Doriane Perard, Jérôme Lacan, Yann Bachy, Jonathan Detchart
The concept of a decentralized ledger usually implies that each node of a blockchain network stores the entire blockchain. However, in the case of popular blockchains, which each weigh several hundreds of GB, the large amount of data to be stored can incite new or low-capacity nodes to run lightweight clients. Such nodes do not participate to the global storage effort and can result in a centralization of the blockchain by very few nodes, which is contrary to the basic concepts of a blockchain. To avoid this problem, we propose new low storage nodes that store a reduced amount of data generated from the blockchain by using erasure codes. The properties of this technique ensure that any block of the chain can be easily rebuild from a small number of such nodes. This system should encourage low storage nodes to contribute to the storage of the blockchain and to maintain decentralization despite of a globally increasing size of the blockchain. This system paves the way to new types of blockchains which would only be managed by low capacity nodes.
Open-access blockchains based on proof-of-work protocols have gained tremendous popularity for their capabilities of providing decentralized tamper-proof ledgers and platforms for data-driven autonomous organization. Nevertheless, the proof-of-work based consensus protocols are vulnerable to cyber-attacks such as double-spending. In this paper, we propose a novel approach of cyber risk management for blockchain-based service. In particular, we adopt the cyber-insurance as an economic tool for neutralizing cyber risks due to attacks in blockchain networks. We consider a blockchain service market, which is composed of the infrastructure provider, the blockchain provider, the cyber-insurer, and the users. The blockchain provider purchases from the infrastructure provider, e.g., a cloud, the computing resources to maintain the blockchain consensus, and then offers blockchain services to the users. The blockchain provider strategizes its investment in the infrastructure and the service price charged to the users, in order to improve the security of the blockchain and thus optimize its profit. Meanwhile, the blockchain provider also purchases a cyber-insurance from the cyber-insurer to protect itself from the potential damage due to the attacks. In return, the cyber-insurer adjusts the insurance premium according to the perceived risk level of the blockchain service. Based on the assumption of rationality for the market entities, we model the interaction among the blockchain provider, the users, and the cyber-insurer as a two-level Stackelberg game. Namely, the blockchain provider and the cyber-insurer lead to set their pricing/investment strategies, and then the users follow to determine their demand of the blockchain service. Specifically, we consider the scenario of double-spending attacks and provide a series of analytical results about the Stackelberg equilibrium in the market game.
Kevin Liu, Harsh Desai, Lalana Kagal, Murat Kantarcıoğlu
As more and more data is collected for various reasons, the sharing of such data becomes paramount to increasing its value. Many applications ranging from smart cities to personalized health care require individuals and organizations to share data at an unprecedented scale. Data sharing is crucial in today's world, but due to privacy reasons, security concerns and regulation issues, the conditions under which the sharing occurs needs to be carefully specified. Currently, this process is done by lawyers and requires the costly signing of legal agreements. In many cases, these data sharing agreements are hard to track, manage or enforce. In this work, we propose a novel alternative for tracking, managing and especially enforcing such data sharing agreements using smart contracts and blockchain technology. We design a framework that generates smart contracts from parameters based on legal data sharing agreements. The terms in these agreements are automatically enforced by the system. Monetary punishment can be employed using secure voting by external auditors to hold the violators accountable. Our experimental evaluation shows that our proposed framework is efficient and low-cost.
The prevalence of Internet of Things (IoT) allows heterogeneous embedded smart devices to collaboratively provide smart services with or without human intervention. While leveraging the large-scale IoT-based applications like Smart Gird or Smart Cities, IoT also incurs more concerns on privacy and security. Among the top security challenges that IoT face, access authorization is critical in resource sharing and information protection. One of the weaknesses of today's access control (AC) is the centralized authorization server, which can be the performance bottleneck or the single point of failure. In this paper, BlendCAC, a blockchain-enabled decentralized capability-based AC is proposed for the security of IoTs. The BlendCAC aims at an effective access control processes to devices, services and information in large scale IoT systems. Based on the blockchain network, a capability delegation mechanism is suggested for access permission propagation. A robust identity-based capability token management strategy is proposed, which takes advantage of a smart contract for registration, propagation and revocation of the access authorization. In the proposed BlendCAC scheme, IoT devices are their own master to control their resources instead of being supervised by a centralized authority. Implemented and tested on a Raspberry Pi device and on a local private blockchain network, the experimental results demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed BlendCAC approach to offer a decentralized, scalable, lightweight and fine-grained AC solution to IoT systems.
Cryptocurrency wallets store the wallet's private key(s), and hence, are a lucrative target for attackers. With possession of the private key, an attacker virtually owns all of the currency in the compromised wallet. Managing cryptocurrency wallets offline, in isolated (`air-gapped') computers, has been suggested in order to secure the private keys from theft. Such air-gapped wallets are often referred to as `cold wallets.' In this paper we show how private keys can be exfiltrated from air-gapped wallets. In the adversarial attack model, the attacker infiltrates the offline wallet, infecting it with malicious code. The malware can be preinstalled or pushed in during the initial installation of the wallet, or it can infect the system when removable media (e.g., USB flash drive) is inserted into the wallet's computer in order to sign a transaction. These attack vectors have repeatedly been proven feasible in the last decade (e.g., [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10]). Having obtained a foothold in the wallet, an attacker can utilize various air-gap covert channel techniques (bridgeware [11]) to jump the airgap and exfiltrate the wallet's private keys. We evaluate various exfiltration techniques, including physical, electromagnetic, electric, magnetic, acoustic, optical, and thermal techniques. This research shows that although cold wallets provide a high degree of isolation, it's not beyond the capability of motivated attackers to compromise such wallets and steal private keys from them. We demonstrate how a 256-bit private key (e.g., Bitcoin's private keys) can be exfiltrated from an offline, air-gapped wallet of a fictional character named Satoshi within a matter of seconds.
Open access
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cs.CR
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
Blockchain stores information into a chain of "blocks", whose integrity is usually guaranteed by Proof of Work (PoW). In many blockchain applications (including cryptocurrencies), users compete with each other to win the ownership of the blocks, a process commonly referred as "mining". Mining activities consume huge amount of power, while the outcome appears to be useless besides validating a block. Here we discuss the requirements of designing a new PoW algorithm. We also propose a PoW scheme to help solve high-dimension, non-linear optimization problems. Simulation experiments of blockchains generated by three miners solved an instance of Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP), a well-known NP-hard problem. The revised scheme enables us to address difficult scientific questions as a byproduct of mining.
Grover's algorithm confers on quantum computers a quadratic advantage over classical computers for searching in an arbitrary data set, a scenario that describes Bitcoin mining. It has previously been argued that the only side-effect of quantum mining would be an increased difficulty. In this work, we argue that a crucial argument in the analysis of Bitcoin security breaks down when quantum mining is performed. Classically, a Bitcoin fork occurs rarely, i.e., when two miners find a block almost simultaneously, due to propagation time effects. The situation differs dramatically when quantum miners use Grover's algorithm, which repeatedly applies a procedure called a Grover iteration. The chances of finding a block grow quadratically with the number of Grover iterations applied. Crucially, a miner does not have to choose how many iterations to apply in advance. Suppose Alice receives Bob's new block. To maximize her revenue, she should stop and measure her state immediately in the hopes that her block (rather than Bob's) will become part of the longest chain. The strong correlation between the miners' actions and the fact that they all measure their states at the same time may lead to more forks -- which is known to be a security risk for Bitcoin. We propose a mechanism that, we conjecture, will prevent this form of quantum mining, thereby circumventing the high rate of forks.
Proof-of-Stake systems randomly choose, on each round, one of the\nparticipants as a consensus leader that extends the chain with the next block\nsuch that the selection probability is proportional to the owned stake.\nHowever, distributed random number generation is notoriously difficult. Systems\nthat derive randomness from the previous blocks are completely insecure;\nsolutions that provide secure random selection are inefficient due to their\nhigh communication complexity; and approaches that balance security and\nperformance exhibit selection bias. When block creation is rewarded with new\nstake, even a minor bias can have a severe cumulative effect.\n In this paper, we propose Robust Round Robin, a new consensus scheme that\naddresses this selection problem. We create reliable long-term identities by\nbootstrapping from an existing infrastructure, such as Intel's SGX processors,\nor by mining them starting from an initial fair distribution. For leader\nselection we use a deterministic approach. On each round, we select a set of\nthe previously created identities as consensus leader candidates in round robin\nmanner. Because simple round-robin alone is vulnerable to attacks and offers\npoor liveness, we complement such deterministic selection policy with a\nlightweight endorsement mechanism that is an interactive protocol between the\nleader candidates and a small subset of other system participants. Our solution\nhas low good efficiency as it requires no expensive distributed randomness\ngeneration and it provides block creation fairness which is crucial in\ndeployments that reward it with new stake.\n
A trusted electronic election system requires that all the involved information must go public, that is, it focuses not only on transparency but also privacy issues. In other words, each ballot should be counted anonymously, correctly, and efficiently. In this work, a lightweight E-voting system is proposed for voters to minimize their trust in the authority or government. We ensure the transparency of election by putting all message on the Ethereum blockchain, in the meantime, the privacy of individual voter is protected via an efficient and effective ring signature mechanism. Besides, the attractive self-tallying feature is also built in our system, which guarantees that everyone who can access the blockchain network is able to tally the result on his own, no third party is required after voting phase. More importantly, we ensure the correctness of voting results and keep the Ethereum gas cost of individual participant as low as possible, at the same time. Clearly, the pre-described characteristics make our system more suitable for large-scale election.
We present two models of the block chain of Bitcoin in the interactive theorem prover Agda. The first one is based on a simple model of bank accounts, while having transactions with multiple inputs and outputs. The second model models transactions, which refer directly to unspent transaction outputs, rather than user accounts. The resulting blockchain gives rise to a transaction tree. That model is formalised using an extended form of induction-recursion, one of the unique features of Agda. The set of transaction trees and transactions is defined inductively, while simultaneously recursively defining the list of unspent transaction outputs. Both structures model standard transactions, coinbase transactions, transaction fees, the exact message to be signed by those spending money in a transaction, block rewards, blocks, and the blockchain, and the second structure models as well maturation time for coinbase transactions and Merkle trees. Hashing and cryptographic operations and their correctness are dealt with abstractly by postulating corresponding operations. An indication is given how the correctness of this model could be specified and proven in Agda.
We propose a conceptual design for a quantum blockchain. Our method involves encoding the blockchain into a temporal GHZ (Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger) state of photons that do not simultaneously coexist. It is shown that the entanglement in time, as opposed to an entanglement in space, provides the crucial quantum advantage. All the subcomponents of this system have already been shown to be experimentally realized. Furthermore, our encoding procedure can be interpreted as nonclassically influencing the past.
Raymond Cheng, Fan Zhang, Jernej Kos, Warren He · 9 authors
Smart contracts are applications that execute on blockchains. Today they manage billions of dollars in value and motivate visionary plans for pervasive blockchain deployment. While smart contracts inherit the availability and other security assurances of blockchains, however, they are impeded by blockchains' lack of confidentiality and poor performance. We present Ekiden, a system that addresses these critical gaps by combining blockchains with Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). Ekiden leverages a novel architecture that separates consensus from execution, enabling efficient TEE-backed confidentiality-preserving smart-contracts and high scalability. Our prototype (with Tendermint as the consensus layer) achieves example performance of 600× more throughput and 400× less latency at 1000× less cost than the Ethereum mainnet. Another contribution of this paper is that we systematically identify and treat the pitfalls arising from harmonizing TEEs and blockchains. Treated separately, both TEEs and blockchains provide powerful guarantees, but hybridized, though, they engender new attacks. For example, in naïve designs, privacy in TEE-backed contracts can be jeopardized by forgery of blocks, a seemingly unrelated attack vector. We believe the insights learned from Ekiden will prove to be of broad importance in hybridized TEE-blockchain systems.
Masarah Paquet-Clouston, Bernhard Haslhofer, Benoît Dupont
Ransomware can prevent a user from accessing a device and its files until a ransom is paid to the attacker, most frequently in Bitcoin. With over 500 known ransomware families, it has become one of the dominant cybercrime threats for law enforcement, security professionals and the public. However, a more comprehensive, evidence-based picture on the global direct financial impact of ransomware attacks is still missing. In this paper, we present a data-driven method for identifying and gathering information on Bitcoin transactions related to illicit activity based on footprints left on the public Bitcoin blockchain. We implement this method on-top-of the GraphSense open-source platform and apply it to empirically analyze transactions related to 35 ransomware families. We estimate the lower bound direct financial impact of each ransomware family and find that, from 2013 to mid-2017, the market for ransomware payments has a minimum worth of USD 12,768,536 (22,967.54 BTC). We also find that the market is highly skewed with only a few number of players responsible for the majority of the payments. Based on these research findings, policy-makers and law enforcement agencies can use the statistics provided to understand the size of the illicit market and make informed decisions on how best to address the threat.
Cyberattacks are nowadays moving rapidly. They are customized, multi-vector, staged in multiple flows and targeted. Moreover, new hacking playgrounds appeared to reach mobile network, modern architectures and smart cities. For that purpose, malware use different entry points and plug-ins. In addition, they are now deploying several techniques for obfuscation, camouflage and analysis resistance. On the other hand, antiviral protections are positioning innovative approaches exposing malicious indicators and anomalies, revealing assumptions of the limitations of the anti-antiviral mechanisms. Primarily, this paper exposes a state of art in computer virology and then introduces a new concept to create undetectable malware based on the blockchain technology. It summarizes techniques adopted by malicious software to avoid functionalities implemented for viral detection and presents the implementation of new viral techniques that leverage the blockchain network.
Bitcoin cryptocurrency system enables users to transact securely and pseudo-anonymously by using an arbitrary number of aliases (Bitcoin addresses). Cybercriminals exploit these characteristics to commit immutable and presumably untraceable monetary fraud, especially via ransomware; a type of malware that encrypts files of the infected system and demands ransom for decryption. In this paper, we present our comprehensive study on all recent ransomware and report the economic impact of such ransomware from the Bitcoin payment perspective. We also present a lightweight framework to identify, collect, and analyze Bitcoin addresses managed by the same user or group of users (cybercriminals, in this case), which includes a novel approach for classifying a payment as ransom. To verify the correctness of our framework, we compared our findings on CryptoLocker ransomware with the results presented in the literature. Our results align with the results found in the previous works except for the final valuation in USD. The reason for this discrepancy is that we used the average Bitcoin price on the day of each ransom payment whereas the authors of the previous studies used the Bitcoin price on the day of their evaluation. Furthermore, for each investigated ransomware, we provide a holistic view of its genesis, development, the process of infection and execution, and characteristic of ransom demands. Finally, we also release our dataset that contains a detailed transaction history of all the Bitcoin addresses we identified for each ransomware.
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is a de facto standard of secure client-server communication on the Internet. Its security can be diminished by a variety of attacks that leverage on weaknesses in its design and implementations. An example of a major weakness is the public-key infrastructure (PKI) that TLS deploys, which is a weakest-link system and introduces hundreds of links (i.e., trusted entities). Consequently, an adversary compromising a single trusted entity can impersonate any website. Notary systems, based on multi-path probing, were early and promising proposals to detect and prevent such attacks. Unfortunately, despite their benefits, they are not widely deployed, mainly due to their long-standing unresolved problems. In this paper, we present Persistent and Accountable Domain Validation (PADVA), which is a next-generation TLS notary service. PADVA combines the advantages of previous proposals, enhancing them, introducing novel mechanisms, and leveraging a blockchain platform which provides new features. PADVA keeps notaries auditable and accountable, introduces service-level agreements and mechanisms to enforce them, relaxes availability requirements for notaries, and works with the legacy TLS ecosystem. We implemented and evaluated PADVA, and our experiments indicate its efficiency and deployability.
Wireless Sensor networks (WSN) today suffer from a lack of security adapted to their multiple constraints, to which authentication and trust management solutions such as PGP only partially responds. On the one hand, the constraints of autonomy and co-operation of the nodes necessary to guarantee the coherence of the network do not require a distributed solution. On the other hand, the constraints of energy consumption and the low computing power of the nodes require the use of algorithms of low complexity (Zhang2014) . To our knowledge, no solution can answer both these problems at the same time. We are proposing a new solution for securing WSNs named BATMAN (Blockchain Authentication and Trust Module in Ad-hoc Networks) to reply to these challenges. We present a model of centralized management for authentication and trust, implementable on the Tezos blockchain, and evaluate through simulation the confidence estimators proposed here.
Hung Dang, Tien Tuan Anh Dinh, Dumitrel Loghin, Ee‐Chien Chang · 6 authors
Existing blockchain systems scale poorly because of their distributed consensus protocols. Current attempts at improving blockchain scalability are limited to cryptocurrency. Scaling blockchain systems under general workloads (i.e., non-cryptocurrency applications) remains an open question. In this work, we take a principled approach to apply sharding, which is a well-studied and proven technique to scale out databases, to blockchain systems in order to improve their transaction throughput at scale. This is challenging, however, due to the fundamental difference in failure models between databases and blockchain. To achieve our goal, we first enhance the performance of Byzantine consensus protocols, by doing so we improve individual shards' throughput. Next, we design an efficient shard formation protocol that leverages a trusted random beacon to securely assign nodes into shards. We rely on trusted hardware, namely Intel SGX, to achieve high performance for both consensus and shard formation protocol. Third, we design a general distributed transaction protocol that ensures safety and liveness even when transaction coordinators are malicious. Finally, we conduct an extensive evaluation of our design both on a local cluster and on Google Cloud Platform. The results show that our consensus and shard formation protocols outperform state-of-the-art solutions at scale. More importantly, our sharded blockchain reaches a high throughput that can handle Visa-level workloads, and is the largest ever reported in a realistic environment.
The Internet of Things (IoT) network of connected devices currently contains more than 11 billion devices and is estimated to double in size within the next four years. The prevalence of these devices makes them an ideal target for attackers. To reduce the risk of attacks vendors routinely deliver security updates (patches) for their devices. The delivery of security updates becomes challenging due to the issue of scalability as the number of devices may grow much quicker than vendors' distribution systems. Previous studies have suggested a permissionless and decentralized blockchainbased network in which nodes can host and deliver security updates, thus the addition of new nodes scales out the network. However, these studies do not provide an incentive for nodes to join the network, making it unlikely for nodes to freely contribute their hosting space, bandwidth, and computation resources. In this paper, we propose a novel decentralized IoT software update delivery network in which participating nodes (referred to as distributors) are compensated by vendors with digital currency for delivering updates to devices. Upon the release of a new security update, a vendor will make a commitment to provide digital currency to distributors that deliver the update; the commitment will be made with the use of smart contracts, and hence will be public, binding, and irreversible. The smart contract promises compensation to any distributor that provides proof-of-distribution, which is unforgeable proof that a single update was delivered to a single device. A distributor acquires the proof-of-distribution by exchanging a security update for a device signature using the Zero-Knowledge Contingent Payment (ZKCP) trustless data exchange protocol. Eliminating the need for trust between the security update distributor and the security consumer (IoT device) by providing fair compensation, can significantly increase the number of distributors, thus facilitating rapid scale out.
Holger Kinkelin, Valentin Hauner, Heiko Niedermayer, Georg Carle
Numerous IoT applications, like building automation or process control of industrial sites, exist today. These applications inherently have a strong connection to the physical world. Hence, IT security threats cannot only cause problems like data leaks but also safety issues which might harm people. Attacks on IT systems are not only performed by outside attackers but also insiders like administrators. For this reason, we present ongoing work on a Byzantine fault tolerant configuration management system (CMS) that provides control over administrators, restrains their rights, and enforces separation of concerns. We reach this goal by conducting a configuration management process that requires multi-party authorization for critical configurations to prevent individual malicious administrators from performing undesired actions. Only after a configuration has been authorized by multiple experts, it is applied to the targeted devices. For the whole configuration management process, our CMS guarantees accountability and traceability. Lastly, our system is tamper-resistant as we leverage Hyperledger Fabric, which provides a distributed execution environment for our CMS and a blockchain-based distributed ledger that we use to store the configurations. A beneficial side effect of this approach is that our CMS is also suitable to manage configurations for infrastructure shared across different organizations that do not need to trust each other.
Many of today's crypto currencies use blockchains as decentralized ledgers and secure them with proof of work. In case of a fork of the chain, Bitcoin's rule for achieving consensus is selecting the longest chain and discarding the other chain as stale. It has been demonstrated that this consensus rule has a weakness against selfish mining in which the selfish miner exploits the variance in block generation by partially withholding blocks. In Ethereum, however, under certain conditions stale blocks don't have to be discarded but can be referenced from the main chain as uncle blocks yielding a partial reward. This concept limits the impact of network delays on the expected revenue for miners. But the concept also reduces the risk for a selfish miner to gain no rewards from withholding a freshly minted block. This paper uses a Monte Carlo simulation to quantify the effect of uncle blocks both to the profitability of selfish mining and the blockchain's security in Ethereum (ETH). A brief outlook about a recent Ethereum Classic (ETC) improvement proposal that weighs uncle blocks during the selection of the main chain will be given.
In the second decade of the 21st century, blockchain definitely became one of the most trending computational technologies. This research aims to question the feasibility and suitability of using blockchain technology within e-voting systems, regarding both technical and non-technical aspects. In today's world, although the course of this spreading is considerably slow, several countries already use means of e-voting due to many social and economic reasons, which we further investigated. Nevertheless, the number of countries offering various e-government solutions, apart from e-voting, is significantly high. E-voting systems, naturally, require much more attention and assurance regarding potential security and anonymity issues, since voting is one of the few extremely critical governmental processes. Nevertheless, e-voting is not purely a governmental service, but many companies and nonprofit organizations would benefit the cost-efficiency, scalability, remote accessibility, and ease of use that it provides. Blockchain technology is claimed to be able to address some, obviously not all, important security concerns, including anonymity, confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation. The analysis results presented in this article mostly confirm these claims.
Davide Frey, Marc X. Makkes, Pierre-Louis Roman, François Taı̈ani · 5 authors
Blockchains have a storage scalability issue. Their size is not bounded and they grow indefinitely as time passes. As of August 2017, the Bitcoin blockchain is about 120 GiB big while it was only 75 GiB in August 2016. To benefit from Bitcoin full security model, a bootstrapping node has to download and verify the entirety of the 120 GiB. This poses a challenge for low-resource devices such as smartphones. Thankfully, an alternative exists for such devices which consists of downloading and verifying just the header of each block. This partial block verification enables devices to reduce their bandwidth requirements from 120 GiB to 35 MiB. However, this drastic decrease comes with a safety cost implied by a partial block verification. In this work, we enable low-resource devices to fully verify subchains of blocks without having to pay the onerous price of a full chain download and verification; a few additional MiB of bandwidth suffice. To do so, we propose the design of diet nodes that can securely query full nodes for shards of the UTXO set, which is needed to perform full block verification and can otherwise only be built by sequentially parsing the chain.
Daniël Vos, Leon Overweel, Wouter Raateland, Jelle Vos · 7 authors
Millions of shipping containers filled with goods move around the world every day. Before such a container may enter a trade bloc, the customs agency of the goods' destination country must ensure that it does not contain illegal or mislabeled goods. Due to the high volume of containers, customs agencies make a selection of containers to audit through a risk analysis procedure. Customs agencies perform risk analysis using data sourced from a centralized system that is potentially vulnerable to manipulation and malpractice. Therefore we propose an alternative: DEFenD, a decentralized system that stores data about goods and containers in a secure and privacy-preserving manner. In our system, economic operators make claims to the network about goods they insert into or remove from containers, and encrypt these claims so that they can only be read by the destination country's customs agency. Economic operators also make unencrypted claims about containers with which they interact. Unencrypted claims can be validated by the entire network of customs agencies. Our key contribution is a data partitioning scheme and several protocols that enable such a system to utilize blockchain and its powerful validation principle, while also preserving the privacy of the involved economic operators. Using our protocol, customs agencies can improve their risk analysis and economic operators can get through customs with less delay. We also present a reference implementation built with Hyperledger Fabric and analyze to what extent our implementation meets the requirements in terms of privacy-preservation, security, scalability, and decentralization.