed to remit most or all of the award. Lincoln acted as a peacemaker and showed sensitivity to what was actually at stake in those cases.Antebellum lawyers celebrated the 'sober judgements of Courts' as a means to maintain social order.1 At the same time, however, they also believed that they should serve as peacemakers who prevented disputes from going to court. Thus, they reflected a larger ambiguity in American culture about the use of courts to settle disputes. Americans acknowledge law as 'a vital part of culture and of the social order,' but the invocation of formal law often is viewed as an antisocial act and as a 'contravention of established cultural norms.'2 As Noah Webster explained in his American Spelling Book (1823), 'Somebody is always the worse for lawsuits, and of course society is less happy.'3Antebellum lawyers in general, and Lincoln in particular, did not want to resolve all disputes with a formal adjudication. Lawyers were not simply courtroom advocates for their clients; they also served a mediating role. As Robert W. Gordon notes, antebellum lawyers 'who took seriously their status as republican mediators were encouraged to run their office as little chancery courts.'4 That mediating role was particularly important in small communities where lawyers were keenly aware of the social context of purely local disputes.5 One of Lincoln's former law clerks recalled that 'the very character of this simple litigation drew the lawyer into the street and neighborhood, and into close and active intercourse with all classes of his fellow men.'6Lincoln himself described the lawyer's role as peacemaker. In his notes for a law lecture, he wrote: 'Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a real loser—in fees, expenses, and waste of time. As a peacemaker the lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good man.'7 That was a common conception of the lawyer's role in the nineteenth century.8 After the 1880 death of Stephen Trigg Logan, Lincoln's second law partner, John T. Stuart (Lincoln's first law partner), observed, 'Logan, in his office, was the just, ripe and safe counsellor, grasping with readiness the facts of the cases submitted to him, separating the truth from the coloring given it by the passion of the client, and readily seeing the point in the case, he was able to give sound advice, which his sense of justice directed to the right. He was not a promoter of litigations. He settled more controversies than he brought suits. He was a peace-maker.'9In 1834 Simon Greenleaf, a professor at the Harvard Law School, proclaimed that a lawyer 'concerns himself with the beginnings of controversies, not to inflame them but to extinguish them.... He is a peacemaker;—a composer of dissensions;—a blessing to his neighborhood.'10 In 1845 the New-York Legal Observer stated that 'the respectable attorney... is almost always a peace-maker and a settler of disputes, without litigation, where it is practicable.'11 Kentucky lawyer George W. Robertson similarly described the lawyer's role in his Scrap Book on Law and Politics, Men and Times (1855), a book Lincoln owned: 'He should never advise a suit unless it is the interest of his client to 'go to law' If the case be frivolous, or the right doubtful, he should advise forbearance or compromise. He should never encourage litigation.'12When faced with local disputes, Lincoln often tried to serve as a mediator or peacemaker. In 1850 he wrote client Abram Bale: 'I sincerely hope you will settle it. I think you can if you will, for I have always found Mr. Hickox a fair man in his dealings. If you settle I will charge nothing for what I have done, and thank you to boot. By settling, you will most likely get your money sooner; and with much less trouble & expense.'13In a case representing the Alton and Sangamon Railroad, he advised the railroad to settle with the defendant because 'it is better to get along peaceably if possible.'14 In 1859 he advised client Hay-den Keeling to drop his lawsuit: 'I do not think there is the least use of doing any more with the law suit. I not only do not think you are sure to gain it, but I do think your are sure to lose it. Therefore the sooner it ends the better.'15Lincoln helped to restore peace to the 'neighborhood' through his efforts to mediate and settle slander lawsuits. He handled at least sixty-eight slander lawsuits during the course of his career, representing plaintiffs thirty-four times and defendants thirty-four times.16 A self-educated lawyer, he became well versed in the law of slander.17 Those cases, however, involved much more than the sterile application of the formal law of slander to the facts of each lawsuit. Slander cases, by their very nature, were community-oriented, reg- ulating acceptable forms of behavior in small communities.18 Litigants in slander suits were involved in the 'small politics' of everyday life: reputation, gossip, and insult.19 In small communities, as anthropologist F. G. Bailey notes, there is a 'fund of common knowledge about all the members of the community' and that fund is made up of reputations.20 As one historian has observed, 'A person's standing in a small community depends on his or her reputation, and reputations are sustained or lost primarily through gossip.'21 Lincoln recognized the importance of reputation; he confessed in 1832 that his 'peculiar ambition' was 'being truly esteemed of my fellow men.'22The Illinois law of slander had both statutory and common-law elements. The Illinois General Assembly defined slander as criminal behavior that could be punished with a fine not exceeding $1,000.23 The next year, the legislature made 'certain words actionable' in civil proceedings. The legislature declared that falsely stating that any person had been guilty of adultery or fornication or had sworn falsely were actionable.24 That legislation thus rejected the English common-law rule that required 'an express imputation of some crime liable to punishment, some capital offence, or other infamous crime or misdemeanor.'25 Several other state courts did follow the English rule, which held that an imputation of adultery or fornication was not actionable.26 In Illinois, it was.Many of Lincoln's slander cases involved accusations of adultery or fornication; Lincoln thus was involved heavily in maintaining community reputations and relationships. In fact, he represented plaintiffs or defendants in at least eleven such cases, all of which concerned a woman accused of adultery or fornication.27 Lincoln and Herndon filed a slander lawsuit for Charles Cantrall and Emily Cantrall in 1849. They sued one John Primm for saying that 'William King screwed Charles Cantrall's wife twice while he was gone; and before that he crawled in bed with her and her husband and screwed her.' Lincoln and Herndon requested $1,000 in damages for their clients.28 In an 1845 slander case, Lincoln and Herndon represented the defendants, Jonathan Miller and Susan Miller. The plaintiffs, William Beaty and Martha Ann Beaty, claimed that Susan Miller had said that 'Mrs. Beaty and Dr. Sulivan were seen together in Beaty's stable one morning very early in the very act' and that 'Mrs. Beaty and Dr. Sulivan were seen in the very act.' The jury found Lincoln's client liable and assessed damages at $45.29 In an 1858 Vermilion County case, Lincoln was among lawyers representing Nancy M. Martin in a suit against Achilles M. Underwood. Martin charged that Underwood had boasted of having sex with her and had said that she 'has been fucked more times than I've got fingers and toes.'30 The jury found Underwood guilty and ordered him to pay $237 in damages.31Lincoln represented the plaintiff in a slander case that was first tried in Menard County in 1843 and then retried in Morgan County in 1844. Eliza Cabot sued Francis Regnier for saying that Elijah Taylor was 'after skin and he has got it' with Cabot, that Taylor had 'rogered' Cabot, and that 'the captain has got some skin there as much as he wanted.'32 When the case went to trial in Menard County, Lincoln delivered a 'denunciation' of Regnier that was 'as bitter a Phillippic as ever uttered'; nevertheless, Cabot received a verdict for only $12.33 Lincoln moved for a new trial based on jury misconduct, and the judge set aside the verdict.34 When the case was tried in Morgan County, Cabot received a $1,600 verdict, which was later sustained by the Illinois Supreme Court.35Lincoln also represented Ambrose P. Edwards and his wife in the appeal of their slander suit against William Patterson and his wife. The Edwardses had sued the Pattersons for Mrs. Patterson's remark that 'Mrs. Edwards has raised a family of children by a negro, and I can prove it.' The Edwardses claimed that those words, by innuendo, charged Mrs. Edwards with the crimes of adultery and The jury agreed and awarded in Lincoln represented the Edwardses after the Pattersons The the and the case to the trial that 'the words do not in their and or in common to a charge of fornication and In an 1850 County lawsuit brought by Lincoln represented the John claimed had her a The jury agreed and assessed damages at and Herndon similarly represented local reputations were vital for their community relationships. slander lawsuits with plaintiffs had been most concerned about accusations about plaintiffs were concerned about their and Lincoln's slander cases for plaintiffs involved accusations of or Lincoln filed his first slander case in on of George W. of Sangamon County, who sued Stephen because had said that he was guilty of also represented plaintiffs who sued because of accusations of In an County Lincoln and Herndon represented William who claimed that had slandered him by an crime against with a had said that my and he fucked her as as he He accused of the who was and will have some Lincoln and Herndon requested $1,000 in The case was with also represented in County lawsuits filed in The defendants in both cases saying that in fact, have intercourse or knowledge with a suit against George W. was tried with the jury both times to a After the second each agreed that the case could be The after the case was William W. the defendant in the second case, his and of an with the In an County Lincoln where their client sued accusations that he had a against with a to a and Lincoln a against the slander law to One explained in 1850 that 'the law is that words not in the case of a common of in to the office he or the or which he Lincoln represented fellow lawyer in a slander suit against Abraham Lincoln's claimed that had charged his of of of of and of that the accused The case went to and Lincoln the to the Those said that if the jury believed that said the words, then had to prove that all the were of will not the charge of of of and both the charge of with The jury also was that 'a of is to prove that the defendant the but that more then a that is a is to prove that the words were The jury awarded in a slander case, a defendant one of the defendant had not the words, or prove that the words were not If a defendant saying the words, then that defendant the of If a defendant claimed that the words were then the defendant had to the of In at least slander cases, Lincoln truth as a to the In cases, Lincoln that the plaintiffs in fact, In other cases, Lincoln to prove that the plaintiff had sworn In cases, Lincoln that the plaintiffs were guilty of In one case, Lincoln that he prove that the plaintiff was guilty of and in he that the plaintiff was guilty of was a the defendant had to the words by the the defendant a in that the charged words were before a jury in Illinois could be that a of the slander if the defendant to the In the Illinois Supreme held that the jury could the a of the slander and only the jury believed that the defendant had without any of The jury each case, the damages be because a is the of the cases that Lincoln the was he jury The other Lincoln's received jury in the cases that Lincoln with the of In cases, the was $1,000 in and in In both cases, however, plaintiffs agreed to remit part of the In other cases that Lincoln the jury awarded and In the cases, the of have helped In County cases that Lincoln his were ordered to pay only and Lincoln had the defendant was sued for the plaintiff a In those cases, Lincoln and filed lawsuits in County, that Robert and had him a and a infamous Lincoln represented both defendants and in both lawsuits that the plaintiff did and and His had the plaintiff a The suit against was tried in with the jury with they found his client not guilty of the second lawsuit in the of after to pay were The of for on a if the plaintiff to one of the Lincoln times but was never in that A defendant also could or damages by that the words were in and was the of a slander case, and if the words were in and then there was In at least cases, Lincoln submitted jury that said if the jury believed the words were but also believed were through of they are to for the In one of those cases, Lincoln submitted an that charged the jury that if they found that the words were much in the of passion as to be from all this is to in of A defendant could also by that he or she had what had said about the plaintiff and had not been by Lincoln that in Beaty Miller. Lincoln's any of the truth of the but claimed that the defendant was what her husband had from one she the said words as she litigation involved not only against slander but also that the damages awarded were In to that the defendant had not the words or that the words were not a lawyer could a of Illinois a defendant in a slander case could damages by the character of the and by any which to but do not to prove the truth of the In a County slander Lincoln's client was sued for saying that the plaintiff had sworn the jury found for the plaintiff, the was only In an Vermilion County case, Lincoln's client, who also was sued for saying the plaintiff had sworn was found guilty but was ordered to pay only in In case, a County jury assessed only in damages against Lincoln's In an 1850 suit in County, Lincoln represented the who had been charged with saying the plaintiff and The jury found for the plaintiff, but awarded That was more against Lincoln and Herndon in an Sangamon County case. Lincoln and Herndon represented the plaintiff, while Lincoln's former partner, Stephen Logan, represented the the jury found client guilty of they awarded one for In a case, Lincoln represented William against for that had said that was of and Lincoln requested in damages, but the jury awarded only in slander cases, Lincoln mediation and compromise. He did not slander he often was able to settle In several the settled the defendant agreed to a large judgment, which the plaintiff then agreed to remit in part or in one County for Stuart and Lincoln represented a plaintiff who sued because of an of The case was settled the defendant confessed to a and Lincoln's client agreed to remit the In an 1845 County case, the defendant agreed to a and the plaintiff then and agreed not to on the for That same year, Lincoln and Herndon represented the plaintiff in a Sangamon County slander suit. The case was settled the agreed to a judgment, which the plaintiff agreed to remit for Lincoln settled an Vermilion County case by having the defendant her and to a and having the plaintiff remit all but Lincoln an he represented Dr. in an 1859 County lawsuit. sued for The case was settled agreed in to a against him and agreed to remit all but and to for an lawyer who was often with Lincoln on the recalled one slander case in which Lincoln, one of the lawyers, most and efforts to compromise the case, which was by of his The case in County and involved a the community of and a from the community of In a accused of and to after the suit was were made for a to the not only the but the as for all became involved as or When the case was to County, their lawyers and and an of to The were and a large The case was tried twice and in a At the next of to and and the that their have to be Lincoln then that Lincoln that of litigation, in which was and he his with all and a After the to Lincoln the of which the and the defendant that he has ever or believed the plaintiff to be guilty of that he has said from which such a charge could be he said on the of others, his in the and that he any in the truth of such charge against said The agreed to and to the of cases that Lincoln settled before or after trial that slander suits were more to restore or reputation than to Lincoln settled at least slander cases by having his client the good reputation of the plaintiff, thus repairing the reputation in the As Lincoln later is the against In an case in County, Ann sued and for claimed that had said Ann is a and Ann her fine by Lincoln, who represented the defendants, settled the case by having his in that or of them ever made any charge against the of the and that of them has ever had any or or any want of on the part of the The then the case by slander case, the plaintiff agreed to the lawsuit Lincoln filed into the the by his this case, the defendant that he has never the words in the that he always has and the plaintiff to be an that he never has and not that the plaintiff ever or in any to his any of and that he this to be the as the most and that he can of the reputation, against such a a case, Lincoln wrote a in which the defendant said that he had not any accused the plaintiff of and not him guilty of such Lincoln's client had of a by the plaintiff 'as being but that he has not said a as from a Lincoln's client agreed to pay and the plaintiff agreed to the Lincoln thus showed sensitivity to what was actually at stake in those he settled each cases by repairing the damage to the was the of other In an case brought in County, John M. and claimed that had slandered by saying she a that she been of fornication with a and had a of an intercourse with a Lincoln represented the The case was later by of the with the plaintiffs not to for same of In an 1845 case, Robert G. sued Lincoln's client John in on the case in Sangamon moved for a of and the case was to Menard then a of that had said that he was a and a The case later was by the with each a of Lincoln acted as a peacemaker in slander he a role of Illinois and at least slander lawsuits were filed in Sangamon County, only went to a was involved in of the cases and of the the settled of the cases without a cases were by the or from the while were settled by agreed the cases, the want of and for to for sustained a to a to and a in the to before Lincoln was involved in at least cases where plaintiffs settled after the had against the were not an by the Illinois Supreme the jury on the of plaintiffs most or all of the that the of slander suits was to restore or reputations in the In cases, plaintiffs all of the for In an slander case in County, for Lincoln was able to settle the case after the jury a verdict against his Emily had sued Lincoln's client, for that had said that had sworn had run with a and had in a The jury agreed that had slandered and assessed $1,000 in The judgment, however, that the of said In an 1843 County case, Lincoln's client was accused of saying that the plaintiff had into a with his his and a from a while he was The jury awarded the plaintiff but the into and the for other cases the plaintiff most of the In a County slander case Elijah and wife sued that had a and had said 'the have her in the of the many a The plaintiffs in Lincoln and represented the defendant Lincoln the which stated that his client was not only not guilty but prove at trial that guilty of fornication with said Elijah before they were When the case was tried in the jury awarded in damages, of which the plaintiffs Lincoln represented the who received an of John claimed that Abram had said that he had before a Lincoln in his claimed that had had and before the jury he that and had together without being The jury found for but Lincoln an of the and the of and of said Thus, Lincoln was able to mediate and settle some cases after had in of Lincoln the of an appeal to reduce an jury In the County the plaintiff claimed that Lincoln's client had slandered him by an of and The jury agreed and awarded Lincoln then filed a for new that the jury had a in verdict and that his client had not received a fair When the plaintiff of the judgment, the for new trial was also a after the verdict in an slander case in In that case, Lincoln represented the plaintiff William who that his had said that he was 'a that 'it was the of the that was and in The however, found that had slandered and awarded in one of later recalled that Lincoln said that his client did not want to money out of the the he could do be to get to remit some of the damage and be Lincoln and his client agreed to of the verdict in for the defendant which in the many slander cases, Lincoln was able to his neighbors to In some cases he settled cases by repairing the damage to the plaintiffs' reputation in for to the good reputation of the In other cases, the defendant consented to a large judgment, which the plaintiff agreed to reduce to a much smaller sum. That also the damage to reputation and settled the case. In others, the plaintiff agreed to remit most or all of the award. Lincoln advised that 'as a peacemaker the lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good His slander cases show that he often took advantage of such the Lincoln Legal in Illinois, I acknowledge the of William and I also to F. Illinois state Illinois Robert and of the of of the of of and of of on and

Robin L. Einhorn

The Civil War brought machine politics to Chicago. The party realignment that created the Republican Party repoliticized municipal elections that had been nonpartisan for nearly a decade, while the war itself presented emergency situations that forced (or, alternatively, allowed) city officials to tax and spend on an unprecedentedly large scale. By machine politics, of course, I do not mean a Richard J. Daley style concentration of power; that kind of machine would not exist in Chicago until Daley himself built it in the 1950s. Rather, by machine politics I mean a form of city government with two characteristics: first, electoral conflict, consisting of an ongoing battle between “reformers” and “bosses,” often waged on the issue of “corruption,” and second, municipal finance structured so that the city treasury underwrote what political scientist Raymond E. Wolfinger has delicately called “incentives to political participation.” Before the Civil War, Chicago's government had neither of these characteristics. It did, however, have a third characteristic that historians usually associate with machine politics: It was decentralized. Antebellum Chicago's radical administrative decentralization, which I have termed the “segmented system of city government,” was destroyed by the Civil War. A system designed to avoid the political redistribution of individual wealth was replaced by one – machine politics – that used its taxing and spending powers to pursue expensive “public interests.” Thus, the origin of machine politics lay not in a democratizing decentralization of power but in the addition of centralizing elements to an already decentralized government and, more important, in the political definition of those public interests for which redistribution was appropriate.