Pascal Berrang, Philipp von Styp-Rekowsky, Marvin Wißfeld, Bruno W. França · 5 authors
The consensus protocol is a critical component of distributed ledgers and blockchains. Achieving consensus over a decentralized network poses challenges to transaction finality and performance. Currently, the highest-performing consensus algorithms are speculative BFT algorithms, which, however, compromise on the transaction finality guarantees offered by their non-speculative counterparts. In this paper, we introduce Albatross, a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) blockchain consensus algorithm that aims to combine the best of both worlds. At its heart, Albatross is a high-performing, speculative BFT algorithm that offers strong probabilistic finality. We complement this by periodically guaranteeing finality through the Tendermint protocol. We prove our protocol to be secure under standard BFT assumptions and analyze its performance both on a theoretical and practical level. For that, we provide an open-source Rust implementation of Albatross. Our real-world measurements support that our protocol has a performance close to the theoretical maximum for single-chain Proof-of-Stake consensus algorithms.
We propose a proof of mining system. Roughly speaking, in this system the mining stake ${\rm mstak}(A)$ with discrimination index $a\in[0,1]$ of an account $A$ is defined by the formula: $${\rm mstak}(A)=(1-a)\cdot\frac{1}{\rm NOM}+a\cdot\frac{{\rm NOBM}(A)}{L},$$ where $L$ is the length of the block-chain, ${\rm NOM}$ is the number of miners in the block-chain, and ${\rm NOBM}(A)$ is the number of blocks mined by $A$.
Ivan Puddu, Daniele Lain, Moritz Schneider, Elizaveta Tretiakova · 6 authors
We investigate identity lease, a new type of service in which users lease their identities to third parties by providing them with full or restricted access to their online accounts or credentials. We discuss how identity lease could be abused to subvert the digital society, facilitating the spread of fake news and subverting electronic voting by enabling the sale of votes. We show that the emergence of Trusted Execution Environments and anonymous cryptocurrencies, for the first time, allows the implementation of such a lease service while guaranteeing fairness, plausible deniability and anonymity, therefore shielding the users and account renters from prosecution. To show that such a service can be practically implemented, we build an example service that we call TEEvil leveraging Intel SGX and ZCash. Finally, we discuss defense mechanisms and challenges in the mitigation of identity lease services.
ABSTRACT The Ethereum block chain as a decentralized platform is so successful that many applications deployed on it. However, for the inherent transparency properties and the lack of privacy, deploying a financial application on top of it is always a challenge. In this paper, we tackle this challenge and propose an anonymous sealed-bid auction protocol based on time-released encryption atop Consortium Block chain. We adopt a strict digital certificate-based identity mechanism of the consortium block chain to permit legitimate participants, and utilize the blind signature based on elliptic curve technology to allowing anonymous participation. Moreover, a timed release public key encryption algorithm is adopted to encrypt bids and prevent auctioneer from colluding with bidders. This is completely different from the method (zero-knowledge proof) used in other papers to prevent collusion between auctioneer and bidder. We provide a specific analysis of our protocol, which shows that our protocol meets anonymity and applicability. KEYWORDS Consortium Block chain, Smart Contract, Sealed-Bid Auction, Time-Released Encryption, Blind signature
Yu‐Jin Kwon, Hyoungshick Kim, Jinwoo Shin, Yongdae Kim
Bitcoin has become the most popular cryptocurrency based on a peer-to-peer network. In Aug. 2017, Bitcoin was split into the original Bitcoin (BTC) and Bitcoin Cash (BCH). Since then, miners have had a choice between BTC and BCH mining because they have compatible proof-of-work algorithms. Therefore, they can freely choose which coin to mine for higher profit, where the profitability depends on both the coin price and mining difficulty. Some miners can immediately switch the coin to mine only when mining difficulty changes because the difficulty changes are more predictable than that for the coin price, and we call this behavior fickle mining. In this paper, we study the effects of fickle mining by modeling a game between two coins. To do this, we consider both fickle miners and some factions (e.g., BITMAIN for BCH mining) that stick to mining one coin to maintain that chain. In this model, we show that fickle mining leads to a Nash equilibrium in which only a faction sticking to its coin mining remains as a loyal miner to the less valued coin (e.g., BCH), where loyal miners refer to those who conduct mining even after coin mining difficulty increases. This situation would cause severe centralization, weakening the security of the coin system. To determine which equilibrium the competing coin systems (e.g., BTC vs. BCH) are moving toward, we traced the historical changes of mining power for BTC and BCH and found that BCH often lacked loyal miners until Nov. 13, 2017, when the difficulty adjustment algorithm of BCH mining was changed. However, the change in difficulty adjustment algorithm of BCH mining led to a state close to the stable coexistence of BTC and BCH. We also demonstrate that the lack of BCH loyal miners may still be reached when a fraction of miners automatically and repeatedly switches to the most profitable coin to mine (i.e., automatic mining). According to our analysis, as of Dec. 2018, loyal miners to BCH would leave if more than about 5% of the total mining capacity for BTC and BCH has engaged in the automatic mining. In addition, we analyze the recent “hash war” between Bitcoin ABC and SV, which confirms our theoretical analysis. Finally, we note that our results can be applied to any competing cryptocurrency systems in which the same hardware (e.g., ASICs or GPUs) can be used for mining. Therefore, our study brings new and important angles in competitive coin markets: a coin can intentionally weaken the security and decentralization level of the other rival coin when mining hardware is shared between them, allowing for automatic mining.
Parinya Ekparinya, Vincent Gramoli, Guillaume Jourjon
In this paper, we explore vulnerabilities and countermeasures of the recently proposed blockchain consensus based on proof-of-authority. The proof-of-work blockchains, like Bitcoin and Ethereum, have been shown both theoretically and empirically vulnerable to double spending attacks. This is why Byzantine fault tolerant consensus algorithms have gained popularity in the blockchain context for their ability to tolerate a limited number t of attackers among n participants. We formalize the recently proposed proof-of-authority consensus algorithms that are Byzantine fault tolerant by describing the Aura and Clique protocols present in the two mainstream implementations of Ethereum. We then introduce the Cloning Attack and show how to apply it to double spend in each of these protocols with a single malicious node. Our results show that the Cloning Attack against Aura is always successful while the same attack against Clique is about twice as fast and succeeds in most cases.
We outline a quantum-enabled blockchain architecture based on a consortium of quantum servers. The network is hybridised, utilising digital systems for sharing and processing classical information combined with a fibre--optic infrastructure and quantum devices for transmitting and processing quantum information. We deliver an energy efficient interactive mining protocol enacted between clients and servers which uses quantum information encoded in light and removes the need for trust in network infrastructure. Instead, clients on the network need only trust the transparent network code, and that their devices adhere to the rules of quantum physics. To demonstrate the energy efficiency of the mining protocol, we elaborate upon the results of two previous experiments (one performed over 1km of optical fibre) as applied to this work. Finally, we address some key vulnerabilities, explore open questions, and observe forward--compatibility with the quantum internet and quantum computing technologies.
The blockchain technology has been changing our daily lives since Bitcoin - i.e., the first decentralized cryptocurrency - was invented and released as open-source software by an unidentified person or a group called Satoshi Nakamoto in 2009. Of many applications which can be implemented based on the blockchain, storage is an important one, a notable example of which is the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS). IPFS is a distributed web based on a peer-to-peer hypermedia protocol to make the web faster, safer, and more open and focuses on public accessible files. To provide a solution for private file storage in the blockchain way, in this paper we propose a Merkle-tree-based File System (MTFS). In MTFS, the blockchain is more than a trust machine; it is an abstract of a cluster system. Distributed random nodes form a tree network cluster without a central controller to provide a secure private storage service and faster message propagation. Advance proxy re-encryption algorithm is applied to guarantee secure file exchanges under permission. Merkle tree will make sure that the files are distributed among the service nodes in a balanced way. The proposed MTFS can be used not only for personal file storage and exchange but also for industry requiring mutual trust in file uploading and downloading in making contracts like insurances.
With the ever growing Internet of Things (IoT) market, ledger systems are facing new challenges to efficiently store and secure enormous customer records collected by the IoT devices. The authenticity, availability, and integrity of these records are critically important for both business providers and customers. In this paper, we describe DLedger, a lightweight and resilient distributed ledger system. Instead of a single chain of blocks, DLedger builds the ledger over a directed acyclic graph (DAG), so that its operations can tolerate network partition and intermittent connectivity. Instead of compute-intensive Proof-of-Work (PoW), DLedger utilizes Proof-of-Authentication (PoA), whose light-weight operations are IoT-friendly, to achieve consensus. Furthermore, DLedger is built upon a data-centric network called Named Data Networking (NDN), which facilitates the peer-to-peer data dissemination in heterogeneous IoT networks.
Blockchain is challenging the status quo of the central trust infrastructure currently prevalent in the Internet towards a design principle that is underscored by decentralization, transparency, and trusted auditability. In ideal terms, blockchain advocates a decentralized, transparent, and more democratic version of the Internet. Essentially being a trusted and decentralized database, blockchain finds its applications in fields as varied as the energy sector, forestry, fisheries, mining, material recycling, air pollution monitoring, supply chain management, and their associated operations. In this paper, we present a survey of blockchain-based network applications. Our goal is to cover the evolution of blockchain-based systems that are trying to bring in a renaissance in the existing, mostly centralized, space of network applications. While re-imagining the space with blockchain, we highlight various common challenges, pitfalls, and shortcomings that can occur. Our aim is to make this work as a guiding reference manual for someone interested in shifting towards a blockchain-based solution for one's existing use case or automating one from the ground up.
Krishnendu Chatterjee, Amir Kafshdar Goharshady, Arash Pourdamghani
In today's programmable blockchains, smart contracts are limited to being deterministic and non-probabilistic. This lack of randomness is a consequential limitation, given that a wide variety of real-world financial contracts, such as casino games and lotteries, depend entirely on randomness. As a result, several ad-hoc random number generation approaches have been developed to be used in smart contracts. These include ideas such as using an oracle or relying on the block hash. However, these approaches are manipulatable, i.e. their output can be tampered with by parties who might not be neutral, such as the owner of the oracle or the miners. We propose a novel game-theoretic approach for generating provably unmanipulatable pseudorandom numbers on the blockchain. Our approach allows smart contracts to access a trustworthy source of randomness that does not rely on potentially compromised miners or oracles, hence enabling the creation of a new generation of smart contracts that are not limited to being non-probabilistic and can be drawn from the much more general class of probabilistic programs.
Open access
3 source records
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Cryptography and Data Security
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
Mining pools, the main components of the Bitcoin network, dominate the computing resources and play essential roles in network security and performance aspects. Although many existing measurements of the Bitcoin network are available, little is known about the details of mining pool behaviors (e.g., empty blocks, mining revenue and transaction collection strategies) and their effects on the Bitcoin end users (e.g., transaction fees, transaction delay and transaction acceptance rate). This paper aims to fill this gap with a systematic study of mining pools. We traced over 1.56 hundred thousand blocks (including about 257 million historical transactions) from February 2016 to January 2019 and collected over 120.25 million unconfirmed transactions from March 2018 to January 2019. Then we conducted a board range of measurements on the pool evolutions, labeled transactions (blocks) as well as real-time network traffics, and discovered new interesting observations and features. Specifically, our measurements show the following. 1) A few mining pools entities continuously control most of the computing resources of the Bitcoin network. 2) Mining pools are caught in a prisoner's dilemma where mining pools compete to increase their computing resources even though the unit profit of the computing resource decreases. 3) Mining pools are stuck in a Malthusian trap where there is a stage at which the Bitcoin incentives are inadequate for feeding the exponential growth of the computing resources. 4) The market price and transaction fees are not sensitive to the event of halving block rewards. 5) The block interval of empty blocks is significantly lower than the block interval of non-empty blocks. 6) Feerate plays a dominating role in transaction collection strategy for the top mining pools. Our measurements and analysis help to understand and improve the Bitcoin network.
Open access
3 source records
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Data Stream Mining Techniques
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
Although Bitcoin in its original whitepaper stated that it offers anonymous transactions, de-anonymization techniques have found otherwise. Therefore, alternative cryptocurrencies, like Dash, Monero, and Zcash, were developed to provide better privacy. As Edward Snowden stated, "Zcash's privacy tech makes it the most interesting Bitcoin alternative (...) because the privacy properties of it are truly unique". Zcash's privacy is based on peer-reviewed cryptographic constructions, hence it is considered to provide the foundations for the best anonymity. However, even Zcash makes some privacy concessions. It does not protect users' privacy in the presence of a global adversary who is able to observe the whole network, and hence correlate the parties exchanging money, by using their network addresses. The recent empirical analysis of Zcash shows, that users often choose naive ways while performing the protocol operations, not realizing that it degrades their anonymity. In this talk, we will discuss an extension of Zcash using mix networks to enhance the privacy guarantees of users that choose to remain anonymous by tackling two major security challenges: one at the application layer of the scheme and one at its network layer.
Smart grid is a large complex network with a myriad of vulnerabilities, usually operated in adversarial settings and regulated based on estimated system states. In this study, we propose a novel highly secure distributed dynamic state estimation mechanism for wide-area (multi-area) smart grids, composed of geographically separated subregions, each supervised by a local control center. We firstly propose a distributed state estimator assuming regular system operation, that achieves near-optimal performance based on the local Kalman filters and with the exchange of necessary information between local centers. To enhance the security, we further propose to (i) protect the network database and the network communication channels against attacks and data manipulations via a blockchain (BC)-based system design, where the BC operates on the peer-to-peer network of local centers, (ii) locally detect the measurement anomalies in real-time to eliminate their effects on the state estimation process, and (iii) detect misbehaving (hacked/faulty) local centers in real-time via a distributed trust management scheme over the network. We provide theoretical guarantees regarding the false alarm rates of the proposed detection schemes, where the false alarms can be easily controlled. Numerical studies illustrate that the proposed mechanism offers reliable state estimation under regular system operation, timely and accurate detection of anomalies, and good state recovery performance in case of anomalies.
We define and examine the shutdown problem for blockchain systems: how to gracefully end the system's operation at the end of its useful life. A particular focus is those blockchain systems that hold archival data of long-lived interest. We outline what it means to achieve a successful shutdown, and compare those criteria to likely end-of-life conditions in a generic blockchain system. We conclude that the decentralized nature of blockchain systems makes shutdown difficult, particularly if the system uses an unstable consensus like the Nakamoto consensus of Bitcoin. Accordingly, we recommend against using blockchain with unstable consensus for any data whose value is likely to persist beyond the life of the blockchain system. For any such systems that are already in operation, we recommend considering a hard fork to implement stable consensus. Such consideration needs to happen well in advance of the system's end of life.
With the rapid growth of renewable energy resources, energy trading has been shifting from the centralized manner to distributed manner. Blockchain, as a distributed public ledger technology, has been widely adopted in the design of new energy trading schemes. However, there are many challenging issues in blockchain-based energy trading, e.g., low efficiency, high transaction cost, and security and privacy issues. To tackle these challenges, many solutions have been proposed. In this survey, the blockchain-based energy trading in the electrical power system is thoroughly investigated. Firstly, the challenges in blockchain-based energy trading are identified and summarized. Then, the existing energy trading schemes are studied and classified into three categories based on their main focuses: energy transaction, consensus mechanism, and system optimization. Blockchain-based energy trading has been a popular research topic, new blockchain architectures, models and products are continually emerging to overcome the limitations of existing solutions, forming a virtuous circle. The internal combination of different blockchain types and the combination of blockchain with other technologies improve the blockchain-based energy trading system to better satisfy the practical requirements of modern power systems. However, there are still some problems to be solved, for example, the lack of regulatory system, environmental challenges and so on. In the future, we will strive for a better optimized structure and establish a comprehensive security assessment model for blockchain-based energy trading system.
Christof Ferreira Torres, Mathis Steichen, Radu State
Modern blockchains, such as Ethereum, enable the execution of so-called smart contracts - programs that are executed across a decentralised network of nodes. As smart contracts become more popular and carry more value, they become more of an interesting target for attackers. In the past few years, several smart contracts have been exploited by attackers. However, a new trend towards a more proactive approach seems to be on the rise, where attackers do not search for vulnerable contracts anymore. Instead, they try to lure their victims into traps by deploying seemingly vulnerable contracts that contain hidden traps. This new type of contracts is commonly referred to as honeypots. In this paper, we present the first systematic analysis of honeypot smart contracts, by investigating their prevalence, behaviour and impact on the Ethereum blockchain. We develop a taxonomy of honeypot techniques and use this to build HoneyBadger - a tool that employs symbolic execution and well defined heuristics to expose honeypots. We perform a large-scale analysis on more than 2 million smart contracts and show that our tool not only achieves high precision, but is also highly efficient. We identify 690 honeypot smart contracts as well as 240 victims in the wild, with an accumulated profit of more than $90,000 for the honeypot creators. Our manual validation shows that 87% of the reported contracts are indeed honeypots.
In recent years, we have seen a great deal of both academic and practical interest in the topic of vulnerabilities in smart contracts, particularly those developed for the Ethereum blockchain. While most of the work has focused on detecting *vulnerable* contracts, in this paper, we focus on finding how many of these vulnerable contracts have actually been *exploited*. We survey the 23,327 vulnerable contracts reported by six recent academic projects and find that, despite the amounts at stake, only 1.98% of them have been exploited since deployment. This corresponds to at most 8,487 ETH (~1.7 million USD), or only 0.27% of the 3 million ETH (600 million USD) at stake. We explain these results by demonstrating that the funds are very concentrated in a small number of contracts which are *not exploitable* in practice.
The rise of smart contract systems such as Ethereum has resulted in a proliferation of blockchain-based decentralized applications including applications that store and manage a wide range of data. Current smart contracts are designed to be executed solely by miners and are revealed entirely on-chain, resulting in reduced scalability and privacy. In this paper, we discuss that scalability and privacy of smart contracts can be enhanced by splitting a given contract into an off-chain contract and an on-chain contract. Specifically, functions of the contract that involve high-cost computation or sensitive information can be split and included as the off-chain contract, that is signed and executed by only the interested participants. The proposed approach allows the participants to reach unanimous agreement off-chain when all of them are honest, allowing computing resources of miners to be saved and content of the off-chain contract to be hidden from the public. In case of a dispute caused by any dishonest participants, a signed copy of the off-chain contract can be revealed so that a verified instance can be created to make miners enforce the true execution result. Thus, honest participants have the ability to redress and penalize any fraudulent or dishonest behavior, which incentivizes all participants to honestly follow the agreed off-chain contract. We discuss techniques for splitting a contract into a pair of on/off-chain contracts and propose a mechanism to address the challenges of handling dishonest participants in the system. Our implementation and evaluation of the proposed approach using an example smart contract demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach in Ethereum.
Open access
3 source records
Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Cryptography and Data Security
Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
Smart contracts are programs running on top of blockchain platforms. They interact with each other through well-defined interfaces to perform financial transactions in a distributed system with no trusted third parties. But these interfaces also provide a favorable setting for attackers, who can exploit security vulnerabilities in smart contracts to achieve financial gain. This paper presents SmartScopy, a system for automatic synthesis of adversarial contracts that identify and exploit vulnerabilities in a victim smart contract. Our tool explores the space of \emph{attack programs} based on the Application Binary Interface (ABI) specification of a victim smart contract in the Ethereum ecosystem. To make the synthesis tractable, we introduce \emph{summary-based symbolic evaluation}, which significantly reduces the number of instructions that our synthesizer needs to evaluate symbolically, without compromising the precision of the vulnerability query. Building on the summary-based symbolic evaluation, SmartScopy further introduces a novel approach for partitioning the synthesis search space for parallel exploration, as well as a lightweight deduction technique that can prune infeasible candidates earlier. We encoded common vulnerabilities of smart contracts in our query language, and evaluated SmartScopy on the entire data set from etherscan with $>$25K smart contracts. Our experiments demonstrate the benefits of summary-based symbolic evaluation and show that SmartScopy outperforms two state-of-the-art smart contracts analyzers, Oyente and Contractfuzz, in terms of running time, precision, and soundness. Furthermore, running on recent popular smart contracts, SmartScopy uncovers 20 vulnerable smart contracts that contain the recent BatchOverflow vulnerability and cannot be precisely detected by existing tools.
We put forward the idea that classical blockchains and smart contracts are potentially useful primitives not only for classical cryptography, but for quantum cryptography as well. Abstractly, a smart contract is a functionality that allows parties to deposit funds, and release them upon fulfillment of algorithmically checkable conditions, and can thus be employed as a formal tool to enforce monetary incentives. In this work, we give the first example of the use of smart contracts in a quantum setting. We describe a simple hybrid classical-quantum payment system whose main ingredients are a classical blockchain capable of handling stateful smart contracts, and quantum lightning, a strengthening of public-key quantum money introduced by Zhandry [Eurocrypt 2019]. Our hybrid payment system uses quantum states as banknotes and a classical blockchain to settle disputes and to keep track of the valid serial numbers. It has several desirable properties: it is decentralized, requiring no trust in any single entity; payments are as quick as quantum communication, regardless of the total number of users; when a quantum banknote is damaged or lost, the rightful owner can recover the lost value.
Shayan Eskandari, Seyedehmahsa Moosavi, Jeremy Clark
We consider front-running to be a course of action where an entity benefits from prior access to privileged market information about upcoming transactions and trades. Front-running has been an issue in financial instrument markets since the 1970s. With the advent of the blockchain technology, front-running has resurfaced in new forms we explore here, instigated by blockchains decentralized and transparent nature. In this paper, we draw from a scattered body of knowledge and instances of front-running across the top 25 most active decentral applications (DApps) deployed on Ethereum blockchain. Additionally, we carry out a detailed analysis of Status.im initial coin offering (ICO) and show evidence of abnormal miners behavior indicative of front-running token purchases. Finally, we map the proposed solutions to front-running into useful categories.
A decentralized application (dapp for short) refers to an application that is executed by multiple users over a decentralized network. In recent years, the number of dapp keeps fast growing, mainly due to the popularity of blockchain technology. Despite the increasing importance of dapps as a typical application type that is assumed to promote the adoption of blockchain, little is known on what, how, and how well dapps are used in practice. In addition, the insightful knowledge of whether and how a traditional application can be transformed to a dapp is yet missing. To bridge the knowledge gap, this paper presents a comprehensive empirical study on an extensive dataset of 734 dapps that are collected from three popular open dapp marketplaces, i.e., ethereum, state of the dapp, and DAppRadar. We analyze the popularity of dapps, and summarize the patterns of how smart contracts are organized in a dapp. Based on the findings, we draw some implications to help dapp developers and users better understand and deploy dapps.
Sabah Suhail, Rasheed Hussain, Abid Khan, Choong Seon Hong
"Trustworthy data" is the fuel for ensuring transparent traceability, precise decision-making, and cogent coordination in the supply chain (SC) space. However, the disparate data silos act as a trade barrier in orchestrating the provenance of product story starting from the transformation of raw materials into the circuit board to the assembling of electronic components into end products available on the store shelf for customers. Therefore, to bridge the fragmented siloed information across global supply chain partners, the diffusion of blockchain (BC) as one of the advanced distributed ledger technology (DLT) takeover the on-premise legacy systems. Nevertheless, the challenging constraints of blockchain including scalability, accessing off-line data, fee-less microtransactions and many more lead to the third wave of blockchain called IOTA. In this paper, we propose a framework for supporting provenance in the electronic supply chain (ECS) by using permissioned IOTA ledger. Realizing the crucial requirement of trustworthy data, we use Masked Authenticated Messaging (MAM) channel provided by IOTA that allows the SC players to procure distributed information while keeping confidential trade flows, tamper-proof data, and fine-grained accessibility rights. To identify operational disruption, we devise a transparent product ledger through transaction data and consignment information to keep track of the complete product journey at each intermediary step during SC processes. Furthermore, we evaluate the secure provenance data construction time for varying payload size.