Atomic swaps enable the transfer of value between the cryptocurrencies of various blockchains without the need to trust an intermediary. In this paper, we propose the concept of atomic loans, which utilize atomic swap technology to allow market participants to create overcollateralized debt instruments in a trustless and disintermediated manner. The primary use cases for atomic loans include enabling fiat/stablecoin access for cryptocurrency holders to participate within legacy systems, as well as enabling leverage for margin trading. We also introduce a bidding process for liquidating collateral in the case of default which provides the ability for a more fair distribution of collateral.
Mozhdeh Farhadi, Daniele Miorandi, Guillaume Pierre
IoT provides services by connecting smart devices to the Internet, and exploiting data generated by said devices to enable value-added services to individuals and businesses. In such cases, if data is exposed, tampered or lost, the service would not behave correctly. In this article, we discuss data security in IoT applications across five dimensions: confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, non-repudiation and availability. We discuss how distributed ledger technology could be used to overcome these issues and propose to use a fog computing architecture as decentralized computational support to deploy the ledger.
We study selfish mining in Ethereum. The problem is combinato-rially more complex than in Bitcoin because of major differences in the reward system and a different difficulty adjustment formula. Equivalent strategies in Bitcoin do have different profitabilities in Ethereum. The attacker can either broadcast his fork one block by one, or keep them secret as long as possible and publish them all at once at the end of an attack cycle. The first strategy is damaging for substantial hashrates, and we show that the second strategy is even worse. This confirms what we already proved for Bitcoin: Selfish mining is most of all an attack on the difficulty adjustment formula. We show that the current reward for signaling uncle blocks is a weak incentive for the attacker to signal blocks. We compute the profitabilities of different strategies and find out that for a large parameter space values, strategies that do not signal blocks are the best ones. We compute closed-form formulas for the apparent hashrates for these strategies and compare them. We use a direct combinatorics analysis with Dyck words to find these closed-form formulas.
Albert Galiev, Shamil Ishmukhametov, Rustam Latypov, Nikolai Prokopyev · 6 authors
In this paper, we propose a novel archival system called ARCHAIN, developed for the State archive-keeping committee of the Republic of Tatarstan (Russia). The blockchain is the primary part of the system, which stores transactions (facts of transfer of documents to the archive) in a protected form.
Blockchains have recently gained popularity thanks to their ability to record "digital truth". They are designed to keep persistence, security, and avoid attacks which is useful for many applications. However, they are still problematic in their energy consumption, governance, and scalability Current solutions either require vast computing power via Proof-of-Work (PoW) or cannot directly utilize computing power as a resource in virtual mining. Here, we propose incentive-based protocols that use competitions to integrate computing power into blockchains. We introduce Proof-of-Accumulated-Work (PoAW): miners compete in costumer-submitted jobs, accumulate recorded work whenever they are successful, and, over time, are remunerated. The underlying competition replaces the standard hash puzzle-based competitions of PoW. A competition is managed by a dynamically-created small masternode network (dTMN) of invested miners. dTMNs allow for scalability as we do not need the entire network to manage the competition. Using careful design on incentives, our system preserves security, avoids attacks, and offers new markets to miners. When there are no costumers the system converges into a standard protocol. Our proposed solution improves the way by which the blockchain infrastructure works and makes use of its computing power. We also discuss how the protocol can be used by fields that require solving difficult optimization problems, such as Artificial Intelligence and Pattern Recognition in Big Data.
Dominic Deuber, Bernardo Magri, Sri Aravinda Krishnan Thyagarajan
Bitcoin is an immutable permissionless blockchain system that has been extensively used as a public bulletin board by many different applications that heavily relies on its immutability. However, Bitcoin's immutability is not without its fair share of demerits. Interpol exposed the existence of harmful and potentially illegal documents, images and links in the Bitcoin blockchain, and since then there have been several qualitative and quantitative analysis on the types of data currently residing in the Bitcoin blockchain. Although there is a lot of attention on blockchains, surprisingly the previous solutions proposed for data redaction in the permissionless setting are far from feasible, and require additional trust assumptions. Hence, the problem of harmful data still poses a huge challenge for law enforcement agencies like Interpol (Tziakouris, IEEE S&P'18). We propose the first efficient redactable blockchain for the permissionless setting that is easily integrable into Bitcoin, and that does not rely on heavy cryptographic tools or trust assumptions. Our protocol uses a consensus-based voting and is parameterised by a policy that dictates the requirements and constraints for the redactions; if a redaction gathers enough votes the operation is performed on the chain. As an extra feature, our protocol offers public verifiability and accountability for the redacted chain. Moreover, we provide formal security definitions and proofs showing that our protocol is secure against redactions that were not agreed by consensus. Additionally, we show the viability of our approach with a proof-of-concept implementation that shows only a tiny overhead in the chain validation of our protocol when compared to an immutable one.
A new type of watermarks for handwritten black-white documents is suggested. Insertion of the watermark in a document minimizes distortion of the latter. The method is intended for validation of handwritten records placed in blockchain database.
Privacy was one of the key points mentioned in Nakamoto's Bitcoin whitepaper, and one of the selling points of Bitcoin in its early stages. In hindsight, however, de-anonymising Bitcoin users turned out to be more feasible than expected. Since then, privacy focused cryptocurrencies such as Zcash and Monero have surfaced. Both of these examples cannot be described as fully successful in their aims, as recent research has shown. Incentives are integral to the security of cryptocurrencies, so it is interesting to investigate whether they could also be aligned with privacy goals. A lack of privacy often results from low user counts, resulting in low anonymity sets. Could users be incentivised to use the privacy preserving implementations of the systems they use? Not only is Zcash much less used than Bitcoin (which it forked from), but most Zcash transactions are simply transparent transactions, rather than the (at least intended to be) privacy-preserving shielded transactions. This paper and poster briefly discusses how incentives could be incorporated into systems like cryptocurrencies with the aim of achieving privacy goals. We take Zcash as example, but the ideas discussed could apply to other privacy-focused cryptocurrencies. This work was presented as a poster at OPERANDI 2018, the poster can be found within this short document.
Peter B. Rønne, Arash Atashpendar, Kristian Gjøsteen, Peter Y. A. Ryan
We present an approach for performing the tallying work in the coercion-resistant JCJ voting protocol, introduced by Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson, in linear time using fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). The suggested enhancement also paves the path towards making JCJ quantum-resistant, while leaving the underlying structure of JCJ intact. The exhaustive, comparison-based approach of JCJ using plaintext equivalence tests leads to a quadratic blow-up in the number of votes, which makes the tallying process rather impractical in realistic settings with a large number of voters. We show how the removal of invalid votes can be done in linear time via a solution based on recent advances in various FHE primitives such as hashing, zero-knowledge proofs of correct decryption, verifiable shuffles and threshold FHE. We conclude by touching upon some of the advantages and challenges of such an approach, followed by a discussion of further security and post-quantum considerations.
Blockchain protocols are based on a distributed database where stored data is guaranteed to be immutable. The requirement that all nodes have to maintain their own local copy of the database ensures security while consensus mechanisms help deciding which data gets added to the database and keep powerful adversaries from derailing the system. However, since the database that forms the foundation of a blockchain is a continuously growing list of blocks, scalability is an inherent problem of this technology. Some public blockchains need a few 100 GB to Terabytes of storage. In this work, we present the concept Superlight with self-contained proofs, which is designed to improve scalability of a public blockchain, while preserving security and decentralization. Instead of all nodes having a local copy of the whole blockchain to verify a transaction, nodes can derive the validity of a transaction by only using block headers. To keep the block headers compact, BLS signatures are used to combine signatures. We provide a definition of SCPs and show the required steps of a client to create a proof that is accepted by other nodes for transferring funds. The advantage of such a light-client-only blockchain is the lower storage requirement, while the drawback is an increased computational complexity due to BLS signatures, limited use-cases due to lack of a global state, and the requirement for an interactive protocol between sender, receiver, and miner to create a transaction.
We propose a framework for threshold cryptosystems under a permissionless-economic model in which the participants are rational profit-maximizing entities. To date, threshold cryptosystems have been considered under permissioned settings with a limited adversary. Our framework relies on an escrow service that slashes and redistributes deposits to incentivize participants to adhere desired behaviors. Today, more than ever, sophisticated escrow services can be implemented over public blockchains like Ethereum, without additional trust assumptions. The key threat to rational threshold cryptosystems is collusion---by cooperating `illegally', a subset of participants can reveal the cryptosystem's secret, which, in turn is translated to unfair profit. Our countermeasure to collusion is framing. If the escrow is notified of collusion, it rewards the framer and slashes the deposits of all other participants. We show that colluding parties find themselves in the prisoner's dilemma, where the dominant strategy is framing.
Illicit crypto-mining leverages resources stolen from victims to mine cryptocurrencies on behalf of criminals. While recent works have analyzed one side of this threat, i.e.: web-browser cryptojacking, only commercial reports have partially covered binary-based crypto-mining malware. In this paper, we conduct the largest measurement of crypto-mining malware to date, analyzing approximately 4.5 million malware samples (1.2 million malicious miners), over a period of twelve years from 2007 to 2019. Our analysis pipeline applies both static and dynamic analysis to extract information from the samples, such as wallet identifiers and mining pools. Together with OSINT data, this information is used to group samples into campaigns. We then analyze publicly-available payments sent to the wallets from mining-pools as a reward for mining, and estimate profits for the different campaigns. All this together is is done in a fully automated fashion, which enables us to leverage measurement-based findings of illicit crypto-mining at scale. Our profit analysis reveals campaigns with multi-million earnings, associating over 4.4% of Monero with illicit mining. We analyze the infrastructure related with the different campaigns, showing that a high proportion of this ecosystem is supported by underground economies such as Pay-Per-Install services. We also uncover novel techniques that allow criminals to run successful campaigns.
This paper presents a concept of the protocol for public registries based on block-chain. The proposed mechanism allows creating a standard database over a bun-dle of distributed ledgers. It ensures a blockchain agnostic approach and utilizes the benefits of various blockchain technologies in one ecosystem. In this scheme, blockchains play the role of journal storages (immutable log), while the overlaid database is the indexed storage. The distinctive feature of such a system is that in blockchain, users can perform peer-to-peer transactions directly in the ledger us-ing blockchain native mechanism of user access management with public-key cryptography (blockchain does not require to administrate its database). The pro-tocol is designed for public property registries, i.e., land titles, cars, boats, corpo-rate rights, etc. Users can create and manage their rights using the full power of blockchain technologies and smart contracts. The governance component in this protocol is introduced as Smart Laws and Digital Authorities, the algorithms to manage the overlaid system and address legal issues with property rights and law enforcement.
Jan 1, 2019·Proceedings of the ... Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences/Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
With the advent of blockchain technology, some management tasks of IoT networks can be moved from central systems to distributed validation authorities. Cloud-centric blockchain implementations for IoT have shown satisfactory performance. However, some features of blockchain are not necessary for IoT. For instance, a competitive consensus. This research presents the idea of customizing and encapsulating the features of blockchain into software-defined components to host them on edge devices. Thus, blockchain resources can be provisioned by edge devices (e-miners) working together closer to the things layer in a cooperative manner. This research uses Edison SoC as e-miners to test the software-defined blockchain components.
The Holy Grail of a decentralised stablecoin is achieved on rigorous mathematical frameworks, obtaining multiple advantageous proofs: stability, convergence, truthfulness, faithfulness, and malicious-security. These properties could only be attained by the novel and interdisciplinary combination of previously unrelated fields: model predictive control, deep learning, alternating direction method of multipliers (consensus-ADMM), mechanism design, secure multi-party computation, and zero-knowledge proofs. For the first time, this paper proves: - the feasibility of decentralising the central bank while securely preserving its independence in a decentralised computation setting - the benefits for price stability of combining mechanism design, provable security, and control theory, unlike the heuristics of previous stablecoins - the implementation of complex monetary policies on a stablecoin, equivalent to the ones used by central banks and beyond the current fixed rules of cryptocurrencies that hinder their price stability - methods to circumvent the impossibilities of Guaranteed Output Delivery (G.O.D.) and fairness: standing on truthfulness and faithfulness, we reach G.O.D. and fairness under the assumption of rational parties As a corollary, a decentralised artificial intelligence is able to conduct the monetary policy of a stablecoin, minimising human intervention.
Applications of blockchain technologies got a lot of attention in recent years. They exceed beyond exchanging value and being a substitute for fiat money and traditional banking system. Nevertheless, being able to exchange value on a blockchain is at the core of the entire system and has to be reliable. Blockchains have built-in mechanisms that guarantee whole system's consistency and reliability. However, malicious actors can still try to steal money by applying well known techniques like malware software or fake emails. In this paper we apply supervised learning techniques to detect fraudulent accounts on Ethereum blockchain. We compare capabilities of Random Forests, Support Vector Machines and XGBoost classifiers to identify such accounts basing on a dataset of more than 300 thousands accounts. Results show that we are able to achieve recall and precision values allowing for the designed system to be applicable as an anti-fraud rule for digital wallets or currency exchanges. We also present sensitivity analysis to show how presented models depend on particular feature and how lack of some of them will affect the overall system performance.
In this paper, we describe LUNES-Blockchain, an agent-based simulator of blockchains that is able to exploit Parallel and Distributed Simulation (PADS) techniques to offer a high level of scalability. To assess the preliminary implementation of our simulator, we provide a simplified modelling of the Bitcoin protocol and we study the effect of a security attack on the consensus protocol in which a set of malicious nodes implements a filtering denial of service (i.e. Sybil Attack). The results confirm the viability of the agent-based modelling of blockchains implemented by means of PADS.
Ethereum smart contracts are executable programs, deployed on a peer-to-peer network and executed in a consensus-based fashion. Their bytecode is public, immutable and once deployed to the blockchain, cannot be patched anymore. As smart contracts may hold Ether worth of several million dollars, they are attractive targets for attackers and indeed some contracts have successfully been exploited in the recent past, resulting in tremendous financial losses. The correctness of smart contracts is thus of utmost importance. While first approaches on formal verification exist, they demand users to be well-versed in formal methods which are alien to many developers and are only able to analyze individual contracts, without considering their execution environment, i.e., calls to external contracts, sequences of transaction, and values from the actual blockchain storage. In this paper, we present Annotary, a concolic execution framework to analyze smart contracts for vulnerabilities, supported by annotations which developers write directly in the Solidity source code. In contrast to existing work, Annotary supports analysis of inter-transactional, inter-contract control flows and combines symbolic execution of EVM bytecode with a resolution of concrete values from the public Ethereum blockchain. While the analysis of Annotary tends to weight precision higher than soundness, we analyze inter-transactional call chains to eliminate false positives from unreachable states that traditional symbolic execution would not be able to handle. We present the annotation and analysis concepts of Annotary, explain its implementation on top of the Laser symbolic virtual machine, and demonstrate its usage as a plugin for the Sublime Text editor.
Anonymity revocation is an essential component of credential issuing systems since unconditional anonymity is incompatible with pursuing and sanctioning credential misuse. However, current anonymity revocation approaches have shortcomings with respect to the auditability of the revocation process. In this paper, we propose a novel anonymity revocation approach based on privacy-preserving blockchain-based smart contracts, where the code self-execution property ensures availability and public ledger immutability provides auditability. We describe an instantiation of this approach, provide an implementation thereof and conduct a series of evaluations in terms of running time, gas cost and latency. The results show that our scheme is feasible and efficient.
Carlos Molina-Jiménez, Ioannis Sfyrakis, Linmao Song, Danny, Hazem · 5 authors
The hype about Bitcoin has overrated the potential of smart contracts deployed on-blockchains (on-chains) and underrated the potential of smart contracts deployed on-Trusted Third Parties (on-TTPs). As a result, current research and development in this field is focused mainly on smart contract applications that use on-chain smart contracts. We argue that there is a large class of smart contract applications where on-TTP smart contracts are a better alternative. The problem with on-chain smart contracts is that the fully decentralised model and indelible append-only data model followed by blockchains introduces several engineering problems that are hard to solve. In these situations, the inclusion of a TTP (assuming that the application can tolerate its inconveniences) instead of a blockchain to host the smart contract simplifies the problems and offers pragmatic solutions. The intention and contribution of this paper is to shed some light on this issue. We use a hypothetical use case of a car insurance application to illustrate technical problems that are easier to solve with on-TTP smart contracts than with on-chain smart contracts.
The old mantra of decentralizing the Internet is coming again with fanfare, this time around the blockchain technology hype. We have already seen a technology supposed to change the nature of the Internet: peer-to-peer. The reality is that peer-to-peer naming systems failed, peer-to-peer social networks failed, and yes, peer-to-peer storage failed as well. In this paper, we will review the research on distributed systems in the last few years to identify the limits of open peer-to-peer networks. We will address issues like system complexity, security and frailty, instability and performance. We will show how many of the aforementioned problems also apply to the recent breed of permissionless blockchain networks. The applicability of such systems to mature industrial applications is undermined by the same properties that make them so interesting for a libertarian audience: namely, their openness, their pseudo-anonymity and their unregulated cryptocurrencies. As such, we argue that permissionless blockchain networks are unsuitable to be the substrate for a decentralized Internet. Yet, there is still hope for more decentralization, albeit in a form somewhat limited with respect to the libertarian view of decentralized Internet: in cooperation rather than in competition with the superpowerful datacenters that dominate the world today. This is derived from the recent surge in interest in byzantine fault tolerance and permissioned blockchains, which opens the door to a world where use of trusted third parties is not the only way to arbitrate an ensemble of entities. The ability of establish trust through permissioned blockchains enables to move the control from the datacenters to the edge, truly realizing the promises of edge-centric computing.
This work presents ContractChecker, a Blockchain-based security protocol for verifying the storage consistency between the mutually distrusting cloud provider and clients. Unlike existing protocols, the ContractChecker uniquely delegates log auditing to the Blockchain, and has the advantages in reducing client cost and lowering requirements on client availability, lending itself to modern scenarios with mobile and web clients. The ContractChecker collects the logs from both clients and the cloud server, and verifies the consistency by cross-checking the logs. By this means, it does not only detects the attacks from malicious clients and server forging their logs, but also is able to mitigate those attacks and recover the system from them. In addition, we design new attacks against ContractChecker exploiting various limits in real Blockchain systems (e.g., write unavailability, Blockchain forks, contract race conditions). We analyze and harden the security of ContractChecker protocols against the proposed new attacks. For evaluating the cost, we build a functional prototype of the ContractChecker on Ethereum/Solidity. By experiments on private and public Ethereum testnets, we extensively evaluate the cost of the ContractChecker in comparison with that of existing client-based log auditing works. The result shows the ContractChecker can scale to hundreds of clients and save client costs by more than one order of magnitude.
Jan 1, 2019·Proceedings of the 16th International Joint Conference on e-Business and Telecommunications - Volume 2: SECRYPT, 325-332, 2019, Prague, Czech Republic
Martin Schanzenbach, Thomas Kilian, Julian Schütte, Christian Banse
In this paper we present ZKlaims: a system that allows users to present attribute-based credentials in a privacy-preserving way. We achieve a zero-knowledge property on the basis of Succinct Non-interactive Arguments of Knowledge (SNARKs). ZKlaims allow users to prove statements on credentials issued by trusted third parties. The credential contents are never revealed to the verifier as part of the proving process. Further, ZKlaims can be presented non-interactively, mitigating the need for interactive proofs between the user and the verifier. This allows ZKlaims to be exchanged via fully decentralized services and storages such as traditional peer-to-peer networks based on distributed hash tables (DHTs) or even blockchains. To show this, we include a performance evaluation of ZKlaims and show how it can be integrated in decentralized identity provider services.
Georgia Avarikioti, Lukas Käppeli, Yuyi Wang, Roger Wattenhofer
We prove Bitcoin is secure under temporary dishonest majority. We assume the adversary can corrupt a specific fraction of parties and also introduce crash failures, i.e., some honest participants are offline during the execution of the protocol. We demand a majority of honest online participants on expectation. We explore three different models and present the requirements for proving Bitcoin's security in all of them: we first examine a synchronous model, then extend to a bounded delay model and last we consider a synchronous model that allows message losses.