Xin Sun, Quanlong Wang, Piotr Kulicki, Mirek Sopek
This paper proposes a simple voting protocol based on Quantum Blockchain. Despite its simplicity, our protocol satisfies the most important properties of secure voting protocols: is anonymous, binding, non-reusable, verifiable, eligible, fair and self-tallying. The protocol could also be implemented using presently available technology.
Many companies rely on Cloud infrastructures for their computation, communication and data storage requirements. While Cloud services provide some benefits, e.g., replacing high upfront costs for an IT infrastructure with a pay-as-you-go model, they also introduce serious concerns that are notoriously difficult to address. In essence, Cloud customers are storing data and running computations on infrastructures that they can not control directly. Therefore, when problems arise -- violations of Service Level Agreements, data corruption, data leakage, security breaches -- both customers and Cloud providers face the challenge of agreeing on which party is to be held responsible. In this paper, we review the challenges and requirements for enforcing accountability in Cloud infrastructures, and argue that smart contracts and blockchain technologies might provide a key contribution towards accountable Clouds.
Recent work has demonstrated significant anonymity vulnerabilities in Bitcoin's networking stack. In particular, the current mechanism for broadcasting Bitcoin transactions allows third-party observers to link transactions to the IP addresses that originated them. This lays the groundwork for low-cost, large-scale deanonymization attacks. In this work, we present Dandelion++, a first-principles defense against large-scale deanonymization attacks with near-optimal information-theoretic guarantees. Dandelion++ builds upon a recent proposal called Dandelion that exhibited similar goals. However, in this paper, we highlight simplifying assumptions made in Dandelion, and show how they can lead to serious deanonymization attacks when violated. In contrast, Dandelion++ defends against stronger adversaries that are allowed to disobey protocol. Dandelion++ is lightweight, scalable, and completely interoperable with the existing Bitcoin network. We evaluate it through experiments on Bitcoin's mainnet (i.e., the live Bitcoin network) to demonstrate its interoperability and low broadcast latency overhead.
Mohammad A. Salahuddin, Ala Al-Fuqaha, Mohsen Guizani, Khaled Shuaib · 5 authors
We propose an agile softwarized infrastructure for flexible, cost effective, secure and privacy preserving deployment of Internet of Things (IoT) for smart healthcare applications and services. It integrates state-of-the-art networking and virtualization techniques across IoT, fog and cloud domains, employing Blockchain, Tor and message brokers to provide security and privacy for patients and healthcare providers. We propose a novel platform using Machine-to-Machine (M2M) messaging and rule-based beacons for seamless data management and discuss the role of data and decision fusion in the cloud and the fog, respectively, for smart healthcare applications and services.
James Tapsell, Raja Naeem Akram, Konstantinos Markantonakis
Bitcoin is a decentralised digital currency that relies on cryptography rather than trusted third parties such as central banks for its security. Underpinning the operation of the currency is a peer-to-peer (P2P) network that facilitates the execution of transactions by end users, as well as the transaction confirmation process known as bitcoin mining. The security of this P2P network is vital for the currency to function and subversion of the underlying network can lead to attacks on bitcoin users including theft of bitcoins, manipulation of the mining process and denial of service (DoS). As part of this paper the network protocol and bitcoin core software are analysed, with three bitcoin message exchanges (the connection handshake, GETHEADERS/HEADERS and MEMPOOL/INV) found to be potentially vulnerable to spoofing and use in distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Possible solutions to the identified weaknesses and vulnerabilities are evaluated, such as the introduction of random nonces into network messages exchanges.
Freya Sheer Hardwick, Apostolos Gioulis, Raja Naeem Akram, Konstantinos Markantonakis
Technology has positive impacts on many aspects of our social life. Designing a 24hour globally connected architecture enables ease of access to a variety of resources and services. Furthermore, technology like Internet has been a fertile ground for innovation and creativity. One of such disruptive innovation is blockchain -- a keystone of cryptocurrencies. The blockchain technology is presented as a game changer for many of the existing and emerging technologies/services. With its immutability property and decentralised architecture, it is taking centre stage in many services as an equalisation factor to the current parity between consumers and large corporations/governments. One of such potential applications of the blockchain is in e-voting schemes. The objective of such a scheme would be to provide a decentralised architecture to run and support a voting scheme that is open, fair and independently verifiable. In this paper, we propose potentially a new e-voting protocol that utilises the blockchain as a transparent ballot box. The protocol has been designed with adhering to the fundamental e-voting properties in mind as well as offering a degree of decentralisation and allowing for the voter to change/update their vote (within the permissible voting period). The paper highlights the pros and cons of using blockchain for such a proposal from practical point view in both development/deployment and usage contexts. Concluding the paper with a potential roadmap for blockchain technology to be able to support complex applications.
Amir Kafshdar Goharshady, Ali Behrouz, Krishnendu Chatteriee
We present a secure approach for maintaining and reporting credit history records on the Blockchain. Our approach removes third-parties such as credit reporting agencies from the lending process and replaces them with smart contracts. This allows customers to interact directly with the lenders or banks while ensuring the integrity, unmalleability and privacy of their credit data. Most importantly, each customer is given full control over complete or selective disclosure of her credit records, eliminating the risk of privacy violations or data breaches such as the one that happened to Equifax in 2017. Moreover, our approach provides strong guarantees for the lenders as well. A lender can check both correctness and completeness of the credit data disclosed to her. This is the first approach that is able to perform all real-world credit reporting tasks without a central authority or changing the financial mechanisms.
During the normal operation of a Cloud solution, no one usually pays attention to the logs except technical department, which may periodically check them to ensure that the performance of the platform conforms to the Service Level Agreements. However, the moment the status of a component changes from acceptable to unacceptable, or a customer complains about accessibility or performance of a platform, the importance of logs increases significantly. Depending on the scope of the issue, all departments, including management, customer support, and even the actual customer, may turn to logs to find out what has happened, how it has happened, and who is responsible for the issue. The party at fault may be motivated to tamper the logs to hide their fault. Given the number of logs that are generated by the Cloud solutions, there are many tampering possibilities. While tamper detection solution can be used to detect any changes in the logs, we argue that critical nature of logs calls for immutability. In this work, we propose a blockchain-based log system, called Logchain, that collects the logs from different providers and avoids log tampering by sealing the logs cryptographically and adding them to a hierarchical ledger, hence, providing an immutable platform for log storage.
Yandamuri, Sravya, Abraham, Ittai, Nayak, Kartik, Reiter, Michael K.
A smart contract on a blockchain cannot keep a secret because its data is replicated on all nodes in a network. To remedy this problem, it has been suggested to combine blockchains with trusted execution environments (TEEs), such as Intel SGX, for executing applications that demand privacy. Untrusted blockchain nodes cannot get access to the data and computations inside the TEE. This paper first explores some pitfalls that arise from the combination of TEEs with blockchains. Since TEEs are, in principle, stateless they are susceptible to rollback attacks, which should be prevented to maintain privacy for the application. However, in blockchains with non-final consensus protocols, such as the proof-of-work in Ethereum and others, the contract execution must handle rollbacks by design. This implies that TEEs for securing blockchain execution cannot be directly used for such blockchains; this approach works only when the consensus decisions are final. Second, this work introduces an architecture and a prototype for smart-contract execution within Intel SGX technology for Hyperledger Fabric, a prominent platform for enterprise blockchain applications. Our system resolves difficulties posed by the execute-order-validate architecture of Fabric and prevents rollback attacks on TEE-based execution as far as possible. For increasing security, our design encapsulates each application on the blockchain within its own enclave that shields it from the host system. An evaluation shows that the overhead moving execution into SGX is within 10%-20% for a sealed-bid auction application.
Xin Sun, Quanlong Wang, Piotr Kulicki, Xishun Zhao
We proposed a framework of quantum-enhanced logic-based blockchain, which improves the efficiency and power of quantum-secured blockchain. The efficiency is improved by using a new quantum honest-success Byzantine agreement protocol to replace the classical Byzantine agreement protocol, while the power is improved by incorporating quantum protection and quantum certificate into the syntax of transactions. Our quantum-secured logic-based blockchain can already be implemented by the current technology. The cryptocurrency created and transferred in our blockchain is called qulogicoin. Incorporating quantum protection and quantum certificates into blockchain makes it possible to use blockchain to overcome the limitations of some quantum cryptographic protocols. As an illustration, we show that a significant shortcoming of cheat-sensitive quantum bit commitment protocols can be overcome with the help of our blockchain and qulogicoin.
We review the so called selfish mining strategy in the Bitcoin network and compare its profitability to honest mining.We build a rigorous profitability model for repetition games. The time analysis of the attack has been ignored in the previous literature based on a Markov model,but is critical. Using martingale's techniques and Doob Stopping Time Theorem we compute the expected duration of attack cycles. We discover a remarkable property of the bitcoin network: no strategy is more profitable than the honest strategy before a difficulty adjustment. So selfish mining can only become profitable afterwards, thus it is an attack on the difficulty adjustment algorithm. We propose an improvement of Bitcoin protocol making it immune to selfish mining attacks. We also study miner's attraction to selfish mining pools. We calculate the expected duration time before profit for the selfish miner, a computation that is out of reach by the previous Markov models.
Blockchain-based consensus protocols present the opportunity to develop new protocols, due to their novel requirements of open participation and explicit incentivization of participants. To address the first requirement, it is necessary to consider the leader election inherent in consensus protocols, which can be difficult to scale to a large and untrusted set of participants. To address the second, it is important to consider ways to provide incentivization without relying on the resource-intensive proofs-of-work used in Bitcoin. In this paper, we propose a secure leader election protocol, Caucus; we next fit this protocol into a broader blockchain-based consensus protocol, Fantomette, that provides game-theoretic guarantees in addition to traditional blockchain security properties. Fantomette is the first proof-of-stake protocol to give formal game-theoretic proofs of security in the presence of non-rational players.
Mustafa Al-Bassam, Alberto Sonnino, Michał Król, Ioannis Psaras
We present Airtnt, a novel scheme that enables users with CPUs that support Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) and remote attestation to rent out computing time on secure enclaves to untrusted users. Airtnt makes use of the attestation capabilities of TEEs and smart contracts on distributed ledgers to guarantee the fair exchange of the payment and the result of an execution. Airtnt makes use of off-chain payment channels to allow requesters to pay executing nodes for intermediate "snapshots" of the state of an execution. Effectively, this step-by-step "compute-payment" cycle realises untrusted pay-as-you-go micropayments for computation. Neither the requester nor the executing node can walk away and incur monetary loss to the other party. This also allows requesters to continue executions on other executing nodes if the original executing node becomes unavailable or goes offline.
Freya Sheer Hardwick, Raja Naeem Akram, Konstantinos Markantonakis
At a time when society is in constant transition to keep up with technological advancement, we are seeing traditional paradigms being increasingly challenged. The fundamentals of governance are one such paradigm. As society's values have shifted, so have expectations of government shifted from the traditional model to something commonly referred to as `open governance'. Though a disputed term, we take open governance to mean a concept, which encourages and facilitates openness, accountability, and responsiveness to citizens. For the success of open governance initiatives, there are some technologies, such as the internet, that are crucial. These technologies enable access to both the data and to engagement activities between citizens and government. There are also other technologies, like blockchain and smart contacts, which could be utilised to assist open governance. A sound starting point would be moving from a system where information is tediously released by a government, on an `as they please' basis, to an infrastructure where critical actions are captured with strong integrity, non-repudiation and evidential guarantees. With an added dimension that facilitates these actions record be accessible to public scrutiny in near real-time. One candidate technology for capturing such actions is blockchain. Initially, blockchains were mainly used to facilitate cryptocurrencies as a record of transactions. The notable example being bitcoin. However, in recent years, blockchains utility is being recognised through smart contracts - potentially a vital building block to realising open and transparent government activities. In this paper, we employ the concept of smart contracts to government tendering activities. The proposed scheme is based on smart contracts, enabling a fair, transparent and independently verifiable (auditable) government tendering scheme. The scheme is then implemented on the Ethereum platform to evaluate the performance and financial cost implications, along with an evaluation of the potential security and auditability challenges.
In this paper we discuss a design philosophy for interoperable blockchain systems, using the design philosophy of the Internet architecture as the basis to identify key design principles. Several interoperability challenges are discussed in the context of cross-domain transactions. We illustrate how these principles are informing the interoperability architecture of the MIT Tradecoin system.
Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies secure a decentralized consensus protocol by incentives. The protocol participants, called miners, generate (mine) a series of blocks, each containing monetary transactions created by system users. As incentive for participation, miners receive newly minted currency and transaction fees paid by transaction creators. Blockchain bandwidth limits lead users to pay increasing fees in order to prioritize their transactions. However, most prior work focused on models where fees are negligible. In a notable exception, Carlsten et al. postulated in CCS'16 that if incentives come only from fees then a mining gap would form~--- miners would avoid mining when the available fees are insufficient. In this work, we analyze cryptocurrency security in realistic settings, taking into account all elements of expenses and rewards. To study when gaps form, we analyze the system as a game we call \emph{the gap game}. We analyze the game with a combination of symbolic and numeric analysis tools in a wide range of scenarios. Our analysis confirms Carlsten et al.'s postulate; indeed, we show that gaps form well before fees are the only incentive, and analyze the implications on security. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that different miners choose different gap sizes to optimize their utility, even when their operating costs are identical. Alarmingly, we see that the system incentivizes large miner coalitions, reducing system decentralization. We describe the required conditions to avoid the incentive misalignment, providing guidelines for future cryptocurrency design.
Parinya Ekparinya, Vincent Gramoli, Guillaume Jourjon
Recently, several works conjectured the vulnerabilities of mainstream blockchains under several network attacks. All these attacks translate into showing that the assumptions of these blockchains can be violated in theory or under simulation at best. Unfortunately, previous results typically omit both the nature of the network under which the blockchain code runs and whether blockchains are private, consortium or public. In this paper, we study the public Ethereum blockchain as well as a consortium and private blockchains and quantify the feasibility of man-in-the-middle and double spending attacks against them. To this end, we list important properties of the Ethereum public blockchain topology, we deploy VMs with constrained CPU quantum to mimic the top-10 mining pools of Ethereum and we develop full-fledged attacks, that first partition the network through BGP hijacking or ARP spoofing before issuing a Balance Attack to steal coins. Our results demonstrate that attacking Ethereum is remarkably devastating in a consortium or private context as the adversary can multiply her digital assets by 200, 000x in 10 hours through BGP hijacking whereas it would be almost impossible in a public context.
In a previous paper, it was discussed whether Bitcoin and/or its blockchain could be considered a complex system and, if so, whether a chaotic one, a positive response raising concerns about the likelihood of Bitcoin/blockchain entering a chaotic regime, with catastrophic consequences for financial systems based on it. This paper intends to simplify and extend that analysis to other PoW, PoS, and hybrid protocol-based cryptocurrencies. As before, this study was carried out with the help of Information Theory of Complex Systems, in general, and Crutchfield's Statistical Complexity measure, in particular. This paper is a work-in-progress. We intend to uncover some other measures that capture the qualitative notion of complexity of systems that can be applied to these cryptocurrencies to compare with the results here obtained.
We propose a bitcoin generalization as a solution to the problem of scalability. The block is redefined as a sequence of sub-blocks of increasing sizes that coexist as different levels of compromise between decentralization and transactions throughput. Miners and users can decide individually the sizes they use without affecting others in the network.
This review focuses on the evolution of cloud computing and distributed ledger technologies (blockchains) over the last decade. Cloud computing relies mainly on a conceptually centralized service provisioning model, while blockchain technologies originate from a peer-to-peer and a completely distributed approach. Still, noteworthy commonalities between both approaches are often overlooked by researchers. Therefore, to the best of the authors knowledge, this paper reviews both domains in parallel for the first time. We conclude that both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. The advantages of centralized service provisioning approaches are often the disadvantages of distributed ledger approaches and vice versa. It is obviously an interesting question whether both approaches could be combined in a way that the advantages can be added while the disadvantages could be avoided. We derive a software stack that could build the foundation unifying the best of these two worlds and that would avoid existing shortcomings like vendor lock-in, some security problems, and inherent platform dependencies.
Blockchain is a novel technology that is rising a lot of interest in the industrial and re- search sectors because its properties of decentralisation, immutability and data integrity. Initially, the underlying consensus mechanism has been designed for permissionless block- chain on trustless network model through the proof-of-work, i.e. a mathematical challenge which requires high computational power. This solution suffers of poor performances, hence alternative consensus algorithms as the proof-of-stake have been proposed. Conversely, for permissioned blockchain, where participants are known and authenti- cated, variants of distributed consensus algorithms have been employed. However, most of them comes out without formal expression of security analysis and trust assumptions because the absence of an established knowledge. Therefore the lack of adequate analysis on these algorithms hinders any cautious evaluation of their effectiveness in a real-world setting where systems are deployed over trustless networks, i.e. Internet ...
George Kappos, Haaroon Yousaf, Mary Maller, Sarah Meiklejohn
Among the now numerous alternative cryptocurrencies derived from Bitcoin, Zcash is often touted as the one with the strongest anonymity guarantees, due to its basis in well-regarded cryptographic research. In this paper, we examine the extent to which anonymity is achieved in the deployed version of Zcash. We investigate all facets of anonymity in Zcash's transactions, ranging from its transparent transactions to the interactions with and within its main privacy feature, a shielded pool that acts as the anonymity set for users wishing to spend coins privately. We conclude that while it is possible to use Zcash in a private way, it is also possible to shrink its anonymity set considerably by developing simple heuristics based on identifiable patterns of usage.
Blockchain technology has been transforming the financial industry and has created a new crypto-economy in the last decade. The foundational concepts such as decentralized trust and distributed ledger are promising for distributed, and large-scale Internet of Things (IoT) applications. However, the applications of Blockchain beyond cryptocurrencies in this domain are few and far between because of the lack of understanding and inherent architectural challenges. In this paper, we describe the opportunities for applications of blockchain for the IoT and examine the challenges involved in architecting Blockchain-based IoT applications.
The past decade has witnessed the rapid evolution in blockchain technologies, which has attracted tremendous interests from both the research communities and industries. The blockchain network was originated from the Internet financial sector as a decentralized, immutable ledger system for transactional data ordering. Nowadays, it is envisioned as a powerful backbone/framework for decentralized data processing and data-driven self-organization in flat, open-access networks. In particular, the plausible characteristics of decentralization, immutability, and self-organization are primarily owing to the unique decentralized consensus mechanisms introduced by blockchain networks. This survey is motivated by the lack of a comprehensive literature review on the development of decentralized consensus mechanisms in blockchain networks. In this paper, we provide a systematic vision of the organization of blockchain networks. By emphasizing the unique characteristics of decentralized consensus in blockchain networks, our in-depth review of the state-of-the-art consensus protocols is focused on both the perspective of distributed consensus system design and the perspective of incentive mechanism design. From a game-theoretic point of view, we also provide a thorough review of the strategy adopted for self-organization by the individual nodes in the blockchain backbone networks. Consequently, we provide a comprehensive survey of the emerging applications of blockchain networks in a broad area of telecommunication. We highlight our special interest in how the consensus mechanisms impact these applications. Finally, we discuss several open issues in the protocol design for blockchain consensus and the related potential research directions.